

ENACTMENT

SELF

FIELD
CONCEPTS

TRANSFERENCE

IPA

INTER-REGIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS

OBJECT
RELATIONS
THEORIES

REGRESSION

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

CONTAINMENT

AMAE

FREE
ASSOCIATION

PROJECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION

DRIVES

INTERSUBJECTIVITY



NACHTRÄGLICHKEIT

IPA INTER-REGIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

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AMAE

Tri-Regional Entry

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Elias M. da Rocha Barros (Latin America) and Arne Jemstedt (Europe)**

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I. INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

Amae is a Japanese word in common daily usage. It is a noun form of *amaeru*, a verb. Both derive from an adjective, *amai*, which means “sweet taste.” *Amaeru* is a combination of a verb, *eru*, which means “get” or “obtain” and *amai*. Thus, the original meaning of *amaeru* is literally to obtain sweetness. In common usage, *amaeru* refers to behaving in a childlike, dependent fashion to elicit indulgence, to obtain what is desired: be it affection, physical closeness, emotional or actual support, or granting of a request. It is a behavior of an appeal to be indulged, and presumes a degree of familial or intimate closeness. Typically, an infant or child might engage a maternal figure or caretaker in a sweetly dependent manner to get his/her wishes granted.

Amae and *amaeru* behaviors are seen outside of the familial environment and beyond childhood in Japanese interpersonal interactions. This might occur in close personal friendships, the intimacy of a couple relationship, the extended family, or within cohesive small groups such as classmates or teammates. It is also seen in relationships where power or status differentials exist such as teacher/student, boss/subordinate, or senior/junior colleagues. Depending on the interpersonal circumstances, the *amae* phenomenon is widely accepted as a signifier of the strength and soundness of a relationship on the one hand, but on the other hand, it can be perceived negatively as an indication of the person’s immaturity, self-indulgence, sense of entitlement, or lack of social awareness and common sense.

In the North American Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, Salman Akhtar (2009) defines *Amae* as a “Japanese term, which denotes an intermittent, recurring, culturally patterned interaction, in which the ordinary rules of propriety and formality are suspended, allowing people to receive and give affectionate ego support to each other” (p. 12). This definition builds on Takeo Doi’s (1971/73) definition of the term, which is further expanded on within the ego psychological terminology by Daniel Freeman (1998), to be an “interactive mutual regression in the service of the ego, which gratifies and serves the progressive intrapsychic growth and development of both participants” (Freeman, 1998, p.47). The editors of the Japanese Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (Okonogi, K, Kitayama, O, Ushijima, S, Kano, R, Kinugasa et al., 2002) also build on Doi’s definition and point to the complexities of preverbally rooted emotional dependence contained in the dynamic underpinnings of *amae*.

No known dictionary or glossary in any of the IPA languages in Europe and Latin America carries *amae* and the term has remained largely unknown until now to the wider psychoanalytic public. This entry builds and expands on all the above sources.

II. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

As a psychological phenomenon, the concept of *amae* was introduced and emphasized by Takeo Doi in his 1971 publication “The Anatomy of Dependence,” which was translated in 1973 for Western audiences. He described a variety of *amae* behaviors in Japanese social and clinical interactions, and advanced the idea of the essential importance of the concept of *amae* in understanding Japanese psychology. He translated *amae* as ‘dependence or emotional dependence’ (1973) and defined *amaeru* to mean, ‘to depend and presume upon another’s benevolence’ (1973). He considers it to indicate ‘helplessness and the desire to be loved’ and the expression of the ‘need to be loved,’ and sees it as equivalent to dependency needs. He sees its prototype in the psychology of the infant in relationship to the mother, not a newborn infant, but the infant who has already realized that its mother exists independently of itself (Doi, 1973). In his later publication, Doi (1989) extends the dynamic formulation of *amae*:

“Another important thing about the concept of *amae* is that though it primarily indicates a content state of mind when one's need for love is reciprocated by another's love, it may also refer to that very need for love because one cannot always count on another's love, much as one would wish to do so. Hence it follows that the state of frustration in *amae*, the various phases of which can be described by a number of Japanese words, may also be referred to as *amae* and in fact it often is so called, since obviously *amae* is more keenly felt as a desire in frustration than in fulfillment. It is related to this usage that we can talk of two kinds of *amae*, a primitive one which is sure of a willing recipient and a convoluted one which is not sure if there is such a recipient. The former kind is childlike, innocent and restful: the latter is childish, willful and demanding: to put it simply, good and bad *amae*, so to speak...” (Doi, 1989, p. 349).

Doi’s assertion that *amae*, i.e. emotional dependency, distinguishes Japanese psychology in essential and unique ways was met by both enthusiastic acceptance and skeptical criticism. It spawned debates such as: In what specific way should Japanese psychology be seen? Does Doi propose that the Japanese character is essentially dependent? How does the concept of *amae* relate to existing psychological and psychoanalytic theories and practices? How does *amae* relate to the understanding of universal human development? How does the concept of *amae* contribute to specific new developments in the theory and practice of psychoanalytic understanding?

III. SOCIO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES

Erik Erikson (1950) described how varied and specific societal and cultural influences result in different modes of adaptation during the process of human psychological growth and development. He expanded on Freud's biologically based psychosexual developmental stages to include psychosocial stages of human development beyond oedipal resolution, extending them over the life cycle. Doi's concept of *amae* and its significance in understanding the specific nature of Japanese psychology can also be appraised in this context.

Many social scientists and cross-cultural observers have noted the particularity of Japanese society and Japanese psychological adaptations. Doi's concept of *amae* adds another dimension to this discourse. A few important characteristics noted as specific to Japanese society and culture include:

1. Hierarchically organized social relationships;
2. Group orientation over individual distinction;
3. Separation of private and public, inner and outside relationships in thoughts, feelings and conduct;
4. Emphasis on shame (generated by outside judgment) and guilt (expression of internal judgment);
5. Avoidance of conflict and the value of harmony;
6. Indulgent, responsive and permissive parental style during infancy and early childhood, followed by increasingly stringent social role assignment and behavioral control in later years.

Widely recognized and keenly observed by cultural anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict (1946) and the historian Edwin O. Reischauer (1977), and articulated further by Chie Nakane, the best-known Japanese anthropologist outside Japan (1970), the vertical hierarchical nature of most Japanese relationships is omnipresent. Related to and intertwined with it, the characteristics cited above are the cultural and psychological echo of four centuries of a feudal system of rigid political and socio-economic class stratification. Modernization with the influence of the West started in the late 19th Century and accelerated after World War II with the new democratic government institutions and many societal changes in political, economic and technological public life. However, traditional cultural values and characteristics endure in contemporary Japanese life as psychological undercurrents. Reischauer (1977) notes the Japanese adaptive capacity for change and recognizes much human commonality between the East and the West. Dean C. Barnlund (1975), in his comparative cultural analysis of U.S. and Japanese adhesiveness of core cultural values transmitted as normative in a society, refers to *amae* as a representative of the "cultural unconscious."

Crucial in understanding *amae* from this perspective is the child-rearing practice that provides constant physical closeness, indulgence, responsiveness, keenly empathetic maternal care, and the availability of other caregivers around the child. Because of the limited space of island life, the propinquity of other people and the necessity to live side by side is a condition of life in Japan. Not only the extended family, but also neighbors and the surrounding community are introduced to a child very early on. Any adult in the vicinity is called *oji-san*, uncle, or *oba-san*, aunt, and older children are referred to *onei-san*, elder sister, or *onii-san*, elder brother. They constitute potential caregivers in a child's life, promoting a sense of safety in belonging to the group. Alan Roland (1991) strongly contrasted the concept of the "familial self" predominant in the Japanese psyche, which is rooted in the subtle emotional hierarchical relationships of the family and group, with the Western "individualized self." Reischauer (1977) observes that the Japanese are not quite as attached to the family as such but more to surrounding groups. This might suggest a "group self" in the sense that a child very early on identifies and internalizes his place in a group.

Illustrative of this dynamic is a Japanese traditional ritual celebration called *Hichi-Go-San*. Children of the ages 2 to 3, 4 to 5, and 6 to 7 are celebrated in traditional costumes and taken to the local shrine in the local community. They are given sweets and toys as gifts in a collective celebration of a passage of childhood.

IV. PSYCHOANALYTIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT AMAE

As noted earlier, while in many ways accurate and insightful in demonstrating the particular phenomenon of *amae* in Japanese people and clinical interactions, Doi's first definition of the concept of *amae* (1973) as a "dependency need in helplessness" and "desire to be loved" triggered a number of theoretical and clinical debates. Developmentally, *amae* precedes a child's acquisition of language. For example, the Japanese say of an infant who actively expresses his/her desires for mother: "This child is already so emotionally dependent (*amaeru*)". When the infant continues to experience the desire for his mother's presence, this emotional configuration becomes positioned at the core of his/her emotional life consciously and unconsciously. This can be compared to what Freud stated about the concept of "sexuality," exclusive to psychoanalysis. "We use the word *sexualität* ['sexuality'] in the same comprehensive sense as that in which the German language uses the word *lieben* ['to love']" (Freud, 1910). In this sense, the Japanese think of the Oedipus complex where love and sex are intertwined even though there are no words that correspond to *lieben* or love in the Japanese language. Analogically, it can be understood that "*amae*" has formed the main stream of emotional life throughout our lives before the Oedipus complex, even in a world outside of Japan, where the word "*amae*" does not yet exist. While *amae* is a verbal concept like love, however, unlike love, it is characterized by the fact that it does not contain "sexuality" by itself. Additionally, there are indications that the elements of *amae* are contained in various psychic

states underlined by ambivalence. If that is the case, it may be useful to compare *amae* to various known psychoanalytic concepts.

Freud stated that there were two currents of love: the affectionate current and the sensual one. “The affectionate current is the older of the two. It springs from the earliest years of childhood; it is formed on the basis of the interests of the self-preservative instinct and is directed to the members of the family and those who look after the child...” (Freud, 1912, p. 180). This corresponds to the self-preservative, instinctual underpinnings of *amae*. The affectionate current stemming from it was later absorbed into the concept of narcissism (Freud, 1914). Here Freud wrote that although primary narcissism cannot be confirmed by direct observation, it can be gleaned from “the attitude of affectionate parents towards children [...] that it is a revival and reproduction of their own narcissism, which they have long since abandoned” (Freud, 1914, pp. 90, 91). While Freud (1930) later abolished his conception of the self-preservative instinct and reached the conclusion that affection was a manifestation of Eros (sexual drive) whose original aim is repressed, Doi proposed that *amae* corresponded to the self-preservative instinct according to Freud’s early theory of instinct and defined *amae* as instinctually derived dependency need.

In addition, Freud (1921) saw identification as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person, which is ambivalent from the very first. So defined, Freud’s identification may correspond to *amae*’s underlying identificatory and ambivalent properties.

Elaborating on the concept further within the object relational matrix, Doi (1989, p.350) reiterated that *amae* is object-relational from the beginning. While it may not quite correspond to Freud’s concept of primary narcissism, it “fits very well with whatever state of mind may be called narcissistic” (ibid, p.350). In this sense, *amae*’s narcissistic properties underlie “convoluted” *amae* which expresses itself by being childish, willful and demanding. “In the same vein”, Doi (1989) writes (1989), “a new concept of self-object defined by Kohut as ‘those archaic objects cathected with narcissistic libido’ (1971, p. 3) will be much easier to comprehend in the light of *amae* psychology, since ‘the narcissistic libido’ is none other than convoluted *amae*” (Doi, 1989, p. 351). In this vein, Japanese analysts see Kohut’s concept of ‘self-object needs’ (Kohut, 1971) as nearly equivalent to *amae*. Also, Balint’s observation that “in the final phase of the treatment patients begin to give expression to long-forgotten, infantile, instinctual wishes, and to demand their gratification from their environment” (Balint, 1936/1965, p.181) may be relevant, because “the primitive *amae* will manifest itself only after narcissistic defenses are worked through by analysis” (Doi, 1989; p. 350).

Building on both Freud and Ferenczi, Balint’s (1936/1965) ideas about ‘passive object love’ and primary love are conceptually closest to “*amae*.” He reflected that Indo-European languages do not clearly distinguish between the two kinds of object-love, active and passive. While the aim is always primarily passive (to be loved), if there is enough love and acceptance of the child coming from the environment to mitigate frustrations, the child may progress into the active ‘giving love’ in order to receive it (configuration of ‘active object love’). In clinical terms, there is a link between primitive *amae* and Balint’s term ‘benign regression’ and between convoluted *amae* and his term ‘malignant regression’.

Although Fairbairn (1952) valued the fact of dependence in early development in general, he did not adopt the idea of dependency needs within his object relations system. Klein's concepts of envy (*higami*/jaundice) and projective identification (1957) can be seen as a distorted *amae*, while sharing the same object with it. Many Japanese analysts see Bion (1961) as having 'predicted' Doi's *amae*, within the context of group dynamics, when he postulated a feeling of security as existing in each of the emotional states associated with the three basic-assumption group fantasies: dependence, fight-flight, and pairing. Likewise, Bion's concepts of "container" and "contained," as well as Winnicott's 'holding', Hartmann's 'good fit', and Stern's 'inter-affectivity' reflect underlying conceptual similarity with *amae*, while reflecting from different perspectives on the infant's pre-adapted dependency on the parent, clinically relevant for the transference-countertransference inter-subjective matrix within the psychoanalytic process.

V. ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES

From a developmental dynamic perspective, it is important to highlight that Doi (1971) sees the origin of *amae* to lie in the infant's relationship to its mother, not as a newborn but when it realizes its independent existence and sees the mother as the indispensable source for gratification. This suggests that *amae* arises in a developmental stage when the differentiation of ego, such as cognition, judgment and identification are already in place and object constancy exists. It implies that Mahler's (1975) separation-individuation phase of development is in progress, after the symbiotic phase and practicing sub-phase have been successfully negotiated. The mother exists as a separate being and her benevolent indulgent delight in the child has been internalized.

If this is the case, the psychic structure of superego, too, is in the process of emerging. Prevailing Japanese child-rearing practices seem to support this view. Abundant maternal attention with non-verbal empathic responsiveness and physical as well as emotional closeness all are available for satisfactory passage through the symbiotic phase and separation-individuation phase of the child's development. Advances in infant research (Stern, 1985) as well as Self Psychology, in recent years, endorse this parental approach to promote growth leading to the secure sense of self.

In Gertrude and Rubin Blanck's (1994) schematic summary of development we might see *amae* as arising in the process of neutralization of the aggressive drive while it serves separation-individuation in active progress. Beginning with toilet training and the capacity to control bodily functions and phallically assertive individual expressions, a moderation of aggressive drive by superego development will ensue. Contrary to this typical Western scenario, Reischauer (1977) observes that toilet training and behavioral discipline of Japanese children are carried out with continued constant gentle attention and care by examples,

encouragement and reminders. These methods promote the child's identification with caregivers in moderating aggressive drive and renouncing individual needs in favor of adapting to external expectations, thus arriving by a different path to superego formation. Nonetheless, increasingly complex and frequently restrictive external rules, roles, demands for harmony, obedience, etc., are difficult cultural values to be accommodated to, causing considerable stress on the still fragile individual psyche. Shame by outside judgment and the threat of withdrawal of a loving connection might be utilized to prompt compliance to superego demands in renouncing the child's individual needs.

In these conflicted negotiations of superego and id demands, regression might take place to the rapprochement stage of development where the child seeks temporary reassurance of symbiotic maternal comfort before again moving forward on an individual, separate path. Both Akhtar (2009) and Freeman (1998) describe the emotional refueling aspect of the function of *amae*. Freeman's observation of *amae* as temporary, intermittent yearning and his emphasis on the reciprocal mutual benefit of the *amae* interaction support this hypothesis. Extending his observation of the mutuality of the *amae* interaction, it should also be understood that *amae* can be initiated by the "dependent" party primarily for the benefit of the other party. For example, the *amae* recipient might consciously or unconsciously sense an anxious mother's need to be reassured by the child because the child's need for separation may be perceived by her as a rejection; *amae* can also meet the need of an insecure boss to feel power over an ingratiating subordinate, or an aging parent's need to experience his/her value to a capable grown child. For that matter, sometimes 'amicable' *amae* behavior might camouflage a challenging aggressive demand couched in an appropriately dependent manner, which would correspond to Doi's (1989) reference to 'negative/convoluted *amae*.'

While Doi's original definition of *amae* (1971, 1973) as "helpless desire to be loved" stresses the aspect of passivity, this passive dimension appears to have its own complexity. Just as Doi (1971, 1973, 1989), Balint (1935/1965; 1968) sees *amae* as a primary biologically underpinned striving/primary need and wish for love, and Bethelard and Young-Bruehl (1998) consider Doi's *amae* as the expectation to be indulgently loved, which they call cherishment, based instinctually and arising at birth. They, just as Doi before them, propose a reconsideration of the self-preservation ego-instinctual hypothesis, with respect to *amae*. In view of more recent infant research that indicates greater infant capacity for active engagement, the 'passive-active' spectrum, pertaining to *amae*, may need further study. In the context of *amae*, this activity observed behaviorally, for instance in the attachment studies of Bowlby (1971), reflects an internal experience, with attachment as its behavioral manifestation (Doi, 1989). We could hypothesize, that psychoanalytically *amae* presents a layered concept, which depicts an active instinctual/affective striving to receive love passively, to be indulged.

An alternative to Doi's defining *amae* as "desire-drive" (1971) would be to reformulate the definition of *amae* as a specific form of defense, particularly prevalent in Japanese psychology, though it certainly exists elsewhere, East or West. We might then see *amae* as the ego's defensive operation, an "appeal for indulgence-allowance," mediating demands of the superego and demands of the id, or individual desires wherever they might be located in the

life cycle of development. This form of ego defense is perhaps needed for adaptation to a strict society, which demands inflexible superego conformity. The hierarchical relational order and group orientation, with strict observance of rules, of roles, and conduct, where private thoughts and emotions are to be kept secret, and where conflicts are resolved by shame, all seem to be a way to deal with a superego formation that originated in feudal society. In order to function with these rigid or exacting superego demands, *amae* relies on non-verbal emotional communication and responses with empathy, and for “sweet” understanding for “allowance” - “indulgence” - as a necessary defense against his/her aggressive drive or the anxiety over the potential loss of the object. The Ego’s mediation of *amae* makes room for a person’s private emotional life and allows some avenues for expression of individual human drives, be they libidinal or aggressive. *Amae* is rooted in identification with pre-verbal experiences of an indulgent caretaker with the capacity to sense the child’s emotional needs and desires to which she responds with empathy, analogical perhaps to Winnicott’s (1965) concept of ‘primary maternal preoccupation’, characterizing ‘the ordinary devoted mother’. In this context, Winnicott’s differentiation between the environment-mother providing ego-relatedness (holding, tenderness, empathy) and the object-mother towards whom id-impulses/drives are directed, may represent later rendition, from the object relations point of view, of Freud’s early division between affectionate and sensual currents of love.

Amae and *amaeru* behavioral communications can be marshaled in a variety of defensive operations such as repression, regression and partial regression, undoing, reaction formation, a ‘mutual secret,’ or even as a pathway to sublimation.

Within this defense-adaptation formulation, too, the notion of ‘mutuality’ is developmentally, relationally, and transferentially implied in *amae*: Hartmann’s (1958) concept of an infant and mother fitting together, Winnicott’s (1965) idea of the ‘holding environment’, as well as Bion’s (1962) concept of ‘container/contained,’ Kohut’s ‘self-object’ (1971) and Stern’s (1985) ‘inter-affectivity’ might be applicable. *Amae* behaviors can be operative throughout the life cycle whenever the individual’s desires and needs are in collision with cultural-superego restrictions.

VI. CONCLUSION

It follows from the above that *amae* behaviors and attitudes cannot be seen just as an expression of simple dependency needs. It is advantageous to see it within complex contextual permutations of both drive/desire as well as defense configuration. This complex view is especially applicable to transference interactions. The appearance of *amae* in the clinical dyad may indicate the positive transference of increased trust and honesty with the clinician, which could serve the working alliance. Doi (1989) assumes, in fact, that no matter what conscious motive induces the patient to seek psychoanalytic treatment, the underlying unconscious

motive is that of *amae* and that ultimately, in time, this becomes the kernel of the transference. Yet clinicians need to be aware of the hierarchical nature of transference inherent especially in the Japanese clinical situation (or, for that matter, in any psychoanalytic setting), and be sensitive and in tune with non-verbal or indirect communication of both ‘positive’ as well as ‘negative’ *amae*, if these are conceptualized as primary needs, instinctual strivings, defense processes, or a complex developmental-dynamic configuration of all the above. Similarly, Japanese patients’ group orientation cannot simply be understood as a lack of boundaries or individuation, as it might appear simplistically in Western culture.

Though we owe the discovery of the concept of *amae* to the specific Japanese context, it can be discerned in varying degrees across cultures. Within a group psychological context, it relates in complex ways to a separate individual’s need to live in, and belong to a given group setting. Developmentally and clinically, while the echoes of early maternal refueling, containing, and holding can be discerned in it, the internal interactive dynamic of *amae* extends over the entire life span of the individual (Doi, 1989; Freeman, 1998).

Doi’s seminal contribution on *amae* needs to be appreciated as a regionally specific developmental and clinical Japanese concept with a global reach, enriching theoretical fluency and clinical sensibility across the borders of geography, psychoanalytic culture, and individual conditions.

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CONFLICT

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“... It is from this pair of opposites that our mental life springs”

(Freud, Letter to W.Fliess of February 19, 1899; in Freud, S. 1886-1899, p. 278.).

I. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Freud inaugurated psychoanalysis on the foundation of psychic conflict – the functioning of the human mind, reflective of the interaction of opposing forces and tendencies. Psychoanalysis places special emphasis on the effects of unconscious conflicts defined as interactions in the mind among forces of which the individual is unaware. In a conflict, opposed wishes, feelings, needs, interests, ideas and values are confronted with each other. In psychoanalytic theory, psychic conflict is central to the dynamics of the human mind and is, in the classical view, fuelled by instinctual [drive] energy and mediated by affectively cathected fantasies. All mental processes are based on the interaction of conflicting psychic forces, which in turn are in complex interaction with external stimuli.

The primary subjects of psychoanalysis are unconscious latent aspects of psychic conflict, which are ultimately founded in repressed infantile wishes. These unconscious contents resurface in distorted forms such as in dreams, parapraxes, symptoms and in the form of cultural manifestations.

For Freud, the core conflict of psychoanalysis is the Oedipal conflict. This dispute – situated between infantile desire and prohibition – is constitutive for the dynamics of psychic life and its manifestations. In addition to its dynamic qualities, conflict also has several metapsychological components: Topographic (conscious, preconscious, unconscious), economic (sensory overstimulation, reality and the pleasure principle), genetic (depending on the development of ego-functions) and structural (conflicts between ego, super-ego and id). Furthermore, the Oedipal conflict is set within the instinct/drive-dualism (sexual instinct / instinct of self-preservation, ego-libido / object-libido, life / death instinct).

Conceptualisations formulated by object-relations theorists expand the arena in which these conflicts unfold by focussing on the character of (internalized) self- and object-relations. Whether a conflict is accessible to conscious thought and thereby can potentially be processed realistically or, whether it must be repressed, depends on the strength of the instinctual [drive] forces involved, on the individual's mental coping capacities and on environmental conditions.

Extrapolating and expanding on contemporary North American, European and Latin American dictionaries and writings (Akhtar's 2009, Auchincloss and Samberg 2012; Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, Skelton 2006; Borensztein 2014), (unconscious) conflicts can be conceptualized according to the following binaries:

1. External vs. Internal/Intrapsychic conflicts: the former referring to conflicts between the individual and his environment, while the latter refer to those within his own psyche;

2. Externalized vs. Internalized conflicts: the former pertain to internal conflicts that have been transposed upon external reality, and the latter to the psychic problems caused by the incorporation of environmental constrictions opposing one's drives and desires;

3. Developmental conflicts vs. Anachronistic conflicts: the former refer to developmentally normative, phase specific, developmentally transformative conflicts caused by parental challenges to the child's wishes or by contradictory wishes of the child himself (Nagera, 1966), and the latter to conflicts that are not age-specific and may underlie psychopathology during adulthood; somewhat similarly, this binary is specified in Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) as Oedipal conflicts vs. Defense conflicts;

4. Inter-systemic vs. Intra-systemic conflicts: the former refers to the tension between id and ego or between ego and superego (Freud, 1923, 1926); the latter (Hartman, 1939; Freud, A. 1965; Laplanche 1973) refers to that between different instinctual tendencies (love-aggression), or different ego attributes or functions (activity-passivity), or different superego dictates (modesty-success);

5. Structural conflict vs. Object Relations conflict: the former refers to a stressful divergence of agenda between the three major psychic structures, namely id, ego, and superego (Freud, 1926) experienced as belonging fully to the individual's self, and the latter refers to a conflict in a psychic space that is antecedent to such structural differentiation (Dorpat, 1976; Kernberg, 1983, 2003); another formulation of this binary is Oedipal vs. Pre-Oedipal conflict;

6. Opposition type conflict vs. Dilemma of choice type conflict (Rangell, 1963); or, analogically Convergent vs. Divergent conflicts (Kris, A. 1984, 1985): the former refers to conflicts between intrapsychic forces that can be brought together by a compromise (formation), the latter, sometimes called 'either-or' conflicts, refer to those conflicts where such negotiations are unlikely and choosing one side of the pull, with the subsequent mourning or renouncing an alternative course, is imperative.

A wide range of psychoanalytic orientations worldwide, with complex differences and overlaps, place varying degrees of emphasis on conflict. On one end of this spectrum are Contemporary Freudian and Kleinian orientations, which continue to retain conflict as a core

concept in their formulation of psychic development and functioning. On the other side of the spectrum may be Kohut's Self Psychology perspectives, a developmental theory based on deficits and the attainment of psychic structure that presents a different paradigm altogether in which, aside from a brief mention of conflict between parent and child over differing self-object needs, the notion of conflict recedes into the background.

How one thinks about conflict is one of the defining factors of both, Freud's theoretical development as well as the development of psychoanalytic theories after Freud.

II. STAGES IN THEORY DEVELOPMENT: FREUD

Tracking the variations in how Freud conceptualized conflict defines several periods of his theoretical development. The unique way three different psychopathologies try to organize their conflicts is symptomatic. Hysterics convert the struggle between sexuality and society into physical symptoms creating a conflict between the mind and the body. Obsessional individuals displace the struggle between an idea and its affect into a seemingly innocuous obsession. Paranoid patients project their incompatible experiences into the outside world creating a conflict between the internal and external world. These unique ways of inadequately resolving psychic conflicts became gradually structured in stages of theory development.

II. A. Trauma and The Pre-Analytic Cathartic Period (1893 – 1899)

During this time, Freud speaks of conflicts between affects associated with traumatic events and the moral prohibitions of the society, designating internal-external, interpersonal conflict, where the notion of inner opposing forces is implied (Freud, 1893 - 1895). In 1899, comparing dreams and hysterical symptoms, Freud reminisces on his 1894 statement of conflict: "It is not only dreams that are wish fulfillment, but hysterical attacks as well...I recognized it long ago... Reality – wish-fulfillment. It is from this pair of opposites that our mental life springs" (Freud, 1899, p. 278). In his early work with hysterics Freud discovered that their sexual desires conflicted with societal norms and that the pathological resolution of this conflict was the symptom. Symptoms are generated as inadequate ways to resolve conflicts: "... patients ... had enjoyed good mental health up to the moment at which *an occurrence of incompatibility took place in their ideational life* ... until their ego was faced with an experience, an idea or a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect that the subject decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego by means of thought-activity..." (1894a, p. 47, original emphasis).

Inspired by Josef Breuer's experiences with Anna O. and Charcot's demonstrations of post-traumatic hysterical paralyses as well as the experimental production of hysterical paralyses and its reversal by hypnotic suggestion, Freud and Breuer assumed (Freud and Breuer 1895) that, in Conversion Hysteria, specific mental circumstances emerged, in which violent, traumatic affects unable to get abreacted were converted into physical symptoms. These symptoms found physical expression but they are not physical in origin, they only serve to - symbolically - express the event that triggered the development of hysteria. The path to remembering the initiating event had been cut off, dissociated from waking consciousness. Freud wrote: "In traumatic neuroses the operative cause of the illness is not the trifling physical injury but the affect of fright—the psychical trauma. In an analogous manner, our investigations reveal, for many, if not for most, hysterical symptoms, precipitating causes which can only be described as psychical traumas. Any experience which calls up distressing affects—such as those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain—may operate as a trauma of this kind" (Freud and Breuer 1895, pp.5-6).

Ideas and wishful impulses, which are conflicting with other values, if suppressed, can lead to symptoms. In 1894, Freud formulated an initial conflict model for the formation of conversion symptoms in hysteria, obsessional neuroses, and phobias, which he summed up under the term *neuro-psychoses of defence* (Freud 1894a,b). In contrast to conflict formation, in neuro-psychoses of defence, Freud understood the symptoms of actual neuroses including anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia (Freud 1894c; Freud 1898), not as an expression of a normally functioning mental process but as a direct result of a toxic libido transformation caused by inadequately discharged sexual energy. Furthermore, it became clear to him that the incompatible ideas of his female patients "arise chiefly on the soil of sexual experience and sensation" (Freud 1894a, p. 47). He additionally found that these ideas were connected to early childhood experiences and concluded that his patients must have suffered from sexual seduction by an adult (Freud 1896, p.203). Accordingly, hysterical symptoms are direct descendants of unconsciously operating memories of these experiences, which - retroactively - resurge and become fully effective when triggered by current events. He further pointed out that the pathogenic nature of these childhood events only existed as long as they remained unconscious (ibid, 211).

But then – in his famous letter to Wilhelm Fliess from September 21st in 1897 – he wrote: "I no longer believe in my neurotica [theory of the neuroses]" (Freud, 1897, p. 259). His "certain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect" led Freud to doubt his seduction-theory (ibid, p. 260). Due to the analysis of his own dreams, Freud formulated a crucial insight on October 15, 1897: "A single thought of general value has been revealed to me. I have found, in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood, even if not so early as in children who have been made hysterical. [...] Everyone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy and each recoils in horror from the dream fulfilment here transplanted into reality, with the whole quota of repression which separates his infantile state from his present one." (ibid, p. 265).

But, soon after, he again reported concussive cases of sexual violence and in a letter to Fliess he proclaimed (quoting Goethe's Mignon) "a new motto: What has been done to you, you poor child?" (Freud 1897, p. 289; Goethe 1795/96). Never completely abandoning trauma as etiological, he swayed back and forth, though despite all doubts in regards to the psychic consequences of remembered traumatic seduction, he did adhere to one idea from 1897 onwards, namely that his patient's "neurotic symptoms were not related directly to actual events but to wishful fantasies, and that, as far as the neurosis was concerned psychological reality was of more importance than material reality" (Freud 1925, p. 34). To him, the concept of trauma was now opposed to the idea of infantile, drive-driven wishful fantasies rooted in the "inner" world, conflictually settled between unconditional desire and prohibition. Here, the rational subject of enlightenment is meeting an ego, driven by unconscious wishes, responding to an environment on which he/she is extremely dependent at the beginning of life. The interface of this crucial dynamic is the Oedipal conflict caused by love and hate impulses towards our primary objects. In 1925 he remembered, "I had in fact stumbled for the first time upon the *Oedipus complex*, which was later to assume such an overwhelming importance, but which I did not recognize as yet in its disguise of fantasy" (Freud 1925, p. 34, original emphasis). The outcome of the conflictual Oedipal crises is constitutive for the dynamics of psychic life and its manifestations.

On the subject of *trauma vis-a-vis conflict*, Freud took different positions. For example, previously in his lectures he pointed out "that between the intensity and pathogenic importance of infantile and of later experiences a complementary relationship exists similar to the series we have already discussed. There are cases in which the whole weight of causation falls on the sexual experiences of childhood, cases in which those impressions exert a definitely traumatic effect and call for no other support than can be afforded them by an average sexual constitution and the fact of its incomplete development. Alongside of these cases there are others in which the whole accent lies on the later conflicts and the emphasis we find in the analysis laid on the impressions of childhood appears entirely as the work of regression. Thus we have extremes of 'developmental inhibition' and 'regression' and between them every degree of cooperation between the two factors" (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 364). In his retrospection from 1925 he referred only to his discovery of the wishful aspect in infantile fantasies: "I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were only phantasies which my patients had made up or which I myself had perhaps forced on them" (Freud 1925, p. 33). On the overall, as the psychoanalytic theory and theory of pathogenesis would become gradually more complex in Freud's formulations, the notion of conflict in relation to trauma, its multiple causes and consequences would acquire additional 'overdetermined' and 'complementary' character: The concept of traumatic powerful excitations from the outside breaking through the protective shield or external stimulus barrier (Freud, 1920) gradually receded in favour of definition of trauma as ego helplessness in the face of real or imagined, internal or external danger (Freud, 1926), which could occur at any period of life, with Ego immaturity predisposing the individual to helplessness.

Are neurotic productions tied in with real, even traumatic experiences or wishful fantasies? The question of which is "true", the authenticity of the seduction scenes or their

fictitious nature runs through the entirety of psychoanalytic theory (Rand & Torok, 1996, 305) and the complexity of their intertwining is best illustrated in Freud's clinical cases (Freud 1905b; 1909a,b; 1910a; 1911b; 1918). Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (1987, 2000) points out that it would have been much easier for Freud to adhere to his original seduction-theory. Sexual abuse in the family environment was known but represented a deviation from the norm. The *trauma model* would have highlighted the difference between normality and pathology. By contrast, the *drive model* talks about the undeniable fact of one's own archaic infantile conquest and death wishes, of the inescapability of one's instinctual [drive] nature. Although Freud highlighted trauma as a crucial etiological factor throughout his work, this stress on internal factors may have contributed to the fact that theoretical discussions of psychoanalytic concepts "moved the traumatic causes in relation to the drive-related conflicts and the fixations of the libido to the brink" (Bohleber 2000, p.802). Contemporary psychoanalytic theories of trauma take into consideration the type and intensity of the trauma, the psychological conditions of the person before the trauma took effect and, the reaction of close caregivers and the environment towards the victims of trauma.

II. B. The Topographic Theory and the First Theory of Anxiety (1900-1920)

As Freud proceeded with his self-analysis, he came to view conflicts as increasingly more internal. In his conceptualization of internal conflict, he replaced affects with instincts and postulated prohibitive forces as existing also within (Freud, 1900; Freud, 1905a,b). In the "Interpretation of Dreams" (1900), these conflicts are theorized as occurring between the structures of consciousness and the unconscious. This internal structuring of psychic conflict is first clearly in view in the Interpretation of Dreams (1900), which will officially inaugurate psychoanalysis. The theory of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1900) defines all the parameters of conflict developmentally (Freud, 1905b) within the context of one's initial object relations with mother, father and the parental couple, as well as with siblings. Here love and desire clash with hostility and murderousness, both of which conflict with familial and social reality. *Internal conflicts* were elaborated on and understood as occurring *between sexual and ego-preservative instincts* (Freud, 1910a; Freud, 1911a; Freud, 1914; Freud, 1915a, b, c).

This period witnessed a crucial expansion in Freud's thinking about conflict. In his "Formulation of the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (Freud, 1911) he described the developmental vicissitudes of the pleasure versus reality principles. The fundamental axis on which the distinction between them rests is the subject's relation to pain. The pleasure principle is best understood as the hatred-of-pain principle, which seeks pleasure to push aside and obscure pain. To obscure pain, the mind will fantasize or hallucinate satisfaction where none exists. When the mind realizes that hallucinations do not create real satisfaction, it learns to accommodate reality, even if it includes pain:

"It was only the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment experienced, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination. Instead of it, the psychical apparatus had to decide to form a conception

of the real circumstances in the external world and to endeavor to make a real alteration in them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable. This setting-up of the *reality principle* proved to be a momentous step.” (Freud, 1911a, p. 219, original emphasis).

Freud’s statement about the ‘mind deciding to form a conception of reality’ will be Bion’s starting point for his theories. There is a subtle change in terminology, witnessed in this paper when Freud first refers to the conflict between pleasure and reality first as principles and then as different aspects of the ego. The focus on the ego and its split between two different orientations to the world defines Freud’s inauguration of what he came to call his ‘psychology of the ego,’ foreshadowing the structural theory of 1923. What the ego does not find acceptable, it represses, which damages consciousness’ ability to contact reality.

In the Rat Man case history, Freud (1909a) summarizes his psychopathology: “All through his life ... he was unmistakably victim to a conflict between love and hatred, in regard both to his lady and to his father” (1909a, p. 237). Four years later, in “Totem and Taboo” (1912-13), Freud will name this as the conflict of emotional ambivalence as he discusses it in terms of taboo prohibitions:

“The principal characteristic of the psychological constellation, which becomes fixed in this way, is what might be described as the subject's *ambivalent* attitude towards a single object, or rather towards an act in relation to the object. He is constantly wishing to perform this act (the touching) [and looks on it as his supreme enjoyment, but he must not perform it], and detests it as well. The conflict between these two currents cannot be promptly settled because—there is no other way of putting it—they are localized in the subject's mind in such a manner that they cannot come up against each other” (Freud, 1913, p. 29).

Here Freud is demonstrating the idea that in addition to conflicts between ideas and affects, there is also a conflict within the emotions themselves.

The idea of emotional ambivalence, expounded here, could be viewed as occurring within a rudimentary object relations context, which defines this period of Freud’s thinking. In this period his thinking turns on the initiation of his concept of narcissism (Freud, 1914), one of the starting points of many object relations theories. The conflict here takes the shape of the struggle between investment in the self vs. investment in the object, or as he puts it, between narcissism and object choice. This becomes particularly important in Freud’s work on loss, identification, and further elaboration of the conflicts within the ego, in “Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1917).

Freud writes that the mind cannot stand the loss of something valued and needed, so that when there is a loss in the external world that object is incorporated in phantasy so that now the object exists in the internal world; a way to deny its absence in the external world. He writes: “The conflict within the ego, which melancholia substitutes for the struggle over the object, must act like a painful wound...” (Freud, 1917, p. 258). From another point of view,

one might refer to this as a struggle over the integration of absence, later becoming an important dimension in the thinking of Lacan.

Freud's next period of thinking within the Topographic theory begins with "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920). Here the aggressive drive was added to the sexual drive and conflict became conceptualized as *instinctual drive vs. defense/repression* (Freud, 1920). Defenses of varying types were associated with different stages of personality development. Anxiety continued to be viewed as resulting from repression (First theory of anxiety). Repression was mostly used as a synonym for defense.

In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" Freud (1920) introduces what he now considers to be the primary conflict in the mind, that between life and death, in the form of instincts that seek to renew life and instincts that seek to repeat the trauma, the conflict between the creation of high unities and the return to inorganic matter. In discussing the developmental twists and turns that his theory of instincts has undergone through the years Freud states clearly his fundamental perspective on conflict: "Our views have from the very first been dualistic..." (p. 53).

Freud here also defines development as the result of conflict. In referring to the "instinct towards perfection" he tells us, "The phenomena that are attributed to it seem capable of explanation by these efforts of Eros taken in conjunction with the results of repression" (Freud, 1920, p. 43). The conflict between Eros and the repression of Eros creates the desire for improvement that increases the capacity for sublimation, pointed out by Freud already in his paper on Leonardo da Vinci (Freud, 1910), which inaugurated applied psychoanalysis.

Towards the end of his life, Freud returns to this view and broadens its importance. He eventually sees the conflict between the life and death instincts as foundational for conceptualization of all human behavior and thinking: "Only by the concurrent or mutually opposing action of the two primal instincts—Eros and the death-instinct—, never by one or the other alone, can we explain the rich multiplicity of the phenomena of life" (Freud, 1937, p. 243).

II. C. The Structural Theory (Second Topographic Theory) (1923 – 1937)

The next stage of theory development, known as the Structural Theory (also known outside of North American circles as the Second Topographic Theory), presented in 1923, was an exposition of the tripartite personality structure: Id, Ego, and Superego (Freud, 1923). This period of Freud's theory opened the idea of conflict by situating the ego in a game of three-dimensional chess. In "The Ego and the Id" Freud (1923a) integrates all his ideas of conflict into a single system of great complexity. For here the *ego must struggle with several conflicting relationships*. Firstly, it must struggle with its conflict with the *impulses of the id*, which themselves are in conflict between the instincts of *life and death*. Secondly, the ego must navigate the conflict between these impulses and *the external world*. And thirdly, the ego, in its identification with its objects, creates another grade within itself, which Freud named the

Superego, to house the now internalized objects. And thus, the ego has created another conflict between itself and its Superego. The complex nature of the Superego's involvement in conflict is presaged by envisioning it as a special grade within the ego - the ego ideal (Freud, 1921), and by its being developmentally constituted as an heir to the Oedipus Conflict (1924b).

The Signal Theory of Anxiety (Second theory of Anxiety), where Structural Conflict emerged in full color, came shortly after (Freud, 1926). Defense mechanisms were defined and located in the (unconscious portion of) Ego. In addition to the previously defined repression, reaction formation, regression, identification and projection, the concept of 'disavowal' comes to occupy increasingly prominent place (Freud 1923b, 1924b). Repression is admittedly but one of the defenses. Anxiety became the motive (trigger) for defense, not its result. Psychoneurotic symptoms were viewed as compromise formations rising out of the conflict between instincts and defense, with the participation of internalized moral prohibitions (Superego) and perceived external pressures. The structural conflict of this era is sometimes called the *inter-systemic conflict*, to differentiate it from the Hartmann's later intra-systemic conflicts within the ego.

Viewed developmentally, "the motives for repression were now conceptualized as succession of fears, quite convincing to the child, involving parental disapproval and punishment which, in the course of development, became internalized and subsumed under the influence of the moral agency known as superego, itself active in a largely unconscious mode" (Abend, 2007, p. 1420). Within the structural theory, Superego becomes an heir to the Oedipus complex.

In this phase of theory development, ego emerges as the focus of clinical action. While holding firm in his focus on intrapsychic conflict, Freud writes in 1937: "...the business of the analysis is to secure the best possible psychological condition for the function of the ego; with that it has discharged its task" (Freud, 1937a, p. 250). The objective is to modify the analysand's ego so it can better deal with instinctual demands, pressing for expression and satisfaction. The methodology of achieving insight through interpretative reconstruction and construction (Freud, 1937b) is further refined. The ego's multiple roles as initiator of defenses, decision maker and executor of actions, synthesizer of conflicting elements in mental life, evaluator and negotiator of the conditions of the environment placed the ego at the center of analytic interest "so much so that the next phase of Freudian psychoanalytic theorizing became known as ego psychology" (Abend, 2007, p. 1420).

III. POST-FREUDIAN DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

The conceptualization of conflict defines psychoanalytic theories after Freud. Two pathways diverged from Freud's work that came into conflict in Great Britain and eventually

in the United States: ego psychology and object relations, a fertile theoretical conflict in psychoanalysis that inspired many seminal future developments worldwide.

III. A. The Role of Conflict in Development: Developmental Deficits and Psychosis

The ‘*conflict versus trauma*’ debate was *expanded* by a model of structural deficit. Here, hypotheses of pathogenicity do not postulate drive-motivated conflicts but work with the concept of an a priori weakened ego (caused by traumatic environmental influences or predisposition). Related terms are "basic fault" (Balint 1968), "early personality disorders" and "structural ego disturbances" (Fürstenau 1977). Proponents of the deficit hypothesis, based on the assumption of causal, severe traumatic events in early childhood – some of them not very evident, and even more often caused by a deficit in responding, containing, holding on part of the caregivers – argue that after the onset of psychosis, trauma takes on the function of a deficit. This implies, that patients are subjected to events, that they are victims of their circumstances and that they themselves do not have sufficient capacities for influencing these processes. The treatment then consequently aims mainly at substitution and psycho-educational influence.

Opposing this conceptualization of *developmental conflict*, other considerations assume that even psychotic processes are caused by intra-psychic conflicts. Fundamental internal dilemmas, far exceeding neurotic conflict, that take place between two mutually exclusive tendencies, lead to splitting processes, de-symbolisation and concrete action. In many of these cases, early childhood trauma was reported (Kapfhammer 2012a, 2012b). The conflict model does not see the trauma itself as a cause of psychoses but understands psychotic functioning as the result of a process, in which the mental apparatus attempts to find a solution for the existence-threatening internal incompatibilities in the aftermath of traumatic events by employing excessive psychic splitting. Therefore, possibilities of actively shaping symptom development are attributed to the patient through the process of psychoanalytic treatment and through the immersion in a shared language and reality that takes place in this process, supporting re-symbolisation and integration of the previously unthinkable.

Psychoanalysis began as a theory of mental conflict, a constant and universal aspect of the human condition and a kind of fuel for psychic development. Conceived as the main focus of a discipline aimed at unearthing and resolving unconscious conflict, over time, this nuclear concept was taken for granted and became implicit in a psychoanalytic perspective, to the extent of not requiring any new specific definition. With the deepening of investigation into the psychic world and the subsequent development of new ways of understanding unconscious mental life, the role of conflict in psychic dynamics has been reduced: although conflict is still conceived as the main concern of psychoanalysis, the focus has shifted to other issues that take into their account the various theoretical and clinical models. After the important change in viewing the role of conflict resulted from Hartmann's introduction of the idea of *conflict-free ego apparatuses* (Hartmann 1939), around the middle of the twentieth century, the focus of psychoanalytic theory and technique extended beyond conflict theory. What most influenced its minor role in understanding psychopathology and in carrying on an analytic treatment was

a greater focus on pre-conflictual stages of development and on relational factors in bringing about change.

Yet, such a shift of emphasis hasn't involved all the psychoanalytic schools in the same way. If we assume, in a somewhat schematic and simplified way, that the many psychoanalytic theoretical and clinical models have developed around four main issues (drive, ego, self and object relations), we could portray the role played by conflict in each of them. From the standpoint of the drive, the individual is seen in terms of the vicissitudes of urges, taking shape as desires that are embodied in actions and in conscious and unconscious fantasies, often experienced as unacceptable and dangerous. Therefore, psychic life is viewed as organized around conflict and its resolution and is signified by anxiety, guilt, shame, inhibition, symptom formation, and pathological character traits. The focus is on desire and urge, and defense against them.

From the standpoint of the ego, the individual is seen in terms of capacities for adaptation, reality testing, and defense. Developmentally, the capacities for adaptation, reality testing, and defense develop over time as the result of the drive-conflict dynamic. From the standpoint of self-experience, the individual is seen in terms of the ongoing subjective state, particularly around issues of boundaries, differentiation of self from other, sense of separateness, self-esteem, the degree of wholeness/fragmentation, continuity/discontinuity. Conflict, here, is not as important in organizing psychic structure. From the standpoint of object relations, the individual is seen in terms of internal images based on childhood experiences, that is in terms of objects that come into play in any new experience. Conflict, in these approaches, concerns the intra-psychic as well the inter-psychic and inter-personal world of the subject.

The validity of *conflict versus deficit* continued to be a controversy in the last decades of the 20th century. The roots of this controversy go back to a specific interpretation of Hartmann's concepts of ego autonomy and conflict free sphere. The Conflict theory view of this controversy explicated by Blum (1985) and Murray (1995) claims that throughout development the ego uses defense mechanisms as powerful, protective and adaptive tools in response to external, internal, real or imagined dangers. The excessive use of defenses can harm non-defensive personality functions. Defenses then can interfere with personality development, leading to constriction and pathological alterations of the ego. However, development proceeds with or without traumatic relational experiences. Freud's statement about the ego making an adjustment under traumatic external conditions can be contemporarily restated in view of specific *intra-systemic conflict within the ego*. The conflict is between defensive and non-defensive functions (Papiasvili, 1995). The content of intrapsychic conflict scanned, uncovered, and analyzed by the psychoanalytic method ranges from pre-genital to Oedipal and post-Oedipal issues. With increasing clinical and theoretical knowledge over the years, all developmental levels are seen to be present and operative in all cases. Pathology of the self-representation within the ego is also variously involved. A specific conflictual activity revolving around the deficit was described by Axel Hoffer (1985) in his concept of *Conflicts of Self-protection*. This concept depicts specific intrapsychic conflicts that develop around

efforts to hide ‘ego deficits’ and the fierce neediness that often accompanies them. “Feelings of shame and self-contempt are associated not only with the perceived ‘deficit’ itself, but also with the desperate, often vengeful efforts to obtain compensation for it...” (Hoffer, 1985, p. 773).

Many contemporary theorists of various orientations view development and psychopathology through a multi-perspectival lens, including both, conflict *and* deficit. Some theories tend towards privileging the deficit model; for example, Self- Psychology emphasizes deficits in the Self as the result of inadequately empathic parenting and, views the analyst’s empathic understanding, besides the interpretation of conflict, as the central component of therapeutic action (Kohut, 1984). Still others, like some Relational and Interpersonal schools, have shifted the focus from both internal deficit and conflict (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012), emphasizing instead that the intrapsychic realm is being forged in a relationship with others within the larger culture (Ingram, 1985).

The editors of the recent American Psychoanalytic Association’s publication, “Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts” (Auchincloss & Samberg, 2012) reflect on contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives’ increased appreciation of the significance of developmental issues in relation to conflicts.

Conflicts arise in development in response to a sequence of predictable, developmental phase specific unconscious threats, so called internal danger situations. In normal early development, pre-Oedipal conflicts arise between the child and his/her environment, between opposing wishes and feelings, and between superego precursors and drives. The threat to the child in *pre-Oedipal conflicts* is the fantasized danger of loss of the object and loss of the love of the object. *Oedipal conflicts*, of greater complexity, demonstrate the child’s capacity for triadic object relations as well as other aspects of ego maturation and development. At the Oedipal stage, the threat to the child involves the fantasied danger of injury (castration complex). Subsequently, through the processes of internalization and identification, the prohibitive forces originally associated with the parental control, have become forces within the child’s own mind. Such a process is evident in superego formation, a developmental milestone, achieved through the resolution of the Oedipus complex. At this stage, the threat to the child is the internal condemnation of the superego. While some conflicts partially resolve as development continues, others exist throughout life, leading to various degrees of psychopathology.

The manifestation of conflict varies in accordance with developmental levels, psychopathology, and cultural factors. Child psychoanalysts also describe developmental conflicts, which are normal, predictable, and usually transitory (Tyson & Tyson, 1990). These are conflicts due to normative phase specific maturational forces within the child that bring the child into the conflict with his/her environment. When the internalization of the external demand has been accomplished, this specific developmental conflict will dissolve and a further step towards structuralization and character formation will have been taken (ibid, pp. 42-43).

III. B. Ego Psychological Perspectives

The psychoanalytic models that give more weight to the conflict are those that highlight the role of ego and drives, as the classical model and Ego Psychology. The conflict has been given greater weight by the contemporary heir of Ego Psychology, the so-called Modern Conflict Theory. Modern conflict theorists depart from Freud's structural theory in order to focus on compromise formations between drive derivatives, anxieties, defenses and superego pressures. Compromise is the outcome of a conflict. Compromises, like conflicts, are everywhere, since every part of the mind is conceived as structured around a compromise formation: namely around a conflict. For modern conflict theorists, mental development is conceived more as a sequence of *compromise formations* than as the classical Freud's tripartite structure (id, ego, superego). The aim of psychoanalytic cure is to help the patient to acknowledge his unconscious conflicts and to have insight into how he defends against drive derivatives based on unconscious fears dating back to childhood. The analyst's task is to structure a psychoanalytic situation that will facilitate the emergence of unconscious conflict and defense in as clear a manner as possible and to interpret this unconscious material to the patient in order to help him attain more adaptive compromise formations (Abend 2005, 2007; Arlow 1963; Brenner 1982, 2002; Druck et al 2011; Ellman et al 1998).

Ego Psychology was initially most closely associated with Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and his collaborators Ernst Kris, David Rapaport, Erik Erikson, and Rudolf Lowenstein. Many others made important contributions, with technical impact and influence on later theory. These include R. Waelder, O. Fenichel, E. Jacobson, M. Mahler, H. Nunberg, J. Arlow, C. Brenner, L. Rangell, H. Blum, and others. Ego Psychologists' unwavering interest in conflict was summed up by Jacob Arlow (1987), who, paraphrasing remarks of Anna Freud, Ernst Kris (1950) and Heinz Hartmann (1939) wrote: "Psychoanalysis may be defined as human nature seen from the viewpoint of conflict" (p.70). In his review of the Ego Psychology and Contemporary Structural Theory, Blum (1998) observed that Ego Psychology was "a misnomer for a structural theory and therefore a literal, encapsulated 'ego psychology' does not exist..." (Blum, 1998, p. 31). Ego psychology, reacting against Id psychology, emphasized attention to the psychic surface, as a derivative of and indicative of the deeper unconscious conflicts. This was associated with renewed interest in the preconscious and in the manifest content of fantasies, dreams and screen memories. Interpretation was considered a sequentially ordered process. The interpretive sequence from the surface to depth and 'defense before content,' highlighting the resistance component of patients' communications, presented an incremental analysis of extended length in the post-World War II era. The theoretical underpinning was the structural theory which considered the psychic apparatus from the point of view of the conflict between id, ego, and superego, with the ego mediating between the other two agencies and reality, and gradually incorporating genetic, developmental and adaptive considerations.

III. Ba. Anna Freud

Anna Freud elaborated defense processes in the genesis of conflict. While in 1926 it was clear that conflict had two dimensions - defended content and defense processes - Freud had concentrated relatively more on defended content. Anna Freud, in her seminal publication, “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense”, elevated defense processes to an equal status with defended content in the genesis of conflict (Freud, A, 1936).

III. Bb. Hartmann, Kris, Rapaport, and Erikson

While writing centrally on the problems of adaptation, and psychoanalysis as a general psychology, Hartmann (1939, 1950) included the concepts of primary and secondary autonomy and (relatively) conflict-free spheres within the ego, as well as the intra-systemic conflict within the ego, between various ego functions. Together with Kris, Rapaport, and Erikson, Hartmann elaborated on the wider functions of the Ego, including ego synthetic and integrative functioning, neutralization, sublimation, development of ego identity (Erikson, 1956) etc.

The in-depth study of the Id, previously undertaken by S. Freud, was now paralleled by in-depth knowledge of the Ego. These early innovators viewed ego as one aspect of the greater mind. Their writings reflect the idea of balance between all forces emanating from and impinging on the human mind. The analyst’s stance, via the alliance with a patient’s ego, was to be equidistant among all three psychic agencies and the external world. While the psychoanalytic method continued to be the treatment of conflict (Freud, A. 1936; Kris, 1947; Hartmann, 1950), psychoanalytic theory as a general theory, not minimizing the importance of conflict, now included behavior surrounding conflict and independent of it as well. Hartmann (1950) pointed out how primary autonomy can become involved in conflict formation, and secondary autonomy can arise out of conflict and become conflict laden again.

Nevertheless, for some ego psychologists who followed (Blanck, 1966; Blanck and Blanck, 1972), Hartmann’s concept of conflict free spheres and ego autonomy seemed to indicate that ego was independent of other psychic agencies. This specific interpretation of Hartmann’s concepts of *ego autonomy* and *conflict free sphere* also contributed to a trend that developed into other conflict minimizing orientations, e.g. Self-psychology, a developmental psychoanalytic theory that emphasized the role of deficit over conflict.

III. Bc. Brenner, Arlow, and Rangell: Modern Conflict Theory and Contemporary Structural Theory

Brenner and Arlow broadened Freud’s notion of the psychic formation that arises out of the conflict between the structures of the mind: id, ego, and superego. They proposed that virtually all psychic outcomes: dreams, symptoms, fantasies, character, and free associations, are a product of conflict. Even the Superego, in Brenner’s view, is a compromise formation, or a cluster of compromise formations. In Brenner’s words: “Everything in psychic life... is a

compromise formation...a combination of the gratification of drive derivatives ...of unpleasure in the form of anxiety and depressive affect... defenses that function to minimize the unpleasure, and of the superego functioning...No thought, no action, no plan, no fantasy, no dream or symptom is ever simply one or the other. Every behavior, feeling or thought is multiply determined by all of them..." (in: Richards, Willick, 1986, pp. 39-40).

This complex approach has an impact on what an analyst hears:

"One no longer listens to a patient with a purpose of answering the question: Is this wish fulfillment, defense or superego? One knows in advance that the answer is yes to all three in every case. One learns to ask instead: "What wishes of childhood origin are being gratified here?... What unpleasure (anxiety or depressive affect) are they arousing? What is a defensive aspect? What is the superego aspect?" (Brenner, in: Richards, Willick, 1986, p. 40).

Building on Freud's Principle of Overdeterminism and Waelder's Principle of Multiple Function, Rangell restates the contemporary version, in line with Brenner and Arlow's *extended notions of conflict and compromise formation*, as the Principle of Interchangeability of Psychic Elements: Psychic elements are engaged in conflictual interaction with each other and are synthesized in an overdetermined fashion into new psychic products which then secondarily participate in conflict activity. The complementary dynamism to synthesis is analysis, dissecting the psychic outcomes to their original component parts while tracing regressive pathways to the roots of conflict. In life, components of conflict are fused in a psychic outcome, which is often an aggregate cognitive-emotional state containing primary and secondary symptoms superimposed on previously achieved personality organization (Rangell, 1983; Papiasvili, 1995). Creative and integrative aspects of defense analysis are formulated by Rangell: "The road to healthy integration in analysis is differentiation and reintegration, by destratification of clinical aggregates and their resynthesis into more stable adaptive wholes..." (Rangell 1983, pp.161). This approach is further extended and refined by Gray (1994) in his 'close process monitoring' analysis of defensive aspects of transference.

Rangell (1963, 1967, 1985) revisited the question of signal anxiety versus affect as a trigger for defense in a conflict sequence. He studied microscopic processes before, during, and after the defense was triggered, preceding any psychic outcome, and concluded that no matter what the nature of an unpleasurable affect participating in the conflict, the immediate signal for the use of defense is anxiety. Rangell describes an "*intrapsychic process*," an unconscious cognitive-affective sequence of *impulse-anxiety-defense-psychic outcome* while maintaining that anxiety continues as a trigger and motive for defense behind all other states of unpleasure. The anxiety is about unpleasure overwhelming the ego. Rangell surmises an unconscious decision making function within the ego, which ultimately shapes the specific psychic outcome. Through interaction with self and object representations, intrapsychic trial actions, representative of an intrasystemic choice conflict within the ego, occur. Objects are assessed for intended discharge. The self is assessed for a feeling of anxiety signaling danger, or safety and mastery.

The ubiquitous background activity, described by Rangell (1963) as an ongoing microscopic conflict series and internal trial actions, may be studied from the point of view of unconscious fantasy. Arlow places unconscious fantasy and unconscious fantasy function at the center of an investigation of intrapsychic conflict. While Freud viewed unconscious fantasy as a derivative of an unconscious wish, Arlow sees it as a compromise formation that contains all components of structural conflict. Just as Rangell stressed the ongoing ubiquitous character of microscopic conflict processes and trial actions, Arlow (1969) stresses the persistent influence that unconscious fantasies have on every aspect of an individual's functioning, including the spheres relatively conflict free. In Arlow's view, unconscious fantasy provides a mental set that organizes perception and cognitive functioning in general.

As for the conceptualization of therapeutic action by contemporary Modern Conflict Theorists, Abend (2007) calls attention to unconscious sets of transference attitudes corresponding to unconscious fantasies specifically revolving around the psychoanalytic setting and process. Gray's (1994) 'close process monitoring' of the defensive functioning of the verbal flow of each session focuses on transference analysis revolving around concerns for the analyst's possible judgmental reactions, within the Modern Conflict Theory paradigm.

Follow up studies of completed psychoanalyses support the contemporary view that conflicts are never completely resolved. Even after analysis conflicts remain active and ready elements in an individual's psyche. What changes is the individual's ability to respond to the arousal of conflict in a more adaptive manner (Papiasvili, 1995; Abend, 1998).

III. Bd. Object Relations Theory and Conflict within Structural Theory: Dorpat and Kernberg

Theodore Dorpat (1976) proposed the term 'Object Relations Conflict' to describe a type of internal conflict that involved a psychic structure that is less differentiated and antecedent to id-ego-superego differentiation. Dorpat's object relations conflict relates to an individual's experiencing opposition between his own wishes and his internalized representations of another person's wishes. An example would be: "I want to do this, but it would hurt my mother." Citing possible ego and/or superego deficits (Gedo and Goldberg, 1973), and a lower stage superego formation (Sandler, 1960), Dorpat stressed a need for a hierarchical model of the mind for an integrated understanding of psychic conflict. At a higher level of internal differentiation, it involves the tripartite model, and at a lower level, an object relations model, where the superego is not fully experienced as an internal agent, where the 'separation guilt' is generated by incomplete separation between the self and object, and the representational process is not fully internalized. Since Dorpat's patient talked about the "mother in my head" and not about an actual interaction with his mother, the conflict could not be classified among the external or externalized conflicts.

As object relations became a more central interest, there were other original efforts to integrate ego psychology and object relations theories with implications for the theory of technique. One such influential integration in North American psychoanalysis comes from Otto

Kernberg. His synthesis developed gradually over the last 30 years, is applicable especially concerning pre-oedipal development and “wider scope,” borderline personality disorder pathologies, where unconscious intrapsychic conflicts are not simply conflicts between impulse and defense. In his writings, Kernberg (1983; 2015) elaborates on the *Pre-oedipal conflicts* as occurring between two opposing units or sets of all good - all bad internalized object relations. Each of these units consists of self and object representations under the impact of a drive derivative, which surfaces clinically as an affect disposition. Both impulse and defense find expressions through an affectively imbued internalized object relation.

Referencing Fairbairn (1954), Klein (1952), Jacobson (1964) and Mahler (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975), Kernberg postulates the internalization of significant relations between self and others as fundamental building blocks in the form of dyadic units of self and object representations, linked by the affect in which they are experienced, constituting the basic infrastructures of the mind. The consolidation and gradual integration of these dyadic units into more complex, supraordinate structures lead to the development of the tripartite structure of ego, superego, and id. The basic internalized self /object representational dyads are conceived as embedded in peak affective states, both positive and negative, determining, respectively, “all good” and “all bad,” “idealized” and “persecuting” mental structures.

Psychoanalytic object relations theory within the structural theory implies two basic levels of development.

At a first level, under the dominance of peak affect states, a dual psychic structure is built up. On the one hand, is a psychic structure constituted by idealized self-representations relating to an idealized other (infant and mother) under the dominance of strong positive, affiliative affective states; on the other, an opposite dyadic set of relationships develops under the dominance of strongly negative, aversive, painful affects, constituted by a frustrating or aggressive representation of the other related to a frustrated, enraged or suffering self-representation (Kernberg, 2004). This concept of the internalization of all good, and completely separately, all bad internalized object relations leads to an intra-psychic structure characterized by primitive dissociative or “splitting” mechanisms. In contrast to these early developments under conditions of peak affect states, early development under conditions of relatively low affect states would evolve under the control of available cognitive functions, the instinctive (“seeking” system) impulses to learning about reality, and lead to early understanding of animate and inanimate reality. Under these early circumstances, there would not exist as yet an integrated sense of self nor the capacity for an integrated view of significant others.

At a second level of development, gradually emerging over the first three years of life, the progressive development of realistic cognitive comprehension of the surrounding world, and, particularly, the predominance of good over bad experiences facilitates the gradual integration of emotionally opposite conditions, the tolerance of the simultaneous awareness of both good and bad experiences. This development of tolerance of ambivalence, of combined positive and negative emotional relations with the same external objects, gradually leads to an integrated sense of self and significant others; or, put another way, to normal ego identity. Ego

identity corresponds to an integrated sense of self and the capacity for an integrated view of significant others.

This second level of development corresponds to the “depressive position” within Kleinian theoretical formulations. It signals the development of *normal* psychological functioning or pathology at a neurotic level of organization. In contrast, the development of character pathology at a borderline level of personality organization, corresponding to Klein’s “paranoid-schizoid position,” represents the consequence of the lack of achievement of the integration of normal identity. Borderline personality organization, a severe level of personality disorder is characterized, in fact, by the lack of identity integration or the syndrome of identity diffusion, the permanence of predominant primitive defensive operation centering around splitting, and certain limitations in reality testing in terms of deficits in the subtle aspects of interpersonal functioning.

Psychoanalytic object relations theory proposes that the shift from borderline personality organization to neurotic and normal personality organization also corresponds to a shift from the predominance of primitive defensive operations to advanced defensive operations centering on repression and its related mechanisms, including a higher level of projection, negation, intellectualization, and reaction formations. This advanced level of development is reflected in a clear delimitation of a repressed, dynamic unconscious, or “Id,” constituted by unacceptable internalized dyadic relationships reflecting intolerable primitive aggression and aspects of infantile sexuality. The ego now includes the integrated, conscious self-concept, and the representations of significant others, together with the development of sublimatory functions reflected in the adaptive expression of affective, emotional needs regarding sexuality, dependency, autonomy, and aggressive self-affirmation. Internalized object relations that include ethically derived demands and prohibitions transmitted in the early interactions of the infant and child with his psychosocial environment, particularly the parents, are integrated into the “super – ego”. This latter structure is constituted by layers of internalized prohibitions and idealized demands, significantly transformed into a personified, abstracted, and individualized system of personal morality (Kernberg, 2012a, b; Kernberg, 2004)).

Kernberg’s contemporary synthetic work (Kernberg, 2015) includes correlating neurobiological underpinnings of such developmental and pathogenic conflictual configurations. “A general conclusion relates to the parallel and mutually influential development of neurobiological affective and cognitive systems, ultimately controlled by genetic determinants, and psychodynamic systems, ultimately corresponding to both reality and motivated distortions of the internal and external relations...” (Kernberg, 2015, p. 38).

The general assumption within this theory is that patients with borderline personality organization present with predominance of the aggressive, persecutory segment of early experience, whatever its origin, which prevents identity integration. An analytic treatment geared to achieve identity integration will permit the integration of the concept of self, thus increasing cognitive control; it would integrate the concept of others, thus normalizing social life, and integrate the experience of contradictory affects, leading to affect modulation and reduction of impulsivity. With these assumptions, the strategy of Transference Focused

Psychotherapy consists in clarifying the object relations activated in the treatment situation (the transference), at each affectively dominant point, both regarding positive and negative experiences. This facilitates the patient's *tolerance and awareness of conflicting mental states*. By means of clarification and ultimately interpretation of mental states, which have been dissociated under conditions of the dominant splitting operations, mentalization is fostered. In the treatment situation, the activation of split-off object relations tend to produce "role reversals" in the transference; in other words, interchange of roles of self and object in the patient's experience of his relationship with the therapist. This process permits the patient gradually to accept his unconscious identification with both victim and persecutor and, at the same time, to understand that his idealizations also have an unrealistic quality, and represent a protective function against the opposite, negative segment of his experience. The therapist, maintaining technical neutrality while protecting the therapeutic frame, permits a gradual introduction of a "three-person psychology". Here, the therapist's function is that of an "excluded" outsider who helps the patient to diagnose the split-off idealized and persecutory states. These states can be subsequently linked together with the metaphorical significance of activated object relations in the transference (Kernberg, 2015).

III. C. Melanie Klein and the Post-Kleinians

In Kleinian schools as well conflict plays a pivotal role, but this occurs from the very beginning of life, prior the consolidation of the tripartite structure of the mind. The interplay between the three emerging structures, set in motion by the conflict between unconscious impulses from the id and ego defenses directed against them, reinforced by superego pressures, is backdated to the very early levels of development, contributing to the construction of the psychic structure. The *struggle between idealized love and destructive aggression* through splitting, projective identification, denial and omnipotent control characterizes psychic life from its very beginning, giving rise to the building blocks of psychic life, i.e. the primitive defensive constellations of paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. This dynamic highlights a deeper dimension of unconscious conflict taking place before the consolidation of id, ego, and superego as three clearly differentiated structures. For Kleinian and post-Kleinian analysts, the view of an unconscious conflict working in the early stages of development has given proof to be helpful in clarifying and approaching therapeutically the severe psychopathologies (as borderline personality organization, narcissistic pathology, sexual perversion, eating disorders, antisocial behavior) characterized by a fixation at the primitive developmental levels in which splitting and other primitive defense mechanisms predominate (Kernberg 2005). Such a view implies that unconscious conflict concerns any affective psychic structure, both the primitive one represented by internalized object relations and the advanced one constituted by the tripartite structure that has integrated its constituents internalized object relations into ego, superego and id structures (Joseph 1989; Klein 1928; Segal 1962; Segal and Britton 1981; Steiner 2005).

In stark contrast to ego psychology, Melanie Klein developed her theory of object relations as an expansion of Freud's view of the psyche as innately conflicted. Klein's seminal

paper on object relations appeared in 1935, in chronological relation to Anna Freud's 1936 book and Hartmann's 1937 paper (published in 1939). While A. Freud and Hartmann were focused on the traits of the ego and how it defends itself against the id while adapting to external reality, Klein was plumbing the depths of the internal world and how it interacts with the external world, expanding Freud's view of the superego. It is interesting to follow the divergence between ego psychology-Freud and object relations-Freud in several papers written in the 1950s. First, in 1952, at the International Psychoanalytic Congress, a symposium was held on 'The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego and Id'. There, Klein stated: "Since the development of ego and super-ego is bound up with processes of introjection and projection, they are inextricably linked from the outset, and since their development is vitally influenced by instinctual drives, all three regions of the mind are from the beginning of life in the closest interaction. I realize that in speaking here about the three regions of the mind I am not keeping within the topic suggested for discussion; but my conception of earliest infancy makes it impossible for me to consider exclusively the mutual influences of ego and id" (Klein, 1952, p. 59)

Thus, at the time when Ego psychology primarily focused on the ego's relation to the id and how it navigated adaptation to the external world, Klein's object relations theory focused primarily on the ego's relation to the superego, and how this relationship was determined by the formative connection between the instinctual impulses and the superego's internal objects. Several years later, David Rapaport (1957) commented on this difference: "Ever since the introduction of the structural theory by Freud, theoretical interest has centered on ego psychology and neglected the exploration of the superego" (Rapaport, 1957/1977, p. 686).

Klein's theory had its first point of demarcation in her 1928 paper, significantly titled "The Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict". Referring to Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex as a 'conflict', Klein theorized that the Oedipus complex as described by Freud—which for him occurs during the phallic phase between the ages of 3-5—has complex precursors in the earlier psychosexual stages focused on oral and anal issues. For Klein, the Oedipus conflict begins in the first year of life, and there is no "pre-oedipal" or "pre-conflictual" phase.

This poses important conceptual issues. For example, the Oedipus complex essentially signifies any triangular structure of relations since, from the moment the infant is aware of father along with the mother, there is a triangle. However, Hanna Segal (1997) points out that as soon as the infant makes an organizational decision to separate the good experiences of mother from frustrating ones, there is a triangle of infant and a good and a bad mommy. This form of organization Klein calls splitting, which is one of the primary ways in which the early (and later) psyche manages conflict. Splitting objects into two parts, or splitting between different objects into good and bad categories, are primary forms of organizing one's world. Splitting functions in tandem with projective identification, which in phantasy gets rid of incompatible elements in the mind by projecting them from the internal world to the external.

Both splitting and projective identification are employed to manage one's internal and external world. Along with the correspondent introjective identification, these processes form an alive mental-social loop that entails dealing with conflict as well as executing normal mental

functioning. This projective and introjective circle of life along the analogy of respiratory inhalation and exhalation—demonstrates Klein's idea of the *innate nature of psychic conflict* linked with vital mental functions. In this process, the ego forms its initial relationship with the conflicting instincts in the id of life and death. In its primary search for an external object to help in its struggle for survival, the infant projects the instinctual impulses, in phantasy—which Klein and Susan Isaacs (1952, p. 58) say is the mental corollary of the instincts—into its external objects and then, introjects this combination of the actual external object, blended with the fantasied object, into the superego, where it functions henceforth as an internal object. Klein subsequently focuses attention on the relation between these internal objects and the external world, as well as—and perhaps most importantly—on the relation between them and the ego.

To understand the complexity of Klein's idea of conflict, it is crucial to see that the internal objects are the personification of the instincts. Thus, the conflict between instinctual desires for both life and death creates conflicting ideal and persecutory internal objects—objects with which the ego must form a relationship. For Klein, the analysis of the ego's relations to internal objects (the superego) is at the core of her theory of psychoanalysis as it formulates around the premise of unavoidable conflict. From this core element stems her entire theory.

The first conflict is innate – the life and death instincts and their emotional manifestations of love and hate, that, through the cycle of projection into the external world and then, introjection into the internal world, create what Freud called emotional ambivalence. Life and death desires create love and hate emotions that in turn create good and bad, ideal and persecutory objects, which often conflict with the actual external object. Then, we have a conflict of instincts, a conflict of emotions and a conflict of internal objects; that, in turn, cause a conflict within the ego as well as with the external object, the last of which, could be called a conflict between phantasy and reality. From these inherent conflicts, Klein then fashioned a theory of development between two differing mental positions. The most direct way to understand these two mental positions is to consider that they are conceptualized around a single fundamental issue in psychic life—love. Klein's theory is most essentially a theory of love and how love survives in a psyche that also generates hatred.

The above forms the primary conflict in mental development. One can understand this by considering what many Kleinian thinkers regard as a key, unspoken assumption of Klein's thinking: that hate is easier than love. Consider a building. It can take years to build a structure, but it can be leveled in a minute. Construction is complex; destruction is simple. Loving an object that frustrates, requires a complicated development; hating an object that frustrates, requires no development. From this realization, Klein's theory recognizes that in the undeveloped psyche, while love exists from the first, hate when it emerges, dominates love. By contrast, when the mind develops beyond this instinctive state, love is enabled to dominate hate. Klein names these mental-emotional configurations as the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, respectively and places them in a developmental relation – the paranoid-schizoid occurring first and the depressive evolving later. The essential defining element in discriminating these two positions is in how one conceptualizes and interacts with one's

objects. In the paranoid position, one is primarily concerned with one's own survival, and one's objects are seen as either helping or threatening one's survival. For this reason, Klein refers to the paranoid position as the narcissistic position. In the depressive position, the defining object relation is that concern for the object's survival becomes more important, or equal, to the self's survival – because it is understood that one cannot survive without a relation to another person.

The term used for each position reflects the nature of the defenses implicated. Projective identification is also an organizing principle because it geographically places highly differing objects in different places, in order to avoid conflict between them. The essence of paranoid-schizoid defenses is that they are invoked with a sense of omnipotence, like omnipotent denial of realities, particularly emotional object relation realities. The depressive position involves its own sense of conflict. Here the conflict between love and hate begins to be resolved on the side of love for the object. Phantasy functions omnipotently with regards to reality until a relation between the two is established, as happens in creativity, for phantasies that do not communicate with the reality of others' experiences often produce failed forms of art.

In the depressive position, omnipotence must be given up in order to allow for the recognition of reality, the separateness and the uniqueness of the object. This requires tolerating guilt, for guilt is the preeminent emotion of conflict. Guilt arises at the intersection where desire and reality clash. Guilt is the recognition of the irrationality and anti-sociability of one's primitive desires; it represents the moment of recognition of the object's importance, separate from one's desires. Guilt mediates the conflict between narcissism and reality, both internal and external. When love and guilt towards one's object are intolerable, Klein theorizes a third mental position: the manic position, which conflicts with the depressive position in that, it is contemptuous of the object, attempts to control the object and to triumph over the needed object by denying its importance. In its conflict with the depressive state of mind that values love over hate, the manic position regresses to the use of paranoid-schizoid defenses to combat the guilt and pain of loving.

Finally, for Klein's theory of conflict, it is important to mention at least one aspect of the *agon* that takes place between the ego and the superego. This aspect involves Herbert Rosenfeld's (1964) and Donald Meltzer's (1966) ideas of projective identification into an *internal* object. According to Rosenfeld, the superego often functions as a gang – such as the Mafia or the Nazis – seeking to control and punish the ego for not being perfect. This is one manifestation of a primary conflict in the psyche, between the ego and the superego. The ego is initially small and helpless, like the infant; in this state, the ego is in enormous need of an object that can help it survive. This needed object is often given omnipotent qualities, to rectify the ego's fear of its lack of power to fend for itself. As in Freud's theory, Klein believes that the ego creates its initial view of its objects under the glow of omnipotence. Having an omnipotent object, the superego, makes the ego believe that even if it realizes that it is not itself possessed of omnipotence, its superego is. This causes the ego to eliminate its own separate existence and merge with its fantasied omnipotent internal object, thus projective identification with an internal object. The ego gives up its independence to feel omnipotently protected, in a

sort of Faustian bargain. Hereby, the ego attempts to resolve its conflict of life and death instincts, love and hate emotions, omnipotence and reality, with a simple wave of the wand of projective identification.

III. D. Wilfred R. Bion

While Klein expanded Freud's notion of conflict to include object relations—both internal and external—Bion (1955) expanded the theory of conflict into the area of mental functions. In his early period, Bion (1957) theorized an *inherent conflict between the healthy and psychotic parts of the mind*, based on the life and death instincts, respectively. The psychotic part of the mind does not want to know about reality, both external and, most importantly, internal. Where Klein saw the mind dealing with conflict by instituting splitting, Bion (1959) referred to a mechanism more primitive and destructive, that he called 'attacks on linking'. Attacking links between two objects, or two parts of the mind, is a psychotic method of dealing with conflict by eliminating any connection that places two separate objects in contact with each other.

Bion's theory is based on his conception of primary conflict. As he puts it, "The problem is the resolution of the conflict between narcissism and social-ism" (Bion, 1962a, p. 118), which is a restatement of Freud's tension between narcissistic object relations and healthy object choice, and Klein's distinction between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. The implied conflict that generates attacks on links is the conflict between fusion and separateness. This idea led Bion (1963) to modify the concept of the Oedipus complex. For Bion it does not primarily evoke a conflict between sexuality and murderousness, between Laius and Oedipus, for example, but between searching for the truth and ignoring the truth, between Tiresias—the blind seer who knows the truth—and Oedipus.

Bion further theorizes this conflict in his books "Learning From Experience" (1962b) and "Elements of Psychoanalysis" (1963), where he writes that there are three kinds of links one can make with an object: L(ove), H(ate) and K(nowing). L and H are the traditional aspects of the Oedipus complex; K is the additional original Bion's conceptualization. Here, Bion conceptualizes a world of anti-links which is dominated by the grand conflict of mental functions between K and minus K; between the desire to make links and know and the desire to attack links and not know, which correlate to the life and death instincts. Bion achieves this addition to Freud and Klein by transporting instinctual conflicts into analogous mental conflicts between K and minus K. One can see this in Bion's 1955 paper, "The Language of the Schizophrenic", where he reinterprets Freud's castration complex - the fear of the loss of one's genitals - as also occurring to the ego, where, from the vantage point of "Learning from Experience" and "Elements of Psychoanalysis", the castration of the ego's mental functions connected with thinking, is effected by minus K.

As Bion's thinking evolves, the conflict between K and minus K expands into the larger category of truth versus lies. This, in turn, links up with Bion's concept of experience (Bion, 1959, 1962b). Experience becomes a crucible for truth in terms of one's ability, or capacity, to

have, to engage and to suffer one's experience. Reason, for Bion, is not the truth; experience is, which means one's emotional experience. Bion's early work focuses on developing the capacity to think about one's emotional experience, while his later work focuses attention on being able *to have* an emotional experience, or, put paradoxically, to be able to experience one's experience. Bion (1965, 1970) differentiates this state from K with the designation O. K represents knowing about one's experience, while O signifies the deepest level of who we are that can never be fully comprehended by the conscious mind but can be experienced. O represents the unknown. The conflict is between K and O - between being and knowing (Taylor, 2011; Tabakin, 2015). The conflict of later Bionian thought is that which pertains to the known and the unknown, to certainty and uncertainty.

Bion's analytic stance towards the fulfillment of his clinical aesthetics of emergence requires a new stance by the analyst. Expanding Freud's (1912) technical ideas of evenly suspended attention and an objective acceptance of whatever the patient's material brings, Bion suggests developing a fresh state of mind, one open to reverie, which necessitates that the "knowing" elements implicated in memory and desire be suspended so that the analyst may achieve a state of mind theorized by the poet Keats' definition of "Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason" (Bion, 1970, p. 125). In this way, Bion can be seen as moving towards a dialectical resolution, a *sublation*, in Hegel's terminology (Rosen, 2014, pp. 138-9), of innate conflicts, where one develops a state of mind that tolerates the interplay between PS (paranoid-schizoid) and D (depressive) elements and configurations signified by Bion as $PS \Leftrightarrow D$. Thus the later Bion does not leave behind the premise of conflict for one of emergence; emergence is rather placed into a dialectical relation with conflict.

III. E. Donald W. Winnicott

An object relations alternative to the conflict model of the mind is offered by Winnicott. In his first book of collected papers written in 1930's to mid 1950's "Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis", Winnicott (1978) formulates gradually his contributions to the dynamics of early child development and childhood neuroses, in conjunction with *primary maternal preoccupation*, trauma, regression, transference and countertransference. His model takes its starting point in the concept of a *primary* state of development that he nominates *un-integration* (Winnicott, 1945). Whereas Klein tended to view the early mind as *dis-integrated* by splitting, projective identification and other defenses based on infantile omnipotence, Winnicott views the early mind as *not-yet-come-together*. As such, the *mind* for Winnicott is not in a situation of basic conflict at its beginnings but is more in a state of needing to come together, which then later eventuates in the conflicts that Freud and Klein described. Until this primal integration takes place, for Winnicott there is no psychic structure. One can see Winnicott's point of departure by considering that Freud, Klein, and Bion each built a theory out of the primal instinctual and emotional conflict that arises from the experiences of life and death, originally emanating from the id. In contrast to this idea of primal conflict, Winnicott suggests a state of primal 'unintegration', where conflicts are not engaged until this primal integration has

occurred. Thus for Winnicott “there is no id before ego” (Winnicott, 1962, p. 56); and ego development does not take place without a good enough mother providing a holding environment which enables the infant to begin to integrate its various parts into a rudimentary ego. Then, and only then, do processes of symbol-formation and the organization of “personal psychic content” begin, which forms a basis for “living relationships” (Winnicott, 1960, p. 45) begin. As Winnicott puts it, at this stage “the infant is not yet an entity having experiences” (1962, p. 56). Klein, by contrast, believed that there *is* a rudimentary ego, some reality awareness, as well as projective and introjective processes, active at birth. For her, the infant at this stage *is* having experiences.

In Winnicott’s second book of collected papers written in late 1950’s – early 1960’s “The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment” (Winnicott, 1965), the focus on maturational processes that need to be furthered along by an environment that facilitates their growth can be seen in full color. Comparing his own position to that of Klein, Winnicott (1960) remarks that Klein acknowledged the importance of the environment in the earliest stages of development in a sense that “her work on the splitting defence mechanisms and on projections and introjections and so on, is an attempt to state the effects of failure of environmental provision in terms of the individual” (p. 50). However, for Winnicott, there was not an individual without an environment. While Freud, Klein, and Bion were unearthing the complexities of the Oedipus situation, Winnicott was conceptualizing a *pre-Oedipal* state of being, where the mother and the infant form a single unit initially. Instead of innate conflict, Winnicott focused his attention on *environmental deprivation*. The (Pre-Oedipal) infant’s *state of being* is Winnicott’s core concern. For him, development does not ride essentially on conflict and its resolution, but more on being and its continuity.

III. F. Self Psychology, Relational and Intersubjective Perspectives

In other psychoanalytic models – mainly those based on self and object relations – issues relating to conflict have a minor role in understanding psychopathology and in carrying on an analytic treatment (Busch 2005; Canestri 2005; Smith 2005). In this model, instead of conflict, what is taken into account for explaining severe psychopathologies is a deficit that takes place in the early undifferentiated stages of development.

Self Psychology and post Self Psychology developments (Kohut 1977; Ornstein and Ornstein 2005) as well as, relational and intersubjective schools (Harris 2005), question the centrality of unconscious intrapsychic conflict; instead, they ascribe severe psychopathologies to *psychic deficit*, thus extending the origins of psychopathology to the stages of development in which the differentiation between self-representation and object-representation has not yet been established.

Hence, also the differentiation of the three psychic structures in which conflict develops (the id, the ego, and the superego) becomes faulty. According to this view, the needs at stake in the pathological process refer mainly to developmental failures: traumatic suffering, losses and, in general, the absence of an emotionally responsive object impair the development of the

ego structure; this result implies much more than impairments resultant from derivatives of libidinal and aggressive drives.

Unlike the pathology based on conflict, that takes place among systems (inter-systemic), pathology based on deficit is referred to failures in the *structure of the self* (intra-systemic). Concerns about developmental failures and deficit psychopathology are widely shared among contemporary post-Freudian and post-Kleinian psychoanalytic schools. Even without fully rejecting conflict, these concerns have challenged the state of monopoly, which the concept of conflict has occupied in traditional theory. Conflict is no longer considered as important as it was in the past. What most influenced the decrease of its importance is the focus upon the role played by the real object over the construction of the psychic structure that has been damaged by a traumatic relationship resulting in deficits of function; this view is supported by a large amount of data on childhood trauma.

For many contemporary psychoanalytic schools, the concept of conflict is not overly rejected but somehow marginalized and supplemented by the concept of deficit, thus widening the scope of psychopathological understanding and, accordingly, of clinical technique. Widening the scope of psychopathological understanding – that is conceiving psychic suffering not only as a consequence of conflict but also as organized around a damaged self-structure – results in a corresponding widening of classical psychoanalytic approach: while this is based on recognition of conflict, followed by interpretation and working through it, analytic strategies inspired by deficit issues aren't intended at searching and unveiling repressed meanings, at overcoming resistance, but rather at assisting the ego in establishing meaning and in feeling that something has the quality of being (Killingmo 1989).

In the different interpersonal, intersubjective, and relational perspectives developing in the past three decades, there has been significant attention paid to the presence and function of *conflicts* that may be *intersubjective and inter-relational*, internally and externally derived, and, in many instances, transgenerational.

Relational theories find the potency of conflict in the individual's encounter with the culture at many levels. Conflicts are likely to emerge as individuals are engaged by, become subject to, or resist, the cultural surround; particularly this becomes the case when the individual inhabits or is inhabited by any of the many forms of non-normative identities and personhoods (race, class, sexuality, disability, culture and gender). Contested forms of identification are at the forefront of many clinical concerns encountered with patients and are expressed in patient anguish and in difficulty in the transference-countertransference matrix.

In his book "Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration", Mitchell (1988) elaborated on conflicts among different relational configurations, derived from conflictual experiences with significant others. Cautioning against simplification, he stated several years later in a "Commentary": "... to portray my view of conflict as conflict between the person and other people in his or her environment is a bewildering misrepresentation. In fact, one of the central points in my 1988 book was to distinguish between relational theories centered on developmental arrests and relational-conflict theories..." (Mitchell, 1995, p. 577). In the work

of Dimen (2003), Layton (1998), Harris, (2005), Corbett (2001a, 2001b), and Goldner (2003), and others, conflict is always located inside *and* between systems, political and personal, social and psychic. From this perspective, influenced by postmodernism, feminism, and queer theory, there is an inherent conflict between regimes of surveillance and those supporting individuality and health, and between normativity and freedom. These contradictions, which in political theory are sometimes posed as structuring conflicts of class, ethnicity, culture or gender are often lived out in countertransference conflicts experienced by the analyst.

In Harris' (2005) view, postmodern psychoanalysts are striving to realize a particular vision of paradox or conflict in which a number of distinct but interrelated self states can coexist—those of healer, psychoanalytic police officer, subject and object of theory, and one who is the subject of, and is subject to, particular cultures, subgroups, and families. From a number of theoretical perspectives, conflict (intersubjective, intrapsychic, and enacted) is attendant on the process of change itself. Conflict is an inherent aspect of developmental movement and such movements (macro or micro) are charged with powerful experiences of disequilibrium. *Change* itself is a potentially complex conflictual state: multidirectional and unstable. Conflicts that emerge in the conditions of psychic or *relational transformations* are produced by many different affect states and relational vertices.

One central idea is that the person in conflict feels in the grips of two impossible 'errands' (Apprey, 2015). Growth will entail separation, and separation from dead or dying objects can feel intolerable. Change can be thought of as the moment when a conflict over psychic tasks and mental freedom creates a dangerous point of struggle or even impasse. Whether we call this the abyss or the edge of chaos, or a dramatic fear laden journey of separation, for some, perhaps in some way for all patients, this is a point of maximal conflict and danger. One can see this in the wax and wane of progress in analysis and the reversals and panics when psychic shifts begin or catch momentum. Willy and Madeleine Barangers' (2006, 2009a,b) Field Theory concept of a spiral process and Bion's (1965) notions of catastrophe and of transformation, present important roots for relational approaches. The catastrophe of change (Goldberg, 2008) and the forms of movement and psychic shift are both the site of mourning and the site of impasses in mourning.

These ideas connect to a powerful set of concepts, which have been developed by J. Henri Rey. In his article "That which Patients Bring to Analysis" (Rey, 1988), Rey argues that patients may arrive in treatment with a hidden agenda – an errand as Apprey (2015) might say – which is to repair the damaged objects in their history now part of a dying or damaged internal world, in short: Heal the object (of internal fantasy) and then the patient can change. This is the impossible conflictual bind in which many treatments unfold. In the spirit of relational theorizing about the potent role of countertransference and the analyst's subjectivity, one can turn Rey's lens on the analyst's unconscious task as well. Approaching the question of anxious resistance to change and the conflict-tinged determination to spoil growth, one must ask the same questions about the presence of such fears and conflicts in the analyst's countertransference. Relational analysts have put a very strong focus on the instrumentality of

countertransference and the powerful ways the analyst's process disrupts and/or facilitates psychic change in the patient.

Looking at relational writing with an eye to the place or function of conflict, it is important to note that other terminologies and other conceptual preoccupations fill the theoretical spaces where conflict might arise. Dimen (2003) and Hoffman (1998), for example, prefer the term *dialectic*. Both are interested in the productive tensions that appear under certain conditions of contradiction, primarily between analyst and analysand, but internally in either member of the dyad as well. It is important to stress that contradiction is not simply disagreement or difference; rather, through various interactions, intrapsychic conflict can be triggered and developed, and vice versa. Intrapsychic conflict can produce external conflicts that are lived out interpersonally. For Hoffman (1998), the fundamental source of conflict is neither sex nor aggression, but rather our deeply conflictual relation to mortality. Yet in one striking analogy, conflict – internal to the analyst, at the outset – between “working by the book” and working spontaneously is compared to the conflict experienced by the child between Oedipal rival and love object. This analogy suggests how inevitably indebted any analyst is to the view of the centrality of sex and aggression to conflict, although these conflicts erupt in shifting states of affect (Spezzano 1998), intersubjective space (Benjamin 1995, 1998) or relational constellations (Davies 1998, 2001).

Benjamin (1998) argues for a fluid, shifting focus on the intrapsychic and the interpersonal, in which motivation exists on both an interpersonal level and in the service of relatedness and narcissistic needs. If there is a dual theory here, it is object relational/relational. The preference for a term like *dialectic* is more than rhetorical. For Hoffman and Dimen, *dialectic* captures the dialogic, active, and interactive aspects of the protean character of conflictual experience. *Dialectics* offers the sense of a *dialogue among alternatives*, a registry of multiple voices, whether choral, harmonic, atonal or of the call-and-response type. For Dimen, the form and function of conflictual life within the realm of sexuality attests to fecundity, surprise, excess, and irreducible trouble.

On the other hand, conflict is relegated to a footnote in Stern's (1997) book, where the author explains that the absence of explicit use of the term *conflict* signals its use as a *background supposition* of less formal interest than the shifting states of psychic experience. This is quite like the use to which Bromberg (1998) and Davies (1998, 2001) put the term. Conflict, for Bromberg, usually appears in the context of dissociation (see Smith 2000a, for a discussion of the intersection of, and differences between, dissociation and conflict in Bromberg's work). Bromberg's working model stresses the expansion of the experiential relational field so that conflict *becomes* discernible. Stern's view is that conflict is an achievement because it heralds the moment when Non-self becomes self. And once conflict is possible about material that had been dissociated, a process of negotiation can take place between the newly minted self-state and other self-states. What had been unthinkable can now be thought and felt, and what to do about it can be considered. Prior to this when that material was dissociated, it could neither be thought nor felt and so what to do about it could not even arise as a question. In subsequent publications, particularly in the article "The eye sees itself"

from 2004, Stern laid out the idea that from a dissociation-based theory of mind, conflict is an achievement, not inevitability. However, from this perspective, unconscious conflict is deemed impossible. With the unconscious as unformulated, there is nothing with enough structure in the unconscious to conflict with something else. From this point of view, also the notion of unconscious fantasy/phantasy may need revision if it applies to anything unconscious and structured at the same time.

If the unconscious is unformulated, unconscious meaning is not a form or a structure, but a potentiality – what might become conscious experience. The idea is connected with *dissociation*, which in Stern's frame of reference is the unconscious insistence, for unconscious defensive reasons, on maintaining experience in its potential or unformulated state. Dissociation is the unconscious refusal to think, to make meaning. Hence, dissociated experience simply can't conflict with any other part of mind because it has not yet attained the kind of symbolic form or realization in which in it *could* conflict.

The conflict is present between the two people, not internal to either mind. The two minds are like the two parts of a cleanly broken plate: they fit together, but each partner has only one of the parts. In the resolution of an enactment, the external conflict becomes internal in the mind of one participant and that provokes a similar development in the other mind. Internal conflict comes about for the first time this way. And that is why conscious conflict is an achievement.

Stern, Davies, and Bromberg place conflict within a model of multiple and shifting self states, where it is lived out in dissociated and discontinuous experiences, in ruptures in going-on-being. The apprehension of internal conflict, in a Brombergian treatment, is made possible by the creation of an interpersonal field in which the analysand can tolerate being seen by another person and can borrow or absorb that observational capacity.

Awareness of conflict is an emergent feature of this kind of relational work, requiring the establishment of conditions of interpersonal safety such that dissociated material can be held in awareness. Davies's attention to unconscious conflict is a nuanced attunement to shifting forms of identifications (partial and whole), played out in various permutations in the analytic relationship. One of her signature images is that of the kaleidoscope, suggesting the protean, changing experience of multiple identifications, as well as the subtle shifts introduced by the experience of conflict that lead to radical reorganizations. The conflict lies between such shifting states.

Conflict in Aron's (1996) conception of *mutual meaning-making* could arise from two sources: either the divided experiences of subjectivity that come from interaction and symbolization, or from experiences of recognition and solitude that arise in various interactions (Benjamin 1995, 1998; Slavin and Kriegman 1992). One type of acute conflict, from Aron's perspective, is located in the interpersonal and intrapsychic realm of the analyst and analysand, and that is the conflict between the wish for recognition and the wish for distinctiveness, uniqueness, and separation. In fact, this is a conflict less of wishes than it is of relational transactions, a clash between paradigms of relatedness. Any theory of conflict must entail some

theory of motivation (Harris 2005). One of the foundational theorists of the relational perspective, Greenberg (1991), feels the need to retain a concept of drive in order to talk about function. Mitchell's (1997, 2000) work followed a trajectory similar to the Fairbairn's model of relational conflict, moving on to Loewald's interest in attachment and development. Mitchell's view came to be that one is not drawn into, but rather is always already embedded in, interactive matrices.

It is not, perhaps, that relationalists eschew drive theory, but instead one might say – in the spirit of Ghent (2002) – that they view drive as having a lowercase *d*. Ghent's motivational ideas owe a debt to Edelman (1987), who imagines that human experience begins with quite simple, uninflected, primitive behaviors (turning to light and warmth, for example) that gradually become imbued with what Edelman terms *values*. In a developmental cascade that quickly becomes complex, small, subtle experiences (not consciously intentional) emerge as elaborated motivational systems. Sexuality, aggression and safety are outcomes, not preset engines of development. According to Edelman, conflict is emergent, not preset at an unconscious level. Ghent and Harris think of conflict through the lens of nonlinear dynamic system theory, or chaos theory, in which conflict is the very provocative initiator of change. Within chaos theory, there is a theory of transformation. Disequilibrium arises out of conflict. Conflict is a source of change, movement, and understanding. Conflict in the service of growth or transformation takes different forms. Conflict, even at the unconscious level, between ways of being or ways of relating, can usher in a destabilization of pattern and negotiated experience. But there is a point in analytic work at which conflictual contradictions, either of mental representations or of object relations, are held in mind unflinchingly—a point where conflict may hover just at the edge of chaos. This is perhaps most acutely present in work with patients experiencing mourning and object loss.

III. G. French Lacanian Perspective

To explore the role of *conflict* in Lacan's work, a term that has no particular currency as such within Lacan's writing and teaching, David Lichtenstein (Christian, Eagle & Wolitzky, 2017; pp.177-194) looks instead to the idea of subjective *division* and the structure of that division as Lacan sees it. In so doing, he illustrates both what it is in Lacan's work that derives from the classical idea of intrapsychic conflict and what departs from it.

A fundamental concept in Lacan's theory of the divided subject is that of lack. The word in French, *manqué*, conveys both 'loss' and 'lack' but also 'void' and 'emptiness'. Lacan viewed the psychic encounter with loss as essential to the formation of the human subject. Indeed, the subject as such comes into being by encountering and representing loss and without it the formation of the subject does not occur. This is essential in Lacan's theory of the subject. It is rooted in Freud's view of primal repression as expressed in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (Freud, 1920) and takes this process as being essential to the formation of subjectivity *per se*. The 'primary experience of satisfaction' that Freud refers to is a mythic point of origin since there is no representation of it and thus no experience of it in the psyche

until it is lost. The effort to regain this lost moment is a defining principle of subjectivity. It is rooted in the human capacity for representation and in this sense at the core of this distinctly human function is the principle of lack, i.e. of lost satisfaction. There is a dialectic relation in Lacan's thought here that draws upon Freud: the primary repression of the lost satisfaction can only occur once there is a representation to be repressed, but there can only be a representation of it as already lost, that is repression and representation must arise together: the lost object comes into being *as already lost*.

One consequence of Lacan's placing loss at the core of the subject's being is that it subverts any idea of the infant as a purely natural creature living outside of culture. The idea of an instinctual infant expressing innate patterns of behavior, including attachment patterns, is far from Lacan's idea of the subject as inscribed in culture from the beginning of its existence. Theories of conflict in psychoanalysis generally focus on the experience of pleasure vs. unpleasure and efforts to resolve the conflicts between the two. Necessarily this implies a theory of 'wishing,' of motivation, intention, or desire. The latter term, desire, and indeed the conceptual relationship between *desire* and *wish*, play fundamental roles in Lacanian thought and shed light on the implicit function of intrapsychic conflict within that thought.

The French word *désir* is an adequate translation of the German *Wunsch*, the word generally used by Freud and translated as *wish* in English. However, *désir* also renders the German *Begierde* (*Begehren*) which is the word that generally appears in Hegel's texts, a more complex one than *Wunsch*, and one suggesting an intensity beyond that of a wish, i.e., passion, greed, or lust. Both Freud's *Wunsch* and Hegel's *Begierde* are connoted by Lacan's *désir* and both could be represented in English by the word *desire* but not as well by the English word *wish*. In considering the contrasting terms *wish* and *desire*, we encounter differences regarding the function of phantasy and indeed the unconscious itself. Brenner's idea that the original wishes are essentially realistic and only become repressed phantasies out of conflict with more powerful wishes, i.e. for avoiding disapproval, etc. is entirely different from Lacan's idea of the inception of desire as unconscious phantasy: unconscious phantasy that may be conveyed by various discreet wishes.

The divided subject requests help from the analyst, he/she asks for help to reduce painful or unpleasant experience. However, the analysis proceeds to address what else these requests may mean. To do otherwise, to turn immediately toward an effort to reduce the unpleasure, *forecloses* the possibility of analysis. The inescapable conclusion is that there is some other wish in this request for help, and perhaps a wish that is oriented around the idea of the all-knowing analyst and the gifts that the knowing analyst will bestow (i.e., in transference). This other wish reflects the division between the (conscious) request and the (unconscious) desire. All clinical psychoanalytic work occurs on the axis of this division. In French, a request is *une demande*. Hence this division in the subject of psychoanalysis tends to be addressed in the English translations of Lacanian thought as that *between demand and desire*.

The distinction *between demand and desire* is similar to the familiar distinction between manifest and latent content but it is not exactly the same. For Lacan, the manifest content of the demand is less important than its logic. The demand has the logic of an imagined solution

to the lack: “If I could have what I want I would be complete.” Because the wish carries the implication of an imagined wholeness, it is *narcissistic* in form. It presumes an imaginary repair for the imagined injury. That is why it is frustrated in a successful analysis. In frustrating this demand for an imaginary solution, the analyst directs the treatment instead toward the expression of new metaphors of the lack, new expressions of desire. There is a resonance in this view both with Hans Loewald’s (1960) notion of the new object in analysis and perhaps with the familiar ego psychological notion about the creation of new compromise formations. The Lacanian view of this new possibility relies upon the essential difference between the structure of desire as an ongoing symbolic expression of inescapable lack and that of demand as a belief in completeness, integration, or healing as a solution to lack. Although the two intentions are different in their structure and logic, it is impossible to encounter a pure expression of desire except as it is both expressed and hidden in demand.

Desire never appears in a pure declarative form. A request for help, for advice, for affection, for support, for love will necessarily be the vehicle for conveying something beyond that request on the register of unconscious desire. And the occasion for that desire will always occur in the here and now as an expression of an interpersonal request (demand). Thus, if it makes sense to think of desire and demand as in conflict: it is a dialectical conflict whereby only in taking them together can one find something new. The analyst’s role is not to heal or even suture this division, but to listen for it, to make the analysand aware of it, and to indicate that the path through whatever symptomatic impasse has motivated the analysand’s request for analysis is to be found there. It is akin to what Hans Loewald referred to as the “aware appropriation of the interplay and communication between unconscious and conscious modes of mentation and desire,” (1978, p. 50-51). The key that links Loewald’s view with Lacan’s is the phrase *modes of mentation*. It is not the content that differentiates desire and demand, or even id and ego; it is the mode by which it is represented.

Listening for the expression of desire behind the apparent meaning of the demand suggests that the analyst ought not to focus entirely on understanding but should be listening instead to ways of expression (modes of mentation) that run alongside the manifest meaning. The question remains whether anything is gained by viewing the listening process in terms of the dialectic between desire and demand rather than, for example, the more traditional psychoanalytic categories of drive derivatives and defenses. The Lacanian idea of marking the expressions of desire, punctuating the discourse of the analysand in various ways so as to indicate that something else was said beyond the intended discourse, is very sensitive to the particular analyst’s way of listening and intervening. In clinical technique, informed by these ideas, the expression of desire in speech always partakes of the figurative substitutions and subversions of expected meaning that are made possible by the structure of language. Interpreting id as opposed to ego contents is not what is at stake in listening to the expression of desire. It is instead listening for the character of the utterance, for its capacity to evoke the over determined play of meanings, that is a better guide to how the analyst facilitates the subversion of the imaginary certainties. All explanatory interventions, whether they are intended to address defense or drive derivatives, run the risk of grounding the discourse in the

certainty of identifications, of an objectification of the subject that blocks the play of meaning that is the calling card of desire.

III. H. Non-Lacanian French Authors

Jean Laplanche (2004) proposed a theory of psychic conflict, which rests on his theory of the unconscious and the drives, centering on the primordial relation to the adult other, the sender of enigmatic (unconscious sexual) messages.

Starting from the pivotal *opposition of love and hate*, Laplanche proposes that there exists, at the level of the sexual unconscious, an opposition between the unbound (erotic) sexuality and bound (narcissistic and/or object-related) sexuality, both on a level of unconscious fantasy. Both are in a dialectical relation to the pre-psychic level of self-preservation, indicating the pre-existence of some psycho-physiological ‘wiring’, characterized by natural tenderness and aggressivity. In human infants, such ‘wiring’ is immediately invaded by the enigmatic messages of the other. At the level of self-preservative functioning, one could situate tenderness (Freud's term), or attachment. The second level is that of the erotic, whose description dates from the Three Essays. Finally, the third is that of the love of the total object, of Eros at once narcissistic and object-related (Laplanche 2004, p. 468). The messages of adults do not keep to a single, consistent level - that of care and tenderness. In this situation of a close physical contact, the sexual fantasies of parents awaken and force or insinuate themselves into the heart of the self-preservative relation. The messages are ‘compromised’ - in the psychoanalytic sense of the term - and are so in a way that is unconscious to the sender himself. The child who tries to master these enigmatic messages goes to recover them via the codes he has available. In this sense, the so-called death drive is in effect that ‘pure culture’ of otherness that we detect in the deepest layers of the unconscious. This is certainly so in the most inaccessible layers of the id. But very soon, from the activity of the ego and with the help of the cultural environment, there appear fragmentary scenes, pieces of fantasmatic sequences, which will be progressively absorbed by the great organizational forces, the complexes of the Oedipus and castration.

The forces of binding in the psyche are no less sexual than the other forces. Nevertheless, they always take as their source certain totalities: the totality of the fellow human as unified being; the totality of the ego, of its form and its ideas.

Thus, in the grandiose opposition of life and death drives, the *opposition of binding and unbinding* is at work on the inside of the psychical apparatus. The newborn child strives to translate the seductive, enigmatic messages of the adult, without allowing too great an unbinding of the stimulus. From then on, the battle for binding is waged against the internal other - the unconscious and its offshoots (Laplanche 2004).

André Green's (1975, 1998) conceptualizations of the 'dead mother', 'work of the negative', the 'analytic object', dynamic interconnectedness between the object and the drive, intrapsychic and intersubjective, 'antagonistic cooperation' between the representation and affect, are firmly rooted in the notion of either *localized psychic conflict* or more *general conflict state*.

Green proposed gathering together such defense mechanisms as repression, splitting, disavowal, foreclosure or rejection and negation, in his formulation of the concept of the *work of the negative*, because he sees all of them as elaborations of the prototypical repression. In his view, all of them imply a judgment and acceptance or refusal: a question whose answer is yes and/or no. This question may be grounded in different contexts, dealing with various materials (instinctual impulses, affects, representations, perceptions, words, etc.). Among the various defense mechanisms, this group is different from the others because its constituents directly imply this basic choice of acceptance or refusal in the consciousness of derivatives that are rooted in the unconscious or the id.

Writing on the borderline psychotic patients, Green notes two mechanisms, which lead to *psychic blindness*: somatic exclusion, where the regression dissociates the conflict from the psychic sphere to the soma, and expulsion (of the conflict) via action, its psychomotor counterpart. Additionally, splitting and decahexis present borderline patients' dilemma of delusion or death (of the psychic process). Here, Increased attention to the subtleties of communication, optimal balance between unintrusive presence and absence, on part of the analyst, allowing for potential symbolization and representation processes to emerge, is called for.

Drawing and expanding on Freud, Winnicott, and Lacan in her theory of childhood psychosis, **Piera Aulagnier** identified three levels of representation: primal pictogram primary process fantasy, and secondary process ideation. Primary process is activated to symbolize and represent the recognition of the existence of another body's presence and absence. In this function, it conflicts with the primal process (pictograms, created for themselves by themselves), which recognizes only one psychic space. The function of the primary process fantasy is to resolve this conflict (2001, p.40-42).

In her study of '*Agieren*', **Joyce McDougall** (1980) notes the English translation 'acting out' accurately reflects a two-fold notion of an economic order: first something is put outside (of oneself or of the analytic situation) which should have been kept in and dealt with psychologically; subsequently, tension is being drained out or away so that nothing of the internal conflict remains. Anxious or depressive affects, which might otherwise overwhelm the individual's capacity to cope with them, are kept out of consciousness. In McDougall's theory, it is a mechanism of '*foreclosure*', approximating Freudian '*repudiation from the psyche*' (different from repression or denial) that mediates the economic maneuver of acting-out and discharge of tension.

In her exploration of psychosomatic phenomena, McDougall describes that psychic conflict is disavowed and thrown out of the psyche to be discharged through the body and its somatic functioning instead. She theorizes that at the beginning of psychic life the body is experienced as an object belonging to the external world. This state of perception continues to exist in dream-life and in certain psychotic states, in which the whole body, or “certain of its zones and functions, are treated as independent entities, as belonging to, or under the domination of Another” (McDougall 1980, p.419).

IV. USAGE OF THE CONCEPT IN LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, many enriching contributions in the areas of *consequences of psychic conflict*, both in the structuring of the psychic apparatus, clinical manifestations and the theory of technique present creative syntheses of Freud, Klein, Bion, and non-Lacanian French Authors., especially Laplanche, Green, Aulagnier, and McDougall.

Although a conflict is discernible in Pichon Riviere’s Perceptual Operational Referential Scheme (ECRO), Racker’s theory of Concordant and Complementary Countertransference, and Lieberman’s Theory of Communication (Borensztein 2014), the most relevant examples of Latin American authors’ thinking on conflict may be illustrated in the contributions of Angel Garma, Arnaldo Rascovsky, Maurice Abadi, and Norberto Carlos Marucco. .

IV. A. Ángel Garma

For **Ángel Garma**, the main conflict takes place between the Ego and the Superego; he follows in this conceptualization the idea held by Freud in "The Ego and the Id" whereby the severity of the neurosis is proportional to the severity of the superego. Moreover, if sleep is the model of the constitution of every transaction, a modification in the conception of the form of production thereof will necessarily have repercussions in the mechanism of the epigenetic theory of the symptomatology.

Garma redraws the mode of ‘conformation’ of the dreams, from the structural theory point of view. In the situation of sleeping, the ego regresses and, as a consequence of that, the censorship is relaxed, which in the daytime life used to keep the contents of the Id unconscious, which can now be expressed with fewer inhibitions. This gives rise to a situation that is equivalent to trauma: An Ego with a symbolic deficit is confronted with highly charged (cathected) and distressing contents, such as the primal scene, anguish of castration, parricide, etc. Faced with such a state of affairs, the dreamer's ego can only cover up said contents,

appealing to the defense mechanisms. One of the modes of deformation is the fulfillment of desires. (1978, pp. 71-78). Every dream turns out to be, thus, a "masked nightmare" (in: *Raskovsky de Salvarezza* 1974, p. 142). Previously, Garma reviewed and posited a reversal of some of Freud's conceptualization on dreams and hallucinatory processes, in relation to trauma and reality testing (Garma, 1946, 1966, 1969). He concluded: "It must be clearly understood that the subject suffering from a traumatic neurosis hallucinates because he is unable either to reject or control by muscular innervation or ego countercathexes the psychological contents referring to the trauma i.e. the internal memories of the trauma, which arise spontaneously within him in the days following the trauma. These contents act very intensively within him for some duration of time, and cannot be avoided, thus causing him to suffer hallucinations in which he experiences the intense memories of what has happened to him not as a mere memory but as something real and external which is happening to him at that very moment" (Garma, 1969, pp. 488-489). In this context it then follows that "Dreams are hallucinations during sleep caused by the traumatic impact on the weakened ego of the sleeper of hitherto repressed psychic contents which the sleeping ego, being unable to control, thus accepts as real and forces into disguise, thus seeking to alleviate painful psychic tensions" (ibid, p. 491).

The dream theory formulated in this way required the elaboration of a metapsychology of trauma from the structural theory point of view as well: "[...] the psyche of the traumatized can be considered divided into several instances: one, which is a parasitic instance created by an intense trauma that compels repetition, another, which is a Self submissive to that instance that repeats what is demanded, another, which is a healthy and sound Ego that ... defends itself ... from the compulsion to repetition and attempts to manage the instinctive forces (1978, p. 116). Later, the "parasitic instance" is called superego (1978, p. 118). In this way, "neuroses are conditioned by a detrimental superego, reflecting a harmful external reality, subjecting the ego, forcing it to behave inappropriately and preventing it from managing the id in a harmonious way" (1978, pp. 118-119).

In any neurotic symptom (on an individual as well as group level), a combination and conflictual interaction of *forces that impose repetition* and others that lead to their '*masking*', as Freud (1939) stated in "Moses and Monotheism" is highlighted in Garma's theorizing.

In this context, Garma also redefines the concept of drives of life and death in relation to conceptualization of *conflicts in masochism*. In his view, life and death drives are not elemental forces, but they are the result of experiences encountered and internalized during the structuring of the psyche. Referring to the nations, which, following Freud can be interpreted as being analogical to a neurotic individual, Garma develops his conceptualization of the erotic and thanatic drives: "Among the reactions from past experiences that persist in the reactions of the present, some of them push any nation towards progress and well-being, while others, on the other hand, are more destructive and cause suffering, so that in a psychoanalytic theory it is possible to state, in a simplified way, that in a nation there are progressive, vital, tendencies or impulses and others that are regressive, self-destructive or deathly" (1978, p. 47). Pursuing the same subject elsewhere, he states: "... [these] are based on considering pathological

behaviors (...) as consecutive to their submissions and to aggressions directed against internalized persecuting objects, (...) which are mainly directed against genitality. In turn, those internal persecuting objects come from submission to their current, childlike and hereditary circumstances that are and have been harmful" (*in: Raskovsky de Salvarezza* (1974, p. 169).

Conceptualizing of the *superego as a set of persecuting objects directed against genitality* of the subject, taking in consideration the centrality of the oedipal conflict and, furthermore, the death instinct as a result of the internalization of destructive experiences for the individual, the superego is an integral part of the instinct of death. For Garma, therefore, masochism is the fundamental element in neurogenesis.

IV. B. Arnaldo Rascovsky

Arnaldo Rascovsky extends this conception further when he locates the origin of all psychopathological behavior within the realm of filicidal tendencies of the subject's parents. Consequently, his understanding of the psychopathology follows from the understanding of *filicide*, as "(...) all the parental actions that disturb the psychosomatic integration of the child within different items that we synthesize with the following denominations: murder, mutilation, denigration, mistreatment, neglect and abandonment" (1974, p.316). Such a filicidal action is continued in the relation of the Ego to the super-ego. The parricidal tendencies are secondary to the filicidal ones and obey the mechanism of identification with the aggressor (1974, p. 314). Rascovsky traces the expressions of filicide in the mythologies of various peoples and in the Bible, which he finally considers as the foundation of the monotheist conception and the sociocultural process (1981).

IV. C. Mauricio Abadi

Mauricio Abadi develops in his book "Renacimiento de Edipo" (1977) a re-reading of the Oedipus Complex from a new interpretation of the "Oedipus King" of Sophocles. As a result of this new conception of the nuclear complex, the elements that intervene in the conflict are other than those established classically. For Abadi, the motivation for all behavior is the *anguish of death*. In turn, any attempt to interpret the manifestations of a subject can only be understood in a triadic dynamic. The characters of the father, mother, and son, present in the Freudian conception of the Oedipus are replaced by roles, which, as such, can be simultaneously or successively occupied by any of the factual figures. These roles are the following: the retentive, the extractive and the filial role. If the fundamental anguish is that of death, both for the father and for the mother, what assures the survival, imaginarily, is the possession of the child. In this way, the fantasy of eternal pregnancy is, for both sexes, universal. Concealed by the patriarchal organization, male envy accompanies the possibility of women becoming pregnant. This is the origin of the custom 'couvade', well documented in

several primitive cultures, whereby the prospective father mimics the labor and delivery while his wife is giving birth.

The model chosen by Abadi to account for the way in which the three specific roles and the specific anxieties that accompany this dialectic are interrelated is that of birth, with the three moments: pregnancy, passage through the birth canal, and extrauterine life. The *conflict* develops along two axes: the struggle *between the sexes* and the struggle of the *parents against the child*. Father and mother fight for the possession of the son who, in this confrontation, is the bet. This struggle is commanded by two feelings: a feeling of love, that is to say, of striving for integrity, and a feeling of hatred, which seeks opposition and exclusion. The son, on the other hand, seeks to free himself from one parent, and for this he must establish an alliance with the other; the sexual appetite for one or other of the parents is the vehicle, the way in which the alliance - bond - is established. The retentive role tries to take over the son (eternal pregnancy) while the extractive role tries to create a union with the retained son to release him or, in turn, to possess him. The struggle of the sexes acquires in this way the sense of a disjunction: “in order for me to live, you must die”. The relationship of the father to the child is characterized by the paternal anguish of his own infertility and the consequent desire for theft of the son. The relation of the mother to the child is a link in which an attempt is made to procreate and then to retain her product, from which the father should be excluded.

The son tries to free himself from the confinement to which the mother condemns him and that causes anguish of death, due to the closure in which he is maintained. The evasion of the maternal prison is equivalent to a matricide and carries the blame of the birth and, correlatively, persecutory anguish in face of the fantasy of a devouring mother or a mother trying to return her product or her child to her uterus. For the son, the father is a liberator from the symbiosis in which the mother tries to maintain him; the father is also a guide and a model to hold himself on the outside. However, the bond with the father is ambivalent since the father desires, along with the liberation of the son, his annexation as a magical way of counteracting the anguish of death. In turn, the child, faced with the primal scene, experiences exclusion and tries, with a policy of alliances, to disband them to achieve his independence from one of the parents or both. Each one of the roles is ambivalent because each action unfolds in *the dialectic of the inside and the outside*, with each of these positions being a carrier of specific anguish: the inside is security, dependence, and prison, while the outside is freedom but also helplessness and abandonment. Therefore, the behavior of the son and the parents is both love and hate, since each of the protagonists of this drama strives, at the same time, to remain or return to an inside and to be free of the closure which threatens him in an imprisoning interior, with death escorting every movement of this dialectic.

IV. D. Norberto Carlos Marucco

In his reference to ‘dialectic’ in place of ‘conflict’, **Norberto Carlos Marucco** builds on Freud, Klein, Bion, Winnicott, Lacan, Laplanche and Green among others. Referring to his clinical experience with borderline patients, Marucco (1997) posits a revision of the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality and representation, based on *the dialectic between the sexual drive and the status of the object*. The author puts forward the idea of a psychic structure *split between disavowal of castration and creation of the virtual object* (nonpathological fetish), in which object choice and the conditions of love are based on the latter. The aim of analytic treatment in the author's view is to achieve a creative equilibrium between acknowledgement of castration and drive-preserving disavowal, a dialectic that is also the basis of a suggested theory of sublimation. The virtual object must be nurtured and metaphorically recreated in the analytic relationship. The dialectic of drive and object is also discussed in the context of sexuality and the transference. To avoid the danger of idealization of the object, the author contends that Oedipal sexuality must be allowed to unfold in the erotic transference, the analyst at times taking the place of the pre-oedipal object.

V. CONCLUSION

Owing to his creativity and insight, Freud changed his own theories of conflict over time. After his death, diversity and controversy intensified, as exemplified by the polemical debates in wartime England between the followers of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. The complex post-Freudian psychoanalytic landscape of Europe reflected to some degree the situation of the British – with their Freudian, Kleinian and Independent traditions with their respective views on the centrality of conflict, admixed with the increasingly influential French perspectives.

With the influx of prominent European analysts escaping the Nazis, particularly those close to Sigmund and Anna Freud, post-Freudian North American psychoanalysis was first systematized under the rubric of ego psychology, with its emphasis on inter-systemic and intra-systemic structural conflicts. By the 1970s, coincident with the death of Heinz Hartmann, the “Hartmann Era” was quietly becoming history, and the era of pluralism in theory and practice arrived.

Across the continents, the growing influences of the British Object Relations theories of Klein, Bion and Winnicott; the French Lacanian and non-Lacanian perspectives, the synthesis of Freud with all the above in the work of the Latin American authors and the emergence of Kohut’s Self psychology, Relational and Intersubjective perspectives, together with the burgeoning of infant studies and advances in modern neuroscience, coincided with the

‘widening scope’ of psychoanalytic clinical practice, enriching psychoanalytic thought on conflict in many directions.

There was a shift from the early focus on oedipal conflict, towards new formulations of (pre-oedipal) conflicts involving developmentally earliest identificatory-projective and introjective processes of internalized dyadic object relations, separation anxiety, object loss, loss of the love of the object, loss of identity and loss of reality, with pertaining earliest stages of building psychic structure through representation and symbolization. Old controversies (and conflicts) about the importance of trauma vs. unconscious conflict, together with the polarization of fantasy (phantasy) vs. reality, biological and constitutional endowment vs. environment and conflict vs. deficit, were newly re-examined, and have been only gradually integrated into the contemporary version of a complex ‘complemental series’ paradigm. The new paradigm is exemplified by converging trends within the recent post-Freudian, post-Kleinian, post-Bionian models as well as synthetic models attempting to integrate pre-oedipal and oedipal levels of organization pertaining to conflict and neurobiological development.

Current greater appreciation of theoretical plurality and perplexity in regard to the conflict has been salutary for psychoanalytic thought and practice. Modern neuroscience confirms that most of our mental activity is unconscious and that mental life is rife with conflict. Despite dire predictions to the contrary, psychoanalysis continues to provide the deepest understanding of the human mind with its essential (explicitly or implicitly acknowledged, center-stage or background) conflicts.

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CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

Tri-Regional Entry

**First Edition 2017: Inter-Regional Editorial Board: Louis Brunet (North America);
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I. DEFINITION

Bion's concept of Container-Contained has been brought to light in "Learning from Experience" (Bion 1962 a) where containment is conceptualized as a stage of the process of creating a new thought after an emotional experience. Later, the concept was meant to analogize the situation of the analytic couple in terms of the mother-infant nursing situation. Thus, it encompasses seminal theory of the origins of thought in the mother-infant prototypical situation and the accompanying internally interactive experience transforming the baby's experience of distress from dread to knowing and thinking about it. This foundational experience is theorized as having developmental and clinical implications throughout the life cycle, particularly when the normative Container-Contained experiences are not able to be achieved.

The concept designates the mother not only as the donor of soothing and fulfilling milk, but also as a receptive organ which receives the infant's emotional pain and is able to soothe that pain for the infant and restore it to life-size management. In Bion's terms, most generally, it represents the transformation of distress from O (in its meaning of nameless dread) to K (knowledge), as in "now I can think about the unthinkable!"

From the evolution-of-theory point of view, the concept represents an extension of the theory of Projective Identification (see the separate entry), from a theory of primitive fantasy and defense, into a theory of a primitive form of communication necessary for the development of thinking.

As a relational model of mental functioning, the Containment process extends a linear reciprocal interplay between the pair of Container-Contained, with the following steps: a mental state ('content') is communicated from a sender to a receiver; the receiver potentially

‘contains’ and transforms it through psychic work; the transformed content, together with the ‘function of containing’ itself may be then re-introjected by the sender.

While the developmental prototype of this model is the mother-infant relationship, the concept is also applicable as a special kind of unconscious communication that takes place in both dyadic relationships and in groups as well as in the psychoanalytic process. It also applies to the understanding of intrapsychic processes, where the individual tries to contain, convert/transform, and convey his/her emotions in words.

In a clinical situation, the process of Containment has a special significance for understanding psychoanalytic processes and the first steps in the development of thinking/symbolizing. Technically, it means more than silently bearing the infant/patient’s screams, or other displays of suffering. Containment involves identification, transformation and interpretation in dealing with emotional experience.

The above multidimensional definition synthesizes and expands existing contemporary regional and international psychoanalytic dictionaries that include the term. Of note are subtle differences in emphasis among them: Alain de Mijolla’s (2002/2005) “International Psychoanalytic Dictionary” carries the entry Container/Contained by Claude Guillaume, who emphasizes the aspect of ‘becoming a psychic object’, i.e., “to become a psychic object, the projected element has to encounter a container, or a thinking function” p. 340); a related entry “Alpha function” by Hanna Segal highlights the functioning of the container, converting/transforming the sensory data into thoughts, i.e., “The mother’s receptivity to the child’s projective identification is a central factor in this process. Her receptivity is dependent upon what Bion called the maternal capacity for reverie—a dreamlike state whose contents are love for the child and its father” (p. 52). North American Salman Akhtar’s (2009) “Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychoanalysis” includes the term “Container” and related entries “Alpha Function” and “Theory of Thinking”. The focus here is on the mother’s and analyst’s role in the developmental and clinical process. In Latin America, the “Argentinian Psychoanalytic Dictionary”, edited by Claudia L. Borensztein (2014) does not include the term, but the renowned Bionian scholar Paulo Cesar Sandler’s (2005a) “The Language of Bion: A Dictionary of Concepts” provides a comprehensive exposition of “Container-Contained” from historical, theoretical, developmental, dynamic and inter-disciplinary perspectives. He brings up the paradoxical nature of the concept, in which “something that contains and something that is contained perform the functions of containing, and being contained vis-à-vis each other” (Sandler 2005, p. 160). Sandler’s emphasis is on Container-Contained defining a “function of the personality” as well as an “element of psychoanalysis”, and being a form of relationship “from the inception of life that allows emotional growth and the growth of the thinking process”, through which “meaning is obtained,” thereby becoming “equated to thinking itself” (ibid p. 160). Sandler situates Container-Contained model as the most developed form of Bion’s Theory of thinking, historically inspired by many of Freud’s developmental-dynamic and clinical conceptualizations (1895, 1900, 1911, 1915, 1926, 1933, 1937), while directly deriving from Melanie Klein’s theory of Projective Identification.

What follows is the comprehensive exposition of the concept in its evolution, including many facets of its proliferation in contemporary psychoanalytic theory and clinical usage.

II. ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT

In “The Interpretation of Dreams” Freud (1900) presents his conceptions about the development of the ability to think, from the experience of hunger (somatic need) experienced by the infant, which ends with the experience of satisfaction arising from external help, giving rise to a perception of nutrition, whose mnemic image is associated, from then on, to the mnemic trace of the excitement generated by the need:

A hungry baby screams or kicks helplessly... A change can only come about if in some way or other (in the case of the baby, through outside help) an ‘experience of satisfaction’ can be achieved which puts an end to the internal stimulus. (Freud, 1900, p. 565).

The connection between the experience of deprivation and the memory of the experience of satisfaction moves the psyche in the sense of re-cathecting the mnemic image of perception and re-evoking the perception itself, to restore the original satisfaction, which corresponds to the desire. The reappearance of perception is the fulfillment of desire, the cathecting of perception, that is, a primitive form of satisfaction by hallucination, according to the primary processes. The Bionian concept of containment is correlated, in the Freudian model, with secondary processes that evolve from sensory ‘perceptual identity’ (raw, unsymbolized elements, “beta”) to ‘thought identity’ (dream elements with symbolic quality, connected to senses, via condensation, displacement, representability and secondary elaboration, analogous to “alpha” elements). In summary, the containing function concerns the development from a primitive psychic apparatus (reflex), to a gradually greater containment, resulting from thinking. According to Freud (1900):

Accordingly, thinking must aim at freeing itself more and more from exclusive regulation by the unpleasure principle and at restricting the development of affect in thought-activity to the minimum required for acting as a signal. The achievement of this greater delicacy in functioning is aimed at by means of a further hypercathexis, brought about by consciousness. (Freud, 1900, p. 602).

Indirectly influential were also Freud’s conceptualizations of *transformation of pleasure ego into reality ego* (1911), re-transcription of memory and *transformation of meaning in Nachträglichkeit* (1895,1918), *thing and word presentation* (1900, 1915), *transformation of traumatic anxiety into signal anxiety* (1926), *constructions in analysis* (1937) and others.

The concept of Containment has its **direct roots** in the 1940’s England with the clinical research on schizophrenia (psychotic thought disorder), studied by Melanie Klein and her

followers Herbert Rosenfeld, Hanna Segal and Wilfred R. Bion. (The term may also link to Bion's experience as a war time tank commander. Containment as a military term implies restricting and minimizing conflict on the battlefield without necessarily eradicating it, thus making it more manageable. "Canton" from its French etymology means a territorial division within a country. A related word "cantonment" refers to a permanent military station in Britain and its former colonies in South Asia, less commonly so in the United States.)

Klein's "Notes on Schizoid Mechanisms" (1946) elucidated her view on the pathological fixation point of schizophrenia in the primitive early phase of infant life, from birth to 3 months, what she called the "paranoid-schizoid" position. In this position part-object relations, persecutory and annihilation anxiety, and primitive defense mechanisms such as splitting, projective identification, denial and omnipotence are active. Rosenfeld (1959, 1969) particularly deepened the understanding of projective identification in his clinical studies (1950-1970). He revealed the process in the patient's infantile, primitive world: patients project the inner objects, part objects and conflictual parts of self into the object – the mother's breast and body/the therapist – to handle them through the object, subsequently making them part of the self by introjecting them back, and identifying with them. This projection and re-introjection process became a fundamental part of Bion's research on container-contained.

The first incipient references to the Container-Contained theory appeared in Bion's 1950's writings, particularly in *Development of schizophrenic thought* (1956, in: Bion, 1984); *Differentiation between psychotic and non-psychotic personality* (1957, in: Bion, 1984); *On hallucinosis* (1958, in: Bion, 1984), and *Attacks on linking* (1959). Making a reference to the baby's relationship to the breast, within Melanie Klein's theory on projective identification (Klein, 1946), he highlights the importance of the adaptation between the mother/her breast and the baby, in confronting the disintegration and death anxiety that the newborn experiences. The satisfactory presence of the container breast is the key when it comes to facing emotions and modifying them, allowing for emotional learning. Thus, Bion's formulations of the projective identification concept as a primitive defense of the ego evolve into a description of a normative developmental realistic projective identification, implicit in the container – contained model.

III. CONTAINER-CONTAINED (CONTAINMENT): EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT IN BION

In 1959 paper "Attacks on Linking" (Bion, 1959), Bion described his experience with a psychotic patient who relied on projective identification to evacuate parts of his personality into the analyst, where, from the patient's perspective, if they were allowed to repose/linger long enough, they would undergo modification by the analyst's psyche and then could safely be re-introjected. Bion describes how when the patient was left feeling that the analyst had

evacuated the patient's projections too quickly, i.e., the feelings were un-modified, the patient responded by attempting to (re)project them into the analyst with increased desperation and violence. Bion links this clinical process to the patient's experience with his mother who could not tolerate taking in the infant's projections and who did not contain the infant's projected fears. Bion suggests that "an understanding mother is able to experience the feeling of dread that this baby was striving to deal with by projective identification and yet retain a balanced outlook" (Bion, 1959, p. 103-104).

In 1962, in his publication "Learning from Experience" and in a paper "The psychoanalytic study of thinking", Bion develops these ideas further, describing as a reverie the mother's receptive state of mind when she can take in and contain the infant's projected terror as *reverie*. By adding the idea of *maternal reverie* to the idea of projective identification, Bion includes how the environment, through primary relations, effects intrapsychic developments. Reverie refers to a receptive mental state where the mother unconsciously identifies and responds to what is projected by the child. Through maternal reverie the mother creates a new understanding of what the child tries to communicate. The mother transforms what Bion calls the beta elements into alpha elements ('alphabetization'), which can then be communicated back to the child. This becomes *the first definition of the model Container-Contained*. Specifically, the process involves the following steps: First, the mother, in a state of reverie receives and takes in those unbearable aspects of self, objects, affects and unprocessed sensory experiences (beta elements) of her infant that have been projected into her in phantasy. Second, she must bear the full effects of these projections upon her mind and body as long as need be in order to think about and to understand them, a process Bion refers to as transformation. Next, having thus transformed her baby's experience in her own mind, she must gradually return them to the infant in detoxified and digestible form and (at such time as these may be of use to him) as demonstrated in her attitude and the way in which she handles him. In analysis, Bion refers to this last segment of the process as publication, what we commonly refer to as interpretation. The ability to 'contain' assumes a mother who has boundaries and sufficient internal space to accommodate her own anxieties as well as those acquired in relation to her infant; a mother who has a well-developed capacity to bear-emotions and feelings, to think and to convey what she thinks in a way that is meaningful to her infant. A mother who is herself separate, intact, receptive, capable of reverie and appropriately giving is thus suitable for introjection as a 'containing' object and little by little, over time, the infant's identification with and assimilation of such an object leads to increasing mental space, the development of *a capacity to make meaning*, and the on-going evolution of a mind that can think for itself. This is what Bion came to call *alpha function*.

In his 1963 "Elements of Psychoanalysis", Bion considers the dynamic relationship between the Container and Contained, marked by abstract signs of ♂ and ♀, to be *the first element of psychoanalysis*. The ♂ (Contained) here has a penetrating quality and the ♀ (Container) a receptive/receiving quality. In this context, ♀ and ♂ are not restricted to the specific sexual meaning, but are without any specific sexual connotation. They represent variables or unknowns: the ♀ and ♂ functions present in all relationships, independently of gender. The ♂(Contained) penetrates the ♀(Container), who receives it and interacts with it,

leading to a creation of a new product. The use of the ♂-♀ symbols highlights the biological nature of the mind, and also includes Freud's and Klein's concepts on sexuality and oedipal configuration.

In his later writings, Bion emphasizes *the reciprocity between the two parts*, and the potential towards growth and interchange between them. The paradox of the dynamic relationship of Container-Contained lies in its reciprocal mutuality: Something that contains and something that is contained also perform the functions of mutually containing and being contained. Developmentally, this means that the breast as a container for the baby's anxieties can also be the reverse: the baby as a container for some aspects of mother's personality.

Later, in the clinical context, this reciprocity is highlighted: “The clue lies in the observation of the fluctuations which make the analyst at one moment ♀ and the analysand ♂, and at the next reverse the roles...” (Bion, 1970, p.108).

Throughout, Bion stresses that “to contain” implies an activity and a process that allows for *the formation of thought and its transformation into words*; this is in opposition to the trivialized, constricted use of containing and receiving as merely passive receptivity. The full exposition of complexity and many facets and processes of transformation are at the center of his 1965 publication “Transformations: Change from learning to growth.” Here, Bion introduces a meta-theoretical concept of ‘O’, as the beginning but also potentially the end point of multidirectional transformative processes. It encompasses the unthinkable ‘nameless dread’, ‘beta elements’, ‘things in themselves’; but also, the ‘Ultimate Reality’, ‘reverence’ and ‘awe’ (Bion, 1965; Grotstein, 2011a, p. 506).

As the Container-Contained is a part of Bion's deductive scientific system, the theory of thought and thinking (Bion, 1962a, 1962b, 1963, 1965, 1970), it is important to place it in this context. According to this broad theory, “thoughts” and “thinking apparatus” have distinct origins, with “thoughts” existing independently of its thinking apparatus: “thoughts” are not generated by the thinking apparatus. In both, the Container-Contained relationship is seminal. Accordingly, Container-Contained relationship could be viewed as *the embryo of mental life*.

According to this theory, the genesis of a “thought” is a process in which the Container-Contained relationship is the initial step. The condition for the psychic content (emotion, sensorial perception) to achieve mental quality (representation, thought) is the existence of the container capable of containing it. The prototypical object of this function (“Container”, with ♀ sign) is the mother's breast, an innate preconception waiting to be realized. Sensorial and emotional stimuli (“contents”), conjugated with this adequate “container” transforms into a “Contained” (with ♂ sign), thus creating the “Container-Contained” relationship, an initial developmental moment of a thought by the thinker. This Container-Contained relationship (♀-♂) allows for the occurrence of an Emotional Experience, which will be characterized by the bond that qualifies it, L (love), H (hate), or K (knowledge, thought). Obtaining attention from Consciousness, this Emotional Experience can be transformed into alpha element, the monad of mental life, through the operation of the alpha function.

The appearance of “thoughts” forces the creation of an apparatus to deal with them. Two foundational mechanisms conjugate for such, namely the Container-Contained ($\text{♀}\text{♂}$) and the dynamic relationship between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive position ($\text{PS} \leftrightarrow \text{D}$). This occurs through an inversion of the symbols ($\text{♂}-\text{♀}$ and not $\text{♀}-\text{♂}$), in other words, a projective identification.

The Container-Contained model also deals with the evolution of thought, as a factor in positive (+K) or negative growth (-K). Considering mental growth, in this relationship, ♂ and ♀ are reciprocally dependent with mutual benefit and with no harm to either party, characterizing what Bion would name, in 1962, a commensal link. In terms of a model, the mother and the child benefit when it comes to mental growth (Lopez-Corvo, 2002). The child introjects this activity between the dyad in such a way that $\text{♀}\text{♂}$ Container/Contained relationship is installed within herself, allowing the development of a function which will encourage the personality to become increasingly complex and creative in order to tackle the mental questions that will arise throughout the lifetime.

Elliott Jaques’ (1960) ‘integrative reticulum’ is used by Bion to put together a model in which “the gaps are sleeves and the threads forming the meshes of the reticulum are emotions” (Bion, 1962, p. 92). The reticulum also receives growing ♂ “contents” through a process that necessarily includes a degree of tolerance of the unknown [the forming sleeves are still waiting for the contents]. On the other hand, learning depends on the ♀ capacity to stay integrated while expanding the degree of elasticity, much like a womb that expands to accommodate fetus’ growth (Sandler, 2005b).

In a review of the concept in “Attention and Interpretation” (1970), Bion leaves aside the former formulation (Bion, 1962) of the links between Container and Contained (love, hate and knowledge) and proposes a new approach that stresses the relationship between Container and Contained. The three types of *links* are now characterized as *commensal*, *symbiotic* and *parasitic*. By commensal he means a relationship in which two objects share a third to the advantage of all three, for example fundamentals of the culture to which container and contained belong. By symbiotic he understands a relationship in which one depends on another to mutual advantage. In this kind of relationship, one party uses projective identification as communication, and the container transforms this into a new meaning for both. By parasitic he means a relationship in which one depends on another to produce a third which is destructive of all three. In such a case the projective identification is explosive and destructive of the container. The Container also is destructive of the content. The Container denudes the Contained of its quality of penetration, and the content denudes the Container of its receptive quality (Bion, 1970, p 95).

The destructive link implies the failure of the Container/Contained: developmentally, when the baby has a disposition of a too strong aggressiveness or envy or when his/her tolerance against anxiety and fear in a frustrating experience is low, there are times when the mother cannot encourage growth well even if she has an ordinary Container function. The correspondences and actions the mother returns are not sufficient for the baby to alleviate the anxiety and fear and it becomes difficult for the baby to introject her containing function and

identify to fit it into a part of him/herself. To the contrary, even if the baby's disposition is normal, when the mother's containing function is insufficient, the mother cannot understand well and grasp the experience of anxiety projected by the baby. In such situations, what the mother returns to the baby is not integrated and the meaning is confusing, therefore the baby cannot accept it as his/her own meaningful experience.

Thus, alongside +K which fosters growth, there is -K implying a symbiotic or parasitic relationship between ♂ sign contained and ♀ sign container, which would be other ways of dealing with the emotional situation as opposed to thought and its consequent growth. That is, a relationship that could lead to mutual destruction.

When applying the concept of containment to social systems, Bion described the conflict between the group (or fixed social order, the establishment), with that of 'the mystic', the individual bringing a new but potentially destabilizing idea into the group. The individual representing the new idea needs to be contained within the group, but this can lead to the new idea being either crushed by the group or the group falling to pieces under its pressure.

With the appearance of -K, there is the presence of envy and feeling of fear, which collaborate decisively for not developing thoughts and the necessary creativity essential to the Bionian model of mental life. The $-(♀, ♂)$ configuration (minus container-contained) leads to growing morality and the emergence of a "super-superego that asserts the moral superiority of undoing and un-learning, and the advantage of finding fault with everything" (Sandler, 2005b, pp. 262-263).

In this context it is interesting to note that in his 1970 text "Attention and Interpretation", Bion refers to the modified Container-Contained, initially presented as a Catastrophic Change, in which there would be expansion of both elements.

In his 1970 publication "Attention and Interpretation: A Scientific Approach to Insight in Psychoanalysis and Groups", Bion summarized and further developed his theoretical system, the contribution on "Containment" seemed modest, but progressively became an important new organizing concept for psychoanalysis. It allowed analysts and therapists "from both sides of the isle" to speak in a common tongue about infant-mother affective, pre-lexical communication. Bion seemed to have opened up a significantly new pathway to the vertex of mental topography with his "Container/Contained", along with his reshuffling of the functions L (love), H (hate) and K (knowledge), which were to serve and interact with Container/Contained.

Hereto the nature of the interaction occurring both within the self and between the self and object(s) was limited to the operation of introjection and projection (later introjective and projective identification). These latter two functions were the developmental precursor of all subsequent defense mechanisms and typified the limitations of the one-person model of psychoanalysis that held that intra-psychic structure was made only of the subject's representations.

In Container/Contained, Bion developed a unique epistemology of the basic communication between mother and infant, in which the inchoate process of thinking begins with the projective identification of the infant's 'thoughts (emotions) without a thinker' (Bion 1970, p. 104) into his mother-as-a-container, whose reverie and alpha-function transforms them into thinkable thoughts, feelings, dreams and memories. Through such communication, the infant's alpha function matures, as "it begins to think for itself by projecting into its own internal container-object with its own alpha function..." (Grotstein, 2005). Developmentally and clinically, Container/Contained function shifts by reversal, dialogically, between the two participants. In Grotstein's (2005) opinion, 'infant-mother-projecting-container team' presents an irreducible two-person model, from which previous one-person models based in projection, introjection and/or projective identification may become a default consequence upon failed Containment. In its clinical analogue, the two-person model of Container/Contained includes the presence and activities of the analyst, although it remains centered on the analysand. Once the interactive psychoanalytic scene is thus broadened, to a two-person, there-dimensional landscape, the intersubjective perspective ('vertex') could be explored. Containment could now be seen as proliferating many if not all transference/countertransference phenomena, becoming a latent bond ('hidden order') between the two (Grotstein, 2011b).

In some of his highly theoretical excursions, Bion (1965, 1970, 1992) links his concept of Containment to Plato's Ideal Forms and Kant's Things-in-Themselves. Here, the projecting subject activates the specific analogues of Container/Contained with the panoply of L(love), H(hate), and K(knowledge), dormant in their pre-existing universal condition of corresponding Ideal Forms and Things-in-Themselves.

IV. POST-BION DEVELOPMENTS

Psychoanalysts after Bion have discussed, elaborated on, and further developed various dimensions of the Container-Contained model. Some examples of such elaborations and further developments, spanning globally across Europe, North America and Latin America are described below.

In England, Ronald Britton (1998) has emphasized how words provide a container for an emotional experience creating a 'semantic boundary' around it, while the analytic situation itself provides a 'bounded world' and place where meaning can be found. He points out that the precursors of thought, beta elements, can be projected out of the mind into three possible spheres, into the body leading to psychosomatic dysfunction, into the perceptual sphere leading to perceptual hallucinations or into the realm of action, leading to symptomatic enactments. He elaborates on the possibility of a mutually destructive relationship of container-contained, 'malignant containment', where the subject faced with the introduction of a new idea can imagine only two (catastrophic) alternatives, 'incarceration or fragmentation'.

Betty Joseph's work has stressed the communicative aspects of projective identification in order to maintain psychic equilibrium, and the possibility of this process leading to psychic change, if contained (Joseph 1989). She has pointed out the subtle but powerful pressures exerted on the analyst via the patient's projections, prompting him or her toward some kind of activity such as answering questions, giving reassurance or giving explanations. This she describes as 'living out a part of the patient's self instead of analyzing it.' The underlying communications here being that the analyst cannot stand or contain the patient's psychic pain. However, when these pressures can be recognized and addressed, the analyst may be able to give the patient the experience of helpful containment.

In Italy, Antonino Ferro (2009) blended Bion's Theory of thinking and Container-Contained model with Willy and Madeleine Barangers' bi-personal field theory, which now for Ferro becomes 'multi-personal' field theory, where "internal groupings of patient and analyst become engaged in complex interactions, ... in terms of α function of the field, β turbulences in the field, and containing qualities of specific sites in the field (♀) and hypercontents (♂) in other sites. ... Little by little, all the tools for thinking introduced by Bion will be considered as belonging to the field, of which the current relationship is one of the loci, as is the History which continuously presses to be deconstructed, deconcretized, and redreamed. The same applies to the β elements waiting to be dreamed..." (Sabbadini and Ferro 2010, pp. 424-425; *emph. added*). Applied to the clinical work, Ferro (2009) and Civitarese (Civitaresse 2008; Ferro and Civitarese 2013a, b) stress the use of the analyst's mind and body, held in reverie, as a guide to the unconscious processes in the patient and between analyst and analysand. (See also separate entry PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS)

North American analysts such as James Grotstein (1981, 2005), Robert Caper (1999) and Thomas Ogden (2004) have also made substantial contributions to the concept. Specifying the transmission processes within the pre-lexical Container/Contained communication, Grotstein developed his concept of 'projective transidentification': "Thus, when the analyst seems to act as a container for the analysand's...experiences, ...the analysand unconsciously *projectively identifies* his emotional state into his *image* of the analyst with the hope of ridding himself of a pain and of *inducing* this state in the analyst by manipulating his image of the latter... The analyst, who is willing to be a helpful co-participant in this joint venture, becomes open and receptive, ... This...eventuates in the analyst's countercreation of his own image of the analysand projections..." (Grotstein, 2005, p. 19-20; *emph. J.G.*). Caper has stressed how a key element of containment involves the ability of the object receiving the projection to maintain a realistic attitude towards the projected part in order to be able to think about it, and thus return it in a form made more manageable. This he understands as going beyond mere holding, which aims primarily at supporting the patient's narcissism. Thomas Ogden's work has focused on the interactive subjectivities involved in projective identification. The Container-Contained model is now widely accepted or greeted with serious scholarly interest, not only within, but also outside the Kleinian group. Among others, Arnold Modell (1989) has highlighted the Containing function of the psychoanalytic setting as a whole, and Judith Mitrani (1999, 2001) has elaborated the import of the analyst's Containing function within the

transference-countertransference paradigms, for various developmental and (psycho)somatic conditions.

The Contemporary **French-Canadian** model of Louis Brunet (2010), an example of a synthesis of both ‘Late Bionian’ (Grotstein, 2005) and French (De M’Uzan, 1994) thinking on the subject, offers a specific clinical construction of this concept. Here, Containment has both “fantasmatic” and “real” aspects that have to be understood jointly. There are intrapsychic and “fantasmatic” aspects in both patient and analyst’s psyches and there is a “real” response from the analyst or the object. Below is an abbreviated taxonomy of five steps leading to an adequate containing response:

1- the starting point may consist of a patient’s projective identification (distressing content expelled/projected into the analyst) associated with the patient’s unconscious fantasy of the existence of a potential indestructible object that would be able to "contain" those dangerous projections and may give back to the child (to the patient) a "tolerable", "integrable" version of this content.

2- following this first “intrapsychic” movement the patient, or child, adds infra-verbal and verbal communications, attitudes and behaviors, acting as ‘emotional inductions’ toward the subject (analyst, parent). These inductions are attempts to "touch the analyst" to get him to feel and take into himself what is projected (See Grotstein, 2005).

3- The “real” object—the mother, the analyst – must be willing to be touched, impressed, moved, assaulted, in fact used in every way necessitated by the transfer of archaic elements from the patient/child.

4- The mother, the analyst - feels emotions, some consciously, but mainly unconsciously, through identifications. The admixture of such identifications and analyst’s/mother’s own ‘touched off’ anxieties and conflicts, create an amalgam self-object. De M’Uzan (1994) studied this aspect with the concept of ‘the chimera’.

5- This chimera must be “understood and transformed” by the analyst. This work may be seen as "psychic digestion" both of the projections of the patient/child and of the analyst’s/mother’s own conflicts and affects mobilized by the projection. He must then give back a "digestible content," the danger being to send to the patient a counter-projective identification.

In Latin America, Roosevelt Cassorla (2013) has elaborated on the containing symbolizing function of the analyst in the context of chronic enactments (see the separate entry ENACTMENT). He writes of the capacity to symbolize as a product of the implicit containing symbolizing α -function that the analyst uses during chronic enactments. In this context, the analyst’s implicit α -function is the capacity of the analyst to tolerate (contain) the obstructive movements that have invaded the analytic process, without giving up a search for new approaches to understanding of what is taking place, in preparation of future interpretations (of the enactments), if they are to be experienced by the analysand as meaningful.

Paulo Cesar Sandler (1997, 2005a) has extended clinically Bion’s concept of the reversal of alpha function, to conceptualize a model of an *anti-alpha function*, a counter-point

of alpha function, not necessarily related only to clinical conditions. Anti-alpha function receives psychic data and turns them into concrete and sensuous images. The model describes a universal primitive tendency of the human mind to concretise non-sensual mental phenomena, turning psychic reality into concrete sensuous reality, precluding free association. Drawing on Bion's theory of thinking, Sandler describes an active process whereby α -elements are transformed into β -elements, which can then masquerade as intelligible sense data. In a clinical situation, under the sway of this process, the analyst relates to the patient's material as if it were truly describing concrete external reality rather than disguising immaterial psychic reality. Anti-alpha-function links with projective identification, and can be operating in the mind of both patient and analyst, to evade painful depressive position. Sandler suggests this kind of mental functioning is far more widespread in society than is immediately apparent, accounting for serious distortions in our collective relationship to reality (1997). However, in non-pathological circumstances, such an anti-alpha function is also activated as an intermediate step in communication as it is found in art, early life, and actions for purposes of concrete survival, etc (2005a). [So widely conceptualized capacity for anti-alpha function may have connecting points with certain types of regression, theorized within post-Freudian conceptual network, as a 'regression in the service of the ego' (Kris 1952). Anti-alpha function also describes the intellectualizing and minimizing defenses used to ward off authentic and psychically distressing experiences].

V. RELATED CONCEPTS

The Container/Contained model has developed parallel with other "space" concepts of the mind, which focus upon the necessity of internalizing a maternal function for developing the capacity for thinking/symbolizing/mentalizing.

Containment should be distinguished from holding (Winnicott,1960). The holding object constitutes only one environmental object, whose significance is determined by the infant or analysand; whereas the containing object constitutes an object whose valence is equivalent to that of the containing object (container) and its 'liege' (its link to the object to be contained).

D.W. Winnicott's concept of holding conveys, as the concept of containment, that the infant cannot be understood independent of the mother, and that internalization of a maternal 'holding' function is necessary for mental development. However, holding is a broader term encompassing both a heightened psychical sensitivity to the infant's needs as well as physical holding and total environmental provision (Winnicott, 1960). Containment on the other hand implies a more active intrapsychic involvement on the part of the object, depending more on her personality.

Esther Bick (1968), Donald Meltzer (1975), and later Didier Anzieu (1989), in a slightly different way, conceptualize the development of a skin-ego having a containing function. André Green (1999) writes about the necessity of a negative hallucination of the maternal function for creating an internal space for symbolization. These latter differ from Bion in that they also call attention to states where psychic space is assumed to not yet have been attained, and to other primitive ways of relating (prior to projective identification) such as primary and adhesive identification.

In contemporary psychoanalysis, Ofra Eshel, in her book (2019), set out her extensive experience of an evocative approach converging two of Bion's seminal concepts (container/contained and being at one with O) with Winnicott's ideas of fundamental being. The analyst changes the analysand's capacity to contain experiences that the analysand was unable to bear on his own, through the analyst's capacity of being radically open to the unknown and the unthinkable.

This approach underscores the ontological-experiential dimension of psychoanalysis. It centers theoretically and clinically on ontological experiences of psychoanalytic oneness, while moving through stages of the analyst's 'presencing' (being-there), and the ensuing analysand-analyst interconnectedness or 'witnessing' - two-in-oneness, that may deepen into at-one-ment with the patient's innermost, non-communicating psychic reality.

Wide clinical utility of Bion's concept can be exemplified by the edited volume "The Generosity of Acceptance" by Gianna Williams, Paul Williams, Jane Desmarais and Kent Ravenscroft (2004) who employ Bion's Container-Contained model while exploring the detrimental consequences of insufficient *paternal function* in histories of children and adolescents with eating disorders. They posit that a dyadic relationship always includes a third element - the space between the subject and object. This is referred to as the 'paternal function', whether or not it is performed by the actual father. They connect a dread of dependency with a need to obliterate otherness through a 'state of mind of fusion' and projective identification, in which there is an attack on this 'paternal function', a denial of space between the dyadic couple and the desire for (and fear of) fusion between subject and object. A further factor is a destructive superego on the side of death engendering persecutory feelings, which are potentially fatal.

VI. WIDE PROLIFERATION OF THE TERM IN OTHER CONCEPTUAL NETWORKS

Some expressed a concern that with a wide usage of various aspects of the concept and its derivations across the broad range of contemporary of psychoanalytic orientations comes a risk of diluting its specificity. (Search of pep-web publications revealed some 6500 papers that use the term "containment".) Under these conditions, it is important to distinguish usage of

the term from usage of the concept. While the term has been used in the myriad of contexts having to do with lessening of anxious tensions in both analyst and patient, the usage of the concept and its derivations (even while paradoxically sometimes not using the term), has evolved and has been usefully employed across the psychoanalytic orientations. This point was addressed by some post-Bionian authors as well as by those from other conceptual networks, especially within broadly based Freudian conceptual networks, including Contemporary Ego psychology, and also within some strands of contemporary Self psychology, while they acknowledge similarities and differences. (See separate entries EGO PSYCHOLOGY and SELF)

From the perspective of some post-Bionian thinkers, connections between broadly based contemporary Ego Psychology and Bionian thought was discussed by Lawrence Brown in his paper “The Ego Psychology of Wilfred Bion: The implications for an intersubjective view of psychic structure” (Brown 2009). For his part, Elias da Rocha Barros notes that “...the concept’s inter-subjective turn seems to have become deeply rooted in contemporary psychoanalytic culture, especially in North and Latin America. This concept filled in a gap that has become critical to contemporary psychoanalysis. I am thinking of the shift in a patient’s relationship to his own mind in the context of inter-subjectivity, in such a way as *to hinder the impulse towards action and foment the possibility of reflection*” (Rocha Barros 2015).

From Contemporary Freudian Ego psychology perspective, Shmuel Erlich (2003) postulates an ‘ego transformative function’, one of the possible links between Contemporary Ego psychology and Bion’s alpha function (see also separate entry EGO PSYCHOLOGY).

In another example of apparent rapprochement, the North American contemporary Ego psychologist Fred Busch (2013), marking a paradigmatic shift from lifting repression towards transformation, makes an almost identical point to the one expressed by da Rocha Barros, when he states that with the development of a psychoanalytic mind the patient acquires the capacity to shift the *inevitability of action to the possibility of reflection*. His ‘working within the transference’ method revolves around what Ogden called, ‘*thinking about thinking*’. The underlying thesis in *creating a psychoanalytic mind* is that what is accomplished in a relatively successful psychoanalysis is *a way of knowing*, and not simply knowing. Transformation of words as actions into symbolic, representational thinking is part of helping the analysand to develop a psychoanalytic mind as an expansion of the capacity to play with thoughts, which is dependent on their being representable. That is, rather than primarily searching for buried memories, one attempts to transform the under-represented into ideas that are representable. The movement is, from pre-conceptual (concrete), and preoperational, into symbolically represented. Thus, before any meaning can be interpreted, the psychic mechanism and content (i.e., conflict, defense, self-reparation, internalized objects, etc.) will need to be represented verbally in a way that leads to symbolization. Words and thoughts serve as efficient, and structuring signs for what is signified. Busch’s points of concordance with Rocha Barros leave open the degree to which Busch relies on the Container-Contained model to explain the emergence of reflectiveness. Overall, however, the emergence of this perspective brings Ego psychology closer to aspects of the work of André Green, Betty Joseph, and Antonino Ferro

psychology closer to aspects of the work of André Green, Betty Joseph, and Antonino Ferro among others.

Referring to Loewald's Ego psychology, which integrates Freud's drive theory with Object relations, Busch (2016) examines many dimensions to how to work in a way that enlarges the 'Ego's capacity for containment' across the spectrum of pathologies, albeit with differences. Within the neurotic to moderately severe character disorders, analysts attempt to transform thoughts into meaning; with more severe character disorders, they try to transform 'language action' (Busch, 2013), along with unmodulated affect states, into thoughts. The movement is from language of action to the language of (unconscious and conscious) communication. Although the methods used to contain more primitive states (in both the patient and analyst) are more frequent (and difficult) with severe character pathology, they also occur in analytic work with neurotic patients. Here, Busch follows and further develops Loewald's (1975) work on "language action within the transference force-field" (ibid, p. 293), serving the purpose of re-enactments. This approach also concurs with André Green's (2000) capturing both the role of containment and building representations, as in "By constructing an analytic space in which free association and psychoanalytic listening are possible, the analyst can voice and link previously catastrophic ideas, quite unknown to the patient's consciousness, to help the patient to create meaning and obtain relief from previously dominant but unknown terrors" (ibid, p. 429).

In his recent publication, "The Analyst's Reveries", Busch (2019) deconstructs, 'demystifies' and explores the clinical utility of the analyst's (=container's) reverie (transformative sensorial-affective image, followed by an associative link to a memory/idea) and explores its relation to some more traditional concepts like countertransference, free association, evenly suspended free floating attention and subsequent self-reflexion. He finds himself in agreement particularly with Bion, Da Rocha Barros and Cassorla and states that reverie can be usefully implemented, when the projective identification can be differentiated from the analyst's own countertransferential input. Thus, the co-constructed nature of reveries only becomes apparent via the analyst's associations and a growing awareness of a countertransferential enactment. It follows that only via analyst's free associations he/she is able to contain what is the beginning as an enactment. Thus understood, analyst's capacity for containment of their internal experiences and for reverie can lead to increasing psychic efficacy of every analysis.

Michael J. Diamond (2014), too, implements the notion of containment among the prerequisites of analyst's overall approach, when he states that the analyst is to "1. allow for *regression in ego functioning*; 2. *take his/her mind as an object*, including its manifestation in the 'analytic third'; 3. *contain internal experience*, including bearing uncertainty and tolerating intense affective states; and 4. *utilize more developed ego functions* for self-reflexivity and elaboration" (ibid, p. 548, *emph. M.J.D.*).

Within inclusive contemporary Freudian framework, Eva Papiasvili (2019) described a 'reverie-like rolling free associative and interpretive process', as taking place "in the therapist-patient dyad when...two unconsciouss communicate with each other in what may look like a

rolling dream-like process” (Papiasvili 2019, p. 246). This inclusive clinical approach synthesizing Freud, Green, and Winnicott with Bion’s model of containment, together with findings of an early attachment era triangulation (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery 1999), underlying the crucial role of the father in the transference, has been found helpful in breaking the inter-generational chain of transmission of postpartum depression between mothers and adult daughters (Papiasvili and Mayers 2017). The transformation proceeds from sensorial and visceral imprints, enacted, interpreted and subsequently symbolized in a dream, which is interpreted again, by both the patient and the analyst (Papiasvili 2016).

In an extended contemporary Freudian network, Ehrlich, L. T., Kulish, N. M., Hanly, M. A., Robinson, M. & Rothstein, A. (2017) are utilizing the concept of containment in the context of psychoanalytic supervision and consultation, in a three-step process: recognition, containment and effective use of parallel processes within the multiple transference-countertransference fields between the therapist/patient supervisor/supervisee, and corresponding pressures and fantasies related to the institutional structure. Containment is here conceptualized specifically as a preventative measure of thus multiply determined potential for enactments. This follows previous conceptualization of psychoanalytic supervision as the container-contained relationship by Virginia Ungar and Luisa Ahumada (2001).

Within the broad conceptual framework of Self psychology, historically relevant may be Kohut’s conception of the building up a cohesive sense of self through selfobject transference, and identification, and processes of “transmuting internalization” (Kohut, 1977). In contemporary Self psychology, Hans-Peter Hartmann (2004) sees containment as similar to the Self psychology’s concept of early affect mirroring and mentalizing, predicated on the “regulative function of an archaic selfobject” (p. 254).

However, according to Grotstein (1981b), containment in Bion needs to be distinguished from Kohut’s mirroring, because “Bion’s conception is of an elaborated primary process activity which acts like a *prism* to refract the intense hue of the infant’s screams into the components of the color spectrum, so to speak, so as to sort them out and relegate them to a hierarchy of importance and of mental action. Thus, containment for Bion is a very active process which involves feeling, thinking, organizing, and acting” (ibid, p.134).

VII. INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

According to Bionian scholar Paulo Cesar Sandler (2005a), a relationship between emotional and intellectual growth has been acknowledged by both Freud and Klein. Sandler credits René Spitz and John Bowlby for pioneering the studies, providing proof of this relationship in specific ‘privation settings’. Many developmental and neurodevelopmental studies which followed provided further confirmation of this link. However, it was Bion’s theory of Container-Contained that “furnished insight about *how* this relationship functions at its inception. Emotional and intellectual growth are put into terms of the relationship between

the infant and the breast in its most minute features. It does not state the relationship as a matter of principle, postulate or imaginary construct ...” (Sandler 2005a, p. 161; *emph. P.C.S.*). It is in this context that the summary review of the inter-disciplinary studies arising out of our various conceptual developmental-dynamic frameworks need to be understood.

VII. A. INFANT RESEARCH

René Spitz’s studies (1945, 1965, 1972) of long-term maternal separation on institutionalized infants was greatly influential on Mahler’s theory of separation-individuation. Importantly, he was also the first one to stress the vital importance of affectionate ‘holding’ of the infant by caregivers, which promotes rich tactile affective nonverbal communication between the infants and their caregivers. This tradition continued with Mahler (Mahler, Pine, Bergman, 1975), within the Ego Psychology/Structural theory framework, and, with the infant research on self- and interactive regulation of Beebe (Beebe 2000), and with the Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPG 2007, 2008), within the Self and Relational theories framework (See separate entries OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, EGO PSYCHOLOGY and SELF).

Following Bowlby (1969) in England, Ainsworth (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall, 1978) in the USA developed contemporary attachment theory, where the attachment is defined as an affective bond between the infant and a caregiver (Blum 2004) and as the behavioral correspondence of internalized object relations under the influence of the early mother-infant relationship (Diamond and Blatt, 2007). The above and comparable studies in the field of infant research and attachment in Europe (D. N. Stern, 1985; Trevarthen & Aitken 2001; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002; Ammaniti & Trentini, 2009; Cortina & Liotti, 2010) consistently support the view of personality organized in terms of ‘self-with-other’, where the interaction between two subjects is the necessary condition for psychic development as well as for psychological cure (See also separate entries OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, SELF and INTERSUBJECTIVITY).

VII. B. DYNAMIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE, AND COGNITIVE STUDIES

Developmental neuroscientists have suggested that there may be a ‘virtual other’ in the brain whose outlines get filled in with experience (Bråten, 2011). Mirror Neuron Systems (Gallese, Eagle and Migone, 2007) are thought to be a possible element in such innately given ‘intersubjectivity’. Neuro-psychoanalytic studies of right brain structures and activities implicated in the unconscious processes of the ‘implicit self with the other’ of Allan Schore (2011) are also relevant in this regard.

From the early stages of intrauterine-prenatal life, sensory experiences take part in the formation of a basic emotional and affective memories, a real cornerstone for the organisation of early representations (Mancia 1980; LeDoux, 1992). Following LeDoux’ investigation of the implicit interplay of the multiple memory systems under conditions of acute trauma in

adults, a number of longitudinal studies continued to expand knowledge of the neurobiological consequences of early dyadic experiences (Balbernie, 2001; Siegel, 1999; Schore, 2003, 2010) in children with and without early traumatic histories. The key message from neuroscientific studies of brain development is that “human connections shape the neural connections from which the mind emerges” (Siegel 1999, p. 2). During the first three years of life, three basic cortico-limbic circuits for the self-regulation of affect are activated and shaped by interaction with caregivers, thus providing the basis for how future significant emotions will be experienced and handled. In this context, Schore (2003) also studied the neurobiological correlates of early onset of *dissociation* among infants who were observed to be matching the rhythmic structure of their mother’s dysregulated states of both hyperarousal and dissociative hypoarousal.

The work of Allan Schore (2001) on the regulation of affects provided by the dyadic relationship is very close to the concept of containment. Although he never uses that specific word, he dedicates a lot of thought to the issue of projective identification as an unconscious communication between right hemispheres of both mother and child (or patient and analyst), thus describing a process whose internalization will eventually lead to the ability of emotional regulation, which seems to be the basis for containment. It is interesting to note the proximity between the concepts of containment and emotional regulation, as is expressed by Anne Alvarez (2016) “There is much interest nowadays in America in self-regulation, and in Britain in containment, but what are their components?”. This question reveals that terms such as self-regulation and containment show conceptual and clinical overlap that deserves fuller exploration and integration.

The neurobiological concept of Default Mode Network (DMN) described by Raichle (2001) promoted several developments in neuroscience and allied disciplines. DMN, a network operating in spontaneous mentation which occurs around 50% of daily life, is a highly interconnected pathway linking the centers of social cognition and memory, involving self-other perspectives, daydreaming, sense of self, exploration of the future and others. It is interesting to note that it reaches its final form by the end of childhood, and is absent or altered in Alzheimer and autistic patients. Considering that such structures (DMN) encompass several experiences concerning the sense of self, one might wonder if it could be viewed as a material expression, in terms of brain networks, of what psychoanalysis describes as the function of containment (Fonseca, 2019).

An attempt at integration of cognitive sciences and psychoanalytic clinical and metapsychological thought of various conceptual networks, including Freud and Contemporary Ego psychology, Bion and Post-Bionian thinking and other British and North American Object Relations theorists, as well as French tradition, comes from Serge Lecour and Marc-André Bouchard (1998). They propose a bi-dimensional view of mentalization that includes multiple levels of containment: *descriptive levels of affect tolerance* (disruptive impulsion/acting out and enactment, modulated impulsion/catharsis, externalization, appropriation and abstraction/reflective association) on the one hand, and *distinct modes of representation* channels of drive-affect expression (somatic and motoric action, imagery, word/verbalization)

on another. This complex framework influences both the patient's and the analyst's capacity to listen, to transformatively contain, and to build the psychic structures especially in patients of a borderline spectrum. The movement is from reflexive towards reflective, from presymbolic and prerepresentational functioning towards representational and symbolic functioning, and from intra-systemic (within ego) towards inter-systemic (between id, ego, superego) conflicts. This conceptualization has many connecting points also with Wilma Bucci's (1994) translation between the non-symbolized, unconsciously symbolized and verbally symbolized, experiential domains, and the later work of Mauro Mancia (2006).

Psychoanalyst and neurologist Mauro Mancia (2006) attempts an integration of the neurosciences and molecular biology with the psychoanalytic theory of the non-repressed unconscious, which he considers the nucleus of the self, and where the primary mother-infant relations are stored. In his view, the neurobiological correlate of such earliest pre-symbolized pre-psychic experiences is the network of 'morpho-functional organization', pre-dating the full development of hippocampus, the center of the affective autobiographical memories. The unrepressed unconscious can be brought to the surface in analysis through the 'musical dimension' of the transference, characterized by the voice (its intonation and rhythm) and the prosody of the language. Dreams can symbolically transform presymbolic and preverbal experiences, so that they can be put into words and thought about even without their recollection. This reconstruction enables the patient to speak and think about them even without the actual recollection. Mancia contends that this integrative model, drawing on plurality of perspectives, from Freud, Klein and contemporary developmental and neurobiological research is in line with Bion's (1962a, b; 1991) theory of thinking: The clinical approach based on such integration facilitates the development and internalization of α -function of the mind, so as to confer a new order to the pre-psychic β -elements reaching it. This follows Mancia's (1981) earlier attempt at linking central nervous system activity specifically to Bion's (1963) conceptualizations of 'container-contained' and 'alpha function'. He writes: "According to Bion, the functions of the mind are in fact operative within neurobiological functions which permit mental operations to organize themselves and become manifest. This is particularly true of the alpha function of dreaming, which may be viewed as part of a neurobiological activity which, to use Bion's language, acts as a 'container' for the organization of thinking processes." (Mancia 1981, p. 450).

VII. CURRENT USAGE AND CONCLUSION

The model of Container-Contained has wide application in contemporary psychoanalysis. In clinical psychoanalysis the containing function is used by a significant number of contemporary psychoanalysts, independent of theoretical orientation. The term is applied not only for understanding the processes of projective identification, but also for work with psychic states dominated by excess tension/emotions due to trauma and/or

undifferentiated psychic states. Today, many would also stress the importance of internalizing the paternal function, not only maternal reverie and alpha function. That is, the father's link to the mother enabling her to maintain a balanced state of mind while attending to her infant's needs and at the same time allowing the existence of a triangular space.

Bion's theory of containment posits a rationale for therapeutic efficacy. It is a theory of the origins of thinking and associated mental functions based on an emotional experience of knowing, which he designates as 'K', and the seeking of truth in the therapeutic encounter, which for Bion is as vital for the mind as food is for the body. In terms of technique, it orients the analyst during the session as to what the patient is trying to convey and when the work of 'containment' is necessary to bring about psychic change.

See also:

EGO PSYCHOLOGY

ENACTMENT

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

SELF

TRANSFORMATION(S)

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

Tri-Regional Entry

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Adrian Grinspon (Latin America), and Adrienne Harris (North America)**

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITIONS

Countertransference is one of the most transformed and transforming concepts in psychoanalysis. It needs to be approached historically, theoretically, empirically and experientially. Today, the concept denotes quite a range of the analyst's feelings (conscious and unconscious), thoughts and attitudes towards the patient in the analytic situation. In the broadest sense it can refer to the totality of feelings, attitudes and thoughts a therapist may have about or towards patients. Most narrowly, countertransference can refer to quite specific, mostly unconscious responses to the transference of the patients—literally *counter* to the patient's transference. As one of the most complex and complexly evolving concepts in psychoanalysis, with many meanings across the spectrum of international orientations today, it is generally acknowledged that the experience of countertransference has both potential benefits and dangers. As a necessary part of the transference-countertransference matrix, it reflects a vital, if divergently conceptualized, interactive dimension of psychoanalysis.

Extrapolating and expanding on contemporary European and North American psychoanalytic dictionaries (Auchincloss, 2012; Skelton, 2006), as a clinical phenomenon, arising out of multiple sources in the analytic situation, being mediated by various conceptualized processes and mechanisms within and between the patient and the analyst, the phenomenology of the experience of countertransference can include:

- * A *conscious feeling or idea* in the analyst in response to the patient's material.
- * An *unconscious feeling or association* that the analyst can retrieve or (re) construct with some serious self-analysis of indications within or after the hour. This may include the analyst's response to the patient's transference, the analyst's own transference, or any element or feature of the exchange, as well as the analyst's intrapsychic experience in response to the totality of the analytic situation.
- * An *unconscious feeling or idea* that conflicts with the analyst's ego-ideal, impedes the analyst's receptivity and self-reflective/self-analyzing functioning, and causes variously conceptualized *blind spots* that hinder the analysis of the patient, or of the build up of the analyst's *counter-resistance*.
- * A *state* in the analyst rather than a temporary problem/phenomenon, thus a counter-

transference *position* from which the analyst's ego is now perceiving, thinking and feeling. To the degree to which such an internal state/position/attitude does not cross over into action, but is experienced as 'induced', it may include variously conceptualized 'projective identification' and/or 'role responsiveness'.

* An *enactment*, if the unresolved countertransference is discharged in action. There is wide debate as to the utility and inevitability of such phenomena. Many contemporary writers advance views of countertransference enactments allowing for the emergence of otherwise inaccessible (archaic, not fully symbolized) unconscious material, which, if understood and interpreted, constitutes an opportunity for the analytic pair to discover new meaning. To the degree to which it is experienced as unconsciously evoked/induced/inspired by the patient's (however subtle) actions, it includes variously conceptualized projective identification and role responsiveness, and may be an escalation of the countertransference position or state above (See the separate entry of ENACTMENT).

A contemporary Latin American dictionary (Borensztein, 2014) depicts the above clinical conceptual plurality in a broad ranging summary statement: from countertransference as covering *everything what emerges in the analyst as a psychological response to the analysand*, to the term countertransference being reserved for what is *infantile, irrational and unconscious* in the latter's relationship with the former.

Overall, there is a wide consensus today across all three continental cultures that *countertransference and transference have to be considered as 'twin' concepts and in constant interplay with each other – transference triggers countertransference and vice versa*. They depict central dimensions of the analytic relationship: transference focuses on the psychic processes of the patient in relation to the analyst, countertransference on those of the analyst in relation to the patient. The clinical interest in countertransference has grown steadily throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Countertransference, as well as transference, was first seen as an obstacle to the treatment. Later, until today, they have both been widely understood to be quasi 'royal roads' to the unconscious of both actors.

This entry will first follow the evolution of the various meanings of countertransference within the evolution of psychoanalytic theory and unfolding conceptual frameworks, with a consequent attempt at their categorization in the Conclusion of the entry. The remarkably international character of the conceptual evolution is noted throughout.

As a matter of style, publication's titles are capitalized and enclosed in quotation marks; quotation marks with page numbers listed next to them designate verbatim citations; *italics* highlight the defining features of the concept within a particular school of thought, or an emerging terminology.

II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

II. A. Freud and the 'Narrow Definition' of Countertransference

The first appearance of the term is in a letter from Sigmund Freud to Carl Gustav Jung in 1909 addressing the latter's experiences in his love affair with Sabina Spielrein: "Such experiences, though painful, are necessary and hard to avoid. Without them we cannot really know life and what we are dealing with. ... They help us to develop the thick skin we need and to dominate '*countertransference*', which is after all a permanent problem for us; they teach us to displace our own affects to best advantage. They are a 'blessing in disguise'" (Freud, 1909, p. 230-231).

The first officially published introduction of the concept is in 1910, in "The Future Prospects Of Psychoanalytic Therapy", where Freud said of the analyst: "We have become aware of the 'counter-transference', which arises in him as a result of the patient's influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he shall recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it ... No psychoanalyst goes further than his own complexes and internal resistances permit" (1910, p. 144-145). It is worth noting that the German term 'Gegenübertragung' used by Freud in this statement was first translated into Spanish by López-Ballesteros (1923) as 'transferencia reciproca', or 'reciprocal transference'.

Two years later, in "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis", Freud (1912) advocated for training analysis to recognize, address and overcome such counter-transference, in preparation for working analytically with patients.

Still later, he added: "we ought not to give up the neutrality towards the patient, which we have acquired through keeping the counter-transference in check" (Freud 1915, p. 164). Freud considered the analyst's mind as an 'instrument', its successful functioning being *hindered* by countertransference, by the *limitations* imposed on the analytic work by the analyst's *unresolved conflicts* and his *blind spots*. Thus, countertransference was regarded as an impediment to the analyst's freedom and capacity to understand the patient. Countertransference should first be noticed, and then overcome.

Yet throughout, in enigmatic hints of contradiction or conflict, true to his self-subversive theoretical endeavor which anticipates and models a multiplicity of conceptualizations (Reisner, 2001), in many of his letters and re-evaluations of his theoretical thinking, Freud also noted that his pupils had learned to bear a part of the self-awareness and self-knowledge. The deepening of our knowledge of countertransference accords with this principle. In this context, it is noteworthy that the first dream reported in the text that inaugurated psychoanalysis, "The Interpretation of Dreams" (Freud, 1900), is the 'Irma Injection dream' of 1895, a *countertransference dream* par excellence.

Historical reconstructions of Freud's life during his self-analysis in the years of 1895-1899, coinciding with his writing of "The Interpretation of Dreams", by Harold Blum (2008) and Carlo Bonomi (2015), reveal the complexity of Freud's transference to Fliess, as well as

his countertransference to their mutual patient Emma Eckstein ('Irma' in the dream, and later the first female psychoanalytic therapist). Blum and Bonomi demonstrate how this countertransference shaped Freud's theoretical development (among other matters from bisexuality to heteronormativity, from seduction trauma theory to the psychoanalytic conceptualizations of psychosexual development, unconscious fantasy and intrapsychic conflict). In this context, the concept of countertransference exemplifies and illustrates the constant interaction of theory and practice, of clinical work and conceptualization, from the 'birth of psychoanalysis' throughout its further evolution.

Freud introduced the concept, but did not take the step of explicitly elaborating countertransference as a useful tool in analytic work – a step that he did take with transference. Freud's explicit early view has come to be called the 'narrow' perspective on countertransference, and many of his early followers subscribed to this 'narrow' perspective, as evidenced in the early psychoanalytic textbooks, presentations and journal publications (Stern, 1917; Eisler, 1920; Stoltenhoff, 1926; Fenichel, 1927, 1933; Hann-Kende, 1936). The narrow perspective often used a hyphenated 'counter-transference' wording in English, stressing the unconscious (transferential) response of the analyst to the patient's transference. An interesting specification coming out of this perspective was made by Helene Deutsch (1926) who introduced the idea of a counter-transference as a '*complementary position*', which was later elaborated on within Heinrich Racker's original contribution.

In looking at the fate of this narrow definition, one can see its persistence among others in the works of the standard bearers of Freudian technique, such as Annie Reich (Reich, 1951), but also, from a somewhat different perspective, Jacques Lacan (1966/1977). While Reich underscores 'counter-transference' as the analyst's *transferential obstacle to psychoanalytic empathy*, Lacan, in spite of his conceptual recasting and broadening of the impact of the analyst's knowledge and 'power' within the asymmetrical relationship between the analyst and the patient, regards countertransference solely as the repository of mistakes, misconceptions, neuroses and gaps in the analyst's overall functioning, and as having no use in the interpretive work (Lacan 1966/ 1977). The Lacanian concept of countertransference as the need to include the precession of the analyst's desire over the patient's in understanding the entire intersubjective dynamic of the situation – echoed by his famous statement that 'resistance' in analysis is first and foremost the *resistance of the analyst* – still resonates today, especially with the French intersubjective orientation in Europe and North America (Furlong, 2014).

However, Freud made some remarks that may be seen as envisioning the view of countertransference as a therapeutic tool through which the analyst could see or sense something of *the patient's* unconscious. He wrote that the "analyst must adjust himself to the patient as a telephone receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone. Just as the receiver converts back into sound-waves the electric oscillations, ... so the doctor's unconscious is able, from the derivatives of the unconscious which are communicated to him, to reconstruct that unconscious, which has determined the patient's free associations" (1912, p. 115-116). Furthermore, while elaborating his views on unconscious processes, Freud (1915) directed special attention not only to the patient's unconscious dynamics but also explicitly to those of the analyst in the analytic situation. He was clear about the fact that the *conscious and*

unconscious psychic processes of the *patient and the analyst* are deeply *intertwined*. Annie Reich, in 1951, emphasized a special aspect of this: for the analyst, the patient may come to represent “an object of the past onto whom past feelings and wishes are projected” (1951, p. 26). Since transference is ubiquitous, it is expected that analysts will have transferences to their patients of just the sort that patients will have to them. (The feelings will be largely unconscious both for the patient and for the analyst).

This is also illustrated by a remark in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937b) where Freud stresses how ongoing contact with the patient’s repression may also arouse drive demands in the analyst that would otherwise be held suppressed, and this may *even result in* “dangers” for the analyst that would make a periodic self-analysis necessary (1937b, p. 249). Compared to previous statements, this presents a clearly different aspect of the patient-analyst relationship; reactions to the patient’s unconscious could activate processes, and even *changes in the analyst*.

Although early on countertransference was mainly conceptualized as a *risk* – that the analyst’s transferences onto patients would prevent the analyst from dispassionately assessing the patient and would interfere with the analyst’s objectivity, neutrality and clinical effectiveness – in Freud’s later perspective, which is a culmination of the previously only hinted ‘other’ trend in his thinking on the subject, countertransference is not only a matter of merely *intrapsychic* dynamics of the analyst, but the result of *interpsychic* processes, a perspective that definitely foreshadows later developments.

II. B. Basic Contouring of the Wider Concept

(Late 1920’s – Early 1950’s in Hungary, England and Argentina)

The paradigm shift of countertransference *from an impediment to a tool* began to emerge in the late 1920s with Sándor Ferenczi’s (1927, 1928, 1932) challenge to the dictum of psychoanalytic neutrality (and abstinence) with traumatized patients, considering the analyst’s position to be rather that of a *participant observer*. Michael Balint (1935, 1950; Balint and Balint 1939), Ferenczi’s student and translator subsequently distinguished between the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ descriptions of the aims of analytic treatment: while the ‘classical’ authors – beginning with Freud – underline advancement of insight, considering aims in relation to structural changes in the psyche to strengthen the ego, the ‘romantic’ authors – early object relation theorists, Ferenczi and Balint himself with his concept of ‘new beginning’ – lay emphasis on the dynamic or the emotional factors (Balint 1935, p.190). Ferenczi’s earlier paper on “Introjection and Transference” (1909) presaged this development of seeing the countertransference of the analyst as instrumental in interacting with the transference of the analysand. *Affective reactions* of all kinds, even love felt towards a traumatized patient, Ferenczi argued, were potential *drivers of psychic change*. His ‘participant observer’ analytic stance and his ‘elastic technique’ (Ferenczi 1928) could be considered a historical precursor to all later views of countertransference as a co-construction and co-creation, and a consideration of the analyst’s subjective experience as importantly participating in an analytic treatment in

multiple ways. Acknowledged as uncommonly creative and continuously influential, especially in regard to analytic work with traumatized patients (Papiasvili 2014), Ferenczi's presentation of his views on countertransference and his practice of the elastic technique were, however, considered controversial and somewhat excessive from the beginning, as sympathetically yet rigorously reviewed by Balint (1966). The more radical parts of this perspective surfaced later in the North American analyst Harold Searles (1959, 1979), who urged that even *erotic countertransference* [the analyst developing a sexual interest in an analysand] could induce powerful *psychic change* in patients.

The consideration of countertransference as a valuable therapeutic tool becomes explicit with Heimann in 1950. Starting from an emphasis on the analyst's feelings towards the patient, Heimann's basic assumption regarding countertransference was "that the analyst's unconscious understands that of his patient. This rapport on the deep level comes to the surface in the form of feelings that the analyst notices in response to his patient, in his 'countertransference'" (Heimann 1950, p. 82). The analyst must use his/her emotional response to the patient—the countertransference—as a key to the understanding of hidden meanings; he or she has to be able to "sustain the feelings which are stirred up... as opposed to discharging them (as does the patient), in order to subordinate them to the analytic task" (1950, p. 81-82). Thus, the analyst's countertransference is, according to Heimann, an *instrument of investigation* into the *patient's unconscious*, one of the most important tools for the analytic work: the condition of its analytic use is, however, that it is recognized as such, and not lived out.

Heimann's (1960, 1982) formulations came to dominate and inform writing about countertransference in a wide range of psychoanalytic cultures. This is what came to be called the '*two-person view*' of *countertransference*, which stands for a recognition that countertransference is in part a creation of the interaction between analyst and analysand, in addition to a transferring from the analyst onto the analysand of residues of earlier unconscious states. In this broader perspective, the term 'countertransference' refers to *all* the feelings, fantasies and *experiences* of all kinds that a therapist has about a patient, not just those derived from his or her own unconscious drives and anxieties, internal objects, and past relationships.

This broadened perspective on countertransference was advanced simultaneously by other prominent thinkers such as Donald Winnicott (1949) in England and Heinrich Racker in Argentina (1948, 1953, 1957, 1968). These parallel developments in England and Latin America were noted by Horacio Etchegoyen (1986), who stressed that Heimann's and Racker's work proceeded independently from each other, with marked similarities as well as differences.

In England, Heimann's newly outlined perspective on countertransference sounded off against a background of controversial debates surrounding the introduction of the concept '*projective identification*' by the Kleinian school (Klein 1946, Meltzer 1973). Although the term 'projective identification' had been used earlier by Edoardo Weiss (1925) and Marjorie Brierley (1944), it is Melanie Klein who is usually credited with formulating the concept, and with the corresponding omnipotent *phantasy of intrusion into an object*. Although Klein herself was apparently not interested in the use of countertransference clinically (Spillius, 1994), her concept of projective identification is closely linked to the concept of countertransference in the broader sense: Projective identification (see the separate entry PROJECTIVE

IDENTIFICATION) implies that the patient projects into the analyst his/her own feelings (originally emphasizing mostly ‘bad’ and destructive ones, before the concept was broadened). Theoretically, within the realm of countertransference, it follows that the unconscious feelings and fantasies within the analyst would be viewed as *induced* by the analysand.

Racker (1948, 1953, 1957), in Argentina, brought the concept of projective identification specifically into the clinical context of countertransference. While both Freudian and Kleinian influences are discernible in Racker’s conceptualizations of countertransference, de Bernardi’s (2000) review of Latin American tradition on countertransference locates Racker as more Kleinian than Freudian overall, due to his drawing prominently on ideas of unconscious fantasy and on the mechanisms of projection and introjection.

In Racker’s view, countertransference is seen as the *analyst’s own response to the patient’s projective identification*: In the emotional responses to the patient’s projections, the analyst could identify either with the patient’s inner objects (*complementary identification*) or with the patient’s self (*concordant identification*).

Expanding on Deutsch’s concept of countertransference as a ‘complementary position’ (Deutsch 1926), Racker referred to the analyst’s tendency to identify with the interior of the analysand. Conceptualized structurally, each internal agency of the analyst’s personality identifies with its counterpart in the analysand’s personality: the ego of one with the ego of the other, the id of one with the id of the other, and so on. Racker called these identifications ‘concordant’ and distinguished them from those in which the analyst identified with the analysand’s inner objects, which he called ‘complementary’. In his system, the concordant and complementary identifications are reciprocally proportional: to the degree to which analysts fail in understanding their concordant identifications, their complementary ones increase.

Concordant identifications translate as a disposition to empathy and have their source in a sublimated positive identification. On the one hand, there is the analyst as a subject and the analysand as the object of knowledge, the object relation is in a sense obliterated and in its place there exists a rough identification based on the identity between some parts of the subject and some parts of the object, the combination of which could be called “concordant”. On the other hand, there exists an object relation of a true transference on the part of the analyst, in which he/she reproduces earlier experiences while the analysand represents some of the analyst’s inner (archaic) objects. This combination is called “complementary”. Thus, through countertransference reactions the analyst could sense the patient’s inner protagonists as projected into him or her.

Heimann holds the opposite position in some respects: countertransference activates feelings in the analyst in response to the patient. Such feelings are *the analyst’s feelings* and not the result of the patient’s projective identification into the analyst, and their registration and understanding constitute *access to the patient’s unconscious*. In Heimann’s elaboration, countertransference is an unconscious “*cognitive instrument*” and a “highly significant tool for the analyst’s work...”, informing the analyst of the possible “lag between the conscious and

unconscious perception.” Such a lag amounts to “an unconscious introjection of his patient, and an unconscious identification with him” (Heimann 1977, p. 319).

Even though Heimann's initial relationships after her flight from Berlin were forged with the Kleinian group, she is mostly included in the group of analysts who took a two-person view of countertransference. She herself dates the beginning of her independence from Klein and her reconnection to the worlds of Ferenczi and Balint with her essay “On Counter-Transference”. That essay presents a *balanced mix* of intense focus on the rich play of *emotional responsiveness* in the analyst and *caution* as to *emotional expression*. She seems to have considered analytic countertransference as a kind of *creation* of the patient, useful to the analyst. However, her clinical vignette includes her sense of countertransference as both ‘clue’ and ‘mis-clue’.

In the controversies surrounding the growing emphasis on the concept of countertransference, Winnicott's “Hate in the Counter-Transference” presents an important, independent position. Published in 1949, this paper foreshadows Heimann's elaborations and institutes Winnicott as a crucial figure in the emergence of ideas about countertransference, particularly in his conceptualization of the mutative and necessary role of aggression as an aspect of countertransference. Winnicott's two papers, “Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development” (1950) and “Hate in the Counter-Transference” (1949), both identify the *inevitability and clinical utility of aggression and hatred in the analyst*. According to Winnicott, hatred is *paired with*, not opposed to, *love* and primary maternal preoccupation. It is boundary-making and aids in separation and in the ability of the analysand to disentangle fantasy and reality, to lessen the dangerous experience of omnipotence. In this way, the hating aspect of the analyst, including the hatred that is in the ending of the hour, is a crucial ingredient of change in the analysand.

Winnicott distinguishes between (1) countertransference feelings that are under repression and possibly need more self-analysis by the analyst (these are idiosyncratic identifications and tendencies of the analyst) and (2) “the truly objective counter-transference, ... the analyst's love and hate in reaction to the actual personality and behavior of the patient, based on objective observation” (1949, p. 69-70). ‘Truly objective countertransference’ refers to the analyst's feelings toward the patient, that are his or her own feelings and – as Heimann sees it later – not the result of the patient's projection into the analyst. These feelings are thus reactions to the patient's behavior: personal reflections to the patient's ‘objective’ way of being. Sometimes it is necessary, according to Winnicott, that these feelings of the analyst be put at the patient's disposal – through recognition by the analyst as his/her own feelings, and/or through interpretation – in order for the analysis to proceed.

This view, like Heimann's, is different from the concept ‘projective identification’ of the classical Kleinian frame of reference, which is considered the ubiquitous mechanism that affects the totality of the patient/analyst relationship. The work by Heimann and Winnicott casts a long shadow of influence over the third, so-called ‘Independent group’ in England (the first being the contemporary Freudians, the second the Kleinians), a shadow that spreads out from Little (1981), who explored the depth of the transference forms of hate and *blocked*

vitality, to Bollas (1983), who promoted a careful attunement to countertransference as the bearer of the *disavowed aspects* of the analyst.

Overall, in England, there is a divergence in the further development of the concept of countertransference. One conceptualization, derived from Klein's introduction of projective identification and emphasized in the 'Kleinian Group', is per se a great step in understanding the patient-analyst way of relating. The second conceptualization, the so-called countertransference of the early 'Independent tradition' (Winnicott, Heimann), maintains that what is from the analyst is from the analyst and not automatically the analyst's response to the patient's projection. This difference in the countertransference conception has relevant effects and consequences on the technical conduct of the treatment and on how the analyst considers and works with the patient's communications.

Parallel developments in the Argentinian school, starting with Racker, stay closer to Kleinian views, as they develop their own version of the use of projective identification within the context of countertransference.

II. C. International Broadening of the Concept – Further Lines of Expansion

(Second half of the 20th century Europe, Latin America and North America)

From the mid-1950s onwards, alongside the 'widening scope of psychoanalysis', countertransference was increasingly seen as a useful tool, while the broadened view became the dominant perspective. In the last fifty years, most psychoanalysts have stopped viewing countertransference as only an impediment and have come to see it instead as a source of insight into the analysand as well as into their own psychic functioning in relation to the analysand. Here, it is sometimes called '*personal countertransference*' or '*diagnostic countertransference*' (Casement 1987). In this perspective, countertransference came to be viewed as a *two-person* co-creation, and transference and countertransference are seen as the endpoints of a single dynamic process. This view of countertransference began to link the phenomenon closely to *enactments*, which some came to see as the first step toward boundary violations, transference and countertransference '*actualizations*'.

In all these developments worldwide, the conceptualization of the relationship between 'projective identification' and 'countertransference' plays an important role. Heimann's and Racker's ideas, along with those of Winnicott and other independent authors, have been developed and extended by Grinberg (1956), Bion (1959), Ogden (1994a) and many others who have focused on the analyst's use of *reverie* and on a process that makes the analytic object/space/setting/field a variously conceptualized triadic configuration and exchange (Baranger 1961/2008, Bleger 1967, Green 1974), which is a new creation of patient and analyst, a 'Third' in Ogden's (1994b) terms.

In Argentina, notable enrichment of the scope of discussion of metapsychology and clinical theory on the subject of countertransference projective-introjective engagements (including dramatizations and enactments) was further enriched by Leon Grinberg's (1956) conceptualization of *projective counter-identification*.

While for Racker and Heimann, however differently conceptualized, the use of projective identificatory mechanisms in the context of countertransference was the analyst's identifying response with certain internal objects or self aspects of the patient, Grinberg focused on the *archaic communicative aspects of the projective-introjective exchange*, a direction which was later picked up by Bion. Grinberg's initial proposal was that projective counter-identification employs a '*short circuit*' in the analytic couple's communication. His assumption was that the patient 'places' into the analyst's psyche some aspects of himself or herself with such a projective violence that, as a passive receptor, the analyst actually and concretely assimilates them as his or her own (1956, p. 508). Referring to his concept in connection with acting out, Grinberg (1968) writes: "The analyst who succumbs to the effects of the patient's pathological projective identifications, might react to them as if he had actually acquired the aspects which were projected on him (the patient's inner objects or parts of the self). The analyst feels passively '*dragged*' into *playing the role* that the patient in an active, though unconscious, way, literally 'forced' upon him. I have called this specific kind of countertransference response 'projective counter-identification'" (p. 172; emphasis added).

As compared to Racker's complementary countertransference, where the analyst's emotional response was based on his own anxieties and conflicts, identifying with inner objects similar to those of the analysand, Grinberg conceptualized the analyst's response as relatively independent of his own conflicts. Grinberg's merit was to emphasize that the analyst's own unconscious is not primarily involved, and consequently, that the analyst's introspection would not be enough to immediately access the roots of such projective counter-identification. Grinberg emphasized what years later came to be known as the irreducible character of the '*micro-acting-outs*' of the countertransference, as an intermediate station in the analyst's search for insight into the archaic parts of the patient's psyche. Such a station cannot be avoided if the analyst is to know the entire texture of the transferred object (Grinberg 1982).

Grinberg's (1956) contribution was to see that the analysand's unconscious intentionality produced effects in the analyst's psyche through the projective identification, no longer conceived as an intra-subjective fantasy (Klein 1946), but as an *interaction process between two minds*. Three years later, Bion (1959) explicitly highlighted this communicative side of the projective identification.

With the evolution of his ideas on projective counter-identification, Grinberg identified *new metapsychological tools* to re-conceptualize the analyst's countertransference. His projective counter-identification stresses the communicative side of projective identification as an *enigmatic, ineffable message* that could only be expressed through the *transference-countertransference dramatization* set off by the patient. In the clinical context, this transference-countertransference dramatization *anticipated* the idea of listening to the most archaic levels of the patient's psyche by the detour of the *enactment*, developed years later (Jacobs 1986; Godfrind-Haber&Haber 2002; Mancina 2006; Sapisochin 2013; Cassorla 2013).

From the late 1950's, Bion (1959) and Rosenfeld (1962) developed the concept into the idea that projective identification is an *unconscious communication* from the analysand. Bion (1959) drew a parallel between the therapeutic interaction and the mode in which the suffering

child projects his/her distress into the mother who ‘contains’ it and can then respond appropriately. The analyst has the same (containing/‘alpha’) function: ‘containing’ the patient’s projections in a state of ‘reverie’, ‘digesting’ them and responding with appropriate interpretations. In this vein, countertransference was seen as not only an instrument through which the analyst could gain access to the patient’s unconscious world, but also a medium through which the patient’s intolerable experiences could be processed; it is not only an instrument of investigation, but also a curing medium. Bion’s development of the notions of containment and alpha-function in the analyst have led to a keen appreciation of the infusion of the analyst’s mind, affects and even body ego with the analysand’s unconscious and preconscious processes. (See the separate entry CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER/CONTAINED)

In its further development, the concept of projective identification has continued to maintain a significant role in Kleinian, Bionian and neo-Bionian theory, and in many of the intersubjective and interpersonal perspectives. As it became extended from the theory of primitive fantasy and defense into the theory of archaic communication and thinking, the complexity of the relationship and differentiation between projective identification and the analyst’s own countertransference became considerable (Grotstein 1994). The mutual and creative *constructions of meanings* in the works of Bion, Rosenfeld, and their later progeny Mawson (2010), within the transference-countertransference exchanges, present a complex process whereby the analyst must work over the *induced affect states* in order to see their communicative aspect. Such projections may illuminate for the analyst, via his/her countertransference, which affect states the patient is struggling with and communicating. In the work of Alvarez (1992), this perspective further expands to a view of the whole *analytic process as co-constructed*.

The rich understanding of the power of *intersubjective processes* upon the analyst, analysand and treatment is deeply indebted to the evolution in Kleinian thought in Great Britain, from Klein, through Bion, (1959) and Rosenfeld, (1962, 1969, 1987), and the Argentinian school of Racker (1957, 1968) and Grinberg (1956, 1968). Various extensions of this perspective follow in the work of Segal, (1983), Joseph (1985), Spillius, (1994) and O’Shaughnessy (1990), Steiner (1994), Feldman (1993) and Britton (2004; Segal & Britton 1981) in Great Britain, and in the work of Grotstein (1994), Mitrani (1997, 2001) and others in the USA.

Throughout, Ferenczi’s early writings on countertransference continued to be directly or indirectly influential. One of the central sources of Ferenczian ideas about countertransference, Michael Balint, the author of the concept of the ‘basic fault’ (Balint 1979), was also a serious contributor to the discussion about projection and introjection. Ferenczi’s radical ideas were brought to London by Michael and Alice Balint, and influenced both Kleinians and the so-called Independent group. Ferenczi and Balint’s ideas reached Latin America through Racker (1957). Racker utilized Ferenczi’s (1927, 1932) concept of *identification with the aggressor within* his concept of *complementary identification* (with the patient’s internal aggressive objects), and further elaborated on Balint’s views of countertransference within the hierarchical training institutions. Some of these same early ideas

of Ferenczi's and Balint's went via Clara Thompson (Green 1964) to the Sullivan interpersonal school in the US, where the *co-constructive character of the analytic exchange* was further accentuated (although regression, so crucial to Ferenczi, Klein and Racker, slipped away).

In this context, as well as in the context of all developments that follow, it is important to stress that seeing co-construction or co-elaboration in transference and countertransference does not reduce the responsibilities or the demands made on the analyst. Countertransference work goes on at conscious and unconscious levels, and the work of *understanding countertransference extends well beyond the hour* in which some aspect of countertransference has emerged.

Unlike countertransference, the mechanism of projective identification has not been universally accepted within psychoanalysis.

While recognizing the aspect of countertransference where patients induce certain experiences and/or behavioral responses in their analysts, Ego psychologists and conflict theorists preferred to speak of '*transference actualizations*' and '*role responsiveness*,' emphasizing the analyst's '*living out*' the patient's *unconscious fantasies*, holding that these terms were closer to their experience (Sandler 1976).

In England, Sandler (1976) – with his concept of 'role-responsiveness' – puts forward a specification from another theoretical orientation, the British 'Contemporary Freudians'. He describes how the patient will attempt to actualize, to bring about in reality – that is in interactive behavior – his internal object relations. This intra-psychic interaction, involving a role for the subject and another for the internal object, will evoke a particular response in the analyst. Sometimes the analyst may notice an impulse to behave in a certain way, but often only afterwards notices that he or she has already started to behave with this patient in a particular mode (here the context of the discussion of the concept 'enactment' – in differentiation to countertransference – is of specific relevance). According to Sandler, the analyst's countertransference reactions are *compromises*: they *echo the patient's unconscious expectations and wishes, but also the analyst's own tendencies* which the patient often unconsciously has noticed, and taken advantage of. The analyst's awareness of such *role-responses* can be a *vital clue* to the dominant transference conflict in the patient.

In the meantime, so called mainstream North American psychoanalysis of the 1950s and 1960s, rooted in Ego Psychology/Structural theory, remained a *one-person model*, subscribing to the narrow definition of countertransference. Classical conceptualizations located countertransference '*in*' the *psyche of analysts, in a spectrum of feelings, resistances, inner conflicts, blind spots, conscious and unconscious attitudes towards patients, reactions to patients' transference, and transference to patients*. However, the child analytic work by Anna Freud of highly developed clinical situations involving the child and its caretakers, influential in the US, the analytic work with psychotics at Chestnut Lodge (Fromm-Reichmann, 1939) and with traumatized and borderline patients at Menninger Clinic (Menninger, 1954) were attesting to the profound influence of the environmental factors and object relationships on the development and formation of intrapsychic structures. While such clinical experiences

highlighted *the importance of the interactional field* of transference-countertransference in the analyst/analysand situation (Moscowitz, 2014), its systematic theoretical integration came only later in Loewald's work (1960, 1971, 1975).

Loewald was a transformational figure, working from the 1960s onwards. Originally strongly influenced in the direction of phenomenology by Heidegger, (1962) Loewald might be seen in connection with Winnicott (1947, 1950, 1972), Erikson (1954), Kohut (1977), Mitchell (1993, 1997), Aron (1996), Hoffman (1998), and Bromberg (1998) among others with more *'open systems' versions of drive theory and object relations theory*. In his developmental model, the child's ego arises from a nucleus of maternal/infant mutual involvement of body and mind, where the mother's psyche interacts with the undifferentiated infant's state in a spiraling and oscillating development of integration and disintegration, pushing toward further integration. This developmental model has implications for transference and countertransference in the sense that all experience is emergent from *intersubjective transactions*, even when *the focus is on the individual* (Loewald 1960). Acknowledging the importance of the findings coming out of child analysis and analysis with psychotic and borderline patients, where the analyst's reactions are under stronger pressure from the patient's unconscious, Loewald (1971) asserts further that transference and countertransference cannot be viewed separately and that both analyst and patient exhibit transference-countertransference reactions, which are *normal ingredients of the analytic process*.

Loewald's insights became a rich template for countertransference discussions not only within the increasingly diversified North American psychoanalytic culture, but worldwide. From this point forward, countertransference was seen as an inevitable aspect of the analytic *relationship* in which *patient and analyst are intertwined* – one of the dominant perspectives in psychoanalysis today.

This view has parallels with some elements of French inter-subjectivist thought in France, Belgium and the French-speaking analytic community in North America. Sometimes called 'The Third model', this view posits that in human development, the 'two-person mind' precedes that of the 'one-person' psychic autonomy of drive, defense and intrapsychic fantasy: In the first phase of human life, the baby's mind must be considered in the context of the care-taking environment (the two-person mind) before the internal topographic differentiation among unconscious, preconscious and conscious systems, and structuralization of id, ego and superego (the one-person mind) can be accomplished. Through this process of 'subjectivisation' (becoming thus internally differentiated and structured subject), the intimate connection with the 'real (potentially traumatizing) other' (Lacan 1966/1977) is paramount. Laplanche (1993, 1999) brought Lacan's statement of the 'traumatic real (other)' – the caretaker - into the intersubjective realm. He emphasized that the unconscious sexuality (of the adult caretaker), triggered by the closeness with the infant's body, 'contaminates' intimate exchanges with the infant in the form of *enigmatic messages*. Others extend this developmental concept further into the realm directly applicable to the clinical exchange and countertransference, by focusing on the 'activity of representation' and 'deferred action in naming of affects', through which the child/the patient "constitutes the I" (Aulagnier

1975/2001, p. 97); and the parent's/analyst's capacity to remain at an optimal distance, facilitating symbolization and representation, "necessary for the formation of thought" (Green 1975, p. 14). Clinically, this translates into close 'listening' to all forms of unconscious exchanges and transmissions of emotions via words and behaviors between the patient and the analyst, as in '*shared-transmitted affect*' (Parat 1995) and '*countertransference position*' of *de-centered clinical listening* (Faimberg 1993).

III. MUTUAL INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES AND CONTEMPORARY USAGE OF THE CONCEPT

III. A. Contemporary Freudian and Object Relations Theory

Within contemporary Ego Psychology and Conflict Theory of North America, Lasky (2002), following Arlow (1997) and Abend (1986) in focusing on subtleties of the inner states and processes of the analyst at work, distinguishes between empathy, analytic instrument, and countertransference proper. Blum (1991) focused on the complexities of *affective communication within the two-way transference-countertransference field* of the analytic process, and particular problems in the analysis of patients who have specific difficulty with recognition, experience, communication, and regulation of affect, within the intrapsychic conflict paradigm (Ellman, Grand, Silvan & Ellman 1998).

Kernberg (1983), writing on the character analysis of mild borderline personality patients, distinguishes between chronic and acute countertransference. Acknowledging Heimann's (1960) influence, he writes: "...*chronic stalemate* may be crucial to diagnosing both *chronic countertransference distortions* (which are more pervasive though less obtrusive than *acute* countertransference developments) and subtle but powerful transference acting out that might otherwise not have been diagnosed. In this regard, the analysis of the analyst's total emotional reaction is a "second line" of approach when the first line of approach to direct transference exploration proves insufficient..." (pp. 265, 266; emphasis added). Overall, Kernberg's (1965, 1975) views on the countertransference have gradually evolved, towards its vital importance, especially in working with borderline patients. While in 1965 he cautioned against the danger of broadening the concept 'countertransference' to include all emotional responses in the analyst (thus risking that the concept lose all specific meaning), in 1975 he acknowledged and emphasized the constructive analytic work of interpreting countertransference. Especially in the work with borderline patients the analyst has to deal with and manage his or her own (at times) *strong inner reactions to the patient's projections of highly primitive object relations*. In his recent Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP), he outlines the paradigm of overtly focusing on the borderline patient's transference responses, yet closely internally monitoring the analyst's countertransference. In this model, the analyst interprets from the *position of the 'third'*, interpretatively commenting on the interaction of both participants in the dialogue (Kernberg 2015).

A generative figure between Object Relations and Relational Theories, Mitchell (1993, 1997) conveys a powerful sense that *countertransference affects are engines for psychic movement*. His vignettes often catch the analytic pair in moments of hopeless despair. Without that experience of hopelessness, Mitchell holds, the analyst would not be impelled to do the work needed to understand the process by which such impasses come about. In his work, there are always two speakers with authority.

The current situation within the broadly based classical tradition is one of an ongoing debate within and across orientations on the status, function and limits of countertransference analysis (Gabbard 1982, 1994, 1995). Jacob's (1993) original theoretical work on the uses of the analyst's countertransference draws from object relations, from contemporary Freudians (Sandler 1976), and from self-psychology. With Jacobs, countertransference emerges in the most florid and *multiply configured* forms, as rich (in its own way) and problematic as transference. In his work the whole of the analyst's instrument, the creative use of all of body, mind, fantasy and interpersonal experience, is crucial for analytic work. Now countertransference is not a problem but (part of) a solution, a necessary register for the analyst's work. Built into the suppositions of Jacob's *use of analytic subjectivity* is his assumption of the subtle and *pervasive communications* – meta, conscious, preconscious and unconscious – that undergird and network through the experiences of all analytic couples. *Meaning-making* being so richly co-constructed inevitably requires that the analyst understand and explore very deeply his/her own part in these complex communications. For Jacobs (1991, 1999, 2001) and Smith (1999, 2000, 2003), and for the more object-relational analysts such as Ogden (1994, 1995) and Gabbard (1994), differences among them notwithstanding, the analyst's subjectivity is crucial for the self-analysis that ultimately moves analytic work forward. In this line of thinking, countertransference is now thought of more typically as enactment (Harris 2005; See also the separate entry ENACTMENT).

Reflecting on the repetitive and compulsive aspects of countertransference, Smith (2000) proposes that countertransference may (even simultaneously) both retard analytic progress and enhance it. Smith is doing here for countertransference what Freud did for transference, namely, showing that it is likely to be both a resistance and an engine of change. As with any repetition compulsion, there is simultaneously an *impulse for health and for illness*.

Apprey (1993, 2010, 2014) extends Sandler's notion of countertransference-driven role responsiveness "to address pleas, demands, and all the prodding in the transference-countertransference continuum driven by unconscious wishes to repeat or upend historical grievances in the public space of the contemporary clinical setting" (personal communication to Papiasvili, 2014). In what he sees as a uniquely contemporary North American extension and use of the concept, Apprey, a contemporary Freudian who bridges complexities of projective identification, enactments and role responsiveness, depicts the role-responsive analyst as *potentiating 'psychical emancipation* from the ... destructive and oppressive internal objects' who intrusively torment and violate the patient from within his or her own psyche.

Freedman, Lasky and Webster (2009) present a complex combination of Freudian, Lacanian, and Winnicottian concepts of symbolization and triangulation, within the *intersubjective matrix*, while distinguishing between so-called *ordinary and extraordinary countertransferences*: ordinary countertransferences are transitory disruptions, and extraordinary countertransferences are impasses, intolerable to the analyst to such an extent that they have to be kept out of his/her awareness. The Lacanian theory of countertransference as seen through the ‘lens of desire’ (Lacan, 1977) here meets the Winnicottian frame of ‘good enough analytic process’ and its ‘potential breakdown’ (Winnicott 1972; 1974).

III. B. Field Theory and Related Perspectives

Clinically anticipated by Ferenczi and Sullivan (1953, 1964), and influenced by evolving Object Relations theories, the concept of the '*field*' prominently entered the discussion on countertransference. Rooted in phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945) and in the European-North American neo-gestalt social-psychological dynamic field theory of Kurt Lewin (1947), psychoanalysts (particularly in Latin America and Italy, and to a lesser degree also in the US) drew upon this perspective to see the *analytic setting* or situation as an *integrated whole* with any aspect of the situation intimately implicated in all others. In this system, countertransference is an inevitable aspect of the *web of experience* in a psychoanalytic treatment. Among major exponents of these views of countertransference are the Argentinian analysts Willy and Madeleine Baranger. They picture the analytic process as an *evolving bi-personal field*, delimited by the setting, but comprising two inter-actors influencing each other in an inevitable, but subtle, way. The *psychoanalytic process is a 'joint creation'*, starting out from transference and countertransference alike. This notion that transference-countertransference arises out of the dynamic field that can create a '*bastion*' (Baranger and Baranger 2008; orig. 1961) implicates analyst and analysand in an *impasse* and in a *new creation*. The structure of the field “is constituted by the interplay of the processes of projective and introjective identification and of the counter-identifications that act with their different limits, functions and characteristics in the patient and the analyst” (ibid, p. 809). In Brazil, Roosevelt Cassorla (2013) developed the contemporary notion of *acute and chronic enactments*, which arise as mutual behavioral discharges between the analytic pair, which *invade the analytic field*, reflecting back to situations when the verbal *symbolization* was *impaired*. Such recent Latin American views of countertransference have been rooted in the work and the tradition of the Barangers and Bleger (1967), which evolved alongside and in reciprocal interactions with Racker (1968) and Grinberg (1968), often with Lacanian accents (de Bernardi 2000; Cassorla 2013).

The analytic field theory has been further developed both in Europe and North America. Stern (1997), in the US, has presented an original elaboration of the *field theory within the interpersonal perspective*. One of the field theory’s major representatives in Europe is Ferro who has blended the *field theory with a Bionian view*. In Ferro's work with Basile (Ferro and Basile, 2008) the field today is understood as a meeting point of the *multiple characters* of patient and analyst with a life of their own, as if on stage. These authors focus entirely on the

narration of the worlds that emerge in each analytic session. They distinguish a series of *countertransference levels*. "Distinctions are based on the modalities that the field shows and makes use of to modulate its own tensions" (Ferro and Basile 2008, p. 3). Transformations of the characters in the session's narratives are seen as representing "*the transformations in the analytic field*. Explorations of such links elucidate the opening and closing of a 'channel' between (the patient's) projective identifications and (the analyst's) reverie" (ibid., p. 3). Ferro (2009) and Civitarese (Civitarese 2008; Ferro and Civitarese 2013) stress the use of the analyst's mind and body, held in reverie, as a guide to the unconscious processes in the patient and between analyst and analysand.

This perspective also has much in common with the British trained North American analyst Thomas Ogden's (1994a,b; 1995) notion of *co-created interactions*, where Kleinian influences are also discernible. According to Ogden, the *intra-psychic* views of transference and countertransference should not only be complemented by the *inter-subjective* picture of a *transference-countertransference matrix*, but these perspectives are to be seen as constituting a *dialectic leading to an '(inter-subjective) analytic third'*, a *new evolving subjectivity*, comprising (analogically to the field), something more than the sum of its parts.

Also combining the intrapsychic and inter-subjective within the French psychoanalytic framework, Green (1973/1999; 2002), in line with Winnicott's works on potential space, defines another formation in the area of tertiary processes. His version is the 'analytic object' (object of analysis and in analysis) as the '*third object*': belonging neither to the analyst nor to the analysand, it has characteristics of transitionality, being *formed in the analytic encounter*. In Green's thinking, the intersubjective relationship connects two intrapsychic subjects, and "It is in the intertwining of the internal worlds of the two partners of the analytic couple that intersubjectivity takes on substance" (2000, p. 2).

III. C. Two-Person, Interpsychic and Inter-subjective Focus; Countertransference as 'Common Ground'

Coming originally out of Europe (specifically Italy), in the last decade, the conceptualization of the 'interpsychic' (besides 'inter-subjective') has been seen worldwide as more and more relevant (Bolognini 2004, 2010, 2016). This recent interest echoes Freud's comments on how two systems of Unconscious may be in direct and influential contact with each other, without the involvement of higher forms of consciousness or subjectivity (Freud 1915, 1937a,b.). In formulating the conceptualization of the interpsychic, the transformational 'modulation of the field' of the field theory (Ferro, 2001), the Winnicottian concept of 'transitionality', and the work on empathy as a complex phenomenon (Bolognini 2009) have been especially relevant. In the recent work of Stefano Bolognini (2016), the '*interpsychic*' may be seen as a "*functional pre-subjective level where two persons can exchange internal contents, through the utilization of 'normal' communicative projective identifications*" (Bolognini 2016, p.110). As an extended psychic dimension, it reflects the reciprocal influence of two minds, which is experienced from inside. In its technical use, when the analytic dialogue is experienced as interpsychic, it gains a "new, more specific effectiveness, first in containing

and then in symbolizing” (Bolognini 2004). This has been elaborated within many divergent contemporary psychoanalytic traditions, including neo-Kleinians and neo-Bionians whose interspsychic work lies mainly in focusing on the readiness to receive projective identifications (Steiner 2011, Pick 2015).

Linking with this view is a strand of French Inter-subjective thinking, with a focus on unconscious communication via enigmatic messages, attention to the patient’s space not being violated, the analyst’s subjectivity, and the analyst’s representational and symbolic capacity being put in service of the patient’s subjectivization, representation and symbolization. Within the context of countertransference, an example may be Faimberg’s (1992, 2005, 2012, 2013, 2015) *countertransference position of de-centered clinical listening*, also known as *listening to listening*, consisting of closely monitoring how the analyst hears what the patient has heard and said (and vice-versa), leading to numerous surprises, as a guide to understanding the patient’s state of receptivity and symbolic representation. Jaqueline Godfrind-Haber’s and Maurice Haber’s (2009) concept of *shared acted experience* constitutes an interspsychic entity of a lived out ‘image of action’ not yet symbolized in words, but containing symbolic capacity. The symbolic leap from potential to realization, from action register to thought register, can be accomplished through the analyst’s countertransferential participation. Similarly, the work of René Roussillon (2009) traces how patient’s actions and bodies carry events-messages from the patient’s pre-verbal history. The interspsychic transmission on the level of transference-countertransference can facilitate their becoming part of ‘psychic life’. From a variety of angles, also Green (2000), Aulagnier (2015), de Mijolla-Mellor (2015/2016) and others stress the analyst’s fine-tuning to the *interspsychic and/or inter-subjective flow of unconscious communication* as a vital prerequisite to the analytic ‘*co- re-construction*’ and historization of the patient’s early trauma, and restoration of symbolic capacity for any interpretation to have a meaning.

In the US and worldwide, *the two-person, inter-systemic view* has also been professed by analysts with a background in infant research, systems theory and Self-psychology. Contemporary infant research of *mutual affect regulation* and affect infusion (Tronick 2002) may be especially relevant to the clinical focus on interspsychic transmission. Applied to the clinical work with adults, many authors (Nahum, 2013) underline the *joint creation* of the *implicit rules* of the psychoanalytical process. However, they play down the concepts of transference and countertransference, emphasizing rather the facilitating meetings between patient and analyst.

While in many contemporary schools of thought, most recently, the concept's explicit use, the explicit mentioning of 'countertransference', may be less in the foreground, it does not mean that the contribution of the personal side of the analyst has gone out of focus, quite the contrary: *The inter-twinning of patient and analyst* is one of the major perspectives in psychoanalysis today. If one examines the longer historical lineage, countertransference has undoubtedly acquired a specific weight in the context of the essential elements of the psychoanalytic method.

In addition to countertransference potentiating growth and knowledge, Gabbard (1995) maintains that countertransference has become an *emerging common ground* among psychoanalysts of different schools. He traces this to the development of two key concepts such as *projective identification* and *countertransference enactment* (see separate PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION and ENACTMENT entries). Following the long evolving history of viewing the emotional reactions of the analyst as an instrument of accessing and affecting the inner world of the patient, the recent discussion has included the inquiry about if and how to extend the active and explicit use of countertransference in the analytic situation, i.e. whether, under certain circumstances, one should disclose the countertransference to the patient, with the aim being to facilitate the patient's understanding of his or her own experience (Renick 1999; Gediman 2011; Greenberg 2015). However, at the present time there is no consensus on the usefulness of this intervention technique.

IV. CONCLUSION

Starting with Freud's 'Irma Injection dream' of 1895, a countertransference dream par excellence, the development of the concept of countertransference exemplifies the constant interaction of theory and practice, of clinical work and conceptualization, from the 'birth of psychoanalysis' throughout its further evolution.

Although early on countertransference was seen mainly as a risk to the analyst's clinical effectiveness, the 'other' trend of understanding countertransference as the result of *interspsychic* processes, only hinted at in the beginning, was becoming progressively more explicit in the analytic discussions of the 1920s and 1930s, as the definition of countertransference was gradually broadened.

The last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have seen a further focusing on the interspsychic phenomena and processes going on not only *in* but also *between* the psyches of the two protagonists of the analytic situation. However, within this focusing there have been very different thematic priorities: the pre-subjective level of exchange, the intertwined subjectivities of patient and analyst, the relationships of both, the psychic field between them and the various channels of exchange – unconscious reactions, affects, and emotions, language, physicality, behavior, etc. As countertransference is increasingly seen as a treatment tool, its potentials and pitfalls, clinically and theoretically, remain of major interest for analysts.

The different meaning aspects which show throughout the development of the concept can be organized according to what other concepts they refer to and what conceptual universes they are emerging from: "*Countertransference*" referring to the *topographical model of the mind* (conscious/unconscious); "*Countertransference*" referring to the *structural model of the mind* (ego-ideal/superego, ego, id); "*Countertransference*" referring to *specific psychic mechanisms* (resistance, projection, projective identification, container/contained);

"Countertransference" referring to specific aspects of the analytic process (effective functioning, emotional response, empathy); "Countertransference" referring to psychic characteristics/restrictions of the analyst; "Countertransference" referring to the transference-countertransference matrix of interpsychic and/or inter-subjective exchanges, or to the field.

Countertransference may be seen as a topic through which different traditions approach each other, making up the “common ground” in psychoanalysis. The authors within a classical Freudian background have come to see that the analyst is inevitably influenced by the patient. Analysts working within the Object relational tradition have begun to view countertransference not only as a result of the patient’s projections and/or displacements (echoing only the patient’s unconscious processes), but also as reflecting the analyst’s tendencies.

Today, across the divides of psychoanalytic cultures, theoretical and clinical pluralities, a wide reaching consensus has set in about the emotions of the analyst being influenced by patient and analyst alike, attesting to the rich, multifaceted, essential, human dimension of the analyst at work.

See also:

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

ENACTMENT

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

TRANSFORMATION(S)

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EGO PSYCHOLOGY

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

“The history of psychoanalysis brought it about that we became acquainted with the unconscious before the conscious and with the repressed before the ego. Nowadays the psychology of the ego stands in the center of our investigations” (Fenichel 1935, p. 348).

“...a healthy person must have the capacity to suffer and to be depressed... We know that successful adaptation can lead to maladaptation... But conversely, maladaptation may become successful adaptation... health clearly includes pathological reactions as a means towards its attainment (Hartmann 1939, p. 311).

Ego Psychology presents a further development, expansion, elaboration and refinement of the Structural Theory (and pertaining Second Theory of Anxiety) of Sigmund Freud of 1923 and 1926. While recognizing the innate (pre-conflictual) ego’s functioning, Ego Psychology focuses on the unconscious ego operations in a broad developmental and dynamic context, which include developmental (and clinical) transformations, and the ego’s multiple roles in psychic conflict, as initiator of defenses, decision maker and executor of actions, synthesizer of conflicting elements in mental life, and evaluator and negotiator of the conditions of the internal and external (to the ego) environment. Post-Freudian Structural Theory/Ego Psychology’s gradual addition and elaboration of genetic, developmental and adaptive considerations (Hartmann 1939/1958; Rapaport and Gill 1959; Freud, A. 1965) to existing Freudian metapsychology has had a substantial impact on clinical theory and technique.

Recent advances have allowed for greater understanding and expansion of topics extending beyond traditional Ego Psychology interests, such as the fine-tuned building of psychic structure through the interpretive process, transference and countertransference (Busch 2013, 2015); female body, sexuality and development (Balsam 2012, 2013, 2015); trauma (Blum 2003; Fernando 2009, 2012a), and recasting of ego functioning, based on the conception that the ego is the central processing, integrating and transformative agent in the psyche and is responsible for our experiential ‘end-states’ (Erlich 2003, 2013).

Defining Ego Psychology as a phase in the development of psychoanalysis not only confirms the nature of the analytic discourse as “a research work in progress”, but also makes it possible to account for the variety of ways in which this new phase was dealt with by several generations of authors around the psychoanalytic world.

While in 1926 it was clear that conflict had two dimensions, one being defended content and the other being defense processes, Freud concentrated more on defended content. Anna Freud (1936/1946) elevated defensive processes to an equal status in the genesis of conflict. Heinz Hartmann (1939/1958), Ernst Kris (1955), David Rapaport (1951, 1958), Rudolph Loewenstein (1963) and Erik Erikson (1950, 1956) then elaborated the wider functions of ego. The in-depth study of the id (and the dynamic unconscious) undertaken previously by Freud was now paralleled by in-depth knowledge of the ego.

Hartmann may be considered one of the architects of the first-generation ‘Classical’ Post-Freudian Ego Psychology/Structural Theory, systematizing, revising, adding, and extending many pre-existing notions and fragments of ego psychology; however, in addition to Anna Freud, Kris, Rapaport and Erikson, there are many others who made very important contributions, with technical impact and influence on later theory. These include Otto Fenichel, Wilhelm Reich, Theodore Reik, Rene Spitz, Edith Jacobson, Margaret Mahler, Paul Federn, Herman Nunberg, Elisabeth Zetzel, Ralph Greenson, Leo Rangell, Robert Waelder, Joseph Sandler, Edoardo Weiss, opening the door for transitional and integrational thought of Hans Loewald, Otto Kernberg, Nancy Chodorow, as well as contemporary Ego Psychology of Paul Gray, Fred Busch, Cecilio Paniagua, Joseph Fernando and contemporary inclusive Freudian thinking of Harold Blum, Rosemary Balsam, Shmuel Erlich and others.

Hartmann's concepts of relatively conflict-free spheres and ego autonomy were not meant to indicate that ego was independent of other psychic agencies, nor did it mean to minimize the importance of psychic conflict. Ego continued to be viewed as one aspect of the greater mind, striving to negotiate a balance between all (potentially antithetical) forces emanating from and impinging on the human mind.

Clinically, this translated into an analyst's stance, via the alliance with a patient's ego, to be equidistant among all three psychic agencies and the external world, in addition to increased attention to the psychic surface, defense (and resistance) processes and patterns. The surface was understood to be a derivative of the deeper unconscious conflict. Technique-wise, this ‘surface’ approach shuns a premature interpretation of the unconscious forces and contents (wishes, impulses and traumatic memories) being defended against in favor of exploration of resistances and an expansion of the patient's capacity for self-observation and self-reflection. This brought renewed interest in the preconscious, in the manifest content of fantasies, dreams and screen memories, in the intrapsychic process itself, with intense attention to the minute-to-minute interaction between unconscious drives and unconscious defenses (Blum 1998; Rangell 1963; Skelton 2006; Paniagua 2008).

The contemporary regional North American and European psychoanalytic dictionaries, that do not subscribe to any particular theoretical viewpoint, define Ego Psychology broadly as ‘a branch of psychoanalysis, including all areas of study, research and clinical application, that focus on the concept of the ego and its role in psychological functioning, development, psychopathology and treatment’ (Moore and Fine 1990; Auchincloss and Samberg 2012), and as ‘a depth-psychological approach that addresses various mental phenomena from the vantage point of the ego’ (Akhtar 2009), with conflict, defenses, adaptations and, in particular, resistances as special object of study (Skelton 2006).

While there is no entry of Ego Psychology in the most recent psychoanalytic dictionary in Latin America (Borensztein 2014), Ramón Parres’ (1977) publication “El Psicoanálisis como Ciencia” (Psychoanalysis as Science) presents a unique synthetic view of psychoanalytic methodology, including mechanisms of defense, transference, and overriding influence of unconscious processes on the conscious mentation, from ego psychological perspective. ‘Rarely cited, widely used’ characterizes Ego Psychology’s influence on the clinical work, such as detailed clinical history including evaluation of ego capacities and ego functioning throughout the analytic process, including establishment and maintenance of therapeutic alliance, resistances and defense mechanisms, which are considered an important part of psychoanalytic armamentarium of everyday clinical practice, without crediting Ego Psychology as participating in their formulation, throughout all of Latin America.

Dictionaries coming out of French and British Object Relations traditions (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973; Hinshelwood 1989), tend to define Ego Psychology (or Ego-Psychology) narrowly as ‘Hartmann’s Ego Psychology school’, which they juxtapose (for different reasons) to both – British Object Relations and the French tradition psychoanalytic thought.

In line with the broad definition of Ego Psychology (as an open ended phase as well as a branch of the evolution of psychoanalytic theory), this entry includes ‘Hartmann Era – Classical Ego Psychology’, internationally sometimes called ‘American Ego Psychology’, as well as further developments of overlapping ‘Contemporary Ego Psychology’, ‘Modern Conflict Theory’, and ‘Contemporary Freudian Thought’, including examples of various reformulations, extensions, transitions and integrations, stemming from mutual influences with other theoretical models within and across North America, Europe and Latin America. Various examples of pertinent enduring as well as emerging contributions are included as well.

II. RECEPTION OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY WORLDWIDE

Ego Psychology had its major impact and trajectory in North America, to which it was brought, fell on a fertile soil, was further elaborated, consolidated and systematized at first

mainly by European émigré analysts who were fleeing Nazi Germany and the impending Holocaust.

The complicated reception of Ego Psychology in Europe and Latin America was influenced by a number of factors, including the divergences in translations, conceptualizations of the ego, reflective of different frames of reference (Ego of the Topographic theory versus Structural theory; narrow or wide definition of Ego Psychology), different levels of discourse (levels of abstraction, theory, technique), in addition to different socio-cultural heritage proliferating into psychoanalytic culture and geography. Some of them are outlined below and further specified in sections of North American, European and Latin American contributions and developments.

Freudian Ich

For Freud, ‘das Ich’ (translated by Strachey as ‘the ego’ rather than ‘the I’) refers to both a mental agency as well as a subjective experience. While in German original this dual aspect of ‘Ich’ seems to indicate an important ‘Ich’ characteristic, Strachey’s English translation and terminological shift from ‘I’ to ‘the ego’ prompted the need to distinguish more clearly the propensities of the ego as a mental structure and psychic agency from the phenomenological experiential self.

Heinz Hartmann’s (1950) progressive conceptual separation of ego from self, and self from self-representations, while instrumental in further conceptual developments, at the same time may have complicated conceptualizing the relations between the abstract impersonal ego functions on the one hand and subjectivity on another. This trend was strongly opposed by the French psychoanalysts (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, p. 131), but also, by some subsequent Ego Psychologists/Post Freudian North American authors who strove to maintain and elaborate the dual character of Ich (‘I’/ ‘Ego’) (Jacobson 1964, Mahler 1979, Kernberg 1982).

On the other side of the controversy is Latin American author Leon Grinberg, who credits Hartmann for laying a groundwork towards addressing the problems of the Freudian ‘Ich’ and “making the distinction between ‘Ego’ as a psychic system and ‘Self’ as a concept referring to ‘oneself’” (Grinberg et al. 1966, p. 239). He also mentions an important antecedent in a previous contribution by Paul Federn (1928), who studied the Ego as a subject of ego functions and also as an object of internal experiences. According to Grinberg, Hartmann’s contribution lies in opening the door for Edith Jacobson’s articulation of self-representation, an important element of Grinberg’s own theoretical system.

Conceptual differences and similarities consequent to the divergent translations:

Ich-I-Ego-Le Moi-Yo-Eu

While the French translation of Freud’s opus “Oeuvres Complètes de Freud/Psychanalyse – OCF/P” (Laplanche et al. 1989-2015) retains the ambiguity of Ich/I, it

translates Ich mostly as ‘le moi’ (tonic form of ‘I’), that is subjective, more a self than the defensive reality-oriented ego of Ego psychology, with the consequence of having less room (and need) for elaborating on defenses, the only exception being Lacan’s (1966) psychotic defense of foreclosure. Theoretically, ‘le moi’ is defined as much by its identificatory ‘alienation’ in the desire of the Other as by its capacity for adaptation. For French analysts everything that is ego is listened to as emerging from the unconscious. There is an absence of the idea of a conflict free sphere. Clinically, Ego Psychology’s proposition of maintaining an analytical stance equidistant among all three psychic agencies and the external world (A. Freud 1936/1946) was taken to mean ‘maintaining a constant distance from the patient’ (Tessier 2004, 2005), which would be incompatible with French authors’ (Bouvet, Green, McDougall, and Roussillon) proposal of a flexible approach to patients, paying attention to their reaction to distance (see also separate entries THE UNCONSCIOUS, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, SELF).

Overall, neither ‘ego’ nor ‘le moi’ are equivalent to German ‘Ich’. While in English-speaking psychoanalysis, there is an increased need for development of the concept of ‘self’, to account for the subjectivity lacking in the ‘ego’, in French psychoanalysis there is a diminished need for comparable development of the self, as ‘le moi’ is already ‘self-saturated’.

Interestingly, similarly as with French ‘le moi’, there is the tight relationship between Spanish Yo or Portuguese Eu with subjectivity, leading to lesser need of usage of the term Self in the studies related to one’s own subjectivity in the Latin American region, the conclusion is different: there is a theoretical appreciation for the differentiation of ego as an abstract mental structure with functions from self as a total person (Resnik 1971-1972), and incorporating Hartmann-Jacobson’s thinking into synthetic models of mind, where ego is a psychic structure which contains self-representations (Grinberg 1966, pp. 242-243).

Critique based on Narrow Definition of Ego Psychology

During the so called ‘Hartman era’ (WWII – 1970), particularly in the English-speaking North America, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein’s ideas (and those of Anna Freud) dominated ‘Freudian’ psychoanalytic discourse, creating an impression of a hegemony.

“What was not appreciated at the time was that those were also individual authors...In the Anna Freud’s group in England there was far more emphasis on the issues of defense and interest in development than abstract discourse concerning ego functions, energy transformations and general psychology of adaptation...” (Blum 1998, p.32).

In the French tradition, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, who define Freudian ‘Ich’/ego as: (1) nucleus of consciousness and bundle of active mental functions; (2) organizer of the defenses; and (3) agency, mediating between external reality, id and super-ego, acknowledge the “school of ego psychology” of Hartmann, Kris, Lowenstein and Rapaport as one of diverse approaches, attempting to represent a “most consistent expression of the Freud’s structural theory”. Highly critical of Ego Psychology as a “school that has set out to relate the acquisitions of psychoanalysis to those of other disciplines (psychophysiology,

learning theory, child psychology, social psychology) in an attempt to found a true general psychology of the ego”, leading to notions of “de-sexualized neutralized energy”, ego’s “synthetic function” and a “conflict-free portion of the ego”, with ego as an “apparatus of regulation and adaptation to reality”, Laplanche and Pontalis at the same time acknowledge that it is “remarkably difficult to integrate all the psycho-analytic contributions to the concept of the ego into a unified line of thought”, to “counter these tendencies of ego psychology” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1967/1973, p. 139).

A corresponding lack of reception of ‘Classical’ North American Ego Psychology in the Francophone analytic world worldwide can be gathered from H       Tessier’s book (2005) “La psychanalyse am  ricaine”. Judging Ego Psychology not in terms of its agenda (to develop psychoanalysis as a natural science), but in terms of its results (such as the autonomous pre-conflictual ego functioning and the conflict-free sphere), the author concludes that “such a perspective is considerably distant from the perspective of Freud” (Tessier 2005, p. 39).

However, one of the self-defined ego psychologists Hans Loewald, has been recently added by the French Canadian analysts to the ‘Third Topography’ (Brusset 2006), a group of mostly French Post-Freudian thinkers who converge on the notion that in development, two-person psychology precedes one-person psychology of the internally structured and conflicted subject of Freud’s Topographic and Structural Theories (See the separate entries of THE UNCONSCIOUS, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, and INTERSUBJECTIVITY).

In his Dictionary of Kleinian Thought, Hinshelwood (1989) describes ‘Ego-Psychology’ as ‘the dominant school of psychoanalysis’ during 1940’s-1960’s, a special study of the ego and a continuation of the Classical psychoanalysis (by default), as it developed until the time of Freud’s death in 1939, a trend that was spearheaded by Anna Freud’s (1936/1946) book “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense” and became established as a school of psychoanalytic thought and practice with Hartmann’s addition of an explicit adaptational point of view in his “Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation” (Hartmann, 1939/1958). Noting its supposed radical departures from the Freudian tradition of emphasis on drive reduction, ego-psychology is presented here as concerning itself with: a). the normative process in which a socially conforming individual is benignly assisted by his society; b). the origins of the ego from a symbiotic primary narcissism; c). the ego’s particular functions, including those involved in the conflict-free areas of the ego (motility, perception, memory, etc.); d). the ego’s mechanisms of adaptation as well as defense; e). the development of a precise technique of interpreting the preconscious (as opposed to the unconscious); and, f). a loyalty to the spirit of Freud’s early search for a scientific (deterministic) psychology. Sullivan’s Interpersonal/cultural Psychiatry, behaviorist tradition, strong tradition of learning theories and developmental psychology is viewed here as strengthening the adaptational aspect and the mechanistic presentation of Ego Psychology, fostering the view of ego and its development that lie outside of the classical psychoanalytic theory of drive reduction, and outside of such mechanisms of defense as projection and introjective identification.

In North America, the internal critique of the ‘Hartmann era’ Ego Psychology (Blum 1998; Busch 2000; Blum 2010, 2015; Balsam 2012) included criticism of ‘phallogocentric’ sex

and gender assumptions; overemphasis of the Oedipus complex; experience distant and impersonal interpretations; defences being confronted rather than analysed; trauma not taken in consideration; psychoanalysis as a general psychology is an overreach: adaptation cannot be elucidated from a purely psychoanalytic point of view, it involves data from other disciplines.

Hartmann's writing style was exceedingly complex, difficult to read and easy to mis-read. According to Nancy Chodorow (2004), the British object relational, French and other critics' claim that North American Ego psychologists no longer believed in the unconscious or the drives, "(mis) read Hartmann's (1939/1958) 'Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation' as advocating a person's adjustment to a sick society rather than as an attempt to rethink 'On the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' through the structural theory..." (Chodorow, 2004, p. 214).

'Hartmann's era' (Bergmann, 2000) Ego Psychology was, for most part, not widely accepted outside the United States. Additional complicated reasons may have to do with the reception of the manner in which the communication of the ideas, not just the ideas themselves, came across, influenced by subjective factors, e.g., André Greene's (2000) "...the wide success of Hartmann was linked to ...the Americans being convinced of their superiority" (ibid, p. 106).

European Perspective:

The departure of many leading psychoanalytic figures trained in Vienna and Berlin psychoanalytic institutes for United States spelled the relative decline of what was the 'cutting edge' of psychoanalysis at the time (1940s-1960s) and for the several following decades. Yet this deficiency contributed to the flourishing of other psychoanalytic orientations and directions in Europe, mainly of drive-based object relations of Melanie Klein and experiential dimensions of self and other of Donald Winnicott. A notable exception is the work of Anna Freud in London, followed and further developed by Joseph and Anne-Marie Sandler, among others (Hoffer, 1949, 1950a, 1950b).

After Sigmund Freud's death in 1939, the further development of psychoanalysis in general and Ego Psychology in particular was shaped by geographical centers and political lines of demarcation, including immigration, travel for personal analysis, the advent of the Iron Curtain, and so forth.

In line with the historical approach of Sigmund Freud in "Two encyclopaedia articles" (Freud, 1923a), Otto Fenichel's historical-contextual statement: "The history of psychoanalysis brought it about that we became acquainted with the unconscious before the conscious and with the repressed before the ego. Nowadays the psychology of the ego stands in the center of our investigations" (Fenichel 1935, p. 348), delineates Ego Psychology as a phase of the theory development.

Viewed as a necessary phase within the overarching work done by Freud in his attempt to define the ways of working of the unconscious, Ego Psychology was to meet the need to

account for unconscious aspects of clinical phenomena like resistance and anxiety, which were not sufficiently explicable by his Topographical Model of the mind, originally formulated in “The interpretation of dreams” (Freud 1900).

Additionally, defining Ego Psychology as a necessary phase in the development of psychoanalysis confirms the nature of the analytic discourse as ‘research work in progress’, and makes it possible to account for the variety of ways in which this new phase was dealt with by authors in Europe and North America.

The early traces of the approach to Ego Psychology developed later by Heinz Hartmann and his collaborators are discernible in his early publication “Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse” [The Foundations of Psychoanalysis] (Hartmann 1927), which was never translated in its entirety into English. In the first chapter, Hartmann presented psychoanalysis as a ‘natural science’, and showed how important it was to redefine it in such a way as to make of psychoanalysis a discipline capable of collaborating with general psychology and social sciences. Such a priority and perspective became the predominant psychoanalytic paradigm between 1950 and 1970 in the United States.

This was never the case in Europe, where the hegemonic agenda and the monolithic character of what was also called ‘American Ego Psychology’ eventually limited the reception of Ego Psychology. The one-sided way in which Ego Psychology was reimported from the United States to Europe almost exclusively in the unilateral form given it by Heinz Hartmann and his collaborators was addressed by Paul Parin in his 1990 article “Die Beschädigung der Psychoanalyse in der angelsächsischen Emigration und ihre Rückkehr nach Europa” (The Damage to Psychoanalysis in its Anglo-Saxon Emigration and its Return to Europe).

In the contemporary Italian dictionary published by Einaudi (Barale, Bertani, Gallese, Mistura, Zamperini, eds., 2007), ‘Ego Psychology’ entry was totally identified with its above mentioned narrow North American definition and the item’s authors Fornaro, M. and Migone, P. (Fornaro and Mignone 2007) omitted mentioning any post-war European development in this field. Similarly, a German dictionary (Hartkamp 2008), defining the item “Ich-Psychologie” (Ego Psychology), mentioned only two German authors Peter Fürstenau and Annelise Heigl-Evers.

It is a paradox that, while Heinz Hartmann cites Fenichel extensively as an important contributor to the theory and technique of Ego Psychology, Martin Bergmann, in his acclaimed publication “The Hartmann Era” (2000) almost exclusively identifies first generation Ego Psychology with the work of Heinz Hartmann and his closest collaborators, acknowledges Fenichel only marginally, and does not mention any significant contribution to Ego Psychology coming from Europe.

Similarly, while Hartmann cites both Sandor Ferenczi and Paul Federn’s contribution in his numerous publications, David Rapaport’s (1958a) selective review “A Historical Review of Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology”, influential in Europe, does not. In Rapaport’s view, the first phase ended in 1897, with Freud’s renunciation of the seduction theory; the second phase ended in 1923, with the publication of Freud’s “The Ego and the Id”; the third phase was

associated with Freud's development of his own Ego Psychology, and continued until 1937; and the fourth phase coincided with the influential publications of Anna Freud (1936), Erik Erikson (1937), Karen Horney (1937), Heinz Hartmann (1939/1958), Abram Kardiner (1939), and H. S. Sullivan (1940), and depicted the specific version of Ego Psychology formulated by Hartmann with his concepts of innate (pre-conflictual) ego functioning and ego autonomy.

Overall, while it is true that the major texts of (North American) Ego Psychology were translated and published in France, Italy and Germany, it is also true that *Ego Psychology survived in Europe* not only in the form given to it by Heinz Hartmann and his collaborators, but *mainly in the form of a series of autonomous contributions*, which will be specified in the European section.

Latin American Perspective:

Latin America in general has not done justice to Ego Psychology. Mexico is the only Latin American country, where psychoanalytic institutes include Ego Psychology as part of the curriculum. In other Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Peru and Brazil, there is no specific seminar of Ego Psychology throughout the psychoanalytic training. Especially in Argentina and Uruguay, probably because of Melanie Klein's and also Jacques Lacan's influence, the Ego Psychology theory is viewed as too close to cognitive behavioral theory, void of libidinal aspects and subjectivity.

Cecilio Paniagua (2014) hypothesizes that many of his colleagues in Latin America are ignorant of the evolution of Ego Psychology since Hartmann, and of contemporary models that have been widespread in North America; such ignorance then would breed prejudicial critique of Ego Psychology as superfluous and superficial, downplaying the importance of drives and unconscious fantasy. Pereira et al. (2007) and Arbiser (2003) also speculate about possible influence of socio-cultural and political views, and a strong regional theoretical preference towards European authors over their North American counterparts, which seems to uniquely influence reception of Ego Psychology.

However, Hartmann, Kris, Lowenstein, Jacobson and Anna Freud are an important part of a core curriculum of psychoanalytic institutes in Mexico, where it is expected that a candidate knows Erikson's stages of epigenesis throughout the life cycle and Anna Freud's "The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense" from their preceding university studies. Perhaps the geographic proximity between Mexico and the United States, including accessibility of graduate and post-graduate studies in the USA plays a role. An example is Ramón Parres, one of the founders of the Mexican psychoanalytic society (Asociación Psicoanalítica Mexicana APM), who studied psychiatry and then psychoanalysis in the United States. In his book "El Psicoanálisis como Ciencia" (Parres 1977) he describes various mechanisms of defense, transference, and the influence of the unconscious processes on the conscious ones, from an Ego Psychology point of view.

While the Ego Psychology is not taught in psychoanalytic institutes outside of Mexico, ego psychological concepts like clinical history, psychodynamic key, defense mechanisms, resistances, therapeutic alliance, analytic setting are in wide clinical use in Latin American psychoanalytic practice, without any attribution or credit to Ego Psychology.

III. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY

III. A. ROOTS IN SIGMUND FREUD

Although forerunners of Ego Psychology are found in Freud's earlier writings (1895, 1900, 1911, 1914, 1915a, 1915b, 1915c, 1917a, 1917b, 1921), "The Ego and the Id" (1923) and "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926) were his most directly relevant contributions to Ego Psychology and were a natural development of his evolving work.

Prior to 1923, the Topographic Theory had focused on the relationship of mental contents to conscious and unconscious systems with their specific characteristics of functioning. Gradually, Freud came to recognize the disparity between clinical work and theory: In clinical work, aspects of the ego could be unconscious (defensive functioning and guilt) and unconscious derivatives could be found in consciousness; however, the Topographic Theory located the content (and processes) in the same Unconscious (Ucs) system *or* Preconscious (Pcs and Conscious (Cs) system (Gill, 1963; Waelder, 1960). These clinical observations underscored the need for some theoretical re-alignments, which Freud elucidated when he introduced his Structural Theory where the mind was conceived of in terms of three agencies/structures - the Id, Ego and Superego – differentiated not by access to consciousness but by stable sets of functions and motives. In the Structural Theory the ego was defined as a coherent organization of processes, such as control of discharge, censorship and defenses, thinking and reality testing, ranging from the permeable border of the Preconscious to the permeable border of the Unconscious. Interestingly, this was presaged in Freud's (1915) paper on "The Unconscious" where Freud briefly conceived of *complex preconscious thinking with infusions of unconscious elements, extending from a permeable border of the system Ucs to the permeable border of the system Cs*.

Central to the development of Ego Psychology was Freud's move from his first theory of anxiety to his second theory of anxiety. Here, the active ego generates a signal of anxiety in response to the anticipated dangers posed by sexual or aggressive drives. *Signal anxiety* is a transformed rudimentary archaic traumatic anxiety, signaling dangers connected with the loss of the object, loss of the object's love, castration, and the loss of internal acceptance/ 'love by superego'. The signal anxiety triggers defenses, warding off impending dangers: "Whereas the old view made it natural to suppose that anxiety arose from the libido belonging to the repressed instinctual impulses, the new one, on the contrary, made the ego the source of anxiety"(Freud, 1926, p. 161). The ego assumed its role as the executive agency of the mind, managing conflict

and forging compromise. In his last writings on the subject, Freud (1940) postulated autonomous ego development.

The Structural model did not appear overnight, neither did it completely replace the Topographic model. The elements of the Structural Theory were being gradually formulated and anticipated, long before 1923. However, Freud often returned to the Topographic understanding of phenomena, and the development of a consistent theory proposing specific connections between two theories of anxiety, e.g., ‘unitary theory of anxiety’ (Rangell 1969 a, b), or applying Ego Psychological principles consistently in psychoanalytic technique, e. g. ‘analyzing defenses’ rather than confronting or ‘overcoming’ them, remained for others to develop (Grey 1982, 1994; Busch, 1992, 1993, 1999; Paniagua 2008, 2014).

III. Aa. Multiple Directions of Early Ego Psychological Studies

Freud’s final conceptualization of ego as an active executive agency in the mind led to the further multifaceted study of the role of ego in psychic functioning, development, psychopathology and treatment, charting the *various directions of early ‘Ego Psychology’*:

Paul Federn (1926), in Vienna, conceptualized the *ego boundary* between the ego and the representation of the object, retaining the subjectivity of Freudian ego/‘Ich’ in his term ‘*ego feeling*’. Terminological and conceptual differences with the ‘Classical Ego Psychology’ in New York, where he immigrated, notwithstanding, Federn’s contributions is his emphasis on the fact that in *psychosis*, with derealization and depersonalization, ego feelings are gradually lost, i.e., that certain narcissistic investment in the ego is reduced. This is the case not only when the alienation concerns the subject's own feelings, but also when it concerns the object world (Jacobson 1954).

Herman Nunberg (1931), in Vienna, described *synthetic function of the ego*, following up in New York with exploration of the concepts of *ego strength* and *ego weakness* (1941). In collaboration with Ernst Federn, the youngest son of Paul Federn, he compiled the “Minutes of the Vienna psychoanalytic society” from 1906-1918 (Nunberg and Federn 1962-1975). His lectures to Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute were published with Freud’s preface (Nunberg 1932/1955).

Wilhelm Reich (1925; 1933/1945), studied the contribution of chronic *alterations of the ego* to the development of character.

Anna Freud (1936/1946), of Vienna, systematized the defensive activities of the ego in “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense”. Later, in London, she spent much of her career to exploration of normal and pathological ego development (1965), keeping in close contact with the psychoanalytic developments in North America.

Robert Waelder (1936a), elaborated on the role of the ego in conflict, bringing Freud’s early principle of over-determination under the purview of the Structural Theory/Ego Psychology as *the principle of multiple function*. Here, every psychic act is a compromise

forged by the ego in response to the multiple conflicting demands of the id, superego, reality, and the compulsion to repeat.

Edward Glover (1943), in England, introduced the concept of ‘*ego nuclei*’ built from memory traces of experience into a coherent whole.

Franz Alexander (1933), graduate of Berlin Institute, and a leading figure of so called ‘Chicago School’ and psychosomatic medicine, wrote on, among many other subjects, multifaceted relationship and mutual influences between *structural and instinctual conflicts*.

Otto Fenichel (1938, 1941c, 1945), transcending limits of Vienna, Prague, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York, an internationally recognized encyclopedist of psychoanalytic theory and technique of his time, in an ongoing ‘controversial dialogue’ with Alexander, pointed out that “An instinctual conflict ... is always a structural conflict as well; one of the conflicting instincts represents the ego ... [or is] strengthened for purposes of ego defense” (Fenichel 1945, p. 130). It was Fenichel who elaborated on Anna Freud’s idea of how ego assists analytic work and, in this process, he coined the phrase ‘*observing ego*’.

III. B. POST-FREUDIAN DEVELOPMENTS IN EGO PSYCHOLOGY/STRUCTURAL THEORY IN NORTH AMERICA

In North America, Ego Psychology was potentiated by Anna Freud (1936/1946), who brought together and elaborated on key defensive functions of the ego, and enunciated the technical point that the analysts’ optimal stance would be equidistant from the derivatives of the three macro-structures, and by the ‘American ego psychologists’ Hartmann (1939/1958), Kris and Lowenstein (Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein 1964), and Rapaport (1959/1960) whose ambition it was to systematize the metatheory of psychoanalysis as a general psychology. Lasting contributions of theirs and the next generation were additionally made by Fenichel, Nunberg, Waelder, Jacobson, Mahler, Rangell, Loewald, Bergmann, Arlow, and many others. Some of the seminal contributions are outlined below.

III. Ba. Heinz Hartmann, His Collaborators and Contemporaries

“Just as Hartmann pointed out with regard to those who stressed ‘the unconscious before Freud’ (e.g., Whyte, 1960) that it was Freud who systematized it, so can we say it was Hartmann who, more than anyone else, systematized the existing fragments of ego psychology into a composite whole” (Rangell, 1965, p. 7).

Beginning with the publication of his 1939 monograph, **Heinz Hartmann** embarked on a series of elaborations of psychoanalytic theory, primarily in the area of ego psychology. He expanded ego functioning beyond defense with an emphasis on adaptation together with the postulation of *innate*, pre-conflictual, relatively *autonomous* (and *relatively conflict free*) and pre-formed psychic structures arising from biological roots and *fitting* together in an *average expectable environment*, further elaborated in conjunction with developmental

considerations. As he stated, "...this is not to say that the ego as a definite psychic system is inborn; it rather stresses the point that the development of this system is traceable not only to the impact of reality and of the instinctual drives but also to a set of factors that cannot be identified with either of them" (1950, p. 79). In collaboration with Kris and Loewenstein, Hartmann (1964) spelled out the implications and applications of the psychoanalytic theory of the ego. They defined each of the three centers of psychic activity in terms of their functions and their interrelationships among (inter-systemic) and within (intra-systemic) the three centers of psychic functioning.

Hartmann also emphasized the importance of detailing the features of the various *ego functions* and their interrelationship with drive and superego considerations as well as with each other (Bellak, Hurvich, & Gediman, 1973). An overall way to group these was in terms of autonomous, defensive and synthetic/integrative functions. He also called for a specification in which *ego functions* were compromised in a given instance of *ego weakness*, thereby highlighting individual differences. Conceptual evolution of *ego functions* is exemplified by *Reality Testing*, which had been identified by Freud already in 1895, will be specified below.

Additionally, Hartmann characterized ego functions as reflecting either *primary or secondary autonomy*. Those functions based on primary autonomy included among others attention, concentration, memory, learning, perception, motor function and intention. Secondly, autonomous functions often begin as substantially defensive (and thereby related to conflict) and through a *change of function* take on other purposes and meanings of an adaptive nature, such as habit patterns, learned complex skills, work routines, hobbies and interests. He also emphasized that this autonomy and freedom from intrapsychic conflict was relative and that such trends could subsequently be re-drawn drawn into inter-systemic conflicts via *re-instinctualization*. In intra-systemic conflicts various ego functions may be in opposition to each other in terms of their directions or aims, or the intra-systemic conflicts may be between defensive and non-defensive ego operations. Hartmann's concept of *secondary autonomy* was understood as a result of a change of function. Just as progressive neutralization of drives (de-libidinization, de-agressivization, sublimation) allows ego growth through secondary autonomy, regressive de-neutralization leads to re-instinctualization (libidinization, sexualization, aggressivization) of ego functions, and a loss of autonomy, reality adaptation and constriction of creativity.

But the structure of the ego is not the only locus where Hartmann has made significant and original contributions. His scope ranges over the entire field of psycho-analysis. Many new insights have come, for example in the area of the psycho-analytic theory of instinctual drives themselves (Hartmann 1948/1964).

The *undifferentiated phase* of mental development *differentiates early into ego and id* due to the protracted helplessness of the young of the human species. Hartmann suggests that it is this very process of structural differentiation to which the differences between the instinctual behavior of lower animals and the behavior of human beings are mainly due. Many functions which are taken care of by the instincts in animals become in man functions of the

ego. Although there is a genetic continuity between animal instincts and human drive, no less important is the relation and continuity between animal instinct and human ego function.

Referring to and extending Freud's (1940) recognition of an autonomous ego development, Hartmann stresses that once the differentiation into three psychic systems has taken place, each dispenses (its own) psychic energy.

As an example of the ever-finer differentiation, Hartmann directed a searching inquiry into the realm of the 'intrasystemic' conditions within the system ego. Turning his attention to the contests which exist between various *ego interests* as well as between different *ego functions*, he described these as intrasystemic conflicts, distinguishing them from the intersystemic ones. Pointing to the many contrasts within the ego, these *intrasystemic correlations and conflicts* have to be considered especially while evaluating ego strength or ego control, as strength in one area may become the very source of ego weakness in other spheres, just as in adaptation achievement in one direction may cause disturbance and imbalance in others. In Hartmann's view, all definitions of ego strength would be unsatisfactory if they take into account only the relations to other mental systems and not the intrasystemic factors and the interrelationships between the different areas of ego functions. This area has been instrumental in further investigations of next generations of Freudian thinkers, e.g., in Leo Rangell's (1963, 1969a, b) work on intrapsychic conflict.

Besides *the additions and consolidations* such as within the *structure ego itself* (stressing *ego's activity and elasticity*), describing in detail other functions than defense, or other processes such as neutralization; tracing dynamic-developmental-functionally adaptive aspects of defenses; mutability of the human instinctual drives as compared to rigidity of animal instincts, Hartmann offers *clarifications*, such as the existing concept of sublimation, identification, internalization, and introjection, or the range of flexibility of psychoanalytic methodology, technique and change ('principle of multiple appeal'); or psychoanalysis as a science. He also forges *extensions* within the purvey of psychoanalysis as a field, as to a normal and general psychology; or to direct child observation; and non-linear (regressive-progressive) definition of growth, health-illness and adaptation-maladaptation continuum:

"...a healthy person must have the capacity to suffer and to be depressed. Our clinical experience has taught us the consequences of glossing over illness and suffering, of being unable to admit to oneself the possibility of illness and suffering. It is even probable that a limited amount of suffering and illness forms an integral part of the scheme of health, as it were, or rather that health is only reached by indirect ways. We know that successful adaptation can lead to maladaptation—the development of the super-ego is a case in point and many other examples could be cited. But conversely, maladaptation may become successful adaptation... We discover a similar state of affairs in relation to the therapeutic process of analysis. Here health clearly includes pathological reactions as a means towards its attainment" (Hartmann 1939, p. 311).

In addition, Hartmann *builds dynamic bridges* to neighboring fields, to the social sciences, to academic psychology, to developmental psychology, learning and field theories, to art and philosophy (Rangell 1965).

Ernst Kris (1936, 1952, 1956) expanded on the role of unconscious and preconscious ego processes in maintaining internal balance, studied ego's role in sublimation and creativity, and coined a term "regression in service of ego", applicable in the development, clinical situation, as well as creative adjustments and pursuits. Kris' idea that quick shifts between different levels of psychic functioning – regression/progression/ integration – under the purview of the ego integrative function, were a key to creativity in any field of art or science, was further developed by **Peter Blos, Sr.** (1954, 1967, 1971, 1978, 1979), a preeminent Ego Psychological theorist of adolescence, as 'regression in the service of development'. Additionally, this line of conceptualization opened the door for future generations of Post-Freudian thinkers in areas of development and free associative processes (Bellak 1961, 1989), and arts and creativity (Rose 1963, 1964, 1999, 2004).

David Rapaport (1951a, b; 1953, 1958b) further elaborated on the development and organization of thought, on the developmental vicissitudes of affects, and on the relationship between the two autonomies of the ego, on the one hand from the environment and on the other from the drives, demonstrating how the relative autonomy from the id was guaranteed by the person's relationship with the environment and vice versa. For Rapaport, the basic notion of the development is a mutually interactive process of increased organizational complexity. In this vein, he has described a process of increasingly complex hierarchic development in the formation of derivative motivational drives and of increasingly complex organization of ego defenses.

Rudolph Lowenstein (1938, 1945, 1957, 1967) studied the complexities of involvement of ego, self, superego and drives in connection with the earliest libidinal and aggressive object ties in formation of masochism. Having previously 'revived' a notion of 'vital instincts' (1940), he posits that the unconscious 'libidinization of suffering' caused by aggression from within and/or without underlies the mechanism of 'seduction of the aggressor', a forerunner of masochism and a weapon of the helpless child to ensure the existence of parental love which is necessary for development of sexuality as it is for survival (Loewenstein 1957, p.231). His "Phallic Passivity in Men" (Loewenstein 1935) points to dynamic meaning of the *passive-active subphases* of psychosexual development. Following on, refining and expanding on, Freud's (1909), Anna Freud's (1936/1946) and Fenichel's (1945) description of psychoanalytic listening to multiple layers of drive and unconscious ego and superego derivatives of free associative process, Rudolph Lowenstein (1963) includes "...listening to what is being said; to how it is being said, when and in what context it is being said; to what is not said, but deliberately or unwittingly omitted; and finally, to the absence of communication—listening to silence" (Loewenstein 1963, p. 453).

A scholar of Ego Psychology with bio-social emphasis, **Erik H. Erikson** (1950, 1956) developed the concepts of 'ego identity' and 'ego integrity' within his psychosocial epigenesis throughout the life cycle (Trust vs. Mistrust in Infancy; Autonomy vs. Shame for Toddler;

Initiative vs. Guilt of Pre-schooler; Industry vs. Inferiority for School Age; Ego- Identity vs. Role Confusion in Adolescence; Intimacy vs. Isolation of Young Adulthood; Generativity vs. Stagnation of Middle-Age Adulthood; Ego-Integrity vs. Despair of Senior Age), thus providing a bridge between individual and social psychology. Sometimes misunderstood as a linear proposition, this eight-stage theory of psychosocial development is based upon a series of ‘core conflicts’, such as “trust vs. mistrust” at the beginnings of life, “ego-identity vs. role confusion” during adolescence, “ego integrity vs. despair” at the end of life, institute ‘developmental crises’ of increased vulnerability and heightened potential, each marked by ‘*disorganization-reorganization-consolidation*’ sequence, where *ego regression plays a major part*. Especially during adolescence, a new consolidation of identity out of many preceding identifications, without a room for temporary *transitional regressive motion* of contemplating different identities, is not possible. Employing Ernst Kris’s ‘regression in the service of the ego’ and Peter Blos’ ‘regression in the service of development’, Erikson presents *regression as part of the oscillating rhythms of growth processes*.

Self-described as a “psychoanalyst who was led to a new concept not by theoretical preoccupation but rather through the expansion of his clinical awareness to other fields (social anthropology and comparative education), and through the expectation that such expansion would, in turn, profit clinical work” (Erikson 1956, p. 56), his writings were sometimes misinterpreted as ‘not enough psychoanalytic’. At present, his work is appreciated anew as aligned with psychoanalytic interests of the 21st century, which prominently incorporate influence of culture. Erikson’s thinking about the inner psychic oscillations in the formation of identity continues to be viewed as very relevant to the contemporary psychoanalytic thought.

Although the concepts of primary and secondary autonomy were later largely eclipsed, they provided an impetus for further studies of interaction of constitutional and environmental factors throughout the development. Ego Psychology directly or indirectly stimulated and was reciprocally enriched by, child analytic and observational studies of Winnicott (1953), Spitz (1965), Jacobson (1958, 1964) and Mahler (Mahler, Pine and Bergman 1975), leading to increased understanding of the pre-oedipal domain.

Erikson’s and Rapaport’s formulations, and Hartmann’s ‘change of means’ and ‘change of function’ would encourage further study of *developmental transformations*, from the earliest development throughout life, and indirectly led to the renewed interest in trauma, previously neglected by ego psychologists (Blum, 1987). The developmental transformation achieved in secondary autonomy was analogous to the transformation of traumatic anxiety into signal anxiety (Blum, 1998).

In contrast to the relative homogeneity of ego psychology in the post-World War II period of the so-called ‘Hartmann era’, ego psychology moved off center stage in the 1970’s (Bergmann, 2000). Following Hartmann’s death, emphasis on object relations theory came further into prominence, and the era of theoretical pluralism set in (Blum, 1998). The social ferment in the USA at that time, philosophical questioning about ‘authority’ in the postmodern era and the feminist critique of inherent sex and gender assumptions also contributed to the critique of the homogeneity of Ego Psychology (Balsam, 2012).

Some of the complex issues involved in such a shift may have additionally included the following:

1. The overemphasis on the Oedipus complex as a procrustean bed (Blum, 2010; Balsam, 2015);
2. There was never an agreed upon method based on ego psychological principles. The approach to resistance analysis, central to ego psychology, was most often practiced by confronting defenses rather than analyzing them (Busch, 1999).
3. As practiced, ego psychology was most often based upon deep (experience-distant) interpretations (Busch, 1999).
4. Analysis was often carried out in a strict, impersonal fashion.
5. Even with the growing body of developmental literature, trauma seemed not to be taken into consideration.
6. Hartmann was important to study but difficult to read. Many courses may have been taught in a way that made it difficult to appreciate his contributions except in an idealized fashion.

‘Hartmann era’ (Bergmann, 2000) Ego Psychology was, for the most part, not widely accepted outside the United States. Reasons for this may have been complex, as can be gleaned from André Greene’s statement “...we can argue that the wide success of Hartmann was linked to ...the Americans being convinced of their superiority” (Greene 2000, p. 106). Even some recent international authors (Sapisochin, 2015) echo historical resentment of Hartmann’s supposed view that he alone carried the mantle from Freud.

According to Nancy Chodorow (2004), the British Object Relational, French and North American academic critics’ claim that North American Ego psychologists no longer believed in the unconscious or the drives, “(mis) read Hartmann’s (1939/1958) ‘Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation’ as advocating a person’s adjustment to a sick society rather than as an attempt to rethink ‘On the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’ through the structural theory...” (Chodorow 2004, p. 214).

III. Bb. Post-Hartmann Developments: Rise of Modern Conflict Theory, Contemporary Ego Psychology and the beginning of Integrative Models

While Anna Freud, Hartmann and collaborators were prominent in the elaboration of ego psychology, further development of how *ego functions* relate to id and superego considerations constituted a major interest for North American analytic theorists for decades (Bergmann, 2000).

Focus later turned to *intrapsychic conflict* with the components of drive, anxiety signal, defense, and compromise, developed by **Arlow and Brenner** (1964), who emphasized the advantages of explanations based on the structural theory over those based on topographic theory. In view of some (Busch, 1995), the work of Arlow and Brenner involved a significant

departure from the work of Hartmann et al. Arlow and Brenner believed too sharp a distinction was made between the conflictual and non-conflictual spheres of the ego (Busch, 1992, 1993). Arnold Richards (Richards and Willick 1986) hypothesized that it was conceivable that by widening the concepts of *compromise formation* and *signal affects*, and by stressing that any form of mental functioning can be used for defensive purposes, Brenner would eventually articulate a model of the *mind in conflict* in which the interpretation of the elements of conflict would make the traditional concepts of ego, id and superego superfluous. Such correctly foreseen evolution of Brenner's thought was further elaborated in his "Mind as Conflict and Compromise Formation" (Brenner, 1994). These developments present a specific extension of the Structural Theory of 1960-1990's, which eventually ushered in the Modern Conflict Theory (see also a separate entry CONFLICT)).

However, some other Post-Freudian synthetic thinkers like **Leo Rangell** and **Harold Blum** who advanced conceptualization of defenses, ego functions and ego functioning, conflict and development, held other views. They did *not* believe that *everything was necessarily compromise formation*. In their opinion, repressions and other specific defenses are not compromise formations (Blum 1985); and ego not only effects compromise, but it could also decide between alternatives (Rangell 1963).

Paul Gray and **Fred Busch**, major contributors to a *Contemporary ego psychological approach* (Skelton 2006), developed a nuanced and detailed account of *the analysis of resistance* and a fuller role for both unconscious and pre-conscious ego functioning. Gray (1994) developed a technique for bringing *unconscious resistances to the analysand's attention*. Busch (1995) brings in the focus on the patient's capacity to hear: at any one moment there are *three surfaces working in the analytic process*: the patient surface is what the patient believes he or she is talking about; the analyst surface is what the analyst believes the patient is talking about; and the workable surface is that *intersection between patient and analyst surface* that allows for a meaningful and understandable intervention to be made. Busch's ego psychological approach attempts to work with all three surfaces. From the *clinical theory* standpoint, **Cecilio Paniagua** (1991) had previously differentiated the concept of patient surface, which belongs to the realm of subjectivity, from a concept of clinical surface, which belongs to the realm of observable behavior, and *workable surface*, defined as those aspects of clinical surface that lend themselves well to the exploration of unconscious dynamics or genesis.

Hans Loewald (1961, 1978), a transitional thinker, self-identified firmly as an ego psychologist, masterfully integrated with Freudian ego psychology the influence of the interpersonal theory of Harry S. Sullivan, Margaret Mahler's views of separation-individuation, and aspects of Melanie Klein, Otto Kernberg (another integrationist), Donald Winnicott, Heinz Kohut and Self psychology. Loewald developed an ego psychology that put instinctual theory together with object relations, emerging from the centerpiece of a child's inchoate ego developing within the mutuality of the mother-child enfoldment. Jonathan Lear (2003), the philosopher-psychoanalyst, has referred to this as a 'big bang' theory of psychoanalysis. Loewald's work has been seen as a vital bridge between a 'one-person

psychology' (an instinctual motivational theory such as Freud's topographic theory) and a 'two-person object relations' psychology, as was also begun in ego psychological developments. His work is also noted as foundational to relational theory that developed in the 1980s in the United States (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). His integrative and transformative work also makes him a father of the contemporary "American Independent Tradition" (Chodorow, 2004). Furthermore, his ideas also resonate with the "Third Model" conceptualizations (see the separate entries of THE UNCONSCIOUS, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES and CONFLICT).

Examples of some of these complex developments are specified further below.

III. Bba. Specific Examples of Elaborations and Extensions

1960's – 2000's

Charles Brenner (1964, 1981, 1982, 1991) and **Jacob Arlow** (1964, 1980, 1987) broadened Freud's notion of the psychic formation that arises out conflict between the structures of the mind: id, ego, and superego. They proposed that virtually all psychic outcomes, e.g., dreams, character, fantasies, free associations, were a product of conflict. Every observable piece of behavior becomes a derivative of underlying conflict. According to Brenner, even the superego is a compromise formation, or a cluster of compromise formations born out of conflict. In Brenner's thinking (1981, 1982, 1991, 1994), *everything in psychic life is a compromise formation*, a combination of the gratification of drive derivatives (an instinctual wish originating in childhood), of unpleasure in the form of anxiety and depressive affect associated with the drive derivative, of defenses [that] function to minimize unpleasure, and of superego functioning (guilt, self-punishment, atonement, etc.). No thought, no action, no plan, no fantasy, no dream or symptom is ever simply one or another. Every behavior, feeling or thought is multiply determined by all of them (Papiasvili, 1995). This particular extension developed into what is today known as 'Modern Conflict Theory' (see the separate entries CONFLICT, and THE UNCONSCIOUS).

Jacob Arlow (1980, 1987) places unconscious fantasy and *unconscious fantasy function* at the center of investigation of intrapsychic conflict. While Freud viewed unconscious fantasy as a derivative of unconscious wish, Arlow sees it as a compromise formation that contains all components of structural conflict. Arlow stresses the persistent influence that unconscious fantasies have on every aspect of an individual's functioning; including the spheres relatively conflict free. In Arlow's view, unconscious fantasy provides a mental set that organizes perception and cognitive functioning in general. Unconscious fantasy determines how we perceive the external and the internal world, how we interpret what we perceive, what and how we remember, and how we respond to it. Unconscious fantasies shape our character traits, determine our behavior, our attitudes, produce our symptoms, and are at the heart of our professional interests and love relationships. Throughout development, the essential narratives of the unconscious fantasies endure, though their manifestations undergo endless transformations resulting in different 'editions' (Papiasvili, 1995).

Leo Rangell (1969a, 1969b) posited *the unitary theory of anxiety* and revisited the question of signal anxiety versus affect as a trigger for defense in an intrapsychic conflict sequence. He studied ubiquitous microscopic *intrapsychic processes* before, during, and after the defense was triggered, preceding any psychic outcome, and concluded that no matter what the nature of an unpleasurable affect participating in the conflict, the immediate signal for the use of defense is anxiety. Subsequently, Rangell described an unconscious cognitive-affective sequence of impulse-anxiety-defense-psychic outcome while maintaining that anxiety continues as a trigger and motive for defense behind all other states of unpleasure. In this context, the anxiety is about unpleasure overwhelming the ego. Rangell (1969a; 1969b) identified an *unconscious decision-making function within the ego's expanded unconscious executive functioning* which ultimately shapes the specific psychic outcome. Through interaction with self and object representations, intrapsychic trial actions, representative of an *intrasystemic choice conflict within the ego*, occur. Objects are assessed for intended discharge. The self is assessed for a feeling of anxiety signaling danger, or safety and mastery, an unconscious equivalent of 'how safe, or how risky for me would be to do...?'.

Harold Blum (1980, 1985) addressed the issues of personality continuity and the *creative and integrative aspects of defense analysis*. He writes: "...The means of defense itself may undergo a change of function...What is defended against may be...the drives, superego, [or]...other areas of ego functions which...have to be reclaimed and reintegrated. Both, intersystemic and intrasystemic conflicts require [the] analysis of defense and defended content...[in order to restore] personality continuity....[The analysis is aimed at] restoration of old connections and establishment of new links between different facets of personality, between past and present, reality and fantasy..." (1985, p. 12). Addressing the controversy of *conflict vs. deficit*, Blum (1985) and Murray (1995) maintained that throughout development the ego uses defense mechanisms as powerful, protective and adaptive tools in response to external, internal, real or imagined dangers. The excessive use of defenses can harm non-defensive personality functions. Defenses then can interfere with personality development, lead to constriction and pathological alterations of the ego (Papiasvili, 1995). As *Ego deficits/ego weaknesses/ego alterations* may be formed during the pre-conflictual development, some (e.g., Gedo, 1979) advocated alteration of technique, going 'beyond interpretation'. Others (e.g., Arlow, 1980, 1987) saw the ego deficits as not occurring outside of (inter- or intra-systemic) conflict; therefore, benefitting from an individual sensitively tailored interpretative approach.

Within, what came to be called *Contemporary Ego Psychology*, **Paul Gray** (1994, 2005), **Fred Busch**, (1992, 1993, 1995), **Cécilio Paniagua** (2008) and **Alan Sugarman** (1994) further developed Anna Freud's contribution to the function of ego defenses, in particular applying principles from Freud's 'signal anxiety' to aid *defense analysis within the analytic method of free association*. They initially emphasized the patient's conscious participation in the analysis and the analysis of the superego and idealization, to foster autonomy in the therapeutic action. Both Busch and Paniagua, in different ways, amplified and further developed Gray's 'microstructural' approach to psychic surface. Paniagua (1991, 2008, 2014) demonstrated how increased *attention to psychic surface* most fully captures *id-ego interactions*. Busch (2006) noted the importance of bringing what is unconscious to the

preconscious, resonating with the work of Green (1974), Joseph (1985) and Madeleine Baranger (1993). Recently, the importance of working in the here and now, in the context of the ego psychological approach to working within the transference and countertransference and highlighting the importance of *building representations and structure* (Busch, 2013), constitute additional connecting points with French psychoanalysis.

Spearheading this contemporary ego psychological approach, **Paul Gray** (1973, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1996) developed a technique for bringing unconscious resistances to the analysand's attention, based upon the patient's use of the method of free association. By closely following the patients' associations, Gray could demonstrate unconscious resistances in action (change of affect, topic, silences), identify and analyze them.

Gray (1973) postulated that “the analyst's primary goal is always the analysis of the patient's psyche, not the patient's life” (p. 477), maintaining a focus on the psychological reality ‘inside’ the analysis. All else was viewed as a potential ‘defensive flight to reality’. The analyst was to focus on the flow of the associations, in order not to interfere with the development of the transference neurosis. The analytic focus should remain exclusively on the moment-to-moment vicissitudes (‘close process monitoring’) of the analysand's free associations.

Gray (1982, 1994) pointed out that although a theory of resistances mediated by the unconscious ego has long existed within psychoanalysis, it is often not implemented in technique. In his classic paper on a “developmental lag” in psychoanalytic technique, Gray addressed the failure of contemporary psychoanalysis to apply the theoretical knowledge about the unconscious ego to the intrapsychic life. He outlined the problem in the following way: “It has for some time been my conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that the way a considerable proportion of analysts listen to and perceive their data has, in certain significant respects, *not* evolved as I believe it would have if historically important concepts concerned with the defensive functions of the ego had been wholeheartedly allowed their place in the actual application of psychoanalytic technique” (Gray, 1982, p. 622).

Gray's (1994, 1996) ‘*close process attention*’ of the defensive functioning of the verbal flow of each session focuses on transference analysis revolving around concerns for the analyst's possible judgmental reactions, within the structural conflict paradigm. Within this paradigm, Gray strenuously argued for the prioritization of micro-interpretations of resistances during any phase of analytic treatment over ‘requiring’ the patient to continuously free associate. ‘Close process attention defense analysis’ is a specific version of an individualized intensively interpretative approach towards judgmental attitude displaced and/or projected by the patient onto to the analyst. In accordance with the ego psychological principles, effective resistance analysis involves an exploration and working through of the nature of the threat to the ego rather than the contents of the resistance.

Gray's critics include those, who argued that his method did not go far enough in shedding the ‘attraction’ of the topographic/archeological-like unearthing of the unconscious contents (Paniagua 2001), as well as those who argued that he went too far (Phillips 2006) in that he overemphasized the role of aggression in mental life, privileged ego resistance over id

resistance, and, while his method was suitable for analyzing repression, it was not applicable to other forms of defense like splitting, dissociation or denial. Criticism notwithstanding, Gray's 'microstructural model' of the use of the method of free association to capture and analyze ego's defensive processes remains an enduring contribution.

III. Bbb. Examples of Integrative Models

As object relations became a more central interest, there were original efforts *to integrate ego psychology and objects relations' theories* with implications for the theory of technique.

Self-identified as Ego Psychologist, **Hans Loewald** (1960, 1962, 1978) developed an Ego Psychology that put instinctual theory together with object relations, emerging from the centerpiece of a child's inchoate ego developing within the mutuality of the mother-child enfoldment. He presents not only ego, but also id as an organization related to reality and objects. In this view, drives are inherently related to and organized within object relations, organizing reality and vice versa; the new object found in analysis is also an instinctual, infantile object. Addressing the analogy between therapeutic process and mother-infant interaction, Loewald uses the metaphor of a higher organization (the analyst) in interaction with a lower organization (the patient) to characterize the therapeutic process, with a "tension" between them across which the patient reaches. He further develops the notion of disorganization and reorganization in analysis, leading to integration at a higher level, originating with Kris' concept of *regression in the service of the ego*, along with a two-sided approach to interpretation: into the original depth via regression and deconstruction, and into a higher level via interpretation and reconstruction. Loewald regarded the transference as the intrapsychic corollary of the interpersonal, which recaptures lost depths, making it possible to change 'ghosts' (unconscious complexes) into ancestors (well-integrated psychic structure) via a transitional 'demon' (or regressive transference) stage. In his view, transference is viewed also as crucial to health, not merely as pathological. Finally, the "integrative experience longed for" is formulated, an inherent developmental and clinical tendency toward higher integration. *Organizing activity of internalization*, as a developmental clinical tendency is central in Loewald's work. Within this frame, he recontextualizes many drive-psychological terms as organizing activities. Loewald reaffirms the centrality of the Oedipal complex for all clinical work, essentially by redefining the oedipal stage with an emphasis on the emergence of the capacity for self-reflection, personal responsibility, and individuality—the capacity to be an individual. Object, object relations and self, in the analytic, intrapsychic sense, do not exist until the oedipal stage. Further, by a sophisticated discussion of parricide and incest, he brings the narcissistic and preoedipal directly into the Oedipal core. There are resonances with Melanie Klein's depressive position in the stress on guilt and reparation, and with Kohut and Winnicott in the symbiotic and transitional character of Oedipal experience as defined by Loewald.

Otto Kernberg's version of Object Relations Theory within Freud's Structural Model and Hartmann's Ego Psychology, has been in development since 1970's. In his formulation, self and object representations are linked by affective dispositions. The focus here is on early conflicts of individuals with borderline pathologies. In his approach, object relations are seen as "an essential ego organizer" (Kernberg, 1977, p. 38) and 'self-object-affect units' as the primary determinants of the overall structures of the mind (id, ego, superego).

In his paper "Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives", Kernberg (1982) clarifies his views on development and structure formation, suggesting a modification of dual drive theory. In defining the self as an intrapsychic structure that originates from the ego ('Ich'/I) and is embedded in it, Kernberg remains close to Freud's implicit insistence that *self and ego ('Ich'/I) are indissolubly linked*. Addressing the development of the earliest self and object representations, Kernberg integrates findings from contemporary neurobiology and studies of infant development with his revised formulation of the dual drive theory in the light of relation between affects and drives. Here, numerous affects are the primary motivational systems, linking gradually differentiated and integrated self and object representations, with affects consolidating gradually into libidinal or aggressive drives. In this model, affects are seen as the building blocks or constituents of drives. Kernberg would continue, update and refine his integrative work throughout the next 30 years.

Kernberg's version of Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory (1982, 2004, 2015) relates the levels of development of psychic structure to the personality organization and psychopathology. He recognizes two basic levels of personality organization (borderline and neurotic), implying two basic levels of development, following the initial level of lack of differentiation and blurring of self and object boundaries (psychosis):

Extending Jacobson and Mahler, selectively integrating certain aspects of Kleinian thought, Kernberg views the preverbal infant building a dual psychic structure, under the dominance of peak affect states. Under these conditions, self and object are split or dissociated into idealized and/or persecutory part-object representation. If mother-child interactions are dominated by aggressive affect, the *integration required for ego identity* is forestalled resulting in borderline personality disorder. Specifically, as it concerns narcissism, the investment is in a 'pathological self structure' ('grandiose self'), containing 'real self', 'ideal self', and 'ideal object representations'.

However, if in the first three years of life, developmental conditions allow for the tolerance of ambivalence, of combined positive and negative emotional relations with the same external objects, the child can develop an integrated sense of self ('normal self', realistic self concept) and the capacity for an integrated view of significant others. Here, the achievement of *self and object constancy, allows for the formation of ego identity*. The resulting internal structuralization delimits the id, and gives rise to an ego capable of sublimatory functions allowing for the adaptive expression of emotional needs regarding sexuality, dependency, autonomy and aggressive/assertive self-affirmation. Internalized object relations that include ethically derived demands and prohibitions transmitted in the early interactions of the infant with his psychosocial environment are integrated into the Super-Ego. This more integrated

(neurotic, ‘normal’) level of personality organization allows for intrapsychic inter-systemic conflicts between all three agencies of Id, Ego, and Super-Ego (drive-defense conflicts). Here, the predominant mode of defense is repression.

In his latest level of theory integration, Kernberg (2004, 2015) proposed a general developmental frame that integrates the psychoanalytic/structural theory of development, rooted in Object Relations Theory, with neurobiological aspects of development. His general conclusion relates to parallel and mutually influential development of neurobiological affective and cognitive systems, ultimately controlled by genetic determinants, and psychodynamic systems, corresponding to both reality and motivated distortions of the internal and external relations with significant others. (See also separate entries of OBJECT RELATIONS, CONFLICT and SELF.)

Nancy Chodorow presents yet another integration which she calls the Intersubjective Ego Psychology, as reconciling two (usually thought of as) contradictory psychoanalytic approaches – American Ego Psychology and Interpersonal psychoanalysis, established by founding North American theorists Heinz Hartmann and Harry Stack Sullivan. She sees Loewald and Erikson, both self-identified as ego psychologists, as early proponents of this hybrid orientation. In Chodorow’s contemporary exposition, Intersubjective Ego Psychology presents “...a middle terrain between, on one hand, classical structural and contemporary ego psychology, and, on the other hand, classical interpersonal and contemporary relational psychoanalysis, much as the British Independent or Middle Group...originally located itself between Klein and Anna Freud” (Chodorow 2004, p.210). Clinically, the intersubjective ego psychology strives thus to integrate a ‘one-person’ intrapsychic perspective centered on unconscious fantasy, drive derivatives, resistances, defenses, unconscious conflicts and compromise formations, in consonance with a ‘two-person’ analytic process, the mother-child, and by extension socio-cultural field. It combines the language of interpretation and insight with the language of enactment, transference-countertransference, and the contribution of analyst’s subjectivity. The orientation includes various contributions of Boesky (1989), Chused (1997), Jacobs (1999), McLaughlin (1996), Poland (2000), and Renik (1996).

III. Bc. Branches and Conceptualizations

III. Bca. Developmental Ego Psychology

Within structural theory, psycho-sexual development, development of personality organization, and object relations were not considered separate theories. The ‘nesting’ of object relations’ theory within the later structural theory of 1923 had been already presaged in Freud’s paper “On Narcissism” (1914), and especially in “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917b) elucidating processes of introjection and internalization. In 1926, **Sigmund Freud** proposed that the ego evolved through identifications. **Heinz Hartmann** (1950) located differentiated self-representations and object representations within the system ego. In addition to **Anna Freud**’s formulation of ‘developmental lines’, which link psycho-sexual development with specific anxieties, defenses and object relations, and Hartmann’s developmental propositions

of undifferentiated ego-id matrix developing from its own inborn potential in interaction with an 'average expectable environment', **Erik Erikson** (1950) offered a narrative of psycho-social development that emphasized the impact of relationships and culture on the development of the ego. Following Freud's and Hartmann's formulations, **Edith Jacobson** (1964) outlined an intimate connection between the microstructures of the internal representational world, invested with affects, and the ego and superego macrostructures. **Margaret Mahler's** contribution (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975), illuminating the progressive separation-individuation 'on the road to object constancy', towards stable object representations, followed. Both theories were reciprocally influential.

Peter Blos, Sr., one of the foremost psychoanalytic investigators of adolescence of the era, operated within the same conceptual framework as Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, while adding an original developmental perspective, specific to the *prominent role of regression in adolescence*. Regression had already been understood as a necessary and often positive part of development by Anna Freud (1963) and as playing an important part in adaptive adult functioning by Hartmann (1939/1958) and Ernst Kris (1952). However, Blos claimed that "the adolescent progressive development is contingent on and, indeed, determined by regression, its tolerance and use for psychic restructuring." (Blos 1971, p. 27). He (1978) later noted that perhaps Mahler's rapprochement phase (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975) was the only other phase in development in which *regression was a prerequisite for progressive development*. Blos stressed that while regression may be a part of development at various times, during adolescence regression was absolutely necessary for progression through the phase towards psychological separation from the parents and the formation of adult character.

Blos (1967, 1979) referred to the regression of adolescence, with its special characteristics, as '*regression in the service of development*', echoing Kris's (1952) 'regression in the service of the ego'. Blos (1967) observed that: "The profoundest and most unique quality of adolescence lies in its capacity to move between regressive and progressive consciousness with an ease that has no equal at any other period in human life. This might account for the remarkable creative achievements of this particular age" (p. 178).

Blos (1967) states that through *drive and ego regression*, the adolescent revisits earlier conflicts and traumas, but now meets them with much expanded ego capacities, but without parental ego support. For most, their ego capacities allow the deep regression while protecting against a fatal regression to the undifferentiated stage of psychosis.

The necessary regression brings up early traumas and acting out of early unresolved pre-oedipal and oedipal conflicts and the narcissistic entanglements that go with them (Blos 1972).

Increasing understanding of *early object relations*, first noted in the work of Hartmann (1939/1958) and **Rene Spitz** (1945, 1946), and especially understanding of the role of the mother in ego development (Mahler Pine and Bergman, 1975; Jacobson, 1964) were also consequential in the unfolding of psychoanalytic ego psychology's issues related to adaptation. Details of the relevant ego functioning in this process were explored, spelled out and ultimately

developed in the United States. Further, these studies led the way to understanding developmental interferences in ego development, which eventually had a profound effect on the understanding of the pathology and treatment of severe character disorders. Within such *widened scope*, the integrative work of **Hans Loewald** (1960, 1962, 1974), and, in a different way, that of **Otto Kernberg** (1982, 2007, 2014), are most relevant.

A contemporary sequel to Erikson's bridging of the individual and cultural-social aspects of development, feminist and gender theory and racial questions continue vitally the interests in the role of culture in ego development (Chodorow, 2004, 1992, Leary 2000, Fogel 2006, Kulish and Holtzman 2003, Balsam 2013).

Contemporary Freudian elaboration of the concept of *Developmental Transformation* can be also viewed as a specific conceptualization within Developmental Ego Psychology. Historically, it builds on studies of both psychosexual (Freud 1905) and psychosocial (Erikson 1950) development, including *Freud's transformation of pleasure ego into reality ego* (1911), re-transcription of memory and *transformation of meaning in Nachträglichkeit* (1895, 1918), and *transformation of traumatic affects into signal affects* (1926); *Erikson's age specific crises* (1950, 1956, 1984), as a whole life extension of embryologic concept of epigenesis (successive formation of entirely new structures) throughout the life span of the relations of self with other; Anna Freud's (1963) developmental lines, and others.

Example of second generation of studies of developmental transformations of drive and affectivity, was the area of transformation of the traumatic anxiety into signal anxiety. This approach, pioneered by **Max Schur** (1955) and followed by number of contributors (Schmaele 1964, Krystal 1974, 1985) postulates that *affect precursors undergo epigenetic developmental transformation* which includes de-somatization, differentiation and verbalization. As a result, *affects become usable as signals*.

More recently, **Jack Novick** (1999), and **Kathy K. Novick** and Jack Novick (1991, 1992, 1994, 2001) examine the multifaceted relationship between trauma, memory, *nachträglichkeit*/deferred action in view of post-oedipal developments of latency and adolescence, where *each phase brings something unique to the mix, which may compensate for earlier difficulties or raise prior dormant issues to traumatic intensity* (J. Novick and K. Novick 2001). In view of these authors, the concept of developmental transformation is to serve as a layered counterpoint to a view of adult memories of latency and adolescence having mainly a defensive screen function (Novick and Novick 1994).

Similarly, **Harold Blum** (1994, 2008) revisited and updated Freud's evolution of his views of trauma, memory, representational processes, and pathogenesis, in the context of analytic reconstruction. Considering the complex temporal and causal issues involved in the *transformation of meaning and function* throughout development, he proposes the concept of *nachträglichkeit* as an unrecognized precursor of the concept of developmental transformation.

Focus on *discontinuity of progressive organizations and reorganizations*, yielding developmental transformations (A. Freud 1936/1946, Neubauer 1996, 2003) of drive and affectivity, memory, object relations, ego and self, giving rise of various *inner reorganizations*

of conflicts, compromise formations and unconscious fantasies (Brenner 1982, A. Kris 1988), have clinical implications in analytic work with widened scope of patient populations, where there is an acknowledgement of different paths to facilitate developmental transformation. Clinical interventions which can facilitate *the dormant transformative capacity* (Lament 2003, Olesker and Lament 2008), acting as a new platform for further growth (Olesker 2011) and may include analytic construction (Freud 1937) and reconstruction of meaning of the memories, leading to *reorganization that encompasses multiple self and object representations* (Blum 1994, 2019). On a session-to-session minute-to-minute basis, such constructive and reconstructive work may necessitate ‘rolling’ metaphoric interpretative *translations-transformations*, between, and of, *different experiential domains*, from pre-psychic pre-symbolic (action, somatosensory, visceral) modes of experience towards unconscious symbolism of dreams and finally preconscious symbolism of language (Papiasvili 2016), and may constitute a meeting point with some of Wilfred Bion’s as well as André Green’s conceptualizations of transformation (Grotstein 2014, Green 2006).

III. Bcb. Central Ego Concept: A Body Ego And Related Concepts

Freud centrally stated, “...The ego is first and foremost a *bodily ego*. It is not merely a surface entity, but is in itself a projection of a surface.” (Freud, 1923a, p. 26). He believed that the primordial roots of mental structures are to be found in the infant’s body sensations and feelings, importantly those internally registered, as well as external.

In the pre- 1960s and early 1970s, the body ego was explored clinically in relation to pain, orgasm, castration anxiety, or symptoms such as depersonalization. **Wilhelm Reich** (1933) wrote of ego defenses as character patterned “*body armor*”. Psychosomatic studies by **Franz Alexander** (1965) and others explored the effects of the emotions on bodily illness. Mental representations of body parts, images, fantasies and sensations were refined in relation to the ego, the self and objects by **Jacobson** (1964).

Conceptualizations emerging out of developmental psychoanalytic research and mother-infant studies of the 1970’s – 2000’s (e.g., Mahler, Pine and Bergmann 1975, Stern 1985, Beebe and Lachmann 2002, Tronick 2002), in continuity with explorations of the early ego under various environmental conditions (Spitz 1950, Bowlby 1958, Winnicott 1971), sustained bodily interests.

A psychoanalytic study of touch presents a specific example of a further development of the body ego concept within the North American Contemporary Freudian thought - the broadest strand of contemporary development within Structural theory/Ego Psychology, which synthesizes pertinent inputs from various psychoanalytic cultures together with interdisciplinary findings.

Touch is a primordial endowment, one of the two sensory-motor systems evident in utero. The fetal skin is touching the surrounding fluid; the fetus sucks its thumb, and during the course of the last trimester touches its body with its hands, progressing over time from head to

feet. Touch is essential to the early development of object relations and to differentiating the self from the external world and other individuals. Self versus non-self is also a major aspect of reality testing and the sense or feeling of what is real.

The significance of *touch and its relationship to both cognition and affect* is embedded in the common metaphors of "touch" as indicating emotion, "feel", "feelings", and "grasp", meaning to understand, related to cognition. Individuals of any age are affectively engaged, emotionally touched by fine art, literature, music, etc. They "feel" sad or happy, dance with romantic feelings, feel the sadness of a funeral march. They are thin skinned if they have hurt feelings, thick skinned if insensitive.

The psychoanalytic literature specifically addressing the significance of touch is relatively limited. Touch, however, is intrinsic in Freud's formulations on dreams, the pleasure-unpleasure principle, instinctual drives, and ego-instincts (which in later theory were ego functions). Freud (1923) was only implicitly referring to touch in his statement: "The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego. It is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (Freud 1923a, p. 26). Touch was elaborated on by **Merleau-Ponty** (1945), a philosopher and child psychologist. In his posthumous notes, "The Intertwining and the Chiasm"(1945) he described the double perception involved in clasping one's own hands, with a *dual registration of touching and being touched*. Touching one's self is differentiated from touching another. Touch perception is vital to knowing the world. The importance of touch is implicit in the works of **Donald Winnicott's** (1953) discussion of the transitional object and **John Bowlby's** (1969) description of the infant's clinging in its attachment to the mother. Also relevant is the study by **Jean Piaget** (1954), "The Construction of Reality in the Child". Noting that the grasp reflex is present at birth, he stated that the grasping of objects including parts of the body, coordinated with vision, facilitates the development of object permanence and knowledge of external reality. The monkey experiment of **Harry Harlow and Margaret Harlow** (1965) indicated the importance of soft contact by touch and grasp in primate development.

Rene Spitz (1965) stated that not only is receiving nourishment essential, but being touched, held, and fondled are also necessary in infant development. Infant and mother establish a *primordial dialogue*. **Esther Bick** (1968) discussed the significance of touch in describing the skin contact of holding the baby at the breast or against the parent's face, fostering *emergent object relations*. **Didier Anzieu** (1985) formulated the concept "*skin ego*", developed in the dyad as a container or "psychic envelope", under the impact of the skin-to-skin contact of the baby and the mother, and under the impact of the sound of the mother's voice and breath, as a narcissistic basis of well-being. The skin ego forms an *envelope of the self, connected to ego function, self, identity, object relations, and a defensive protective boundary or membrane* (Anzieu 1989).

Harold Blum (2019) noted the significance of touch and holding for the *development of self and object constancy*. The sensory and proprioceptive registration of touch is necessary for the emergent body ego with its surface, particularly the skin (Chinn, et al., 2019).

Touch is essential to the differentiation of *inside and outside* the bodily surface as well as *self versus non-self*. The body surface is the skin, and touch is related to affects and emotions. Touch is embodied in the emotional life in narcissism and object relations. The emotional aspects of touch are experienced in massage, warmth, cold, compression, or distention. The skin also registers dysphoric stimuli, such as excessive heat, cold, compression, abrasion, cutting, itching. Dysphoric touch may have self-preservative functions, such as avoiding burns. Touching or stroking the erogenous zones are linked with erotic fantasy and excitement, masturbation and copulation. Every aspect of a subject's life has a potential to consciously and unconsciously touch all others, and *the earliest maternal caresses are indelible in the formation of the psychic structure, character and personality*.

While the postmodern influence of the 1980s and 1990s, in the United States, following Foucault, rejected Freud's biologically based ideas, for many reasons, including the concrete biological essentialism and phallocentrism of psychoanalysis of pre-1970s, Feminism and *contemporary gender studies* are again reviving interest in a body ego. Among examples of this trend are writers challenging phallic monism in the American Journal of Psychoanalysis Female supplements 1976 and 1996; an advent of a new journal Studies in Gender and Sexuality in 2000; and a growing number of publications on the dynamic meaning of the body (Raphael-Leff, 2001, 2014; Balsam 2012, 2013, 2015; Lemma 2014; Diamond 2013).

Rosemary Balsam's "Women's Bodies in Psychoanalysis" (2012) explores in depth why has the *female body* been marginalized in psychoanalysis, with a focus on female problems and pains, and how can psychoanalysts *re-think female body in terms of pleasure, power, competition and aggression*. She re-traces the mental development back to the female biological body (across female gender variants and sexual preferences, including the 'vanished pregnant body'), and she demonstrates that the images of the body, weaved into everyday lives, lead to the clues that inform gendered patterning. This approach frees the postmodern gender studies from perpetuating the divide between the physical and the mental.

In a different way, proponents of the Relational school (Harris, 2000) re-focused psychoanalytic attention on body/mind dilemma with the notions of 'gender as a soft assembly' and that of 'embodiment'.

Contemporary neuroscience (Emde 1991, Solms 2003, Damasio, 2010) has given a boost to re-examining Freudian meta-theoretical postulates, *re-centering the body* again in relation to *the ego*.

Body image is another concept related to body ego and the mental representation of the body. The term is used descriptively clinically, especially in the body dysmorphia associated with eating disturbances in adolescence, denoting the subjectivity of somatic changes and growth experience, and as it relates to the subjectivities of gender, pregnancy, fitness, illness, frailty, aging or other physical conditions.

III. Bd. Classifications And Further Study Of Ego Operations

Today, mental operations listed under the rubric of ‘ego’ include basic mental functions (autonomous ego), control and delay capacities (ego strength), and defenses. All of these mechanisms usually work outside of conscious awareness, either ‘dynamically unconscious’ (Shulman & Reiser, 2004), or descriptively/latently unconscious/ ‘preconscious’ (Kubie, 1974). Like breathing, however, at times the (unconscious) automaticity of these operations can be overridden by conscious effort and vice-versa, they can participate in, and be influenced by dynamic unconscious conflictual configurations.

Ego operations usually function unconsciously, except in emergencies, in situations of acute need or when a vital interest is at stake: Conscious enhancement of reality testing, intellect, and self-preservation (ego functions) can be exemplified by all-night studying for a test, conscious impulse control (ego strength) in alcoholics’ abstinence, or conscious suppression of thought (defense) in a grieving surgeon who must perform a surgical procedure. Additionally, during psychoanalytic treatment, ‘mentalization’ understood as a conscious efflorescence of the psychoanalytic mind (Busch, 2013), may be critical to a successful outcome.

III. Bda. Autonomous Ego Functions

First identified by Freud ((1911a, 1917), Hartmann (1964) and others, later classified into categories of 12 and described in terms of intactness or deficit, by Bellak, Hurvich and Gediman. (1973), one of the recent lists of 26 *autonomous ego functions*, clustered and summarized for diagnostic purposes (above) to identify deficits and/or inhibitions by **Jerome Blackman** (2003, 2010) includes, but is not limited to:

- Reality testing (Freud, 1985, 1911a), sense of reality of the world and of the self as “relationship to reality” (Frosch, 1966)]; and related ego functioning;
- Sleep-wake cycle, consciousness, & sensorium;
- Perception (5 senses) & Memory (Freud 1900, 1911a; Hartmann 1939/1958)
- Integration/synthesis/organization (Freud, 1911a; Nunberg 1931; Hartmann, 1939/1958; Rose/1991);
- Primary process thinking characterized by symbolization, condensation & displacement (Freud, 1900; Arlow & Brenner, 1964);
- Secondary process thinking (logic & time sense [Freud, 1900]);
- Psychomotor control (Mahler, Pine and Bergman 1975);
- Intelligence (Hartmann, 1939/1958; Piaget, 1952) & speech, language, symbolizing function (Blum 1978, Leavy 1983);

- Judgment about danger (Hoch & Polatin, 1949) & anticipation of consequences;
- Concentration & attention (Freud, 1900);
- Orientation (in space, place, time, overall context) (Kernberg 1915);
- Self-care (A. Freud, 1965);
- Social-interpersonal functioning (Slavson, 1969), autoplasic adaptation & alloplastic adaptation (Ferenczi 1934, Hartmann 1939/1958);
- Movement from play to work (A. Freud, 1965; Blackman, 2016);
- Abstraction ability (Blos, 1979);
- Observing ego; self-observation Freud 1920, 1923; Fenichel 1938b; J.Sandler and A. Freud 1981) or mentalization (Kohut, 1959; Fonagy et al., 2002);
- Ego interests (hobbies and career choices/Hartmann 1939/1958);
- Self-preservation (Freud 1911) and vital instincts (Lowenstein 1940);
- Executive functions (decision-making about oral, sexual and violent wishes; decision-making choice function within the intrapsychic process/Ragnell 1969a,b; ego integrative functioning/Rose 1991);

With growing knowledge of the complexities of the unconscious ego functioning, various authors proposed additions to, or expansions of, the existing conceptualizations of the ever-enlarging list: As an example, **Leo Rangell** (1969a; 1969b) identified an *unconscious decision-making function within the ego's expanded unconscious executive functioning*. In another example, **Gilbert Rose** (1964, 1987, 1991) further specified *ego integrative function* in relation to the *fluctuations of the 'ego boundaries'* and to *the sense of identity*, helpful in clarifying the difference between the relatively healthy creative person and one with an underlying psychotic or borderline character structure. He writes: "One cannot recommend a 'creative surrender' to imagination unless the ego's integrative function, sense of identity, and reality testing are essentially intact" (Rose 1991, p. 131). **Dan H. Buie** (1981) additionally includes *capacity for empathy*. **Leopold Bellak** (1961), studied the *structural aspects* of the process of free associations, previously characterized by a certain type of ego function, called by Hartmann the *self-exclusion of the ego*, closely related to Kris's '*regression in the service of the ego*' (1939). He has identified this particular ego function as the '*oscillating function of the ego*'. Like in the creative act, so in free associations, there is "a swing from regression to vigilance of cognitive, adaptive and synthetic functions. This produces emergent qualities which we know as the creative process" (ibid, p.13). Bellak concludes that the process of associating is predicated upon the ego's oscillating function—the ability to oscillate from regression in the service of the ego (as described by Kris) to a heightened acuity of self-observation, and of synthetic functioning.

Additionally, from Ego Psychological point of view, *object relations* have at times been considered part of ego functioning (e.g., Bellak, 1989), and at times as supraordinate (Boesky, 1983) but based on autonomous ego functions (perception, memory and integration of self and others), and dynamically constituted by drives (pleasurable experiences of gratifications with objects) and defensive processes (internalization/introjection to relieve painful affects).

While many of the ego functions are investigated and quantified within the purview of psychological tests (Rapaport, Gill and Schafer 1945; Wollman, 1965), Ego Psychology places them firmly in the context of psychoanalytic interest as part of structural theory of personality organization and development.

III. Bdaa. Example of a Major Ego Function: Reality Testing, Reality Sense and Related Conceptualizations

Historically among the first, Reality Testing (RT) was designated by **Sigmund Freud** (1895, 1911a) as a major function of the ego (Freud, 1917), and a key basis for distinguishing psychosis from non-psychosis. Defined as “...the constant attempt to reconcile discrepancies between inner and outer experience” (Moore & Fine, 1990, p. 162), RT is central to adaptation (Hartmann, 1939), and includes the related processes of anticipating, attending, concentrating, remembering, feeling, and developing concepts (Schafer, 1968).

Freud’s work on the components of RT can be summarized as: 1. The ability to distinguish between perceptions and ideas [outer-inner, perceptions-hallucinations] (Freud 1895, 1915); 2. The accuracy of perception (Freud 1925); and 3. Self observation (Freud 1933). **David Rapaport’s** (1951) *reflective awareness* informs and ties in with **Hartmann’s** (1947, 1953, 1956) addition of *inner RT*.

In “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, Freud (1915) held that the basis for differentiating internal from external is the result of the repeated experience that some stimuli are evaded by motor action (external), while others (internal) are not. **David Rapaport** (1950) later hypothesized that safeguarding RT beyond motor differentiation depends on conceptual, spatial and temporal frames of reference.

Freud (1911b) formulated that a psychosis developed when RT was lost as a result of total withdrawal of libidinal cathexes from the object representation. A subsequent formulation based on the structural model assumed a regressive/defensive decrement in RT to defend against anxiety and other dysphoric affects (Arlow and Brenner, 1964). The distortion of RT among psychotics is also attributed to the negation of the painful perception of others’ emotional states (Modell, 1968). Impairments in RT can result from defects in self observation. Here Freud (1923, p. 28) came to distinguish RT and self observation as an ego function whereas he considered self reproach as a function of the conscience (Freud, 1914, p. 95; 1918) later named the superego function (Freud, 1921). Intactness of the superego is necessary for adequate RT (Waelder, 1936b), and in favorable development, self-observation/self evaluation progressively become more an ego than a superego function (Hartmann, 1956; Stein, 1966).

More generally, unconscious fantasy thinking could be a major distorting factor in perception and in RT (Arlow, 1969).

Reality related issues are discussed in most of **Heinz Hartmann's** papers (1964) including external reality (in his proposal of the average expectable environment, 1939), and also regarding cultural factors (1944), moral values (1956) and, '*inner reality testing*' (1947, 1953, 1956). The latter can be "...summarized as insight, psychological mindedness, and awareness of inner states. *Inner RT*, then, would include awareness of these inner states, and an accurate appraisal of them" (Hurvich, 1970, p. 307).

Hartmann (1939/1958, 1953) also identified *reality relatedness* and associated processes as having roots in primary ego autonomy. Further developments within Ego Psychology aimed to integrate the primary autonomy origins view with psychological development, by assuming two developmental lines - one as a component of primary autonomy, and the other as an aspect of the inner/outer self and object differentiation (Jacobson 1964) aided by separation-individuation processes (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975). Closely 're-reading' Freud's evolution of the concept, but without the tools Ego Psychology offered, French Laplanche and Pontalis pronounced the key inner/outer discrimination as too complex and "it's meaning is still indeterminate and confused" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1973, p. 384).

Addressing the very complexity, **David Rapaport** (1950) added *reflective awareness* (awareness that one is aware) as a component of inner RT, and emphasized that it facilitated distinctions between states of consciousness, such as ideation, with and without awareness. Also included are subtle varieties of conscious experience in relation to percepts, memories, assumptions, and assessment of whether something is true or false, certain or uncertain. From a psychoanalytic standpoint, inevitable unconscious influences on perception and memory render an inter-penetration of outer and inner realms to varying degrees (Loewald, 1960), so that perception of the external world and of others includes "transference" elements (Grubrich-Simitis, 2010). In a framework where massive psychic trauma has occurred, it has been recommended that support for the reality of some powerfully denied perceptions and experiences take precedence over interpretation of the psychic meaning of the experience at a certain phase of analytic work (Grubrich-Simitis, 2010).

Peter Fonagy has expanded reflective awareness, to an aspect of *mentalization*, and into *reflective function*, which includes both awareness of self and ego states and aspects of mental states of others (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2004).

A related concept of *reality constancy* (Frosch, 1966) is conceptualized as the achievement of a degree of organization, continuity and stability of reality relations' components, *parallel with object constancy*. The specification of a developmental line labeled *reality processing* (Robbins & Sadow, 1974) underscores the acquisition of more complex aspects of internal and external reality resulting from an interaction of the two.

Closely associated concept is the *sense of reality*. **Paul Federn** (1926) described a sensation based on an awareness of ego boundaries, which allows the subject a "sensing" of

the inner-outer distinction, rather than an evaluating and contrasting RT function. Relatively intact ego boundaries are necessary for accurate reality testing (Federn, 1926; Kernberg, 1967). RT is more intellectual, rational, and conceptual, while the sense of reality is more emotional, intuitive and perceptual. “Reality testing finds its material in the conditions of experience, while reality sense functions with respect to the experience itself” (Weisman, 1958, p. 246).

III. Bdb. Ego Strength(s)

Somewhat different from basic functions, *ego strengths* are defined by delay and control capacities. They include:

- Impulse control – i.e., delay of gratification of oral, sexual, and hostile-destructive wishes;
- Affect regulation – being able to tolerate strong affects without using defenses
- Containing primary process mechanisms – keeping them out of consciousness (Bellak et al., 1973; Kernberg, 1975);
- Tension tolerance (of internal conflict), frustration tolerance (waiting for external gratifications), & (emotional and physical) pain tolerance (Blackman, 2010)
- Development of sublimatory channels (Kernberg, 1975) for drive wishes
- Using fantasy as trial action (Hartmann, 1964);
- Adaptive regression in the service of the ego (Kris 1952, ARISE – Bellak 1989), and of development (Blos, Sr.); allowing some primary process into consciousness to relate to small children, to tell a joke, to create art, and to engage in psychoanalytic treatment;
- The stimulus barrier or screen (Esman, 1983) – allowing for focused thought, concentration, and work.

III. Bdc. Defenses in Relations to Ego Functions and Ego Strength

Defensive measures were, at one time, limited to repression and censorship of sexual thoughts (Freud 1900). Later, defenses were conceptualized as “ego instincts” (Freud 1915a; Young-Bruehl & Bethelard 1999). Today, “defense” refers to any mental operation that shuts out of consciousness an aspect of mental functioning (A. Freud 1936; Blackman, 2003). When affects are considered a combination of sensations and thoughts (Brenner 2006), defensive operations can be viewed as mechanisms that usually shut sensations or thoughts out of

consciousness (isolation of affect or repression, respectively), or both – although the mind can attempt to relieve affects by shutting out of consciousness a wish, guilt, shame, perception, an object representation, or by shutting off the activity of an ego function (“inhibition,” [Freud 1926; Blackman 2003]). The mental protection offered by defenses can be distinguished from the propulsive and adaptive activities of autonomous ego functions and ego strengths. In fact, defenses often come into play when ego strengths are overwhelmed and the autonomous ego is actually threatened (“traumatic anxiety”) or imagined to be threatened (“signal anxiety”). One of the ‘taken for granted’ Hartmann’s contributions in this context lies in the widely accepted notion that defenses may have had originally developmentally-dynamically adaptive purpose (Hartmann 1939).

Building on **Freud’s** (1905) initial constructs about changes in cathexes, and **Hartmann’s** and **Kris’s** (1955) elaborations on the neutralization of drive “energy,” sublimation can today be considered to occur when an unrealizable (drive) wish or desire is repressed, projected and symbolized, then integrated with developing autonomous ego functions (Blackman, 2010). For example, when a boy realizes he cannot bear children, his wish for a child can be displaced and symbolized onto his wish for a dog. As he reads and is taught about dog rearing (use of intellect), and becomes skilled at it, his love and activities with his dog are integrated into a sublimatory activity. Later he may become a psychologist or a physician, as the original sublimation becomes more complex, attaining the rank of an “ego interest” (Hartmann, 1939). Because the activity involves intellect, integration, abstraction ability, superego functioning (ethics), and empathy for patients, such a career choice is no longer easily reducible to the original symbolizations and integration with autonomous ego functioning. It is only in situations where career choice, for example, becomes conflictual and troubling, that deconstruction of the symbolism of the original sublimation may be necessary during analytic treatment.

Failures in sublimation (de Mijolla-Mellor 2005), can lead to severe psychopathology during child and adolescent development, especially anfractuous compromise formations involving sex and violence. As opposed to such a developmental disturbance, secondary inhibition of an already developed ego interest can be seen in ‘success neuroses’ (Freud, 1916) and in sudden disturbances in adults’ hobbies (Cath et al., 1977), where the activity has become *re-instinctualized*. Cath gives an example of an excellent woman tennis player who suddenly lost her motor control (inhibition of ego function) due to a guilt reaction after someone commented to her that tennis was a “good way to get out your aggression.”

In the area of exploration of arts and creativity, the theoretical *shift* from the view of *sublimation* as another ego defense, albeit with redeeming social value, to being a *significant means of promoting ego strength* (and by implication a means of expansion of self and object representational and symbolic range), exemplified by **Gilbert Rose’s** (1990) weaving together and extending Hartmann’s, Kris’ and Arlow’s conceptualizations, are specified below in the section of Inter-Disciplinary Studies.

III. Be. Use Of Ego Psychology In Diagnosis, Selection Of Treatment Modalities, and Technique

III. Be. Diagnosis

Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals DSM III, IV and 5 (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 1994 and 2013) and textbooks describing evaluations make reference to ego psychological concepts, although often without attribution (e.g., Sadock et al., 2009). The “mental status examination” usually includes assessment of ego functions and findings about ego strengths, such as regulation of wishes, affects, and the primary process, which constitute unconscious regulatory protection of autonomous ego functions from breakdown. Ego strengths are thought to have multiple origins: heredity; internalizations of soothing and limit-setting during development; adequate secure-organized attachments; successful childhood individuation and adolescent identity-formation; and adult “hardening” through experience.

Although phenomenological diagnosis typically ignores “psychoanalytic” concepts, it unwittingly derives its descriptions from ego psychology. For example, schizophrenia can be considered a syndrome defined by a series of deficits – in integration (loose associations), in abstraction (concreteness), in reality testing (derealistic and paralogical thinking), and in prevalence of primary process (hallucinations and delusions).

Robert Waelder’s reformulation of Freud’s principle of *overdetermination* (1900, 1918) as the principle of *multiple function* (Waelder, 1936), re-stated in contemporary terms as the *interchangeability of psychic elements* (Rangell 1983, Papiasvili 1995) is also applicable to modern multifactorial clinical pathogenesis: Recent statistical evidence suggests a congenital or hereditary basis for the brain malfunctions responsible for some of the ego deficits seen in people suffering with a schizophrenic syndrome (Willick, 2001). However, in some forms of psychosis, contrarily, overwhelming persistent external forces (beatings, sexual abuse, war, crime-ridden neighborhoods) during early development can constitute a ‘traumatic’ etiology (Volkan, 2015), although a unitary theory of psychoses based on such formulations can be misleading (Willick, 1994).

On the opposite end of the scale is *ego function intactness*. Some patients, though complaining of severe problems, show little or no damage to autonomous ego functions or ego strengths. They may suffer from anxiety, depression, conversion, obsessions, phobias, and a large variety of personality disturbances, which are explicable almost solely using conflict theory (Papiasvili, 1995; Brenner, 2006). In these disturbances, “analyzability” is favorable. This means that individual’s abstraction, integrative, reality, and self-preservation functions are more or less intact; they show sufficient impulse control, affect tolerance, and containment of primary process; they possess some capacity for empathy, trust, and emotional closeness (object-relations/attachment); and they manifest sufficient superego functioning (capacity for shame and/or guilt). Such individuals could be considered “neurotic,” because their ego functions are relatively intact and their complaints are primarily caused by maladaptive compromise formations, as ‘overdetermined’ attempts at solutions (Waelder, 1936a) of underlying inter-systemic conflicts among libidinal and aggressive wishes, superego, reality,

the resulting affects, and defensive operations (not deficits). Multiple compromise formations arise during each developmental era (Blackman, 2013). Sometimes material from an earlier developmental phase shields against consciousness of later conflicts ('libidinal regression' [Freud, S., 1905]); at other times, conflicts from later development defend against unconscious conflicts from earlier developmental phase (handled by 'reconstruction upward' [Loewenstein, 1957]; also called 'reaching up' [Volkan, 2014]).

III. Beb. Treatment and Technique Selection

To assess *analyzability*, **Elizabeth Zetzel's** (1956) concept of *therapeutic alliance* and **Ralph Gresson's** *working alliance* (1965), with components of mutuality of purpose, trust and ethics (Meissner 1992) may carry a special significance. These clinical/technical concepts, in line with Hartmann's (1939/1958) conceptualization of 'relatively conflict-free ego functioning', seem to have evolved from Freud's idea that the analyst and analysand "form a pact with each other" (Freud 1940 [1938], p. 173), unobjectionable positive transference (Freud 1912, 1915d), and, especially where Gresson's working alliance is concerned, from Fenichel's 'rational' transference' (1941). Gresson (1965) enumerates a list of the patient's ego functions, that play an important part, in addition to a role of object relations that are needed to 'do the analytic work'. These include, but are not limited to *communication in words*, with feelings; partial regression, free association; listening to the analyst, comprehending, reflecting, and introspection, memory, self-observation and fantasy; ability to develop transference and the capacity to maintain contact with the reality of the analytic situation. It is the oscillation between these two positions that is essential for analytic work.

As psychoanalysts began to consider how to modify technique for other-than-typical neuroses, so called '*widened scope*' patients, **Leo Stone** (1961), **Jacobson** (1964), **Kernberg** (2008, 2016) and others described their approach with patients with preoedipal pathologies.

Although ego strengths and object relations show damage in both psychoses and "near-psychoses" (E. Marcus, 2012), analytically informed ego-fortifying interventions (Frosch, 1988), together with the building of more adaptive defenses (Blackman, 2003), and safe and stable object relations (Fromm-Reichmann, 1947; Alpert, 1959; Kernberg, 2008, 2015, 2016), in addition to psychotropic medication, have been recommended.

Severe damage to ego and/or superego functions represents one end of the diagnostic spectrum (Willick, 2001). Some patients, whose functions are somewhat less damaged, may be helped through analytically-based relational (Mitchell, 2000) approaches, self and intersubjective approaches (Atwood, Orange, & Stolorow, 2002), which utilize concepts of reality testing, wish, and defensive activity in addressing pathology and treatment of patients with disturbances in self-image. Some severely ill patients with a somewhat less disturbed integrative or reality testing functions – so-called "near psychotic" (Doidge, 2007) may benefit from "reconstruction upward" (Loewenstein, 1957) or 'Transference Focused Psychotherapy' (Kernberg, 2008), both of which utilise specifically modified dynamic interpretative approach. Others, who view psychosis as the result of pathogenic projective-introjective mechanisms,

treat psychotic patients with analytically informed psychotherapy (Garfield, 2011), aiming to improve autonomous ego functioning, including reality testing and adaptation.

When individuals show little damage or delay in ego functioning, the method of choice is the interpretative psychoanalytic technique, which today includes not only interpretation of the individual's layered unconscious conflictual and compromise constructing activity, but also sensitive attunement and interpretation of the spectrum of nuanced unconscious ego activity involved in construction of multiple transference configurations, pertaining to different eras of patient's life (Rangell, 1969b) as they are occurring within the psychoanalytic setting, but also in the patient's involvements outside of treatment (Blum, 1983a).

Such nuanced assessment of unconscious ego functioning and ego strength allows for individualized modification of technique for those who demonstrate some interference with one or more ego capacities, such as poor impulse control (e.g., over-drinking), which caused mistakes in judgment (disturbed ego function). The assessment of etiology of such interferences in ego operations assists in determining the individualized modification of technique. The treatment for deficits in impulse control and deficits in judgments is different from that for addressing maladaptive defenses and compromise formations, although the presenting problem may be almost identical.

One technique for distinguishing between different causes of ego function disturbance is a "trial interpretation" of the probable defensive inhibition that led to the problem possibly associated with the defenses of provocation of punishment and denial of a reality. Addressing these defensive elements should, in most neurotic individuals, lead to agreement with the analyst, revelation of new material, recollection of a dream, or a change in defense configuration – which may or may not be more adaptive (Waelder, 1960; Brenner, Reporter, 1975; Schlesinger, 1995). Such responses are usually not forthcoming from people whose disturbance in ego functioning is not defensive, but more due to deficit; they tend to require various (ego and superego) supportive measures (such as thinking through the range of alternatives and their consequences, setting safeguarding limits, etc.).

In crafting an intervention, Hartmann's (1951) '*principle of multiple appeal*' may be instrumental: after first discovering unconscious conflict (Blackman, 2003), the analyst clarifies specific elements of a patient's pathological compromise formations, elucidating inhibitions of function and defenses managing the affects generated by conflicts among drive wishes, reality, and self-punitive tendencies. The idea is that when a person's autonomous ego functions, especially abstraction, integration, reality testing, and self-preservation, are relatively intact, a new understanding of the previously unconscious elements of any compromise formation will lead to the 'resonance effect' through adjacent psychic structures and processes, and realignment of the internal conflictual milieu, recalibration of instinctual investments, object relations, and relief of symptoms.

Ego psychologically-based interventions look to resolve "inter-systemic conflicts" (between the systems ego, superego, and id), example of which might be shyness and overeating to relieve shame over masturbation fantasies; and/or at "intra-systemic" deficits or

conflicts, such as in spite of ‘knowing’ the adaptive choice, being compelled to commit transgressions or exercise poor judgement. The analyst will attempt to understand the disturbance “within” the superego, and the origins of the conflicting identifications. The superego may turn out to be unintegrated (Ticho, 1972), or, undoing – a defense that attempts to erase guilt through rebellious behavior – may be predominant. In such cases, technique to highlight the defenses against harsh superego functioning, i.e., “confrontation” (Compton, Reporter, 1975), may lead to understanding the undoing (going against one’s values), inhibition of judgment, and/or provocation of punishment in some patients (Freud, 1916). On the other hand, patients with superego deficits (‘antisocial personalities’) with a minimal capacity for experience of guilt, may be untreatable (Blackman & Dring, 2016) or marginally treatable with special measures (Kernberg, 1992, 2007).

Contemporary ego psychology addresses conflicts and/or specific developmental deficits both in ego and superego functions, thereby allowing for individualization of diagnosis and treatment, incorporating multiple feedback loops in the clinical setting.

III. Bf. Emerging Developments

III. Bfa. Creating a Psychoanalytic Mind

In his recent book of the same name, **Fred Busch** (2013) considers as the essential curative process *a shift in a patient’s relationship to his own mind*. With the development of a psychoanalytic mind the patient acquires the capacity to shift the *inevitability of action to the possibility of reflection*. It is an enormous psychic achievement to view one’s mind as a playground for motivations rather than only a representation of reality, and most importantly potentially frees one from the slavery of the repetition compulsion.

In this view, psychoanalytic mind is the way towards a deeper understanding of oneself is through one’s own mind - the essence of what psychoanalysis has to offer. Busch presents a specific method that gives *greater clarification on how this happens and the methods to bring this about*. In broad-brush strokes, the basic paradigm shift in the psychoanalytic method revolves around what Ogden called, “*thinking about thinking*”. It has allowed us to better understand unique ways patients communicate or attempt to not communicate.

The major changes that have evolved in the classical method can be characterized in the following way: 1. Working with *experience near data*; 2. Helping the patient learn *how to know his own mind is as important as what he comes to know*: ‘Process knowledge’ over ‘State knowledge’; 3. Emphasis on *building internal representations and structures*. 4. Focusing on the *unconscious communication* in the psychoanalytic hour; 5. Prioritizing understanding what is going on *within the session*, rather than primarily searching for the past in the present; 6. The significance of understanding the difference when a *patient’s language* is an attempt to do something, and when it’s an attempt to *communicate* something; 7. Working *within the transference and countertransference*; 8. Analyzing in a way that leads to *self-analysis* rather than relying on identification with the analyst’s analyzing function. 9. While the analyst’s

expertise is crucial to the process, the *analyst's stance* is primarily one of helping the patient *find his own mind*, rather than mainly being an expert in the content of the patient's mind.

The underlying thesis in *creating a psychoanalytic mind* is that what is accomplished in a relatively successful psychoanalysis is *a way of knowing*, and not simply knowing. *Working in the preconscious cuts across theoretical lines, and is the basis for one element in a new common ground. Further, it is a crucial ingredient in creating a psychoanalytic mind.* Transformation of words as actions into symbolic, representational thinking is part of helping the analysand to develop a psycho-analytic mind as an expansion of the capacity to play with thoughts, which is dependent on their being representable. That is, rather than primarily searching for buried memories, we attempt to transform the under-represented into ideas that are representable. The movement is from *lifting* repression to a paradigm of *transformation*, *from pre-conceptual, (concrete), and preoperational, into symbolically represented. Thus, before any meaning can be interpreted, the psychic mechanism (i.e., conflict, defense, self-reparation, internalized objects, etc.), and content, will need to be represented verbally in a way that leads to symbolization. Words and thoughts serve as efficient, and structuring signs for what is signified.*

Among crucial principles of *working within the transference*, the author mentions the analysand's readiness to understand the interpretation in an emotionally meaningful way; accepting and letting the transference into the room and clarifying it before attempting to do anything with it. While the enacted transference is most often about repetitions of fantasies and memories associated with internalized object relations, it does not mean that it can or should always be interpreted as such. Ever since 1912, Freud (1912a) held *two views of transference*. The narrow one, which is most commonly used, and a broader one, which included seeing the *analytic relationship* representing the *stage* on which the patient re-enacts his symptoms, memories, dreams, and current experiences. So defined, the transference can be *a state of mind in the analysis, not only a representation of past object relations*. Contemporary analysts came to understand how defending a fragile self-state can lead to an aggressive transference, or how fears of love lead to distance. However, it still seems Freud's view of the transference as a repetition of a past object relationship dominates our current views of transference. Transference as the result of a *state of mind* seemed to have faded as a causative factor. *The expression of the transference first needs to be empathically captured and clarified by the analyst.* Only by clarification can the analyst see if the defense is thick or thin. Clarification of thin resistances in the enacted transference leads to further associations and expansion of the ego capacities.

The emergence of this perspective brings Ego Psychology closer to aspects of the work of Andre Green, Betty Joseph, and Nino Ferro among others.

III. Bfb. Trauma and Posttraumatic Mental Functioning: 'Zero Process'

Only gradually *trauma* acquired a position of central interest to Ego Psychology. Historically, three sources contributed to the need for deeper appreciation and understanding

within this area: Large scale traumas of the World War II; massive traumas of the Holocaust; and the new undisputable evidence of child abuse (e.g., Bergmann, Jucovy eds. 1982; Blum, 1986; Bohleber, 2000; Kempe, Silverman, Steele et al. 1962; Shengold, 2000). In an IPA Classic Books edited volume on “Reconstruction of Trauma”, **Harold Blum** (1986) wrote, “Massive extended trauma differs from the usual concept of trauma which is that of an incapacitating ego shock in a short period of time. The massive traumata of adult life may be comparable in its global effect in breaking down already formed structure to trauma in the infant which leads to damage or arrest in the formation of structure. The greater the vulnerability and the more massive the trauma, the more profound and pervasive the structural impairments. Developmentally, vulnerability is greater during preoedipal structural differentiation than during postoeidipal structural consolidation.” (p. 26).

In a book edited by **Sidney Furst** (1967a) a number of ego psychologists clarified the conceptualization of trauma, stressing its specificity and more narrow definition (A. Freud, 1967) as involving a massive overwhelming of the ego, and uncontrolled regression, to be distinguished from other situations of conflict or emotional upset. Furst (1967b, 1978) described the traumatic process as beginning at a ‘tipping point’, beyond which the ego seemed to slide uncontrollably into a deeper and deeper regression, involving loss of many basic functions.

Anna Freud (1967) noted that the traumatic situation and process should be distinguished carefully from the sequelae of trauma. In keeping with the differentiations made by Anna Freud and others, a number of ego psychologists stressed the importance of understanding trauma on its own terms, as something that enters as an independent factor into interactions with other issues, such as mourning and drive conflicts (Blum, 2003), as well as stressing the importance of trauma in all stages and developmental levels, including adult trauma (Phillips, 1991).

Joseph Fernando (2009) took the ego psychological conceptualization of the traumatic process as an independent factor in mental dynamics and used this differentiation to clarify and deepen the understanding of a number of issues. First, he reiterated a point that had been made by others (Yorke and Wiseberg, 1976): While trauma had been previously connected by Freud to the motive for primal repression, in fact, in trauma, the ego is enough out of commission that such complex and coordinated defenses as repression may be impossible. It is powerful, pervasive affect that is the motor for primal defenses. Freud (1926) had stated that the overwhelming of the ego from the “inside” by the drives, or from the “outside”, were equivalent and led to the traumatic situation that motivated primal repression. But everyday clinical observations disprove this: the sequelae of the breaching of the barrier against overwhelming internal sources (as in night terrors or temper tantrums) is quite different from the breaching of the external stimulus barrier. Freud (1920, 1939) had described the aftereffects of the second situation, in terms of the compulsion to repeat the trauma, and yet avoid anything connected to it, and thus knew very well that this difference existed, but he did not consistently maintain this view when speaking at the more general theoretical level.

Fernando (2009, 2012a, b) used the *ego psychological differentiation of various ego functions, to obtain a deeper understanding of the nature of post-traumatic mental functioning*. It had been said that posttraumatic memories are concrete and unsymbolized, but Fernando found that in order to have a regular experience, a good deal of processing, comparing the incoming sensory experience with expectations, and construction of the experience, has to take place. This occurs prior to any symbolization or attachment of the experience to language. Likely, it is this first order construction of the present moment that is aborted, or at least stopped at some point before completion, in trauma. These posttraumatic memories have the basic quality of memories of being retained over time, but in other ways behave more like a future or present experience, being always about to happen, and at times happening in flashbacks, but never being in the past as a true memory. Fernando coined the term “zero process” for this form of mental functioning, asserting that it should be distinguished from both the primary and the secondary processes. For instance the “timelessness” of the zero process has a much more frozen, on or off quality, compared to the ceaseless movement, but lack of wearing away over time, of the contents of the primary process. When **Richard Kluft** (1993) states that Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is a “multiple reality disorder”, he is describing a situation in which the zero process dominates the clinical picture. The contents of the zero process have not yet been turned into regular memories, but exist as a perpetual present. The ideas about the zero process may be of help in understanding not just DID, but many other aspects of trauma. For instance, the power of intergenerational transmission seems much less mysterious if we understand that the traumatized person is living in a number of realities, and their child is merely responding to this at the emotional and unconscious level. What is transmitted are not memories, but realities. At the clinical level, certain technical innovations seem obvious. For instance, when a traumatized patient says that she still can’t convince herself that the trauma actually happened, her analyst can observe that maybe this is because ‘her trauma has not yet happened’. It still lives in her future, waiting to happen. It is the analyst’s role to help, gently, to make this terrible future happen, and then become part of the past.

III. Bg. Interdisciplinary Studies: Example of Ego Psychology & Art and Creativity & Neuroscience

There is a wide acknowledgement within the contemporary Freudian discourse (not only in North America) that if the differences between the fields of inquiry with their different methodologies are recognized and not confused, the interdisciplinary connections, applications, and cross-fertilization between psychoanalysis and other fields of inquiry can lead to fertile analogies and new hypotheses. Such was the method of Freud’s theorizing process. In order to continue his theoretical progress, Freud called upon other fields, such as biological sciences, anthropology, linguistics, archaeology, art, literature, etc., and he based himself on their analogical link without confusing them.

Among many analysts who followed Freud, Erikson, Hartmann, Kris and Bellak in the exploration of *complex role of regression, destruction, transgression, and conflict in generating growth, expansion, and creativity*, in the context of the arts, sciences and culture at

large (Blum 2011, Chessick 2001, Wilson 2003, Baudry 1984, Papiasvili 2020), **Gilbert Rose** (1964, 1987, 1990, 1991, 2004) exemplifies a particular elaboration and extension of Hartmann's (1939/1958, 1946) formulations of undifferentiated phase, primary and secondary autonomy, and neutralization as a continuing process in the ego as an open system and an organ of (creative) adaptation.

Focusing on *the form* rather than the content, and building on the assumption that *different ego functions work at varying degrees of closeness to the primary process*, and that there are transitions of shading between primary and secondary processes, Rosen emphasizes the continuum between primary and secondary processes, interacting on all levels, not sharply distinguishable, and imparting qualities of both passion and spontaneity on one hand, and control on the other. While “the secondary process separates, discriminates, focuses and says ‘no’ in order to protect the organism against overstimulation, the primary process does wide-ranging, undirected scanning, synchronizes disparate elements in order to increase the receptivity towards stimuli and saying ‘yes.’” (Rosen 1990, p. 73). This is less a matter of conflict between antithetical drives than it is a matter of the ego in its moment-by-moment functioning and harmonizing the dual nature of perception.

One important implication of this theoretical shift is that *sublimation could advance from the constricted view of being yet another ego defense*, albeit with redeeming social value, *to being a significant means of promoting ego strength and expanding the appreciation of reality*. Rosen's view concurs with Israeli analyst **Pincas Noy**, who also stresses that *sublimation facilitates the interplay between primary imaginative processes and secondary process knowledge of reality*; here, the primary process tendency for *immediate discharge is delayed*, while the primary process *modes of organization* are exposed to objectification and feedback from the secondary process (Noy, 1969, Rosen 1990). Sublimation thus makes it possible for the ambiguity of the primary process to be contained within the problem-solving framework of the secondary process.

Elsewhere, Rosen (1963, p. 783) draws on **Andrew Peto's** (1958) earlier formulations of deep regressive fusion of thermal, tactile, vestibular, and the kinesthetic sensations as the earliest pre-symbolic representations of the undifferentiated body image. Rosen sees them as evolving into autonomous spheres of the ego, and hypothesizes that archaic thought is based not only on a projection of the body image but that it is an oscillating body image in and through which the archaic ego operates to grasp the world. At first reflecting the ups and downs of the mother-child relationship, these proto-patterns of body-image sensations develop into thought symbols rich in affective coloring. With further structuralization of the ego and increasing neutralization this development ends in the formulation of concepts devoid of emotional overlay. Extending this thinking into the creative work of an artist, he states: “The hand of the artist may continue the old mouth-hand and body-ego integration by carrying sexual and aggressive energy to the canvas as in infancy it carried it from the mouth to the skin. The canvas may sometimes represent the skin” (Rose 1963, p. 787-788).

Creative experience may serve as a bridge between ‘ego core’ and ‘ego boundaries’ to be traversed, starting at any point and moving in either direction, like an analytic interpretation (Rose 1964).

In his later writings, Rose (2004) weaves together metaphor-accessing primary process ambiguity (Kris 1952) with unconscious fantasy stimulating affects (Arlow 1969), and studies of central visual processing and (primary and secondary) neural sensory ‘mapping patterns’ (Zeki 2001, Damasio 2003) to propose that aesthetic forms contain the sensory impact of perceptual ambiguity, leading directly to affects, secondarily elaborated by unconscious fantasy. Especially with the regard to the non-verbal arts, he hypothesizes the link between the arts and the pre-verbal development, when sensory data were intrinsically ambiguous and susceptible to multiple interpretations: “Together with the fresh affects that accompany such rediscovery, this takes place within the regulation of the safe holding environment of aesthetic form. Thus, nonverbal art might be said to continue on higher levels the affect regulation begun preverbally” (Rose 2004, p. 427).

III. C. DEVELOPMENTS OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY SPECIFIC TO EUROPE

The way European analysts document and reconstruct the various approaches to Ego Psychology in Europe is to draw on **Otto Fenichel**. In his 1941 paper “Psychoanalysis of character,” describing “three reasons why psychoanalysis could not fail to be extended to ego psychology” (Fenichel 1941a/1954, p. 200), he presents the first reason as the clinical phenomenon of the patient’s resistance: “Thus it was the necessity for analysing the resistance which in practice started psychoanalytic ego psychology” (Fenichel *ibid*, p. 201).

Among the early contributions from pre-WW II era, **Anna Freud**’s specific focus was on developmental psychology together with conceptual and diagnostic research. For **Paul Federn**, Ego Psychology meant the means to better understand how to formulate and treat the clinical problems of patients with a damaged ego, a field in which he was a pioneer, as Anna Freud was in hers. Additionally, among the European authors of the pre-war period, the role of **Sándor Ferenczi** with severely traumatized patients cannot be overlooked.

Ego Psychology was the main inspiration for the multifaceted work which **Alexander Mitscherlich** performed in West Germany till his death in 1982, aged 73, in order not only to help his people work through the incredible disaster brought about by the twelve years of Nazi Regime, but also in order to bring an enlightened and socially critical psychoanalysis back to his country. The common denominator of his work was Freud’s 1928 plea for a stronger ego that is able to listen to and follow *die Stimme des Intellekts* (the voice of reason).

Another major contribution to Ego Psychology coming from post-World War II Europe is represented by **Joseph Sandler**’s integrative agenda, which allowed bringing Ego Psychology closer to Object Relations Theories and to the School of Melanie Klein.

Although (North American) Ego Psychology was critically received by the Italian Psychoanalytic Society, **Stefano Bolognini**’s clinical priorities should be noted in terms of the

systematic attention he has given to the ego psychologically founded interaction between the ego and the self.

Furthermore, the diverse contemporary scene is enriched by resurgence of Contemporary Ego Psychology in Madrid by **Cécilo Paniagua** who developed further Paul Grey's 'microstructural analysis' of psychic surface, in ways in which it demonstrates an effective capturing of id-ego interactions, evolving in the psychoanalytic process.

Some of the aforementioned contributions are specified below.

III. Ca. Ego Psychology in Europe before World War II

Of interest here is Carlo Bonomi's 2010 revisiting the topic "Ferenczi and Ego Psychology." Only one year after his first meeting with Freud, **Sandor Ferenczi** coined the term "introjection" (see Ferenczi, 1909), which he thought of "as extension of the ego" (Ferenczi 1912, p. 317). In 1913 he published two additional contributions to the psychoanalytic study of the ego: "Stages in the development of the sense of reality," and "Belief, disbelief, and conviction." In the second paper, Ferenczi defined the sense of reality as not attainable by relying on authority, anticipating an important aspect of his later opposition to Ego Psychology based on the Structural Model. In fact, according to this, and at variance with Ferenczi's usual point of view, the patient's sense of reality is considered enhanced by the introjection of the analyst as an auxiliary superego.

According to Bonomi, it was essentially due to the technical problems encountered by the analyst in the clinical work with patients that the mutual estrangement gradually developed between Ferenczi's line of thought and the ego psychological concepts connected with the Structural Model emerged most clearly. While the development of the so-called 'standard technique' increasingly stressed the analyst's abstinence from any form of participation in the relationship with the patient, Ferenczi gradually elaborated on an attitude of thoughtful participation in the psychoanalytic encounter.

By 1927 Ferenczi stopped adhering to a preconceived model of therapy, embracing instead the idea of a basic "elasticity" of technique (Ferenczi, 1928). Having systematically worked with a wide range of traumatized and dissociated patients, Ferenczi had come to view the main problem of the ego not in its autonomy from instinctual pressures, as framed within Ego Psychology, but as the preservation of its boundaries and the feeling of oneself.

Two papers by **Franz Alexander** are instructive in terms of the reception of Freud's Structural Model and the elaboration of its technical consequences: his 1925 paper, written while still in Berlin, "A metapsychological description of the process of cure," and the 1935 paper, already in Chicago, "The problem of psychoanalytic technique." In the former paper, described as "one of the earliest responses of psychoanalytic technique to the structural theory" (Bergmann and Hartmann 1976, p. 99), Alexander was the first analyst to advance the idea that "psychoanalytic technique should center its energy on the amelioration of the superego" (Bergmann, Hartmann, 1976, p. 99). In the second paper, a quite different point of view can be

found: “In analytic therapy our main allies are the *striving of unconscious forces for expression and the integrating tendency of the conscious ego*. ... Nunberg’s thesis that the psychoanalytic treatment is not only an analytic but simultaneously a synthetic process as well is fully valid. [...] Through our interpretations, without fully realizing it, we actually do help the synthesis in the ego” (Alexander 1935, pp. 610-611; original emphasis).

Otto Fenichel, influential in Europe as much if not more than in North America, welcomed Ego Psychology as a perspective through which it would eventually be possible not only to better account for the clinical phenomenon of unconscious resistance, but also to enable more exact formulation of basic principles of analytic technique.

The fact that “ego psychology antedated the Hartmann era by a number of decades” and that “the leading ego psychologist was **Otto Fenichel**” (Bergmann 2000, pp. 4 and 67), are substantiated by a large number of ego psychological papers by Fenichel, starting with his 1926 paper on “Identification.” Throughout 1935 – 1941, Fenichel wrote series of influential ego psychological papers on psychoanalytic technique (1935/1953; 1941/1954); early stages of ego development (1937/1954), ego strength, ego weakness and various ego disturbances (1938/1954), defense mechanisms (1940/1954), character (1941a/1954) and affects (1941b/1954), always with the regard to the pertaining technical implications. .

In his paper, “Concerning the theory of psychoanalytic technique,” Fenichel writes: “Nowadays the psychology of the ego stands in the center of our investigations” (Fenichel, 1935/1953 p. 348). In the paper “Structural aspects of interpretation,” he shows how “the analyst works *exclusively* upon the *ego*” (Fenichel 1941c/1954, p. 54; original emphasis) and arrives at the final formulation: “That the analyst should carry on his work of interpretation from a position equidistant from ego, id, and superego, is a rule suggested by Anna Freud (1936) which can be paraphrased as meaning that the analyst must see all three aspects of psychic phenomena and in the struggle between them remain neutral. Essentially, however, he begins always to work with the ego and only through the ego can he reach the id and the superego; in this sense he is always closer to the ego than to the other two” (Fenichel 1941c/1954, p. 70).

Equally relevant for contemporary clinical work is the ego psychological approach of a phenomenological nature developed by **Paul Federn**. Federn conceptualized psychosis, especially schizophrenia, not in terms of psychic conflict but in terms of a psychological deficiency connected with the family environment of the patient. Psychoanalytically speaking, a psychosis is for Federn a “sickness of the ego,” characterized by “insufficient cathexis of the ego” and accompanied by a “pathological or insufficient ego feeling” (Federn 1952).

In 1952, Edoardo Weiss assembled Federn’s papers, connecting his clinical work with psychotic patients with his study of their ego, in the anthology “Ego Psychology and the Psychoses” (Federn 1952).

Historically and conceptually, notable is Federn’s conflict between his need to stay close to Freud (of whom he, together with Anna Freud, became the official representative in Vienna after 1923) and his theoretical and clinical orientation revealing the need to freely

pursue his clinical interest in the sickest patients, and to develop his own theoretical point of view, that is, his own Ego Psychology.

III. Cb. Three Authors Active Before and After World War II

Not only **Edoardo Weiss** (1889-1970) and **Anna Freud** (1895-1982), but also **Gustav Bally** (1893-1966) were active in the field of Ego Psychology both before and after World War II. As far as Bally's contribution to Ego Psychology is concerned, his 1932 article "Frühe Entwicklungsstadien des Ichs. Primäre Objektliebe" [Early stages of development of the ego. Primary object love] was mentioned twice by Heinz Hartmann in his monograph *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*.

In 1925 Weiss co-founded the Italian Psychoanalytic Society and founded the Italian *Rivista Italiana di Psicoanalisi*. In it, he published various ego psychological papers, as for example, "Il Super-io" [The superego] (1933), and "La parte inconscia dell'Io" [The unconscious part of the ego] (1934). His tolerance and pluralism are an important ingredient of the way in which psychoanalysis developed in Italy after World War II (see David 1990, and Conci 2019).

Anna Freud's 1936 book, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, was the most important book on ego psychology after Freud's *Inhibition, symptom and anxiety* (1926), antedating Hartmann's *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* by three years. Paul Gray (1982) stressed the resistances that Anna Freud's book evoked among analysts, not excluding Freud, who referred to her work only once. Anna Freud did not fail to admit the importance of Hartmann's perspective in her homage to Hartmann in the *Festschrift* in his honor:

"The child analyst's thinking, governed as it is by the developmental aspects of the human personality, does not thrive on the basis of drive psychology alone, but needs to range freely in the whole theoretical field of psychoanalysis, according equal significance to id, ego, and superego, to depth and surface, as Hartmann does. This creates the specific links between his work and the child analyst's thinking" (A. Freud 1966, p. 17 and p. 21).

The Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic, founded by Anna Freud in 1947, became a world-wide leading institution for the training of child psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. In the mid-1950s a major research project was undertaken under the leadership of Joseph Sandler, the Hampstead Index Project (see Bolland and Sandler, 1985). As a result, many papers were published by Sandler and his co-workers, most of them in the *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* and reprinted in Sandler (1987).

Anna Freud's 1965 book, *Normality and Pathology in Childhood*, was characterized as "one of the most important books of the Hartman era" (Bergmann 2000, p. 49).

III. Cc. Ego Psychology in Europe after World War II

In 1947, **Alexander Mitscherlich** founded the German journal *Psyche*, which contributed much to the diffusion of North American Ego Psychology. In Germany, Ego Psychology also played a role, similar to the one it played in the US, in the delayed reception of Kleinian psychoanalysis (see Bergmann 2000). Mitscherlich's intellectual brilliance and political skill helped him to inaugurate in 1960 in Frankfurt the State-financed Sigmund Freud Institute, which played a particularly important role in the promotion of psychoanalysis in the years to come.

Defining a specific diagnosis and therapy of the psychological problems connected to and caused by the Nazi Regime was the topic of his most famous book, written by Mitscherlich with his wife Margarete Mitscherlich-Nielsen: *The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior* (1975; German original 1967).

Not only did Mitscherlich play a major role in reconnecting German psychoanalysis with the international psychoanalytic community, but he was also instrumental in inspiring and training several generations of leading German analysts: Horst-Eberhard Richter, Johannes Cremerius, Hermann Argelander, Wolfgang Loch and Helmut Thomae. Johannes Cremerius played an important role both in Germany and in Italy in promoting ego psychologically oriented analytic work, both through his work as a training analyst and supervisor and through his many technical papers. Collected in the 1990 anthology, *Vom Handwerk des Psychoanalytikers: Das Werkzeug der psychoanalytischen Technik* [The Craft of the Psychoanalyst: The Tools of Psychoanalytic Technique], they deal with the defense mechanisms active in a wide range of patients – e.g., those who talk too much, those who talk too little, patients with superego problems – and how to deal with them. Later in his life, Cremerius became a pioneer in the German reception of the work of Balint and Ferenczi, but he never gave up the ego psychological basis of his way of working (Conci 2019, chapter 10).

Hermann Argelander (1920-2004) founded the important concept *szenisches Verstehen*, which can be traced back to what can be called a *szenische Funktion des Ichs*, that is, a “scenic function of the ego” (Argelander 1970, 2013; Conci, 2017). In a series of papers, Argelander presented the psychoanalytic work in terms of a dialogue which involves and/or requires the analyst's participation in the emotional life of the patient, and the relationship resulting from such an interaction. This relationship allows the patient to express the unconscious conflicts that brought him to ask the analyst for help in terms of concrete unconscious behaviors and/or structured scenes, to which the analyst will more or less consciously add his own contribution.

In light of **Paul Parin's** (1916-2009) work inside and outside psychoanalytic institutions, the Zurich colleague Thomas Kurz (2017) classified him as belonging – together with Alexander Mitscherlich and **Johannes Cremerius** – to the so-called “Freudian Left” (Jacoby 1983), founded by Otto Fenichel. For all of them, Ego Psychology was the most useful perspective from which to study the relationship between the individual and his society.

An instructive way of characterizing **Joseph Sandler**'s work and legacy is to quote the words with which Otto Kernberg opened and closed his contribution to the monographic issue of the North American journal *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* dedicated to him in 2005. Kernberg wrote: "I believe it is fair to say that Joseph Sandler has contributed more than anybody else to the integration of classical ego psychology with contemporary object relations theory, at both the theoretical and the clinical level" (Kernberg 2005, p. 174).

Peter Fonagy and Mary Target provide the summary and overview of Joseph Sandler's main concepts in their 2003 handbook, *Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology*, following the discussion of the developmental models of Anna Freud and Margaret Mahler. The publications of Sandler to which Fonagy and Target included are, among others: "The background of safety" (1960a; also in Sandler, 1987), "The concept of superego" (1960b; also in Sandler 1987), "Countertransference and role-responsiveness" (1976), "On the development of object relationships and affects" (with Anne-Marie Sandler 1978), "The past unconscious, the present unconscious, and interpretation of the transference" (with Anne-Marie Sandler 1984), and "On the structure of internal objects and internal objects relationships" (1990).

Although the work of Joseph Sandler has been well received and widely assimilated throughout Europe, for example in Italy and Germany, it is possible that many colleagues work ego psychologically without realizing it.

'Hartmann's Ego Psychology' may have never occupied a central role among the analytic perspectives which characterized Italian psychoanalysis in the 1950s -1980s (Conci 2019). However, ever since 1990's, **Stefano Bolognini** (2004, 2011) has been developing series of theoretical and clinical conceptualizations stemming from both North American Ego Psychology and Self Psychology (Conci 2019).

Bolognini developed the concept of the *relationship between the Ego and the Self* of an individual as a condensed intrapsychic functional equivalent of the mother-infant primary relationship: "The Ego tends to treat the Self more or less the same way the mother treated (in a very general, but above all psychic, sense) her own child." (Bolognini 2019, p. 115).

Correspondingly, he paid special attention to the many situations of serious suffering of the Self, where the functioning of the Ego is often altered: "regressed, intoxicated, projectively distorting reality, darkened and deprived of hope, persecutorily besieged", etc. (Bolognini 2019, p.118).

Overall, in Bolognini's writings, both *Ego and Self condition each other in a mutual way*, so that in analysis the Ego and the Self of both analyst and patient interact continuously, with ubiquitous unconscious alternations between prevailing of the "Analysis with the Ego" or the "Analysis with the Self" (Bolognini, 2004).

Another author who contributed to the resurgence of the Contemporary Ego Psychology worldwide is **Cecilio Paniagua** (1991, 2008, 2014), who has earned medical degree in Spain, lives and practices in Madrid, and has trained in psychiatry and psychoanalysis

in the United States. Because of his publications in both English and Spanish, his influence is felt not only in parts of North America and Europe, but notably in Latin America (below). In his numerous writings, which present further evolution of Paul Gray's 'microstructural' approach to structural conflict, via close attention paid to the transference-resistances surfacing in the analytic process, he documents how the clinical technique consistent with Freud's structural theory permits a more naturalistic and specific approach to analyzing unconscious conflict, thus (paradoxically) *facilitating 'id analysis'*. Here, minimizing the influence of suggestion, the patient is enlisted to actively participate in observing their own micro-interferences in the associative links of their thoughts, emotions and sensations, and become active partners in the exploration of their own drive derivatives.

III. Cd. Ego Psychology in Israel

The vicissitudes of Ego Psychology in Israel are in many ways characteristic of the fate and transformation of ego psychology in Europe in general. The Israel Psychoanalytic Society during the period from World War II through the 1960s and 1970s was mostly composed of European immigrants, and therefore mirrored the situation in many European societies. Viewed from this perspective, the emergent picture is quite variable. Those who had some or most of their training in the United States were clearly identified as Ego Psychologists, while those who came from a Latin American background were heavily influenced by Kleinian psychoanalysis. These different orientations were reflected in varying and contrasting foci: on one hand, a definite orientation towards diagnosis, psychic structure, character formation and defensive constellations, while on the other hand, a preference for a focus on object relations and drive, as well as associated defences, concentrating mainly on envy, aggression, projection and projective identification.

Subsequent developments in the Israel Psychoanalytic Society, beginning in the 1980s, were marked by a 'rebellion' against and a turning away from Ego Psychology, marked by the contention that it was remote, too cerebral, not experience-near, and 'not-caring' enough. What followed and gained ascendance were successively shifting emphases on Object Relations, Self-Psychology, Winnicottian psychoanalysis, Relational and Inter-Subjective orientations, and more recently the re-emergence of Kleinian and Bionian psychoanalysis. Currently, all these orientations exist simultaneously in a proliferation and polyphony of voices and are represented and supported by a variety of organized groups of adherents. What they all have in common, however, is eschewing Ego Psychology. Allowing what may be an oversimplification, this state of affairs appears to correspond to and reflect the generally prevailing European state of affairs (not leaving out Lacanian psychoanalysis).

While the above description reflects the current state, albeit with the admission of some generalization, there are additional relevant several points to be mentioned to complete this picture. In a sense, these additions may represent the 'return of the repressed' – namely the *re-emergence of Ego Psychology or its influence, albeit under quite different guises*. Three contributions and their vicissitudes illustrate this contention: the influence of Ego Psychology

on and through the medium of psychological testing; the contributions of Bion; and a theoretical elaboration of experiential factors in self-and-object relations (below).

III. Ce. Ego Psychology and Psychological Testing

In Israel, one of the major influences as well as manifestations of Ego Psychology was through the development and practice of clinical psychological tests. The contributions of **David Rapaport** and his co-workers represent the seminal influence in this area (Rapaport, Gill & Schafer, 1945). This pioneering effort had many subsequent developments in both clinical practice and psychological research. The approach taken in Rapaport, Gill and Schafer's work follows closely the ego functions first described by Freud (1911) and elaborated by numerous subsequent authors (e.g., Bellak et al, 1973; Bellak, 1989; Beres, 1956, 1971; Rapaport, 1958). The testing manual of Rapaport, Gill and Schafer that describes, analyses and codifies mental functioning, became the cornerstone of clinical psychological testing for diagnostic purposes, and served for decades as the basis for the formation of clinical psychologists and their interrelatedness and participation in psychiatric case management.

In effect, these tests and the reports written on their basis mainly represent the analysis and diagnostic integration of the subject's ego functions. They focus on such ego functions as attention and concentration, social and adaptive judgment, levels of thinking from concrete to abstract, affect management, self-image and identity, etc., and the observed fluctuations, gaps and impediments in these functions. The final integrative picture serves to pinpoint the diagnostic category that best describes the patient in terms of his or her ego functions, as well as certain depth psychological dynamics revealed by the tests. For quite some time, these diagnostic tests were regarded as the equivalent of a psychological x-ray picture of the patient, corroborating, complementing and sometimes challenging or contradicting the clinical psychiatric diagnosis. Furthermore, since the tests were the exclusive domain of the psychologist, they helped to define and establish the emergent professional identity of the clinical psychologist and to enrich his understanding of the depth and complexity of the human mind, personality and functioning.

As a professional discipline, clinical psychology was able to establish and initially define itself by means of this special capacity. This changed gradually as clinical psychologists gained professional independence and autonomy and increasingly engaged directly in full-fledged psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Perhaps the current relative abandonment and downgrading of diagnostic personality testing as a sole defining aspect of the professional identity and activity of clinical psychologists in Israel, almost totally usurped by their psychotherapeutic activity, parallels the waning trajectory of Ego Psychology in Israel.

III. Cf. Bion and Ego Psychology

It is customary to think of **Wilfred R. Bion** as (at least initially) a Kleinian analyst, although he himself rejected such attributions. It is far less usual to think of Bion as Freudian.

Yet Bion's theoretical contributions, especially his early ones, were quite clearly and openly based on and related to Freud's thought. This is particularly striking, for example, in his early papers, such as "Differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic personalities" (1957), in which his thinking is in close dialogue with Freud's notions about relating to reality in terms of ego functions (Freud, 1911). Precisely on this paper, Freud's "Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning," **Lawrence Brown** based his paper "The ego psychology of Wilfred Bion: implications for an intersubjective view of psychic structure" (Brown, 2009), the first paper known to be dealing with this topic.

Later aspects of Bion's original oeuvre also reflect his perhaps unacknowledged debt to notions of ego functions. It is, for example, implicit in Bion's theory of group dynamics (1961), in which the 'Work Group' is analogous to the adaptive reality-ego of the individual, while 'Basic Assumption' groups are somewhat analogous to the Id (Rioch, 1975). Over and above this, Bion's consistent concern with transformations, with the psychic working over and processing of crude beta elements into alpha elements, with the psychic processes that create dreams and reverie out of pre-psychic sensory-near elements, with thinking and language – all of these can be seen as his *recasting ego functions in his own conceptual terms*. The culmination of this effort at re-conceptualization finds expression in the well-known Grid, which may be regarded as a novel way of *deconstructing ego functions* and how they help or fail to reach more advanced psychic levels of abstraction, realization and authenticity in a way that combines and *integrates ego and self*. It is, of course, totally unlikely that Bion would have regarded himself as an Ego Psychologist (certainly in the sense of narrow definition of the American Ego Psychology above), nor should he be categorized as one. But it is instructive and informative to follow his line of thought as a European counterpart that represents an attempt to reframe what American Ego Psychology tried to achieve, albeit along very different conceptual lines.

III. Cg. Ego Psychology and Experience

A major attribute of the normal functioning of the ego is the creation, formation and integration of what constitutes our subjective, conscious and unconscious, experience. The question of subjective experience is an age-old philosophical issue. Psychoanalysis, however, aims at elucidating the inner forces, dynamics and mechanisms that shape and produce our experience. In a sense, "experience" as such, while it plays a central role in clinical discourse, is either "explained" as the 'end result' and emergent outcome of such forces, or the narrated signifier of these inner dynamics. Yet patients describe experiences, and psychoanalysts and psychotherapists speak to them in experiential terms. This may be one of the factors that influenced what happened to Hartman era Ego Psychology, which was often criticized as being "experience-distant" (Kohut, 1971). The language of 'self' and of 'relationship' seems better suited to capture such *experiential aspects*, yet at the same time it disregards the fact that such communicable observables *are ultimately dependent on underlying ego functions* that produce and sustain them (Grossman, 1982). Notably, Erikson was confronted with this issue when he tried to introduce the concept of identity into psychoanalysis. He tried to resolve the difficulty

by introducing it at first as the concept of *ego-identity*, since identity is in one sense a *structural* construct, but in another sense, it is an *experiential* phenomenon (Erikson, 1956). This was indeed the objection raised by some ego-psychologists to the concept of identity, which they criticized as lacking metapsychological rigor and intrapsychic clarity of definition (Abend, 1974).

A recent attempt to deal with these issues and to integrate them conceptually with existing psychoanalytic models is the work of **Shmuel Erlich** on experiential modalities (Erlich & Blatt, 1985; Erlich, 1998, 2003). Erlich conceives of the *processing* of internal and external data (perceptual, cognitive and affective) as proceeding along *two* parallel, contiguous and continuous dimensions of the experience of Self-and-Other. In one modality, the experience is of separateness and differentiation, and in the other – of fusion, union and merger of self and other.

The modality of separateness gives rise to experiences of causality, aim-directedness and intentionality, logic and objectivity (as in scientific thinking), to the experience of time as linear, and to cause-and-effect considerations of reality. Drive related experiences (e.g., experiencing desire) take place as well in this modality, since craving and desire are directed at an object that is experienced as separate from the self, which must be attained for drive-satisfaction to take place.

In the second modality, self-and-other are experienced as one, connected and fused. Time is experienced as circular or as timelessness; thinking is non-causal and governed by feelings of oneness and ongoing existence. In this modality there is no room for desire since object and self are already experienced as united in oneness. Regarding thinking, these descriptions are reminiscent of the primary and secondary processes (Freud, 1900). Yet the *experience* generated by each modality is clearly quite different. In the modality of separateness, experience is adaptively geared towards external reality (experienced objectively) and can give rise to feelings and experiences of mastery, success or failure, and satisfaction gained or absent. The second modality, of oneness, produces experiences of ongoing existence, as in Winnicott's going-on-being (1960), and the connectedness of self-with-other (who may be a person, but also a cause, an idea, an inner identity or an occupation and social role). Further aspects of the operation of these experiential modalities are elaborated in several publications (notably Erlich, 2003, 2013).

Erlich adopted the terms *Doing* for the first modality and *Being* for the second, terms which were used by Winnicott (1971) with somewhat similar connotations. There are, however, fundamental differences between Erlich's and Winnicott's concepts. While Winnicott refers to the *contents* or end-states of experience, Erlich conceives of these modalities foremostly as *that which processes experience*, producing ultimately quite different end-states. He does not base his concepts on what is perceived or reported (e.g., levels of observed activity) but on the *inferred underlying processing modes*. In this he is in fact describing two modes in which the ego operates continuously and simultaneously. His theory is therefore a contemporary addition to or a recasting of ego functioning, based on the conception that the *ego is the central*

processing and integrating agent in the psyche and is responsible for one's experiential end-states.

Erlich's contribution is in the same line as Bion's assumption of alpha and beta elements in psychical function. Bion introduced the notion of an alpha-function, whose task is 'to convert sense data into alpha-elements and ... provide the psyche with the material for dream thoughts ... the capacity to wake up or go to sleep, to be conscious or unconscious ...' (Bion 1967, p. 115). As suggested above, these theoretical contributions can be regarded as *indirectly representing transformative ego-functions or ego-activity*.

III. D. DEVELOPMENTS IMPACTING LATIN AMERICA

Latin American psychoanalysis overall developed from the intertwining of strong Freudian and British Object Relations tradition and their various elaborations in the work of post-Freudian and post-Kleinian theorists in North America and Europe, prominently including French psychoanalytic authors.

As it pertains to the post-World War II era of Latin American psychoanalysis, the immigration movement from Europe to the United States and from Europe to South America, divided the sphere of influence of Ego Psychology and British Object Relations theories.

Specifically, 'American Ego Psychology', coming from the United States (as opposed to Europe), has been juxtaposed to the British Object Relations theories. In addition, notable bi-polarities also exist between the French and Anglo-Saxon influences in the development of psychoanalysis in Latin America in general (Roudinesco 2000), which subsequently influenced the reception and evolution of Ego Psychology in the region.

Due to the translational lag and criticism coming from both the Kleinian and French psychoanalytic traditions, Ego Psychology theoretical interest in a psychic surface and preconscious phenomena was misunderstood and confused with cognitive behavioral theory, which would make it void of libidinal aspects, unconscious fantasy and subjectivity.

Consequently, theoretical and cultural controversies notwithstanding, sometimes the matter is more the term 'Ego Psychology' itself, which is not popular in Latin America, rather than the actual conceptual framework and clinical approach.

III. Da. Early Developments and Influences

In Latin America, Ego Psychology's theory's historical beginning can be traced to Freud's studies of ego throughout his oeuvre, infantile sexuality, narcissism, group psychology, the structural theory of "The Ego and the ID" (1923) and that of "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926). Degree of knowledge and familiarity with **Anna Freud's** "Mechanisms of Defense" (1936), **Heinz Hartmann's** "The Ego and the Problem of Adaptation" (1939/1958) and **David Rappaport's** "Organization and psychopathology of thought" (1951), providing a

systematic and hierarchical organization of the concepts of Ego Psychology, differs among different psychoanalytic cultures of Latin America.

III. Daa. Ramón Parres and ‘Classical Ego Psychology’ in Mexico

One of the founders of the Mexican psychoanalytic society (Asociación Psicoanalítica Mexicana APM) in 1956, **Ramón Parres** studied psychiatry and trained in psychoanalysis at Columbia University in New York, and was heavily influenced by Ego Psychology perspective.

The Institute of APM in Mexico City, which is named after him, includes a comprehensive Ego Psychology coursework and seminars, as part of its core curriculum, as do all psychoanalytic institutes in Mexico. Unique to Latin America, not only Hartmann, Kris, Lowenstein, Jacobson and Anna Freud, among others, are an important part the institutes’ curriculum, but it is expected that a candidate knows Erikson’s psycho-social developmental stages and Anna Freud’s “The ego and the mechanisms of defense” from their preceding university studies.

In his book “El Psicoanálisis como Ciencia” (Parres 1977), Parres presents a unique integration of psychoanalytic ego psychological clinical theory, methodology and technique, including mechanisms of defense, transference, and overriding influence of unconscious processes on the conscious mentation. Following the publication, detailed clinical history including evaluation of ego capacities and ego functioning throughout the analytic process, establishment and maintenance of therapeutic alliance, exploration of resistances and defense mechanisms, have been considered an important part of psychoanalytic armamentarium of everyday clinical practice throughout all of Latin America, albeit often without any credit to Ego Psychology.

III. Dab. Ego and Self, Ego Psychology and Self Psychology & Early Efforts at Integrations between Ego Psychology and Object Relations

Differences between Ego Psychology and Self Psychology are very clear in Mexico, as maybe not as much in the rest of Latin America. Hans Kohut is quoted if Self Psychology is mentioned. Winnicott’s true and false self, involves the concept of self, but he is thought of as Object Relations theorist, representative of the British ‘Middle’ school, not as a representative of Self Psychology or Ego Psychology. Winnicott and Bion are widespread in Latin America, especially in Argentina, and subsequently also in Chile, Brazil, Peru, Colombia and even later in Mexico. In Latin America, those who anticipated in some sense Self Psychology, like Ferenczi, Balint, Fairbairn, Bion and Winnicott, are thought of as Object Relations theorists.

Pertinent to Latin American understanding, Ego Psychology refers more to the functions and dynamics of a psychic apparatus, while the self includes other structures, the super ego and the id.

Leon and Rebeca Grinberg (1971), from Argentina, in their book “*Identidad y Cambio*” (Identity and Change), studied the history and evolution of the terms involved in Erikson’s concept of identity, ego and self, in pursuit of conceptualizing ‘non-ego’, ‘non-self’, and various permutations of the unconscious fantasy of self in the ego, in an intent to systematize their coherent relationship. The Grinbergs point out that, in the present time, Erikson’s concept of identity is as strategic as the study of sexuality in Freud’s time. What constitutes the primary identity attachments leads to differentiation between the ego and the self. The concepts of ego and self are clearly different and need to be understood as separate concepts. According to Grinbergs, the investigations of the problems of the self starts precisely with Hartmann’s distinction between ego as a psychic system and the self as referring to oneself. Grinberg understands Hartmann’s concept of ego to be neither synonymous with that of personality, nor subject as opposed to object of the experience, it is more like the consciousness of the sense of oneself. For him, the ego is a substructure of the personality and is defined by its functions. These functions refer to Freud’s first ego, the body ego, meaning the influence that the body image has on the differentiation of self from the world of objects, but also, how the functions of the organs of the body establish contact with the external world and fall gradually under the ego’s control. This postulate helps Hartmann in avoiding the confusion that exists between self as an object as oppose to the ego as organization. The word ego is used to include psychological processes/functions such as thinking, perception, remembering, feeling and has an organizational and self-regulating function in relation to the self. The ego functions are responsible for the development and execution of the satisfaction of the internal drives on one hand, and the demands of the external world on the other. The self is an intermediate concept between the intrapsychic phenomena and that which concerns the interpersonal experience.

Grinberg views Hartmann’s ideas as giving Edith Jacobson the impetus for elaborating further the concept of self that encompasses the whole person including the body and its parts called the primary psycho-physiological self, with equal libidinal and aggressive drives that give birth to primary narcissism and masochism. As the ego evolves, it incorporates its mnemonic representation of objects, and as the individual grows, he/she will be able to differentiate the internal from the external, the ego from the self and from objects, as well as differentiating the ego representations from the self-representations. Thus, the secondary narcissism and masochism respond to aggressive and libidinal drives of these representations of self, contained in the ego, now differentiated. Identity has two aspects, one that refers to the self and the other to the ego linked to the synthetic function. In Grinberg’s view, according to Jacobson, the self has a temporal dimension that includes the changing phases of childhood, adolescence and adulthood. In the psychotic organization a false self develops, a self that protects the real self until a more facilitating milieu allows the emergence of the genuine self, recovered by the ego. According to Grinberg, this is how the concepts transit from Freud (the body ego) to Erik Erikson (the constitution of identity), to Jacobson (the temporality of the self in the ego formation), Otto Kernberg’s (clarification of the meaning of temperament, character and personality) and to Melanie Klein (self as introjection identification as a result of the ego introjection of the object and the projective identification as a result of the projection of the

parts of the self to the object) and finally to John Oulton Wisdom (orbit and orbital objects, internal object relations and nuclear objects introjected).

Five concepts were thus delimited by the Grinbergs:


- *ego*: The psychic structure described by Freud that includes unconscious fantasy of the self upon the ego (corresponds to the core of Wisdom's diagram and includes Jacobson's self representation concept).

- *Non-ego*: Refers to the self and includes the orbital (internal objects plus the super ego) and the object representations according to Jacobson's description. The non-ego is in the self, and when it expands itself over the frontiers of the self, it becomes the non-self.

- *Self*: Encompasses the ego and the non-ego as a whole person, the body, the psychic structure, and the *liason* with the internal and external objects, where the individual is opposite to the world of objects.

- *Non-self*: External world and objects.

- *Unconscious fantasy of the self in the ego*: Jacobson does not include unconscious fantasies, and this links ego psychology to object relations theory. The latter confirms the difficulty with the entry of self in Latin America since the use of self as Montero (2005) explains, remains as a structure based on the subjective experience.



This diagram in the Grinbergs' illustrates with precise clarity *the borders between ego and self*.

In "The Problem of Identity and the Psychoanalytical Process", the Grinbergs (1974) builds on Erik Erikson's (1956) theory of formation of identity from preceding fragments of various identifications, Ernst Kris'(1952) theory of regression enabling creative activity and Mahler's (1958) studies of identity disturbances in cases of autism and symbiosis, among others, to formulate his own formulation of the sense of identity as " the outcome of a process

of continued interaction of three links of integration, namely the spatial, temporal and social links” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974, p. 506) .

Another author who explored *the relation between the ego and the self*, informed by ‘American Ego Psychology’ was Argentinian **Salomón Resnik**. In his “El yo, el self y la relación de objeto narcisista” (The Ego, the Self and the narcissistic object relationship), **Resnik** (1971-1972) reviews the different meanings of the notions of ego and self, including their theoretical and etymological roots, in German, English, and Spanish, in psychoanalysis, academic psychology and philosophy. Weaving together and exploring William James’ “Principles of Psychology” (1890), Freud’s description of the Ego as a structure with functions (thinking, coordination, synthetic and integrative functioning, defense mechanisms), and Hartmann’s and Jacobson’s formulations, he focuses on the ‘ambiguity and specificity of Self’: “the Selbst remained as an ambiguous idea, to which Anglo-Saxon psychoanalysts have given specific meaning in clinical experience” (Resnik, 1971-1972, p 267).

In Mijolla’s dictionary (2002), influential in Latin America, **Agnes Oppenheimer** describes *the emergence of Self Psychology from an Ego Psychology perspective*, depicting how the ego structure endowed with functions differs from self-representations, which are narcissistically invested. The self will then become a structure *per se* of the psychic apparatus.

As a central and fundamental concept in *Self Psychology*, empathy is considered a core concept to understand self and self-object relations. Kohut, defined it as “the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person. It is our lifelong ability to experience what another person experience” (Kohut 1984); it is directed to understanding a two-person interactive process. It also relates more to narcissistic pathology. Regarding the economic aspects, there is need for *differentiation between the cathexis of the ego and that of the self*, the latter being mainly reserved for narcissism.

In *Ego Psychology*, based on Freud’s structural (second topography) theory and the psychic apparatus of ego, id and super-ego, the *ego* is ‘who one is’; the ego negotiates between one’s basic needs and the demands of the environment, part consciously and part unconsciously aiming towards adaptation and reducing anxiety, as different from the *self* and self-objects.

In the *Classical Ego Psychology perspective* (Hartmann 1939/1958, 1950; Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946), ego is present from the moment of birth and is represented by functions that are not immersed in the conflict of internal and external reality. Many of these functions are relatively autonomous and correspond to an area relatively free of conflict. In this model, not all of the energy of the ego comes from the libido and the drives. Ego is an organization; it has a structure as well as other complex sub-structures involved in hierarchical functions. Some of these functions are free from the effects of conflict, what Hartmann called primary autonomous functions, while others only become secondarily autonomous after the resolution of conflicts. In this process, all aspects are mediated by relationships as identifications become the major ego function for facilitating this ‘neutralization’ of energy.

Contributor to the *early integrational thought*, Argentinian **Roberto Doria** (1997), in his “Divergencias en la Unidad” (Divergencies and Unity), includes a chapter “Psicología del

Yo”, a historical account of Hartmann’s contribution. He especially depicts the continuities between Freud and Hartmann, the richness of Hartmann’s encompassing opus and his purpose of building new horizons towards a more general psychology. For his part, Doria emphasized especially the importance of *Hartmann’s organizational function* which has a greater reach than the synthetic function. According to Doria’s view of Hartmann, *the functional capacity of the ego and of the structures of the personality, depends and is self-regulated by this organizational function*, whereas the synthetic function is limited to ego functions and does not reach the external reality. Doria further highlights Hartmann’s theoretical disagreement with the death instinct and his proposal of an aggressive drive rooted in an undifferentiated constitutional matrix instead. The intervention of *neutralization of these aggressive drives* leads to the integration of energies that nourishes the functional structures of the ego and superego. In Doria’s view, this shows something of a parallelism with the sublimation mechanism mentioned by Freud. It is with these Hartmanian ideas in mind, that Doria appeals of an urgent *need for an integration of Hartmann’s Ego Psychology theory and technique with those of Object relations*, benefitting especially to severe pathologies.

In this spirit of integration, **Edith Jacobson** and **Margaret Mahler** would be later considered in Latin America the ‘creators of the Object Relations theory in the Ego Psychology theory’. They are viewed as contributors to the elaboration of a dialectic connection in the development of *affects and drives, linked with mental representation of the self and the object world*. While there is an acknowledged overlap between Ego Psychology and Object Relations theories in both of their contributions, Jacobson (Mahler’s analyst), who concentrated on the role of progressive integration of the self- and object-representations in the formation of the psychic structures, is considered closer to Ego Psychology, while Mahler’s theory of separation individuation, from symbiosis towards object constancy, essential in Latin American psychoanalytic thought and work, is considered by many somewhat closer to the Object Relations theories.

III. Db. Recent Developments That Influence Latin America

Salman Akhtar’s (2009), *Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, is very much taken into account in Mexico and the northern part of Latin America. Akhtar, in his ego psychology definition makes a very clear explanation that it is a shift ... “from drive to defense, from discharge to sublimation, from impulse to counter cathexis, from revelation to resistance, and from the cauldron of instincts to the executive operations of the ego.” Latin America is only gradually becoming familiar with, and acknowledging many integrative efforts of creating bridges between Ego Psychology, Kleinian theory, and Balint and Winnicottian independent British theorists, such as Sandler’s and F. Pine’s writing’s on the four psychologies of psychoanalysis (Pine 1988), referenced also by Akhtar. Akhtar’s definitions of ego, encompassing contributions of many ego psychologists and their conceptualizations of ego automatism, ego boundaries, ego coverage, ego defects, ego defenses, ego deviation, ego distortion, ego function of metaphorization, ego functions, ego ideal, ego identity, regression in the service of the ego, ego instincts, ego integrity vs. despair, ego libido, ego modification,

ego needs, ego nuclei, ego passage, ego regression, ego relatedness, ego strength-weakness and ego's sense of self disappearance, gives a very extensive theoretical and technical exposition of ego psychology.

At first, the way **Erik H. Erikson's** psycho-social stages of the life cycle were transmitted/translated to Latin American analysts, sometimes unfortunately lacked his proverbial richness of interactive and regressive-progressive complexity, especially typical of his transition between stages. The focus was then largely on only the sequential and linear progression. Presented in this limited way, it is viewed as opposed to other more dynamic, spiral, interactive proposals that progress and regress in a very complex interaction, less epigenetically developmentally (pre)determined. However, perhaps due to Grinbergs' (1971, 1974) important earlier work in Spanish (and its English translation), it is increasingly better understood that Erikson emphasizes the crucial cultural and social aspects that participate in forming the 'ego identity' out of many partial identifications via processes of introjections, internalizations and integrations. In this sense it is understood that the ego has subjective aspects of the self and it is responsible for the integration of the different mental representations of the self as an important function and structure of the ego.

Latin America had originally a somewhat limited view of Ego Psychology theory as dedicated exclusively to the treatment of neurotic psychopathology. In this context **Otto F. Kernberg's** unique integration of Ego Psychology and Object Relations theories with specific technical indications and methodology extending analytically oriented treatments to borderline patients with borderline personality organizations, presenting a theoretical overlap between ego psychology and object relations approach, was significant. In Latin America some started to consider Kernberg's contribution as a 'Contemporary Ego Psychology' integrative approach, especially relevant to patients with difficulty in symbolization with the borderline personality organization.

Thus, newly recognizing the *overlaps between Ego Psychology theory and Object Relation theory*, **Otto Kernberg** was at first considered primarily Object Relations theorist, and only gradually he began to be viewed as representative of a *rapprochement between Ego Psychology and Object Relations*, as his theory also incorporated Klein's splitting, pertaining to the paranoid-schizoid position. Kernberg's technique (Kernberg, O.F., F.E. Yeomans, J.F. Clarkin et al. 2008) in working with borderline patients, 'Transference-Focused Psychotherapy' (TFP) is taken very much into account in Mexico. Because of his arrival from Austria first to Chile and his subsequent life and medical studies there, Kernberg is considered, in a sense, a Latin American theorist. His knowledge of Spanish language, his travels through the Latin American continent, giving lectures, plus the fact that he is a prolific author of many books written or translated to Spanish, makes his theory accessible (with its both Ego Psychology and Object Relations aspects). Chile is becoming the second Latin American country after Mexico, that relates to aspects to Ego Psychology theory, mainly in working with borderline pathologies.

Clinical concepts such as co-constructions of *therapeutic alliance* of **Elizabeth Zetzel** and *working alliance* of **Ralph Greenson** are important in Latin American psychoanalytic

clinical practice, as they signify focus on the quality and nature of the psychoanalytic relationship.

With growing volume of psychoanalytic work with children and adolescents, **Erikson's** 'basic trust', 'industry', and working towards 'autonomy' is consistently taken into account, but very strangely considered as an exception of ego psychology theory, meaning it is more developmental and necessary, serving well as a technique with children and adolescents. Due to misunderstanding and to a cultural-historical 'American stigma' that confuses Ego Psychology with cognitive psychology, in a contemporary perspective, there has been a 'weaving in' of such ego psychological concepts as *resistances*, *expansion of the attention to*, and *interpretation of defenses*, that converge in a contemporary synthetic version of Developmental Ego Psychology, that includes an updated version of Mahler's Separation-Individuation in **Daniel Stern's** (1985) conceptualizations, like 'affect attunement', while casting Hartmann, Lowenstein and others aside. The idea that psychoanalysis belongs exclusively to the inner world may be giving way to a more integrated or contemporary psychoanalysis, taking into account also wider range of pathologies.

While *immigration* is a big issue worldwide, in Latin America there has been much suffering, and the work with immigrants is mainly based on ego psychological and socio-cultural concepts. Such developmental concepts as **Mahler's** *separation anxiety* during the rapprochement subphase of her separation-individuation theory, the need for, (and reclaiming of) object constancy, and Erikson's 'basic trust versus mistrust' and (re)formation of 'ego-identity' become essential, in addition to Stern's *affect attunement*.

Glen Gabbard's (2009) clarifying discussion of three major psychoanalytic paradigms: Ego Psychology, Object Relations theories and Self Psychology, and their evolution from the original classical analytic theory is gaining influence across the continent, as is **Robert S. Wallerstein's** (2002) "Growth and Transformation of American Ego Psychology", which introduced Latin American analysts to the evolution of the Ego psychology from Hartmann to the present theoretical pluralism of the complex post-Freudian thought in North America, *integrating Contemporary Ego Psychology/Structural theory with Object Relations and elements of Self Psychology*. Such perspective, understood as bridging the ego processes, including the reality principle on one hand, and the social life on the other, resonates with important strands of Latin American psychoanalytic thought and practice.

Cecilio Paniagua's (2014) *Contemporary Ego Psychology* ('psicología del yo contemporánea', or PYC in Spanish) has been embraced in Latin America, especially by young psychoanalysts, since it is a fresh version that emphasizes technique over theory. As a Spanish psychoanalyst, who writes in Spanish, as well as in English, Paniagua expanded on, and recognized that, the Gray's close-process interventions may need to be "adapted to different cultural milieus" (Paniagua 2008, p. 2019).

Paniagua's systematic approach consists of the exploration of the resistances more than the associative working through, keeping in mind the importance of the therapeutic alliance, in order to privilege the self-observing ego as a road towards understanding the unconscious

conflict and the exploration of the id that contribute to the formation of character traits. He mentions that the analytic task is mainly centered on the exploration of the obstacles that oppose the verbal manifestation, as a resistance to the emergence of instinctual drives. The interpretations of the analytic material are privileged in timing only when the patient in ego regression is ready for introspection. The surface becomes important in that the special attention is given to the flow of the sequence, changes in the tone of the voice, pauses, omissions, that hint on the nature of the defenses warding off the id derivatives. The author calls this *microanalytic* listening.

Historically, Paniagua ties his contemporary Ego Psychological approach to the concepts which are appealing to Latin American analysts: The place of the analyst is not of knowledge, but of healthy *ignorance*, which is more than the use of floating attention based on countertransference, it is rather a conscious attentive attitude to the free associations of the patient. The latter is based on Theodore Reik's (1948) concept of the "*intuitive third ear*" relying more on the analyst's observation than on what he is feeling. This way, the analytic working through will boost *the observing ego* and the patient will have an active role of a co-participant, not only of a provider of biographical material. The interpretations are more clarifications (Bibring 1954), with great value placed on the effort of the patient involved in self-observation, rather than what seems to have been understood as classical authoritative one-sided interpretative interventions. The *synthetic ego function* will thus lead the analytic process to drive derivatives that were repressed, towards more adaptative solutions.

IV. CONCLUSION

In North America, contemporary Ego Psychology holds firmly to the view that vast portion of all aspects of psyche operate unconsciously, including conflictual interactions within and between id-ego-superego and the outside world with its objects and their internal representations, which produce wide range of compromise formations, implicated in psychic health and creativity, as well as in illness. Contemporary ego psychologists subscribe to the notion that the meaning, depth and intensity of experience come from integration of conscious and unconscious through fantasy, transference and from understanding of integration of conscious and unconscious primary process affective density with secondary process language, that springs from the deepest roots of existence. It is within this context that Ego psychology studies ego's multiple roles in psychic conflict and complexities of intra-ego functioning, encompassing both defensive and autonomous ego functions, and ego strength. The interplay of intrapsychic and inter-psychic processes unfolds under varying internal and external conditions, including trauma, in life and in the analytic situation. Developmental unfolding and transformations of drives, defenses and internalized cultural and ethical values affect and are affected by autonomous ego functioning and ego strength and resilience.

By integrating findings from other schools of thought, Ego Psychology has embraced the notion that a multitude of developmental and clinical phenomena occur simultaneously.

Current-day clinical and theoretical Ego Psychology offers understandings that interpretation operates on the edge of patient's readiness for insight, is not sterile, but affectively nuanced, and that the analytic process, itself, involves compromise formations in the analyst and analysand. Transference and countertransference are recognized as complex, overdetermined experiences. Such a multifaceted understanding of layered intrapsychic and inter-psychic transference processes of both participants, working from 'within the transference', can enhance mentalization involved in 'creating a psychoanalytic mind', a prerequisite of success of interpretive technique. Ego functions contribute to perceptions of the body ego, its dynamic meaning and its mental representations. Responses to trauma can be understood in terms of unconscious ego mechanisms dominating 'zero process' where the trauma is always 'waiting to happen' that arise specific to those traumas.

Ego psychological concepts help to describe and delimit techniques involving reconstruction of pathogenic (past and present) events, and furthering processes of internalization, building psychic structures and representations. Finally, concepts from Ego Psychology, emphasizing individual psychic experience in all its depth and range, can offer nuanced guidelines to individualize and fine-tune dynamic assessment and psychoanalytically geared intervention leading to expansion and articulation of the interplay of all aspects of psychic process and mental life.

In Europe, Ego Psychology can be defined as a necessary phase of psychoanalysis, as a school, and as an analytic perspective variously developed according to the personality of the psychoanalysts who dealt with, formulated it and were influential – before and after World War II in various strands of European psychoanalytic thinking and practice.

In this context, if different protagonists and their special interests are fully articulated, it becomes apparent that many facets of Ego Psychology with its theoretical and clinical dimensions still represent an important though often neglected branch of psychoanalysis. From this point of view, it is true that psychoanalysts orient their work – as Otto Fenichel used to say – on the ego of their patients, but apparently do it so automatically that they sometimes fail to integrate this work into their self-image and their theory.

In Latin America, the theory of contemporary Ego Psychology is not wide spread, however, as contradictory as it may sound, it is widely used in everyday psychoanalytic clinical practice. Ego Psychology's influence is felt in: a. giving more immediate and constant attention to the flow of words, the sequence of associations, the inflection and tone of the voice, as well as other affective expressions in order to be able to detect the instinctual derivatives, that are on their way to conscious manifestations; b. sensitive tracking the obstacles and interference of the ego that considers these expressions perilous, and of the super ego that will judge them as unacceptable. While fact that the drives and unconscious fantasies are not discarded in (North American) Ego Psychology theory is not fully appreciated in Latin America, in practice it is understood (along the lines of Ego Psychology clinical technique) that the subtle and

disguised signals of anxiety that conform the analytic material are indeed the tip of the iceberg of the id elements that have created the need for a certain type of ego defense. There is an increased understanding of a need for a development of a strong working alliance within the clinical psychoanalytic setting, fostering the ego's self-observing function in the here and now, which, in turn, increases the patient's readiness to use the analyst's interpretation of the underlying fantasies and drives.

While Latin American analysts may use different methods, informed by various theories, to explore the unconscious (internal and external) motivation, the basic methods of free associations, setting, resistances, defense interpretation, transference and counter transference remains. Ego Psychology theory is always in multitude of ways present in everyday clinical practice. As psychoanalysts work with patients, they explore the most primitive body ego pathologies, lack of symbolization, and acting-out as part of basic contemporary psychoanalytic methodology that guides towards effective working through resistances and defenses truncating ego functions of symbolic processes and language.

There is a continuous need for viable core elements of psychoanalytic clinical theory, and theoretical paradigms (and their changes) have repercussion in the clinical practice (Tuckett, 2011). Various integrational efforts between Ego Psychology and Object Relational thought in Latin America underlie the recognition that all analytic orientations subscribe to the common denominator that our life is guided by unconscious motivations even if they differ in the method of exploring those motivations. It follows that Contemporary Ego Psychology in its many facets is very much alive in Latin America, but it has been neglected as being recognized as such: Paradoxically, theory is frowned upon, yet, technique is an essential part of everyday clinical psychoanalytic practice, as it is understood that, in practice, working with defenses and resistances opens the way to underlying conflicts, drive derivatives, unconscious fantasies and drives.

Most authors across North America, Europe and Latin America, who include Ego Psychological concepts as part of their theoretical and clinical armamentarium understand that ego development proceeds in the context of object relations and in the context of ego's mutually influential interactions with the id. In this regard, the theoretical division between the drives and their derivatives on one hand versus unconscious ego at work on the other hand, translated clinically into 'id analysis versus ego analysis' presents false dichotomies. In depth exploration of the intricacies of the web of ego's adaptive, maladaptive, defensive as well as creative functioning allows for drive material to emerge more spontaneously at the clinical surface, and this in turn permits a more thorough analysis of the id.

Additionally, creative flourish of contemporary integrations and conceptual overlaps, involving variations and elements of Ego Psychology, shed light on *the dynamic realm of ego functioning*, including multidirectional interplay of the conscious and unconscious contents and processes, the inner representational world linked with affects and drives in relation to multiple dimensions of psychic structure formation, as well as multiply conceptualized 'transformative

processing' of various experiential domains, including subjectivity, otherness and alienation, pre-symbolic/pre-psychic and unconsciously symbolized communication, on the backdrop of continuous relations between ego and self in the development, in life, and in the analytic process of everyday practice.

See also:

CONFLICT

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

SELF

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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ENACTMENT

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. DEFINITIONS

The concept of enactment does not have a stable place in psychoanalytic theory. Uses of the term vary widely from confinement to the analytic situation to a broad range of interactions and behaviors in life.

Following the first use of the term in a title of a paper by Theodore Jacobs (1986), *enactment* has often been thought of as a North American concept. However, in contemporary North American psychoanalytic literature, there is no single concept of *enactment*. Rather, there is a group of such concepts, more or less closely related to one another but also quite different from one another. The following sample of the uses absorbs, combines and expands on, the North American definitions of the concept by Akhtar (2009) and Auchincloss and Samberg (2012):

- Transference/Countertransference enactments (e.g., Jacobs 1986, Hirsch, 1998), where analyst and/or analysand express transference or countertransference wishes in action, rather than reflecting on and interpreting them. This use of the term was further expanded by McLaughlin (1991) to include 'evocative-coercive transferences of both patient and analyst' and yet further developed by Chused (1991, 2003) as 'symbolic interactions' with unconscious meaning for both participants, potentially extending beyond the analytic situation. This phenomenon could be viewed as a version of 'acting out' or 'acting in' (Zelig, 1957), extended to both participants.
- The analysand's unconscious induction of the analyst to live out the analysand's unconscious fantasies. This idea is akin to 'projective identification' and/or 'role responsiveness'.
- 'An embedded series of often subtle, unconscious, interactive, mutually constructed dramas that are lived out' (Levine and Friedman, 2000, p.73; Loewald, 1975). Here, 'enactment' is being used to name a kind of intersubjectivity since the analyst is seen as a co-creator of what happens between the two parties.
- Any dramatic expression of transferential/countertransferential rupture of a fluid analytic containing exchange (Ellman, 2007), potentially extending beyond the psychoanalytic

situation (Chused, Ellman, Renik, Rothstein, 1999), may be communicated nonverbally or verbally (see the “interpretative enactment” by Steiner, 2006a, below).

In Latin America this conceptual plurality has been reduced, owing to the additional historical influences of authors like Racker (1948, 1988), Grinberg (1957, 1962), and Baranger & Baranger (1961-1962), and the further contemporary studies of Cassorla (2001, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015), Sapisochin (2007, 2013) and others.

- The predominant contemporary understanding of *enactment* in Latin America concerns phenomena where the analytical field is invaded by discharges and/or behaviors that involve both patient and analyst. Enactments arise from mutual emotional inducement without the members of the analytical dyad clearly realizing what is happening. Enactments reflect back to situations where verbal symbolization was impaired and, when words are available, they are used in limited and concrete ways. Enactments are ways of remembering early relationships through behaviors and feelings that are part of defensive organizations. (See below the differences between chronic and acute enactments)

European understanding of the term is closer to the Latin American than to the North American version, because the concept is rather exclusively confined to the analytical session. However, for some European analysts it differs from the Latin American version in that enactment is not so much a co-creation of patient and analyst, but rather the result of the interaction between them. The references to *enactment* being positioned within the countertransference or acting out are also fairly common.

- For example, Steiner’s (2006a) view of “interpretative enactment” is about the analyst's verbal communication, and is the idea that, though offered as interpretation, the utterance expresses the analyst's countertransferential feelings and attitudes.

The prevailing view of *enactments* in relation to psychoanalytic *interpretation*, within all three continental psychoanalytic cultures, is that *whatever the formulation of the underlying processes and contents, enactments, as they relate to the psychoanalytic situation, are seen as developmentally and/or dynamically meaningful, and they need to be understood and ultimately, however gradually and in an individualized fashion, interpreted* (Papiasvili, 2016).

II. BACKGROUND IN FREUD

The contemporary concepts of enactment all have roots in concepts that Freud articulated. From the time of Breuer’s treatment of Anna O. (Breuer, 1893) – the first collusion described in the psychoanalytical literature – Freud (1895) was concerned about actions that took place in the course of the patient unfolding his or her problems to the analyst. Transference (1905)

was the first such discovery (the Dora case), where the fantasy structure of the patient is projected onto the analyst. Though first described in his self-analysis in 1899 (“The Interpretation of Dreams”), in 1910 Freud gave the oedipus complex greater prominence, showing how children related sexually to their parents in patterns that they repeated in adult life, now with the analyst as parental substitute. Countertransference (1910) followed, referring to “the patient’s influence on his unconscious feelings” (1910, p.144). Acting out was next (1914) (though Freud had mentioned it earlier, seeing Dora’s premature termination as revenge on Freud, a substitute object for the punishing feelings that she felt towards Herr K). A further underpinning of the contemporary term ‘enactment’ came with his appreciation of the importance of the repetition compulsion (1914). This concept described how traumata unconsciously became repeated in treatment and in life. Freud wrote,

“He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he *repeats* it without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it... he cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering...” (1914, p.150)

In 1923, the development of the structural theory led to a focus on the defense mechanisms and their relation to the ego. Defenses that would become central to the concept of enactment were projection, introjection, and re-projection. In sum, the current concepts of enactment embody, though of course also go beyond, many Freudian concepts.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

The verb *to enact* is allied to the verb *to act* and one of the meanings of *to act* is to play a dramatic or theatrical role. The term *to enact*, together with its corresponding noun *enactment*, is found, imprecisely, in early and contemporary psychoanalytical literature, and refers to dramatic externalizations of the patient’s internal world either in a session or in everyday life. The term *re-enactment* has the same meaning.

In his seminal paper “On Countertransference Enactments”, Jacobs (1986) describes *enactments* as situations where an analyst is surprised by his own apparently inadequate countertransferential behavior. Later, the analyst may perceive the connections among his behavior, the emotional induction of the patient and personal factors of his own. Jacobs (1991, 2001) further clarified, emphasized, and popularized the term ‘enactment’. He used the term as the name for a specific occurrence in analysis in which one participant's psychology is played out vis-à-vis the other. What he tried to convey was the idea that *enactments are behaviors on the part of patient, analyst, or both, that arise as a response to conflicts and fantasies stirred up in each by the ongoing therapeutic work*. While linked to the interplay of transference and countertransference, these behaviors are also connected via memory to associated thoughts, unconscious fantasies and experiences of infancy and childhood. Thus, for Jacobs, the idea of enactment contains within it the notion of *reenactment*, that is, the reliving of bits and pieces

of the psychological past of both parties in the analytic situation.

Jacobs' concept of enactment resonates with Winnicott's (1963) somewhat paradoxical notion that, if the analysis goes well and the transference deepens, the patient will get the analyst to fail him *as needed* in the area of normal infantile omnipotence, i.e., in the transference.

However, Jacobs was not the first. Hans Loewald had used the term earlier, in "Psychoanalysis as an Art and the *Fantasy Character of the Psychoanalytic Situation*" (1975). He wrote that,

"...[the] process in which patient and analyst are engaged with each other ... involves a re-enactment, a dramatization of aspects of the patient's psychic life history, created and staged in conjunction with, and directed by, the analyst". (p. 278-9)

The patient and analyst co-create illusion within the transference neurosis. The patient takes the lead in the fantasy recreation, as if in a stage play. The analyst's role is multidimensional. He or she is both the director and also different characters in the patient's life. The patient and analyst are co-authors of this drama, which is experienced both as fantasy and actuality. Instead of simply assuming the roles, the analyst reflects them back and eventually the patient gains access to his or her inner life and gradually takes over the directorship, the script. Aristotle's "imitation of action in the form of action" would in psychoanalytic terms be both re-enactment and repetition. Schafer (1982), a colleague of Loewald at the time, also believed that multiple self narratives or "storylines" could be recognized as differing versions of an analysand's basic story played out with an analyst (say, dramas of imprisonment, rebirth, or oedipal rivalry).

Sandler (1976) drew attention to mutual induction between the members of a dyad and the spontaneous responses by the analyst to the patient's unconscious stimuli, which he called *role-responsiveness*.

Gradually the idea of *enactment* became more widely used and discussions on the topic became more common in the psychoanalytical literature (McLaughlin, 1991; Chused, 1991; Roughton, 1993; McLaughlin & Johan, 1992; Ellman & Moskovitz, 1998; Panel, 1999). For some, *enactment* simply replaced the term *acting out*, although we should recall that *acting out* is the English equivalent of the German word *Agieren*. In German "*er agiere es*" is the original for "but acts it out" (... [T]he patient does not *remember* anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out." Freud, 1914. p. 149).

In some psychoanalytical cultures the term *acting out* began to refer to more or less occasional and impulsive acts that broke into the expected free association, thus restricting the concept of *Agieren*. At the same time, the term came into use to label behaviors of impulsive and psychopathic personalities. The moralistic connotations of *acting out* contaminated the language of professionals in mental health and in law. The replacement of the term *acting out* with *enactment* aimed at eliminating the conceptual confusion and pejorative aspects of the term.

There is a legal connotation of the term *enactment* as a law, a mandate or a decree -- an order that must be obeyed, which was also taken into account. The psychoanalytical concept incorporated both meanings. There was also the fact that, by definition, *both members of the dyad* participate in an *enactment* and are insufficiently aware of what is happening. The analyst is driven by the relationship, subject to his own internal issues and blind spots. In contrast, in *acting out* the patient's discharges can be noted by the analyst, as he does not allow himself to get involved in them.

Many analysts have described situations similar to those we call *enactment*, but without calling them such. The concept made it possible to bring together similar phenomena that had been associated with Freud and elaborated by psychoanalysts of various theoretical orientations in such terms as repetition, re-living, externalizing, acting-out, etc. The term gradually became part of the common ground of psychoanalysis. Recent discussions and studies can be found in Paz (2007), Ivey (2008), Mann & Cunningham (2009), Borensztein (2009), Stern (2010), Waska (2011), Cassorla (2012), Sapisochin (2013), Bohleber et al (2013), and Katz, (2014).

Enactments vary in quality and intensity due to the different degrees of deficits, or impairment in the capacity to symbolize. The mildest might be "actualizations" (Sandler, 1976) that gratify transferential wishes toward the analyst. The most malignant involves an impaired capacity of the analyst, leading to behavioral abuses of his or her authority that go far beyond the limits of what would be considered analytical treatment (Bateman, 1998).

The psychoanalytical literature discusses whether *enactments* are harmful or are necessary and useful. The trend is to consider that *enactments* arise naturally when an analyst is faced with traumatic, psychotic or borderline configurations, even when neurotic aspects predominate. They are certainly useful after they have been understood, and this understanding can only come about after they have been identified, that is, in *Nachträglichkeit* fashion (*après coup*, or in deferred action). *Enactments* that are not adequately identified block the analytical process and can destroy it.

III. A. North American Evolution of the Concept: Additional Influence of the British Object Relations

Projective identification is an important element in enactment. It was first described by Klein (1946/1952), who defined it as an unconscious fantasy consisting of splitting and projection of good and bad parts of the ego into the object. Winnicott also used the concept. Bion (1962) expanded projective identification to include pre-verbal and/or pre-symbolic communication between mother and infant. To Bion's concept, Joseph (1992) added the subject's active-if-subtle behaviors (alongside his intrapsychic machinations), which work to produce an atmosphere in the room and to evoke in the analyst (object) certain emotions, sensations and ideas that might prod him or her toward behaving in otherwise unusual ways, ways that are nonetheless consistent with the internal schema of the analysand (subject). O'Shaughnessy (1992), describes two kinds of enactments, 'enclaves' and 'excursions', which may have destructive potential for the analytic process. The 'enclave' ensues when the analyst

turns the analysis into a refuge from disturbance, and the ‘excursion’ ensues when the analyst turns the analysis into a series of flights. O’Shaughnessy recognizes that partial and limited acting out is an inevitable part of every clinical situation, but it becomes problematic when not contained so that it then deteriorates into enactments of a destructive type – enclaves and excursions (Shaughnessy, 1992).

Additionally, enactments can be viewed as an example of Winnicott’s (1963, p. 343) idea, discussed earlier, that we succeed by failing—failing the patient’s way. This is a long distance from the simplistic theory of cure by corrective experience. To paraphrase Winnicott, enactment in a patient can be in the service of the ego if it is met by the analyst, and used to allow the patient to bring something toxic into the area of his or her control, where it can be managed by projection and introjection.

Thus, for North America, the concepts of enactment have deep roots in Freud, and also in the object relations tradition.

III. B. Latin American Evolution of the Concept: Wider Context and Conceptual Precursors

Latin American psychoanalytical thought was influenced by pioneer authors who, in the 1940s and 1950s, developed deep studies about the analytical process taking into consideration what occurred between the members of the analytical dyad. Racker (1948, 1988) studied the “complementary countertransference”, as a consequence of the analyst’s identification with the patient’s internal objects. Grinberg (1957, 1962) described the “projective counteridentification”, a situation where analysts allow themselves to be taken over by the patient’s projective identifications and react to them without perceiving it. Later Grinberg modified some aspects of his ideas and showed the utility of this concept to the comprehension of what occurred between the members of the analytical dyad. Both Racker and Grinberg described situations similar to actual ideas of enactment. These and other authors influenced Willy and Madeleine Baranger who, taking the Kleinian ideas as a basis, described the *analytical field* (Baranger & Baranger, 1961-62, 1969, 1980).

Such an analytical field is a place/time that involves two people (analyst and patient) who are taking part in the same dynamic process, one in which neither member of the dyad is intelligible without reference to the other. Both constitute a structure named the *unconscious phantasy of the dyad*, that goes beyond the sum of the aspects of each participant. In this context, the Barangers described a product of the field named *bastions*. They occur when parts of the patient and parts of the analyst become intertwined, engulfed, in a defensive structure. The bastion may appear as a static foreign body, while the analytical process seems to be continuing to run its course, or it takes over the whole field, becoming pathological. The idea of bastion is close to the idea of *chronic enactment* (Cassorla, 2005).

Owing to these developments, the Latin American psychoanalytical culture rapidly absorbed the concept of enactment. Conceptual clarification was further facilitated by

contemporary studies of Latin American contributions on the symbolization processes (Cassorla, 2001, 2005, 2009; Sanchez Grillo, 2004; Sapisochin 2007, 2013; Gus 2007; Paz, 2007; Borensztein, 2009; Rocha, 2009; Schreck, 2011).

IV. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS AND USES OF THE CONCEPT IN THE AMERICAS AND IN EUROPE

IV. A. Latin America: Developments and Clinical Relevance

Clinical situations like *enactments*, described in the literature, generally indicate some action or abrupt behavior that has made the analyst feel he has lost his analytical function. For example, he might be surprised to realize that he has behaved ironically, aggressively or seductively. Or he might notice that he is uninterested or that he ended a session before the scheduled time, or extended it. He may realize he has become overly fascinated by the patient's interesting stories, or has been arguing with the patient. In these cases, he notices that his analytical capacity has been impaired and so he feels embarrassed and guilty. Later the analyst may realize he was identifying with aspects projected by the patient. Specifically, these phenomena should be referred to as *acute enactments* (Cassorla, 2001). Sometimes the analyst's behavior is more apparent than that of the patient. The term *countertransferential enactment* is used to refer to the analyst's behavior.

Cassorla (2005, 2008, 2012, 2013) studying borderline configurations shows that, before *acute enactment* occurred, the analytical dyad had already set up long, drawn-out dual collusions where patient and analyst became indiscriminate from one another. Such symbiotized dyads exhibit behavior similar to theatrical performances or mimicking (Sapisochin, 2013), and this type of behavior is termed *chronic enactment*. Neither member of the dyad realizes what is taking place and, when they do, it is shortly after the occurrence and realization of an acute enactment.

The study of the sequence: chronic enactment (unperceived) -> acute enactment (perceived) -> realization of the chronic enactment that had occurred – provides a description of a type of natural history of the analytical process when one is working in areas where the process of symbolization is impaired. Clinical facts uncover defensive organizations that avoid the perception of triangular reality, experienced as traumatic. Clinical experience shows the following sequence:

Phase I. The analyst knows that he is dealing with a patient who is difficult to access and who attacks the analytical process and subverts it. However, it is certain that, with patience and perseverance, the difficulties will be understood.

Moment M: At a given point the analyst surprises himself by making an intervention or committing an act, usually impulsive, which embarrasses him, makes him feel guilty and gives

him the impression that he has lost his analytical capacity. He is afraid he has done some harm to his patient and imagines impending complications.

Phase 2. The analyst, bearing his negative feelings, notes the consequences of his behavior. To his surprise, the analytical process becomes more productive and the symbolic network of thought expands. The understanding of Moment M strengthens the analytical bond and the patient associates it with previous traumatic situations that are being worked through.

Further investigation into the facts described lead the analyst to realize that, in Phase 1, he had been involved in a prolonged collusion with his patient (*chronic enactment*) in certain areas of functioning of the analytical dyad, which he had not perceived. The collusions, now identified, alternate between sadomasochistic scripts and scripts of mutual idealization. Analyst and patient control each other mutually and become extensions of one another.

Reviewing Moment M the analyst realizes that, in fact, he lost his analytical capacity not at this time, but earlier, during Phase 1. Moment M indicated, in fact, that this ability was being recovered. For example, the supposed aggression of the analyst had undone a masochistic collusion, or a relationship of mutual idealization that was blocking the analytical process (Phase 1). Moment M revealed an *acute enactment* that had undone the earlier *chronic enactment* at the same time that it made it perceptible. The acute enactment therefore manifested the trauma of having come in contact with triangular reality. Sometimes, before the clear perception of the acute enactment, such momentary contact with triangularity may be marked by almost imperceptible acute ‘micro-enactments’, when the defensive organization immediately circles back to chronic enactments (Cassorla, 2008). During the unperceived chronic enactments, the analyst continues to work persistently even though he may feel he is not being sufficiently productive. Even so, in parallel areas his work implicitly continues to give meaning to the traumatic holes in the symbolic network. The defensive organization is gradually undone even though this may not be apparent in the analytical field. Acute enactment, that is, the sudden perception of triangular reality, emerges when there has been sufficient restoration of the symbolic network. The analytical dyad senses that the separation between self and object will be bearable. This separation, therefore, can be considered a mitigated trauma. Acute enactment is thus a mixture that involves both traumatic affective discharges and the symbolization of traumas in the here and now of the analytical process. When the analyst perceives the enactment and, in a *Nachträglichkeit* fashion, resignifies it, the symbolic network is broadened further. This broadening enables the emergence of new associations that are related to traumatic effects being worked through, thus stimulating constructions by the analyst (Phase 2).

When the patient brings mainly symbolic aspects into the analytical field by means of communicative projective identifications, an instantaneous dual collusion is formed between patient and analyst. It is then undone by transference interpretations by the analyst. By analogy, these instantaneous collusions can be called *normal enactments*.

Cassorla (2008, 2013) discussed these clinical aspects using Bion’s theory of thought and proposed that chronic enactments constitute a situation where both members of the

analytical dyad cannot dream the emotional experiences that occur in the analytical field. He described chronic enactment as non-dreams-for-two. On the other hand, acute enactments, that undo chronic enactments, constitute a mix of discharges and non-dreams that are dreaming here-and-now in the analytical field. The capacity to symbolize is a product of the implicit alpha-function that the analyst uses during chronic enactment.

IV. B. North American Developments and Clinical Relevance

Just as Latin American authors emphasize the importance of the concept to better understand the analytical technique with children and adolescents (Sanchez Grillo, 2004; Rocha, 2009; Borensztein, 2009), in North America, too, the child and adolescent analysts evolve and use the concept in clinical work and theory.

Judith Chused, taken by Theodore Jacobs's 1986 work with adults on the expansion of countertransference to include 'enactment', wrote of a productive use of the self in tracking the analyst's own reactions in work with the young. Chused (1991, 1992) offered detailed clinical examples in her work with latency age children, adolescents and young adults. In 2003, Chused defined 'enactment' widely:

"When a patient's behavior or words stimulate an unconscious conflict in the analyst, leading to an interaction that has unconscious meaning to both, that is enactment. Conversely, an enactment occurs when an analyst's behavior or words stimulate an unconscious conflict in a patient, productive of an interaction with unconscious meaning to both. Enactments occur all the time in analysis and outside our offices ... Some of the most significant ... occur...when an analyst's behavior has deviated from her conscious intent by unconscious motivators, and it 'feels wrong' when scrutinized..." (Chused, 2003, p. 678).

In 1995, Judith Mitrani coined the term 'unmentalized experience' to refer to situations in earliest infancy that later find expression in analysis through the process of enactment, where they can be interpreted in the transference and may give significant form to our imaginative constructions. Later (Mitrani, 2001), she came to the realization that the word 'experience' is a misnomer in this context, as there must be *psychic awareness* and therefore some level of mentalization to experience something. She therefore underlined the distinction between something that has *happened* to an individual vs. something that has been *suffered*, and that has *subsequently* entered the realm of awareness *with the aid of a containing object*; in other words, some 'thing' that has attained a level of significance in the mind.

In this, Mitrani harkens back to Federn (1952), Bion (1962) and Winnicott (1974). Federn (1952) made an important distinction between *suffering* pain and *feeling* pain. For him, suffering is an active process by the ego, in which the pain-inducing event – e.g., frustration or loss of the object – is taken up and its full intensity is appreciated. Thus, it undergoes transformation and so does the ego. In feeling pain, by contrast, the pain-inducing event cannot be endured and worked through by the ego. The pain is not contained but merely touches the

border of the ego and is warded off. With every recurrence, the painful feeling affects the ego with the same intensity and traumatic effect. The distinction between “happenings” and “experiences” was addressed previously by Winnicott in “The Fear of Breakdown” (1974) -- a breakdown that happened in early infancy but had not been experienced. Indirectly relevant may be also Bion’s theory of thinking (Bion, 1962), whereby during the period of infancy when psyche and soma are as-yet indistinguishable from each other, raw sensory impressions/beta elements are recorded in the body and are contended with by bodily means until psychic representation is made possible with the help of the maternal containing alpha function.

In Mitrani’s view, such an ‘*unmentalized happening*’ of felt but not suffered pain, registered on a sensual or bodily level, which has yet to be assigned any symbolic meaning, may be at the root of many enactments in analysis. When the analyst makes good use of enactments, the body gets a second chance to become symbolically represented as it enters into *relationships of meaning* with other psychic representations.

The neurobiological perspective on the body’s role in enactment via somatic memories has been researched and reviewed, for example, by Van der Kolk and Van der Hart (1991). Their discussion ranges from the early, related neurobiological ideas of Janet and Freud up to the present hypotheses of somatic encoding in the brain of traumatic memories.

For the Relational School, enactment is a central concept in the theory of the psyche and in understanding therapeutic action in clinical analysis. Active in the US since the 1980s, relational theorists such as Anthony Bass describe their approach thus:

“Contemporary relational approaches have been in large measure defined ... by their emphasis on the qualities of joint participation: interaction, intersubjectivity, and mutual impact derived from the complementary, mutually shaping interplay of transference and countertransference. These phenomena may be most stunningly manifest—with all the power of their grip on the unconscious—in negotiating the process of what can frequently seem like the minefields of enactment...” (Bass, 2003, p. 658).

Irwin Hoffman (1994) describes dialectical thinking as part of this approach and examines, for example, the technical implications for the analyst’s authority, mutuality, and authenticity of the patient’s unique capacity for unconscious interactions. For Bromberg (1998, 2006), the mind is a landscape of multiple shifting self states. Enactment in the treatment situation is the way to access previously inaccessible content of sequestered self states. According to Bromberg (2006), Bass (2003), Hoffman (1994) and Mitchell (1997), it is in keeping with the relational tradition that the analysts consult their own shifting self states for clues about what is transpiring in their patients.

Enactment is also central to the intersubjective systems approach. This approach was developed by Robert Stolorow et al. in the late 1980s and illuminates interpersonal aspects of the relational approach to treatment. In the intersubjective approach, enactments are seen as evolving from dissociated relational states, representing interpersonal communication from a patient’s early encoded neural experiences and traumata. The intersubjective school is inspired

by neuroscientific research and research on the non-verbal communication of infants, young children, and their parents, for example, by Beatrice Beebe and Frank M. Lachmann (2002).

Ilany Kogan (2002), an Israeli analyst who is a prominent member of the US based Yale Trauma Research Team, has explored enactment in the children of Holocaust survivors. She defines the term as “the compulsion to re-create their parents' experiences in their own lives through concrete acts.” (2002, p. 251). This is an important clinical demonstration that shows precisely how emotional narratives in inner life can be hidden from awareness. Involved are the intergenerational transmission of trauma, Freud’s theory of interpersonal unconscious communication, and – though she does not mention it – Hans Loewald’s (1975) idea that analysis is like the mimesis of dramatic art – in this case tragedy. Kogan differentiates her use of ‘enactment’ here from others by saying that, in contrast to Jacobs (1986) for example, she is not specifically focused on the interactive immediacy between patient and analyst. Her concept is more like an amalgam of Freud’s acting out and acting in, and Sandler’s (1978) and Eshel’s (1998) actualization. She employs the term in conjunction with “a black hole” (p. 255), a gap in conscious information at the center of the psyche that is nevertheless *not* empty (see Auerhahn and Laub’s (1998) holocaustal “empty circle” and others on severe trauma). Loewald (1975) speaks of a psychic absence as inherent in enactment, one that is discoverable in analysis, furthering patient differentiation, growth and autonomy. In this Kogan is akin to Loewald.

Kogan illustrates her thinking with clinical examples, such as the following: A woman, anorexic in her youth (an enactment of parental starvation), whose father had concealed the existence of a first wife and child who were lost in the Shoah, married a man at age thirty-one who had abandoned his wife and child. Though she had no idea of this, her marrying this man was an enactment of her father’s situation. While in analysis, she unintentionally deserted a precious kitten for a day, which died, left in an overheated bathroom. Later she herself went to sleep in a bedroom with leaking gas. She had no conscious knowledge of her father’s experiences at the time. It took work with the transference to detect the various unconscious identifications with victim and victimizer and the different kinds of self-punishments at work in her. Eventually, the family narrative could be spoken.

IV. C. European Developments and Clinical Relevance

European analysts use the term enactment and related terms as countertransference and acting-out when they deal with the clinical phenomena implied in the concept. They generally confine themselves specifically to the analytic situation.

In fact, many European analysts talk of acting-out or enactment to refer to the same clinical fact, using the two words as synonyms. However, for some analysts, enactment can be considered as a development of acting-out, originating in Freud’s term *Agieren* (Paz, 2007). Nevertheless, there are other analysts who, although distinguishing between them, consider that they can coexist in the clinical field, provided they occur at different moments in the analytic process (Ponsi, 2013). According to Sapisochin, enactments of the analytic couple are

the royal road to the insight of the unrepressed unconscious; this unconscious, although not representable verbally, is in the form of imaginary registers of emotional experience, which the author calls “psychic gestures”. (Sapirchik, 2007, 2013, 2014, 2015).

Most of the European authors think that the analyst’s enactment is a consequence of a patient’s acting-out or enactment. Therefore, enactment describes a fact not only linked to the analyst but also to the patient; and possibly among some European analysts there is a predominant use of the concept for both analyst and patient. Although when referring to the latter some authors speak of “pressure” or “acting out” of the patient to drag the analyst into enactment.

They also consider enactment as something, at least partially, inevitable before understanding what is going on between patient and analyst, (Pick, 1985; Carpy, 1989; O’Shaughnessy, 1989; Feldman, 1994; Steiner, 2000, 2006a).

In French psychoanalysis the term ‘acting out’ (which is translated as *‘passage à l’acte’* - Mijolla, 2013) is fairly common, while the term ‘enactment’ is rarely used. However, analytic situations similar to what in other psychoanalytic communities is referred to as ‘enactment’ are taken into account: they are usually defined using expressions such as *‘mise en scène’* or *‘mise en jeu’*. Gibeault (2014) has used the neologism ‘énaction’ to describe a kind of acting in behavior and words endowed with a transformational capacity through a countertransference ‘enactive empathy’ (*empathie énantante*). Italian De Marchi (2000) and Zanocco et al. (2006) as well view empathy, more precisely ‘sensory empathy’, belonging to the area of primary bond, as a basic instrument for communication close to enactment. Green considers “énaction” as an attack on the setting (Green, 2002) Also in the French language area, Belgian authors Godfrind-Haber and Haber (2002) write extensively about a concept related to enactment in *‘L’expérience agie partagée’* (‘shared acted experience’), which stresses the value of ‘shared unconscious inter-psychic action’. It can be viewed as a pre-symbolic preparatory phase, during which the patient can make a ‘symbolic leap’ towards recovery of symbolization, so that later interpretations can be experienced as meaningful.

Developments of the concept of countertransference among European analysts imply descriptions of inadequate analyst’s reactions from the pressure of the patient’s transference. The concept of projective identification allows understanding of the dynamic of these processes. Sandler, with his contribution of role-responsiveness and B. Joseph, with the deepening in the patient-analyst relationship with the concept of “total transference situation”, are some of the authors describing phenomena close to enactment. Steiner clarifies the relationship between countertransference and enactment: “I think of the emotional and intellectual availability as countertransference and the transformation into action as enactment” (Steiner, 2006b, p.326).

In Europe, as in the Americas, most analysts have come to consider enactments inevitable, as was once the case with with transference and countertransference. However, contrary to wide range of opinions in the Americas as to the usefulness, desirability and manner of working with enactments, most European analysts, seeing enactments as essentially a failure

of the analyst's containing analytical function, consider their occurrence useful only if and when the analyst becomes aware of them, is able to interpret and work them through within the analytic process. 'Enactive empathy' of Gibeault (2014), De Marchi's (2000) and Zanicco's (2006) 'sensory empathy', and Godfrind-Haber's and Haber's (2002) 'shared acted experience' are examples of enactment-related concepts with emphasis on accessing, and working analytically with, pre-verbal, pre-represented and pre-symbolized data. While not a mainstream, they enrich the European and global dialogue on enactment and enactment-related phenomena.

V. CONCLUSION

When the analytic dyad gets dramatically destabilized (acute enactment) this may indicate that a previously chronic enactment was undone and is now active within the analysis. The analyst needs to become aware of this state, attempt to understand and then interpret what has occurred. The analytic field can be destroyed if this is ignored or the chronic enactment return. Additionally, the analyst can identify further aspects of chronic and potential acute enactments by taking a 'second look' when he/she writes the material, re-thinks it, or discusses it with other analysts.

Enactments carry potentially significant developmental and dynamic meanings. Listening to, working with, understanding and interpreting enactments, can minimize the incidence of unsymbolized somatic expression and of acting-out by the patient in his or her every-day life. Doing so may lift the burdens that the unremembered and unforgotten events/happenings of infancy and childhood -- including those transmitted transgenerationally -- impose on the patients' current relationships and involvements in their life pursuits. Analysts may also better apprehend, from a position of empathic understanding what a patient has lived through, thus deepening and widening the scope of transformative emotionally meaningful psychoanalytic experience for patients, and the analyst's own multidimensional involvement in the psychoanalytic process.

While the prevailing view among all three continental psychoanalytic cultures is that enactments are to be understood and ultimately interpreted, it is very important to be mindful of the existence of the type of countertransferential enactment, where the analyst's diminished analytical capacity for containment can be communicated not only nonverbally, but also verbally, and disguised even within an interpretation.

* * * * *

For a comprehensive North American review of the subject of enactment, see Ellman and Moscovitz, 1998. *Enactment: Toward a New Approach to the Therapeutic Relationship* (Library of Clinical Psychoanalysis). New York: Jason Aronson, Inc.

For an example of an international multitheoretical review, see Bohleber W, Fonagy P, Jiménez JP, Scarfone D, Varvin S, Zysman S (2013). Towards a Better Use of Psychoanalytic Concept: A Model Illustrated Using the Concept of Enactment. *Int J Psycho-Anal*, 94:501-530. (2013)

For an international validation process of acute enactment and chronic enactment concepts, see Cassorla (2012). What happens before and after acute enactment? An exercise in clinical validation and broadening of hypothesis. *Int J Psycho-Anal*, 93: 53-89.

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INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Tri-Regional Entry

**Inter-Regional Editorial Board: Adrienne Harris (North America),
Abel Fainstein (Latin America), and Christian Seulin (Europe)**

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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Overall, *Intersubjectivity as a psychoanalytic orientation* comes from the US and involves a theoretical paradigmatic shift as well as re-contextualization of clinical process. It draws on numerous sources, which include, but are not limited to, philosophy of phenomenology and structuralism, academic depth psychology ('personology'), infant research within developmental psychology and child psychoanalysis, and the British (and originally Hungarian) psychoanalytic authors, as well interpersonal and socio-cultural theories within psychoanalysis and dynamic psychiatry and psychology, and various field theories.

A distinct view of Intersubjectivity in French psychoanalysis, influential in France, Belgium but also in parts of Canada and the US, as well as more recently in parts of Latin America, has developed along parallel lines out of a different psychoanalytic tradition, although there are connecting points. It draws on specific re-reading of German original of Freud's opus, and a direct translation of Freud into French, in conjunction with a historically meaningful socio-cultural context of the importance of language, even for those analysts who do not follow Lacan's specific dynamic interpretation of Structural linguistics, and a somewhat different (from the US) interpretation of the Field theories, as well as of British authors.

In the estimation of some contemporary French authors (Green 2000), the theories of Intersubjectivity coming out of the US and that of the French psychoanalytic thinking, present a corrective movement of an under-theorized/inadequately theorized aspect of pre-existing psychoanalytic theory, rather than a revision.

Broad-based definition of *intersubjectivity* in the recent psychoanalytic dictionaries of North America and Europe (Akhtar 2009; Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, Skelton 2006) emphasize the multifaceted and multilayered reciprocal dynamic interaction between people, based on their own (conscious, preconscious and/or unconscious) subjective experiences, and varieties of interpenetrating mutually transformative aspects of such engagements, in early development as well as in psychoanalytic dialogue.

While there is no definition of intersubjectivity in the recent psychoanalytic dictionary in Latin America (Borensztein 2014), the entries related to Psychoanalytic Field, Unconscious Communication and Theory of Communication also reflect similar aspects of inter-subjective

interactivity. Contemporary accounts of French Intersubjective thinking (Tessier 2014 a,b) stress the ‘unconscious subject’ and its formation in relation to ‘the real other’, subject and object.

This entry includes the exposition of *intersubjectivity as a dominant psychoanalytic orientation* as well as an increasingly prominent aspect of psychoanalytic thought and work, present in various ways across the spectrum of many psychoanalytic orientations worldwide.

II. BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL, SOCIO-HISTORICAL, THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL CONTEXT

II. A. Roots in Philosophy

The ideas of intersubjectivity were emerging gradually across the range of disciplines and writers: First in **philosophy**, as a reaction against Descartes’ subjectivity of a self-contained mind four centuries ago. Two centuries later Hegel’s Phenomenology of mind based self-consciousness emerging within rudimentary intersubjectivity. In the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, a contemporary of Freud’s, intersubjectivity became a specific focus of philosophical inquiry.

Ever since **Rene Descartes’** (1596-1660) mind-body dualism, western philosophy has been preoccupied with the issue of subjectivity. Cartesian subjectivity is that if an isolated mind, able to be certain only of itself, its own thinking and self-awareness. Descartes invented the concept of subject as a self-contained monad, where everything else is doubtful. It took 200 years, until **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** (1770-1831) viably challenged the notion. For Hegel, subjectivity or self-consciousness required encounter with another. In his master-slave dialectic, self-consciousness arises out of struggle between two individuals who realize they depend on each other: without mutual recognition neither can achieve adequate self-consciousness. There is a shift from the Cartesian solipsistic one-person model to Hegelian dyadic two-person model of mind. **Edmund Husserl** (1859-1938), the founder of ‘transcendental phenomenology’ pursued the question of intersubjectivity: how one gains awareness of other subjectivities. The intersubjective reciprocity, replacing the subject-object relationship with a subject-subject relationship coming from the philosophical background of German Idealism of both Hegel and Husserl is based on the assumption that there is no isolated subject without a world. For Husserl, the individual consciousness is always related to an other: the individual ego is drawn into a dialogical individuation process and can only recognize itself through the other. Precursors of intersubjectivism in German-language psychoanalysis can be recognized in the concept of encounter: besides transference, during treatment an existential encounter develops, for which the patient is not taken as an object of knowledge but becomes a partner of a dialogue that transcends the transference-countertransference dynamics. (Bohleber 2013, pp. 807-809).

Reminiscent of Plato, Husserl sought to find awareness of the world as it truly is. He postulated that the awareness of other subjects emerges out of empathy with them. Paradoxically, (as much later pointed out by Stolorow about Husserl, but also about Heinz Kohut), such an intersubjectivity is decidedly a one-sided affair, occurring only in the mind of one person – the one who empathizes. However, it provides for presence of others as subjective entities like oneself and it achieves such awareness of others as subjective entities as oneself through empathy, without Hegel's struggle for recognition. For **Martin Heidegger** (1889-1976), intersubjectivity is the basic human condition. His Dasein is a 'being in the world', whom it is impossible to conceive independently of the other. Dasein is defined by its questioning of its being, truth of which is impossible to know and which depends of an awareness of the end of being, i.e. death, temporality. One development rooted here leads to existential analysis of **Ludwig Binswanger**, the other to **Jacques Lacan**, and still another to **Hans Loewald**, who is often cited by US intersubjectivists as an important progenitor. For both, Heidegger and Lacan, language is the medium of unknowingness, structuring thought as much as making it invisible.

Structuralist philosophy of the 20th century – **Paul Ricoeur** (1913-2005)'s studies of metapsychological structure of Freud's work and **Hans Georg Gadamer** (1900-2002)'s exploration of subtleties of intersubjective communication – were both also relevant to clinical encounter in psychoanalysis.

Merleau Ponty (1918-1961), influenced by Gestalt psychology of **Kurt Lewin** (as was **Henry Murray's** 'personology' school, which was deeply impressive to Stolorow), based his philosophy on the unity of subject and object. His concept of unconscious, located between the subject and object, is at the center of one's life in the world. His **Post Heideggerian hermeneutics** assertion that the self-knowledge derives from the process of involvement in the world influenced **Madeleine and Willy Barangers** and **George Klein's** psychoanalytic conceptualization, related to intersubjectivity. Merleau-Ponty's notion of *embodied subject*, provides a specific medium for intersubjective relatedness: the body as the site where being and the world are manifest as one. It brings Freud's undertheorized notion of 'ego being first and foremost a body ego' (Freud, 1923) into the intersubjective realm.

II. B. Socio-Historical Context in North America

II. Ba. Terminology

While intersubjectivity may be seen by some (Schwartz, 2012; Kirshner 2009) as implicitly present in the Freudian model of treatment (Freud 1915, 1923), it remained 'undertheorized' and it did not enter psychoanalytic terminology until **Jacques Lacan** introduced it in 1953. It may be a paradox that the first North American writer who mentioned the term in a psychoanalytic literature was quintessential Ego psychologist **Heinz Hartmann** in 1956, where he drew attention to *intersubjective validation* in the context of scientific discourse in his paper "Notes on the Reality Principle". The first writers in the USA who

mentioned the term already in the context similar to its current usage were coming originally from the classical tradition and their writings on the subject became more known abroad than in the US at the time. Familiar with Lacan and Ricoeur because of his studies of the language of interpretation, **Stanley Leavy**, a student of Roy Schafer, contrary to the prevailing Classical position at the time, wrote (Leavy, 1973) that the *basis of operations between patient and analyst is intersubjectivity* and the model of the work is relationship. His argument is subtle and relies on the immersion of the analyst and the patient in the language and on the mutual and continuous interpretations. Another publication in North American psychoanalytic mainstream at the time was **Arnold Modell's** "Psychoanalysis in a New Context", of 1984. Inspired by Andre Green and Donald Winnicott, Modell emphasized that *psychoanalysis was primarily a matter of subjectivities, originally springing from baby-mother relational matrix*. Later he elaborated on the interpretation of psychic life centering on the process of 'metaphorization': a translation of bodily experiences into metaphors, which is the symbolic function underlying all subjectivity.

Usage of the term as a **cornerstone of a theory**, signaling a **paradigmatic shift** starts with **Robert D. Stolorow's, Bernard Brandchaft's and George E. Atwood's** "*Psychoanalytic Treatment: An Intersubjective Approach*" (1987). Psychoanalysis is pictured here as "*a science of the intersubjective, focused on the interplay between the differently organized subjective worlds of the observer and the observed. The observational stance is always one within ... the intersubjective field ...*" (ibid, pp. 41-42). Here, the entire psychoanalytic framework is centered on the concept of the *intersubjective field*. Such an field is located at the point of intersection of the two subjectivities and is generated by the interplay between transference and countertransference. Moreover, in words of Stolorow: "The (*intersubjective*) reality that crystalizes in the course of psychoanalytic treatment is not 'recovered' or 'discovered', as implied in Freud (1913), nor is it 'created' or 'constructed' as stated by others (Hartmann, 1939; Schafer, 1980; Spence, 1982). It is articulated through a process of empathic resonance. The intersubjective approach can integrate...experience-near insights obtained from such divergent viewpoints as classical conflict psychology and Kohut's self psychology..." (Stolorow, 1988, p.337)

Phenomenological inquiry led Stolorow and Atwood to the *context-embeddedness* of all emotional experience. This path from phenomenology to phenomenological contextualism mirrors that taken in the movement from Husserl's still-Cartesian phenomenology to Heidegger's phenomenological contextualism (Atwood, Stolorow and Orange, 2011).

II. Bb. Some Pertinent Developments In Theory And Clinical Practice Within Socio-Historical-Political Complexity Of US Psychoanalysis, Leading to the Emergence of Intersubjectivity as a Psychoanalytic Orientation

In US psychoanalysis, intersubjectivity can be viewed as a major shift of paradigm from at least three intertwining perspectives: a. from the perspective of psychoanalytic metapsychology there is a relative demotion of the dynamic unconscious and the drive concept

in favor of urge towards intersubjectivity or intersubjective orientation as an irreducible force within human mind; b. from the clinical perspective, the intersubjectivity presents a new two-person model for clinical technique centering on the intersubjective field as an intersection of two subjectivities – that of the patient and that of the analyst; c. and from the social-political perspective, unique to the complicated history of the previous exclusionary policies of psychoanalytic establishment in the USA, whereby the previously excluded group of non-medical analysts were now not only included, but frequently front and center of these multifaceted changes.

Some of the complex intertwining developments leading up to the above paradigmatic changes are outlined below.

In the US, classical psychoanalysis with its theoretical emphasis on the dynamic unconscious, repression/resistance and infantile sexuality, as defined by Freud (first in Brill's English translation), took hold since the 1920's and 1930's, and in subsequent decades it came to be the dominant influence in trainings of psychiatrists throughout the country. Most of the psychoanalytic institutes at the time had trained only physicians, which, together with the subsequent elegantly scientific English translation by Strachey sometimes contributed to mechanistic application of clinical technique, leading to accentuated asymmetry of a medical/surgical model of the physician/authority/ all knowing expert, and the patient/ unknowing sufferer, strict *impersonal* adherence to technical requirements of 'sanitized' neutrality, evenly hovering attention, and close monitoring of the patient's free associations followed by long periods of silence until the associations provided the analyst with enough material to give a sometimes impersonal experience-distant interpretation of pertinent unconscious determinants.

From late 1930's, Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein and others (Hartmann, 1939; Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946) instituted substantive expansion to Freudian metapsychology under the rubric of Ego psychology, gradually adding genetic, developmental and adaptive consideration to the existing dynamic, structural and economic theories (Rapaport and Gill. 1959, Freud, A. 1936/1965). In their developmental theory, the unconscious emerges through an undifferentiated matrix that yields the potential for future ego development and functions. In their theory of adaptation, which posits an 'average expectable environment', *ego development is mediated by relationships as identifications become the major ego function*. In the analytic work, there is a growing emphasis on the unconscious processes within the ego, e.g. defenses.

Emerging here is the increasing significance of experiences with *people in the child's environment*. With this development, growing importance is being given to new sources of unconscious contributions to transference (and countertransference) activity. Considering mounting **influence from Budapest (Sandor Ferenczi, Michael Balint)** and later from the **British Middle School analysts (Donald Winnicott)** and the early **Kleinians (Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann)**, contemporaries of Hartmann continued the *object relations' discussion* by giving greater depth to the conscious and unconscious aspects of very early developmental periods. **Edith Jacobson** (1964) investigated the self and object representational worlds, and

Margaret Mahler (1963; Mahler et al. 1975) provided the classic formulations of separation-individuation later revisited by **Daniel N. Stern** (1985). Attention was directed to the impact of the pre-Oedipal period of childhood on later development, as well as to the ways in which external controls, deriving in part from the child's transactions with the parents, are internalized.

In contrast to relative homogeneity of Ego psychology in the post World War II period of the so-called 'Hartmann era', Ego psychology moved off the center stage in the 1970's. Following Hartmann's death, *object relations* came further into prominence, and theoretical pluralism set in. The social ferment in the USA at the time of postmodern philosophical questioning about 'authority' and the feminist critique of inherent sex and gender assumptions of Freudian 'phallocentrism' also contributed to the critique of the homogeneity of Classical Ego Psychology. Some of the additional factors included: The overemphasis on the Oedipus complex as a procrustean bed; As practiced, ego psychology was often based on experience-distant interpretations; Analysis was often carried out in a strict, impersonal fashion; Even with the growing body of developmental literature, trauma seemed not to be taken into consideration; Classical and Ego psychological literature, namely Hartmann was taught in an idealized fashion (see the separate entry EGO PSYCHOLOGY).

Ego Psychology changed as theorists insisted on clinical findings to support metapsychological assumptions. Here the evolution included some members of the early group (e.g. Mahler, Jacobson) as well as new generations of thinkers (e.g., Beres, 1962; Arlow & Brenner, 1964; Kanzer, 1971). This new era was signaled by the Arlow and Brenner (1964) monograph, in which they *collapsed the metapsychological perspective under the structural point of view*. This shift helped open the door for new ways of thinking about both development and clinical situation, including new integrational efforts of Otto Kernberg (1966) who integrated selected elements of British Object relations theories with Ego Psychology, proceeding to develop 'American Object Relations Theory', and Heinz Kohut (1971), who started extending Freud's view of Narcissism and proceeded to create his own system called Self Psychology, defining psychoanalysis as a treatment in which the analyst was to listen empathically to the patient to identify the need for *selfobject responsiveness* (from the analyst) and closely monitor the analyst's failure to meet the actual selfobject needs of the patient. (See the separate entries OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, SELF).

One of the primary changes in the zeitgeist of this thinking was a *reaction against the metapsychological orientation*. Informed by the methodology of 'operationalism' (focus on concrete operations), the *anti-metapsychological emphasis* was developed first in the works of interpersonal/cultural theorists **Harry Stack Sullivan** (1953), **Karen Horney** (1941) and **Erich Fromm** (1941), who often selectively used the concept of the unconscious only as a secondary descriptive term rather than as a major aspect of psychic life. However, even in their formulations, the 'alienated', 'not-me' parts of oneself had to be kept out of awareness and pushed deep into the 'immutably private' unconscious. This approach has contributed directly and indirectly to psychoanalytic conceptualizations and dynamic work with serious pathologies, conceptualizations of early development and deepening of the understanding of

unconscious transactions within the *transference-countertransference field*. Together with **Harold Searles** (1979), who expanded the scope of understanding of countertransference, **Sullivan, Horney and Fromm** would be later viewed as *progenitors of intersubjectivity*. Originally intending to counter Kraepelin's view of schizophrenia, Sullivan identified *emotional suffering as having an interpersonal basis* in pathogenic interactions early and throughout the childhood of an individual. Etiologically prominent, such interactions lead to difficulties in life that could be effectively treated by an *interpersonally based approach* in which the analyst corrected the patient's anticipation that the analyst would act like earlier harmful figures in the patient's life. Ultimately, a Sullivanian Institute, the William Alanson White Institute, was formed in New York City where *interpersonal psychoanalysis* was practiced and developed into what ultimately became the Relational school.

William Alanson White Institute also pioneered psychoanalytic training for psychologists from 1943, closely followed in this regard by Postgraduate Center for Mental Health in New York, in 1949, where Lachmann and Stolorow trained, whose original faculty under the leadership of **Lewis Wolberg**, formerly of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, the citadel of Classical psychoanalysis', but which also maintained a treatment site for deinstitutionalized outpatients and pioneered the group psychoanalytic training, with relative openness to the *plurality of theoretical orientations* (originally led by **Asya Kadis**, an émigré analyst from Hungary). Both institutes maintained child psychoanalytic departments with direct contacts with various training sites of the British Psychoanalytical Society. Another institute that notably contributed the diversification of perspectives was the New York University Post-doctoral Institute established in 1961, which offered Freudian, Relational and Interpersonal training tracks for psychologists. It follows that many contemporary luminaries of relational thinking were trained there. Since late 1980's, the American Psychoanalytic Association institutes opened their doors to non-medical clinicians and a number of IPA independent institutes and societies around the country with the inclusive medical and non-medical membership have come to existence and expanded.

The clinical work with the wide range of patients of various ages and pathologies, as well as the arrival of psychologists and other non-medical clinical professionals on the scene of US psychoanalysis disturbed the status quo, signaling potential expansion of conceptual boundaries in many directions.

The next challenges to metapsychology came from within the metapsychological point of view itself. Among the major contributors to this challenge were **Merton Gill** and **George Klein** (1976), who eventually delineated two psychoanalytic theories: (1) a clinical theory based on indisputable empirical observation; and, (2) a speculative abstract theory. **Roy Schafer** (1976) proposed an action language that attempted to explain psychological phenomena in dynamic formulations using verbs and adverbs and not nouns or adjectives. In addition, Schafer advocated for the use of *language* in a manner inclusive of *motivational forces* and their consequential actions, as *action sequences*. This was another step in the direction of *intersubjectiveness*. Later anti-metapsychologists include **Heinz Kohut** (1977) and **John Gedo** (1979). New groups began to develop, adding further Interpersonal, Self-

Psychology and Relational perspective practitioners (Gerson, 2004), whose *clinical unit of attention was interpersonal* (below).

Another substantial revision of Freudian metapsychology during 1960's – 1980's comes from **Hans Loewald**, self-identified as Ego psychologist, whose influence as a transitional figure, connected to Winnicott and Jacobson, but also to Heidegger, was subsequently widely recognized as contributing to receptivity of US Classical analysis towards intersubjectivity in its many versions. Loewald stressed the *essential role of object relations in both psychic formation as well as the change* brought about through analysis. Stolorow would later express agreement with Loewald's (1960/80) clinical conception of "the analyst as a transforming object who invites syntheses of new modes of experiencing object relationships" (Stolorow, 1978, 317). In his methodological revision of Ego psychology developmental theory, Loewald regarded the psychic structure of the instincts as originating in the interaction of the infant with its human environment (mother) (Loewald, 1978a,b/80). In viewing *instincts/drives* as the *product of interaction* Loewald extends Jacobson's thesis that the instincts were a link between the infant's self and its objects. Going further, Loewald identifies *interaction as the critical aspect in the internalization of the subjective representation of the self and other*, highlighting the *interaction as a basic building block of the mind*. Just as was the case for Winnicott in the UK, Loewald and Jacobson in the US can be seen as *the forerunners of the intersubjective movement*,

Some writers (Schwartz 2012) see the explosion of intersubjectivity in 1980's as an elaboration of developments that were under way in psychoanalysis since at least 1950s, when **Heimann and other early Kleinians, Racker**, and in a different way **Ferenczi** and **Balint** led the way in bringing attention to *countertransference* as a central element of clinical psychoanalysis. In this context, *intersubjective approach would be one of several outgrowths* of that development. This line of development is especially relevant for intersubjectivity of contemporary Relational theories and, differently, for theories of unconscious communication in North American post-Kleinian and post-Bionian orientations (below). Yet, while conceptually enriching, Klein's focus on internally generated phantasies, dominating the mind of all individuals, patients as well as analysts, throughout life, were viewed initially by some Ego psychologists as well as many Intersubjectivists in the US as devoid of any acknowledgement of the importance of the external environment.

Appreciation and influence of the concepts relevant to inter-subjectivity coming out of French psychoanalysis were delayed due to translational lag, but even when subsequently translated, US Intersubjectivists often viewed **French thinking** as controversial in that it further expanded the 'reification' of the unconscious. However, there is a qualified acceptance of French thinking among the wider psychoanalytic community in the US, as the intersubjective construction of drives is better understood. From 1990's, **Wilfred Bion's** intersubjectively relevant conceptualizations of communicative 'projective identification' and 'containment' (see the separate entries CONTAINMENT and PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION) as well as **Ogden's** analytic 'third' are increasingly embraced in the US, especially in the West Coast (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle) where Bion worked, wrote and taught in the latter part

of his life. Bion's conceptualizations had profound influence on the strand of contemporary intersubjective thinking about unconscious communication (below).

Among the psychoanalytic theorists who were most influential in shaping his thinking, **Stolorow** (1994) credits **Freud** ('without whom there would be no psychoanalytic theory to be dialoguing about'), Winnicott (for 'his insight into the self and human intersubjectivity...in the form of evocative poetic imagery'), George Klein (for 'radical theorectomy'), Kohut and Gill, both of whom 'initially steeped in classical metapsychology, and both eventually proposing radical alternatives to traditional theory'. Revealing of Stolorow's evolution towards experience-near recontextualization of (Freud's) metapsychology is one of his earlier papers (Stolorow, 1978) where he asserts that Freud's structural formulations both contain and obscure his penetrating clinical insights into the subjective experience of conflict, and he proposes, that id, ego and superego, are best understood as "a symbolic representation of the tripartite structuration of the subjective experiential world in states of emotional conflict" (ibid, p.314). This is followed by series of writings, in which Stolorow repeatedly stressed that intersubjectivity theory does not seek to replace Freud's, as "it exists on a different level of abstraction and generality than does Freud's and other psychoanalytic theories, in that *it does not posit any particular psychological contents ... It is a process theory It also provides a framework for integrating different psychoanalytic theories by contextualizing them*" (Stolorow 1998, p.424). An example of such *contextualization* may be intersubjective thinking on conflict: "When Conflict is liberated from the doctrine of the primacy of instinctual drive, then the specific conflict becomes an empirical question to be explored psychoanalytically. The focus ... shifts from the presumed vicissitudes of drive to the intersubjective contexts in which conflict states crystalize" (Stolorow 1994, p. 224). Stolorow (1998) also emphasizes that the intersubjective viewpoint does not eliminate psychoanalysis' traditional focus of the intrapsychic. It contextualizes it. The problem with classical theory, he thought, was not its focus on the intrapsychic, but its inability to recognize that the intrapsychic world is context dependent. This aspect of Stolorow's intersubjective thinking would become especially relevant for Relational schools (below).

While generally, it is possible to view such clinical concepts as countertransference, enactment, projective identification and containment (see the separate entries ENACTMENT, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, CONTAINMENT, PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION), and related de-centered clinical listening, reverie, and others as propelling the trend towards intersubjectivity, **the clinical relevance of intersubjectivity** becomes clearest when seen within the context of a contrast between a *one person approach* with a *two person approach* to the psychoanalytic process., as viewed by USA Intersubjectivists:

In the *one person approach*, the unconscious (of the analysand) is seen as the target of the process, as in: 'to make the unconscious conscious' in the Topographic theory paradigm, and/or 'where the id was, the ego shall be', within the Structural theory paradigm. Here, the analyst is seen as having authority of being the one who has knowledge of the basic parameters of the unconscious and its ability to dominate all individuals' psychological processes. Nuanced exposition of this approach, re-casted within the contemporary interactive context

view of psychoanalytic process, was elaborated by some contemporary Ego psychologists (below).

The *two person approach* sees the analyst as less of a knowing authority, as it questions the primacy of deep unconscious drives and fantasies. The analyst isn't viewed as the he or she who knows the content and working of the unconscious mind of the patient. At most, the analyst shares with the patient a mind that has unconscious aspects but both are in effect subject to its unknown quality. The more egalitarian analyst is open to considering the patient's attributions to him as not merely transference but worthy of considering from the patient's point of view. The analyst acknowledges that he is influenced by the patient and that the patient in turn is influenced by him and may even be responding to suggestion rather than to a true perception of him or herself.

Since the analyst working within the paradigm of intersubjectivity isn't convinced that the patient is always dealing with experiences which can be explained by particular pre-conceived metapsychological conceptualizations, he has openness to acknowledging that he, himself, is hardly free from his own subjectivity. As Owen Renik (1993) put it, the analyst himself has to deal with his own *irreducible subjectivity*. In Renik's opinion, the analyst is always interpreting from the perspective of his own experience-generated beliefs rather than that of the patient. The *merging of two subjectivities, that of the patient and that of the analyst, becomes the functional definition of intersubjectivity*. Influence, interaction and the emergence of something that is an amalgam of both, becomes the hallmark of such an approach.

Consequently, focus on intersubjectivity requires of the analyst an acknowledgement that he or she is participating in a "*field*" of two individual subjectivities. Following the intersubjective relational turn this can be seen as having differing manifestations. The idea of the co-mingling of two unconscious minds may appeal more to traditionally inclined analysts. On the other hand, within any version of psychoanalysis that is based upon interactional-relational thinking in a two person context, the use of an intersubjective approach, while not ahistorical, rests on dynamic clinical phenomenology, and consequently stresses the importance of the here and now experience of the relationship between analyst and patient with considerable reservation about metapsychology of an omnipotent and omnipresent unconscious.

The intersubjective and relational dimensions of the psychoanalytic situation and process have been gradually incorporated by many contemporary Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalysts, (e.g. **Theodore Jacobs, Nancy Chodorow, Steve Ellman, James Grotstein, Lawrence Brown** and many others) in variety of ways, giving rise to some hybrid conceptualizations and orientations, some of which will be noted below.

II. Bc. Socio-Historical Context in French Canadian Intersubjective Thought

French speaking psychoanalysis includes North American (Québec) French speaking analysis. Given the close connections between North American French psychoanalysis and

French psychoanalysis on the one hand, and English speaking psychoanalysis -British as well as American- on the other hand, the reception of intersubjectivity in North American French psychoanalysis is mediated by the more general psychoanalytic affiliations of North American French speaking analysts. Those who are significantly influenced by American or Anglo-American psychoanalytic orientations may be more likely to be receptive to the relational/intersubjectivist paradigm. On the contrary, those positioned closer to French psychoanalytic culture will be stimulated by the French psychoanalytic literature on the issue. In addition, being exposed to these three psychoanalytic traditions may also lead to original synthesis on the issue intersubjectivity. Among examples of such syntheses include intersubjectively relevant expansion of Brusset's (2006) "La Troisième Topique" (Third Topography/Third Model below), and synthetic comparative writings of **Lewis Kirshner** (2005) and **Hélène Tessier** (2005, 2014a,b). Proponents of the 'third' metapsychological model point out how deeply interrelated drive and object relations are. Among authors whose contributions to this area of reflection have been particularly influential in North America are Lacan, Aulagnier, Winnicott, Green, Laplanche, Reid, and (recently added) Loewald (see the separate entry OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY). In their theorizing, drives are viewed as essentially interactionally (intersubjectively) constituted.

Specifics of French intersubjective thinking will follow under the Intersubjectivity in French Psychoanalysis.

II. C. Coming of Intersubjectivity and Relational Turn in Europe

The word *intersubjectivity* begun to be used in European psychoanalytical literature in recent years not so much to designate a new specific concept or a new specific dimension of human relatedness, but as to refer in general to the reciprocal interaction between two human beings, in particular between the child and the caregiver and between the patient and the analyst. The use of this term became gradually more frequent while focusing on the exchanges occurring in the analytic dyad along with progressive disregarding of aspects of drive and intrapsychic dynamics.

What has been called the "relational turn" in psychoanalytic culture, that is a shift from a "one-person psychology" to a "two-person psychology", has taken place in the European psychoanalysis as well as in the North American one: yet, while in North America the relational model grew in opposition to the mainstream Ego Psychology model, in Europe it developed to some extent from native relational features, from a kind of relational awareness that was already present from the beginning in its traditions, though not fully developed.

A presence of a relational perspective in European psychoanalysis could be traced from a number of lines of thinking, such as Ferenczi's approach to trauma, Bowlby's studies on attachment, Winnicott's approach to the mother-child relationship.

Post-Freudian France has been the scene of major theoretical and clinical output. Ripples of this intellectual explosion have had a profound impact on other French-speaking

psychoanalytic communities in Europe and North America (see the separate entry THE UNCONSCIOUS). Within the context of the broad historic-cultural importance of language and translations, French analysts initiated the trend of “*going back to Freud*”, ‘re-tourning’, re-reading, de-constructing and setting the classical concepts to work, even before Laplanche’s ‘Oeuvres complètes de Freud – Psychanalyse (‘OCFP’)’ (Laplanche 1989a), viewing their work as an elaboration and a dialogue with Freudian œuvre.

Due to the distinct character of intersubjectivity in French psychoanalysis in both Europe and North America (Canada), Intersubjectivity in French Psychoanalysis will be treated as a separate chapter (below).

II. D. Socio-Historical Context of Theory and Clinical Practice in Latin America

Latin American psychoanalysis drew from the original sources, mostly in Europe. In this way, Freud, Klein, Winnicott (and later Lacan) “founded” psychoanalysis in Latin America in the 1940s. Yet two decades later, we witnessed the influence of the viewpoints advanced by the British school first, and by the French school later.

After being studied and implemented in the Americas for more than fifty years, the ideas of Freud, Klein, Winnicott, or Lacan have not remained the same. Cultural conditions impose changing patterns that differ from the cultural patterns of the countries where these ideas were born. The history of our profession starts in a center (Vienna, London, Paris). When it moves toward the periphery, new phenomena occur, and more so when it crosses the oceans. There, the fortunate expansion of psychoanalysis intertwines with a variety of factors.

While looking to Europe for inspiration, Latin America is not a copy of the Old Continent. Latin American psychoanalysis had developed within local cultural expressions, and gradually transformed and mingled with them. It strived to integrate into academia and hospital care, and it interpenetrated with political expressions and social movements.

Working in a hospital, or in a consulting room, in Latin America is not the same as doing so in Europe. Latin American analysts span a wide socioeconomic range – from independent professionals, to colleagues who are poorly paid employees of health insurance companies and must often resort to other sources of income. The (sometimes violent) “irruption” of social life into our consulting rooms is inevitable. For this reason, many analysts who practiced decades ago were intersubjectivists ahead of their time due to the way they approached their clinical practice. They took context very much into account, in the manner of an expanded psychoanalytic field. In view of their way of working with patients, today they would be considered intersubjectivists, even if they did not know the authors of reference in this field. Currently, many analysts who identify with a variety of theoretical frameworks (Lacanian, Neo-Kleinian, Meltzerian, or Freudian) approach their patients oblivious to their own alleged theoretical viewpoint; their clinical attitude is close to that of intersubjective analysts.

III. DEVELOPMENTS OF SPECIFIC PERSPECTIVES

III. A. Specific Perspectives in North America: Mainly USA

In the US, *Intersubjectivity, as a psychoanalytic orientation*, is understood to be a theory that explains influences affecting relationships between people. The term has been applied to infant development (Trevarthen, Stern) to account for the reciprocally coordinated co-created reactivity and responsiveness in the interplay of caregiver and infant that propitiates the infant's development (Beebe and Lachmann). The term has been further applied to explain the interplay of the subjectivities of analyst and analysand. In this usage intersubjectivity shifts the traditional emphasis on transference and countertransference to an expanded expression of the analyst's subjective experience. The term has also been applied to explain a particular emergence in psychoanalytic relations (Benjamin) or any intimate dyad or group (Lichtenberg) of a "third," that is, an ambiance and a particular way of doing and being that is more than or different from the subjectivity of the involved individuals.

Borrowing from philosophy particularly Husserl, Robert D. Stolorow introduced intersubjectivity into Self Psychology. Stolorow's usage is in direct opposition to what he refers to as "the Cartesian myth of the isolated mind." Intersubjectivity as a dominant perspective replaces the traditional major emphasis on intrapsychic processes in Freud's dual drive conflict theory and its later rendering in ego psychology. Different usages of intersubjectivity have become incorporated in relational theories derived from Sullivan's interpersonal relationships and field theories. In relational theory, intersubjectivity can be regarded as the matrix from which all communication and exchanges take place – in dyads, family, groups, and cultures. In addition, intersubjectivity is viewed as importantly involved in the ability of an individual to make empathic entry (Kohut) and mentalize (Fonagy) others.

In its application in relational, self, and field theories, intersubjective accounts tend to be experience-near and close to the concepts of philosophers of phenomenology. When applied within the contemporary frameworks of Ego Psychology or post-Bionian orientations, they tend to include intersubjective contextualization of the metapsychological level of theoretical discourse.

III. Aa. Self Psychology Perspectives

Self Psychology began by carrying over the ego psychological emphasis on an intrapsychic focus. To this focus **Kohut** (1971) added a conception of a special relationship between the self and the selfobject. In this concept a deficit in the self such as the regulation of anxiety were repaired by the transmuting internalization of the function from the object into the self. This relationship between a self becoming cohesive through the activity of the selfobject has been referred to as a one and a half person psychology. Two major revisions were made to this original conception. One was a shift from the language and conceptions of the structure hypothesis to an experience-near theory (**Lichtenberg**, 1975, 1979, 1992).

Addressing a sense of self, a sense of the object, and a selfobject experience of enlivenment and cohesion connected self psychology to the subjectivity of intersubjectivity. The second far-reaching revision was the proposal by **Stolorow** (1997) of intersubjectivity.

Borrowing from philosophy particularly Husserl, Stolorow introduced intersubjectivity as a broad principle necessary for and inherent in human relatedness. Here, all development occurs within an *intersubjective field*, an intersection of individual subjectivities.

In its broadest conception, “*intersubjectivity* denotes neither a mode of experiencing nor a sharing of experience, but the *contextual pre-condition* for having any experience at all” (Stolorow, 2013, p. 385, original italics). Infant research (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002) and developmental theories validate the claim that caregiver-infant intersubjective interactions set the pattern and tone of relatedness. Less broadly, intersubjectivity is used to account for moment-to-moment alteration of affects, intentions, and goals of each individual in a dyadic, triadic, or group relationship.

In analytic therapy, intersubjectivity, understood as the interplay of subjectivities of analyst and analysand, shifts the traditional emphasis on transference and countertransference to an expanded expression of the analyst’s subjective experience. This redefinition of the analyst’s role in the dyadic relationship creates a “more reciprocal (yet, still asymmetrical) subject-to-subject intimacy” (Lichtenberg, Lachmann, & Fosshage, 2016, p. 86-87). The subjectivity of intersubjectivity refers to the individual’s awareness of affects, intentions, goals, perspectives, and reflections about him or herself. Additionally, as emphasized in self psychology and attachment theory, subject-to-subject intimacy is based on and necessary for each person to sense into the state of mind, perspective and strivings of the other (empathy [Kohut, 1971] and mentalization [Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target 2002]). Along with helping to account for empathic perception, intersubjectivity helps to explain three other concepts central to Self Psychology: a focus on adaptive strivings, disruption-restoration sequences, and the *ambiance* that develops in the field. In its focal point of entry into developments in the intersubjective analytic field, Self Psychology tends to give precedence to inferences about a patient’s positive strivings (leading edge) while many other relational theories give precedence to interpreting maladaptive conflictual strivings (following, trailing edge). Intersubjectivity has been instrumental in the recognition of the significance of the *ambiance*, the general affective state, that is more than the individual subjectivities of the members of any intimate dyad. The *ambiance* that forms in the intersubjective field of an ongoing analysis has a profound effect on both analyst and analysand and the outcome of the treatment

III. Ab. Relational Perspectives

In the Relational Perspective, Intersubjectivity, often understood to be overlapping or synonymous with interpersonal, relational or bipersonal, is meant to encompass psychic experiences that emerge and are constituted and experienced in a dyadic or multi-element system.

Intersubjectivity may be usefully seen in contrast with intrapsychic dimensions of experience. The intrapsychic has historically referred to a one person system, describing the internal conscious and unconscious experience of an individual. The interpersonal or relational, set up antiphonally to the intrapsychic, is a concept applied to the following

Conceptual Elements (of Intersubjectivity):

- a) The social dimension of individual experience;
- b) The bi-personal field imagined as unconscious, preconscious and conscious;
- c) Experience shared interpersonally or collectively;
- d) Experiences individual or dyadic/multiple that emerge with the unique characteristics of a melded, contextualized setting;
- e) The constitutive effect of the intrusion of ‘otherness’ into the individual, an ‘other’ as large as the state and as microscopic as a shared state change
- f) Clinical implications of intersubjectivity, e.g. Enactments.

III. Aba. Historical Roots

Different analytic schools draw the historic genealogy for intersubjectivity differently. From the relational perspective, Sullivan is certainly important and the work of Racker as well as British Independent and Kleinian analysts as filtered through the interpersonal school. Ferenczi is also an important figure in the evolution of this tradition, inaugurating a concern and interest in the impact of external relationships as a complement to constitutional, and internal world developments that were emphasized in the classical tradition out of which Ferenczi’s work emerged. Ferenczi’s concern with trauma, its reality base and psychic sequelae stimulated renewed interest in the intersubjective field as a site of psychic labor and transformative work.

Sándor Ferenczi

Ferenczi’s work (Ferenczi, 1949; Dupont, 1988) has been an important influence on the development of theories that emphasize intersubjective dimensions of psychoanalytic work, including his emphasis on mutuality, enactment, and the bi-directionality of psychic processes (Bass, 2015, 2009; Aron and Harris, 2010). His brief experiment in mutual analysis itself, as described in his clinical diary (1988) is the most radical representation of a fully intersubjective therapy in our history. Ferenczi has been a common ancestor to two groups: the British Independent Group (Parsons, 2009) and the American Relational Group (Bass, 2009), which have played an important role in the application of intersubjective ideas to psychoanalysis. Access to the clinical diary (Dupont, 1988) and the Freud/Ferenczi correspondence that followed revealed a common sensibility deeply embedded in the history of psychoanalytic ideas. Ferenczi’s ideas about the analytic relationship—the analyst as a real person (a subject)

in an actual relationship, as well as an object in a transference relationship—offered the potential to forge with the patient a new beginning, tapping heretofore unexplored potentials for growth and change.

The American Interpersonal School, and the Relational School that followed developed a clinical perspective in line with Ferenczi's discoveries, that placed at its center the radical recognition that the analyst was inevitably a participant in the mix of the process with the patient, co-creating their shared analytic experience as a particular encounter between their two subjectivities, their conscious and unconscious experience. It emphasized that transference and countertransference were inevitably complementary, each begetting the other in an infinite Mobius strip of mutual influence and transformations that could be studied and explored in the psychoanalytic relationship to good effect. The analyst was a participant observer, and so the impact of his or her actual personality, and idiosyncratic ways of being and relating to the patient constituted important dimensions of analytic experience that an intersubjective point of view saw as central.

These ideas, too, were anticipated by Ferenczi, who had himself noted the centrality of countertransference as a mutually shaping complement to transference. He discerned the role of reciprocal influence in the analytic relationship and the crucial importance of the analyst's recognition of his own impact on the patient, a factor that he recognized would go a long way toward ameliorating the inevitable iatrogenic risks of retraumatization. Ferenczi highlighted the implications for analytic treatment of recognizing the analyst as a real person (ideas picked up in the British School by Fairbairn, Guntrip, and Balint, and in the American School by Thompson, Wolstein, Singer, Levenson, and many others).

Ferenczi discerned that the patient read and reacted to the smallest nuances of the analyst's behavior. The patient, according to Ferenczi's 1932 Clinical Diary entry (in: Dupont, 1988), "detects from little gestures (form of greeting, handshake, tone of voice, degree of animation, etc.) the presence of affects" (ibid, p. 11), which may reveal to the patient more about the analyst than even the analyst may know. Ferenczi's observations made the mirror metaphor (below) obsolete for many analysts and were recognized as central to the perspective of many interpersonal psychoanalysts in the 1950s and beyond, and to Relational theorists who followed, as intersubjectivity became more and more central to the theory.

For Freud (1912) with his telephonic metaphor: "The analyst must bend his own unconscious like a receptive organ toward the transmitting unconscious of the patient. He must adjust himself to the patient as a telephone receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone. Just as the receiver transmutes the electrical oscillations induced by the sound waves back again into sound waves, so is the physician's unconscious mind able to reconstruct the patient's unconscious, which has determined his free associations" (ibid, pp. 115-116), the analyst's unconscious was to be used as a highly sensitive listening instrument, guided by key principles such as neutrality, anonymity and blank screen or mirror function.

That meant that the transmitting function of the analyst must remain well disciplined, lest its reception by the patient's listening apparatus endanger the process through which

transference must develop unhampered. Seen from the Relational-Intersubjective perspective, it was as though Freud prophetically incorporated into his telephonic metaphor a mute button. Presented as such, this was not fundamentally an intersubjective theory. While the analyst used his unconscious as a listening instrument, the patient's unconscious was not understood to have the same capacity. The patient's subjectivity concerning the analyst was not given its due. Freud came closer to the reciprocal mode of listening in his 1915 paper on "The Unconscious", where he states "It is a very remarkable thing that the Ucs of one human being can react upon that of another..." (Freud, 1915, p. 194). However, this point remained undertheorized throughout his oeuvre.

Ferenczi had reported encountering personally transformative experiences with his patients that had impelled him to forge a widened scope of psychoanalytic understanding and enabled him to take seriously for the first time bipersonal and reciprocal, and therefore intersubjective dimensions of psychic experience and transformation. As Ferenczi (in: Dupont, 1988, p. 84) wrote, "When two people meet for the first time, an exchange takes place not only of conscious but also of unconscious stirring." He coined the term "dialogue of unconscious" to describe that an unconscious dialogue is always taking place between patient and analyst, and takes place on a two way street.

This dimension of Ferenczi's work found especially fertile ground for growth in the United States. Relational ideas and their applications support technical options organized in part around a theory that emphasizes the intersubjective process as a 'dialogue of unconscious'. This has the effect of directing the analyst's attention to the effects and the reflections of his own participation, as well as that of the patient. This listening orientation tends to be paradigmatic to Relational analysts, with intersubjectivity and its uses in analytic engagement at its core.

III. Abb. Intersubjectivity and Field Theory in Relational Thinking and Clinical Work

Overall, the field theories, relevant to intersubjectivity, are rooted in the mid-20th century interpersonal theory of psychiatry of **Harry Stack Sullivan**, social psychology's field theory of Kurt Lewin, and the Merleau-Ponty's conceptualizations leading to Latin American psychoanalytic field theories of the Madeleine and Willy Barangers (2008), Enrique Pichon Riviere (2017) and José Bleger (1967). In the United States, the concept of the field in interpersonal theory began in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Clara Thompson. Sullivan's work was the most important conceptual influence. For him the field was the arena of what he called "interpersonal relations," and it was, in turn, interpersonal relations that formed the core of his entire system of thought, as well as his understanding of the difference between his thought and the psychoanalysis of his time. The field concept has since been developed by many interpersonal and relational writers, including **Stephen Mitchell** (1988), who referred to the *relational matrix*.

Psychoanalytic theories like those of Bion and his followers also embedded their ideas about mind and affect in a relational context. Knowing (K) arises always in an interpersonal affective and cognitive matrix (xKy).

Additionally, Intersubjectivity is inherent in the work of political theorists like Louis Althusser or Theodor W. Adorno, and postmodern scholars like Slavoj Žižek and Christopher Butler.

Interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis are both centered on the concept of the field, as a *very broadly defined field theory*. Implicit in most interpersonal and relational writings, is that the analytic situation is defined in terms of its *relatedness*. Analyst and patient are continuously and inevitably, and consciously and unconsciously, in interaction with one another. This interaction has to do with what they experience in one another's presence, and how they behave. The field also determines what each participant can experience in the presence of the other, especially in terms of the affective aspects of experience. The field is, on one hand, the sum total of all those influences, conscious and unconscious, that each of the analytic participants exerts on the other. On the other hand, the field is the outcome of all those influences, the relatedness and experience that is created between the two people as a result of the way they deal with one another.

As soon as there is an outcome in the field – as soon as the field changes to accommodate the influences supplied by its participants – that outcome becomes part of the influence on the next moment of relatedness. Like the influences that pass back and forth, outcomes in the field are not necessarily conscious. And so the sequence continues: each moment of influence in the field interacts with the personalities of those who are influenced to create the next moments of relatedness; and those moments of relatedness, in turn, are part of the conscious and unconscious influences on each participant's experience of the moment after that.

For most theorists of the interpersonal field, even when the process of formulating conscious experience unfolds without undue defensive inhibition, disruption, or detour, the course of that formulation is charted in the same moment that it takes place, and its final shape therefore comes into being only as it arrives in our minds. Prior to that moment, for many interpersonal and relational analysts, what will become formulated experience is only possibility. Conscious experience, that is, does not pre-exist its formulation; it is not predetermined, but emergent; it is not the revelation of something that is already "there" in the mind, but a process, an activity. Here, the interpersonal, relational, or intersubjective dimension of the experience can be reached: the experience that can be formulated within the analytic dyad is a function of the nature of the relatedness between the two people. The possibilities for the changing contents of consciousness are determined by the equally mercurial nature of the interpersonal field.

The *field is a jointly created configuration of relatedness*, a social medium that is the result of the conscious and unconscious involvement and intersection of two subjectivities, including the interaction of what are referred to in other traditions as internal objects. The

participants in the field may or may not be aware of the field's influences on them, depending at least partly on the consequences that would ensue from that awareness. The field is more like concepts of the *analytic or intersubjective third* (Ogden, 1994; Benjamin, 2004), or what **Samuel Gerson** (2004) calls the *relational unconscious*, than a mere context or surround. The field is that configuration of influences that continuously gives clinical process its particular, changing shape and nature.

The fact that the field links two subjectivities, however, does not mean that it is a simple additive combination of influences. Instead, it is a unique creation, a new and ceaselessly changing *gestalt* that expresses and represents the present, shifting states of relatedness between patient and analyst. The field is not synonymous with transference-countertransference. If the idea of transference-countertransference remains meaningful (if, that is, it has not become so diluted that it refers to the entire analytic relationship), it must refer to patterns of relatedness modeled on the nature of experience with significant people from the past. The interpersonal field is broader than that. It includes the influences on each participant of the entire nexus of affects, motives and intentions, thoughts, proto-thoughts, meaningful behaviors, metaphors, and fantasies that come into being when two people are involved with one another.

How the field is composed in any particular moment encourages some unbidden articulations of experience and discourages others. In turn, we can say that the composition of the field is created by the interaction of the self-states of its participants, and is therefore in continuous flux. As self-states shift in the minds of each participant, as they routinely do, in responsive reciprocity with the self-states of the other participant (Bromberg, 1998, 2006, 2011), the field changes.

The *interpersonal field remains a concept, not an experience*. In more experience-near terms, changes in the field are changes in the possibilities for relatedness – i.e., changes in the kinds of relatedness that are facilitated and inhibited. We rarely “know” the field. For the most part, the field comes to our attention only through what we *sense* or *feel* of its influences. To explicitly reflect on the field usually requires a conscious effort, one that few people besides psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, with their professional interests, have a reason to expend; and there are many circumstances, or aspects of the field, that do not even allow the possibility of such reflection. On the phenomenological level, as the nature of the field shifts, but generally without attracting our conscious attention, different kinds of relatedness feel most obvious or natural to the participants. Patient and analyst fall most easily into, and out of, certain relational patterns. These events are unnoticed, unremarkable – in a word, “natural.” As one kind of relatedness becomes natural (to take a simple example, friendliness), other kinds of relatedness (irritability) fall into the background and feel less comfortable, easy, or natural to create in this environment, or are even actively avoided, sometimes with unconscious dynamic purpose (i.e., unconscious defensive purpose).

From this perspective follow two further points: First, if we take in consideration the facilitating and inhibiting influences of the field on the contents of individual minds, we also must take the position that the freedom to allow the greatest range of unbidden experience rests

on the degree of flexibility and freedom of the field. Second, the degree of the field's flexibility is defined by the range of relatedness available to the participants.

III. Abc. Intersubjectivity as a Central Dimension of Relational Psychoanalysis

A Relational perspective in psychoanalysis began to emerge in the 1980s in the US, following the publication of the **Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell** (1983)'s "Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory", which posed a relational/conflict model of the mind, as distinguished from a drive/conflict model. As relational theory developed, through a synthesis of a number of perspectives compatible with a relational/conflict model (American Interpersonal Psychoanalysis, Object Relations theories in their Kleinian and British Independent varieties, post Kohutian self psychologies with intersubjectivist emphases and others), the development and application of theories emphasizing the intersubjective dimension in psychoanalysis and development played a central role. Because relational psychoanalysis is a heterogeneous perspective, representing a variety of complementary syntheses and integrations within its broad perspective, different understandings, emphases and applications of intersubjectivity theory can be seen among analysts who are self identified as 'relational.' Attachment theorists, the Boston Change Process Group (BCPG) and Jessica Benjamin (2004), following Winnicott, have emphasized developmental aspects of intersubjectivity, the latter in particular stressing mutual recognition, rupture and repair, and an emphasis on 'the third,' in their theorizing (Benjamin, 1988, 1995, 2004, 2013). Theorists with roots in the Interpersonal tradition (**Stephen Mitchell, Anthony Bass, Phillip Bromberg, Donnel Stern** and others) have emphasized the unique irreducible subjectivities that co-establish each dyad, with its particular transference/countertransference fields of experience and capabilities for exploring them and discerning their relative contributions to enactments and other forms of psychotherapeutic entanglement. Relationally informed analysts in particular emphasize the quality of *bi-directionality* in transference/countertransference field, including in enactments. From a relational, intersubjective point of view, it cannot be taken for granted, for example, whether an enactment or a projective identification can properly assumed to begin with either therapist or patient, without open minded joint inquiry into the currents of experience that co-establish the intersubjective field of experience which they generate. Patient and analyst, each with his or her own subjectivity, conscious and unconscious experience, engage each other with the full range of resources and limitations, blind spots, insights, which they can bring to bear in the therapy.

Relational theory, *fundamentally intersubjectivistic* in its point of view, attempts to come to terms with the implications of this perspective for analytic work. Relational theory and technique has strongly emphasized the subjectivity of both participants in the process. Relational analytic therapies have focused on the contribution of the analyst's subjectivity to the process, and how the patient experiences that contribution. It emphasizes as well how the analyst becomes implicated in enactments that reveal to the patient and analyst dissociated parts of their experience that had not been accessible prior to the recognition and working through of such enactments (Bromberg, 1998, 2006; Aron, 1996; Bass, 2003; Benjamin, 2004,

2013). Relational psychoanalysis has emphasized mutual dimensions of psychoanalytic process, and while distinguishing between aspects of mutuality as fundamental to the process (Dupont, 1988) and the asymmetries inherent in psychoanalytic process (**Lewis Aron, Irwin Hoffman**), other authors (Bass, 2001, 2007) have emphasized complementarities that obtain between the analysts' and patients' psychic contributions to the process, beyond the conscious role identifications and responsibilities that guide analysts and patients in different ways.

Modern psychoanalysts drawing on intersubjective concepts of subjectivity and analytic process mix and match and make many variable and comparable theoretical entities. Some are more interested in the force of the socio-political; some elaborate the implications of the intersubjective for technique, some for metapsychology. While there are differences and overlaps among these approaches, intersubjectivity is perhaps somewhat unique or at least unusual in psychoanalytic concepts in that the term and its extensions and meanings are changing and evolving quite intensively. Recently, the term *intrasubjective* has emerged, a term intended to capture the double experience of between and within.

III. Ac. Examples of Hybrid-Integrative Perspectives in The USA

III. Aca. North American Intersubjective Ego Psychology

A uniquely North American/US 'Independent Tradition' of Intersubjective Ego Psychology is described by **Nancy Chodorow** (2004) as holding in tension and reconciling two contradictory psychoanalytic approaches – ego psychology and interpersonal psychoanalysis, established by founding American theorists Hartmann and Sullivan. The contemporary Intersubjective Ego Psychology incorporates both – a focus on intrapsychic conflict, compromise formation, an internal world and intrapsychic fantasy, yet the psyche (of both the patient and the analyst) is also interpersonally and culturally created; transference is a history driven repetition, which analyst interprets to the patient, yet not everything what goes on between the patient and the analyst comes from the patient and patient may also be the interpreter of the analyst's experience or affect the analyst's countertransference, and both participants can co-create analytic field, which is, in some sense, more than the sum of the two-person parts. Intersubjective ego psychologists hold both perspectives at the same time and thereby modify each.

The contemporary intersubjective ego psychologist **Warren Poland** (1996) expresses such hybrid integration in following words: "How can it be that no man is an island and that at the same time every man is an island? ... It is misleading to speak glibly of one-person psychology versus two-person psychology. No single person exists outside a human, object-connected field; the analytic space colors how such a single person comes to understanding by the other and to insight. At the same time, the mind of any individual can be engaged by another yet is always crucially apart, a private universe of inner experience" [Poland, 1996, p. 33].

In the sense of this double focus on the depth of individual's experience as well as acknowledgement of the profound impact of the societal-cultural surrounds, Chodorow (2004) views contemporary Intersubjective Ego Psychology as a direct progeny of **Hans Loewald** and **Erik H. Erikson**, both émigrés from Nazi occupied Europe. She depicts especially Erikson's case writings, portraying the tragedies of internal life as well as the uncontrollable accidents of one's family and history. She also highlights Erikson's concept of psychosocial development (Erikson 1964) and his wider social-cultural-political interest as evidenced in his writings on poverty, the mistreatment of Native Americans, and the depression and self-blame that immigration or living in a racially biased world can foster (Erikson, 1964). In his chapter on American identity in *Childhood and Society*, Erikson (1950) highly praises American individuality, but at the same time condemns racism, capitalism, exploitation, and mass society. Addressing Loewald's societal and individual focus, she notes his statement of what he calls the great betrayal by Heidegger during the Nazi period, as well as his developmental focus on the unavoidable killing of one's parents and oedipal atonement, and his recognition of the intractability of certain negative therapeutic reactions based partially in the death instinct. Hans Loewald was among the Freudian revisionists of 1960's, 1970' and 1980's, who forged a connection between Freudian Ego Psychology and Object Relations Theory to create a psychoanalytic theory that he felt stayed closer to peoples' experience of their lives. His main concerns addressed the most fundamental assumptions of psychoanalytic theory building, and basic preconceptions about the nature of mind, reality and the analytic process.

Loewald believed that Freud postulated two different understandings of the drives. The first was before 1920 with drives as discharge-seeking. The second came with his introduction of the concept of Eros in 1920 in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where Freud radically altered his definition of the drive as no longer discharge-seeking but rather as connection-seeking "not using objects for gratification but for building more complex mental experiences and for re-establishing the lost original unity between self and others." (Mitchell and Black, 1995, p.190). Loewald's revision of Freud's drive theory required a radical reformulation of Freud's traditional psychoanalytic concepts. While for Freud the id is an unchanging biological force clashing with social reality, for Loewald the id is an interactional product of adaptation rather than a constant biological force. The mind is not interactive secondarily but is interactive by its very nature.

Loewald theorized that in the beginning there is no distinction between self and other, ego and external reality, or instincts and objects; rather there is an original unitary whole composed of both baby and caregivers. His transformational influence during 1960's, 1970's and 1980's on psychoanalytic metapsychology and on the emergence of new ways of conceptualizing analytic material is exemplified by his statement that "Instincts understood as psychic and motivational forces become organized as such through interactions within a psychic field, consisting originally of the mother-child (psychic) unit." (Loewald, 1971, p. 118). It is because of statements like these that Loewald, self-identified as an Ego psychologist, was subsequently found to be exemplary of 'Third Model' thinking described below (see also OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES entry).

By putting Freud's instinct theory and ego psychology together, Loewald's work can be seen as building a vital bridge between a “one-person psychology” and a “two-person object relations psychology” (See also separate EGO PSYCHOLOGY and OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES entries).

Responding to the critics on both sides – those who view this hybrid integrative orientation as focused too much or too little on the unconscious and the drives – Chodorow (2004) elaborates how intersubjective ego psychologists follow Loewald's concern with the analyst's unconscious and its effects on the clinical process; and they find the unconscious in Erikson's attention to anxieties and defenses and his elaborately and empathetically described processes of symptom formation in children. In her view, it is precisely because psychoanalysis begins from a recognition of the unique subjectivity created in each individual by unconscious affects, drives, fantasies, conflicts, compromise formations, and a personal dynamic history, along with a recognition that two subjects bring their uniqueness to the transference-countertransference analytic field, that they also create, in a particular cultural and analytic environment, that intersubjective ego psychology – the American fusion of ego psychology and relational psychoanalysis – continues to grow.

In this context, **Elliot Adler and Janet Bachant** (1996) re-examine an essential foundation of classical technique, the psychoanalytic situation, defining it in terms of basic elements of psychoanalytic relatedness, which make the in depth exploration of human motivation possible. Psychoanalytic situation is viewed here as an “extraordinary interpersonal arrangement, anchored by two clearly differentiated yet complementary ways of relating: free association and analytic neutrality” (Adler and Bachant, 1996, p. 1021). Described as one pole of ‘reciprocal role requirements’, free association is viewed as a prerequisite of expressive freedom to have an introspective encounter with their deepest emotional stirrings in *the context of an interaction with another person* (ibid, p. 1025; original italics). As an interpretive tool, it is viewed as outweighing even the resources of theoretical knowledge. Analytic role is viewed as complementary to that of the patient. It serves a function of protecting the patient's expressive freedom. In this way, psychoanalytic situation and technique is casted as a two-person process of analytic exploration of one-person neurosis: “*one-neurosis*, not a one-person model of analytic treatment” (ibid., p. 1038).

Among areas of interest to contemporary Freudian psychoanalysts, which are relevant to intersubjectivity, are unconscious sharing of ‘states of consciousness’ (Libbey, 2011), bi-directional unconscious influences and the inter-psychic realm (McLaughlin, 2005), further studies of the field created by patient *and* analyst, based on Ogden (1994) and W. Baranger and M. Baranger (2008), enactment (Ellman and Moskowitz 1998, 2008) and ‘enaction’ (Reis, 2009), and others.

III. Acb. Intersubjectivity in North American post-Kleinian and post-Bionian Thought

Extending and reinterpreting Bion, additionally absorbing thoughts of some Latin American and Italian authors, **James Grotstein** (1985, 1999, 2005) has developed an

integrationist version of intersubjectivity, based on unconscious communication and a dual-track development, manifesting in psychoanalytic discourse. His intra-subjective, inter-subjective and trans-subjective conceptualizations are metapsychologically rooted in the alterity of ‘the other’ subject, but also of the unconscious and primary process; and phenomenologically clinically observed, present and experienced. Example is his concept of ‘projective transidentification’. Here, taking off from Freud’s “It is a very remarkable thing that the Ucs of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the Cs.” (Freud, 1915, p. 194), and reinterpreting Bion and Klein’s conceptualizations, he hypothesizes that “intersubjective projective identification constitutes both the operation of an unconscious phantasy of omnipotent intrapsychic projective identification solely within the internal world of the projecting subject—in addition to two other processes: conscious and/or preconscious modes of sensorimotor induction, which would include signaling and/or evocation or prompting gestures or techniques (mental, physical, verbal, posturing or priming) on the part of the projecting subject; followed by spontaneous empathic simulation in the receptive object of the subject’s experience in which the receptive object is already inherently ‘hard-wired’ to be empathic with the prompting subject” (Grotstein, 2005, p. 2051).

Overall, analogically to Bion extending Klein’s pathological projective identification into the realm of communicative projective identification, Grotstein extends Bion’s conceptualizations, communicative projective identification among them, into the intersubjective realm.

Another theoretician who concerns himself with the intersubjective dimension of unconscious communication is **Lawrence Brown** (2011). He integrates historical contributions of Freud, Klein and Bion to explore how together patient and analyst co-create narratives of unconscious configurations as tools to analyze the patient’s traumatic and psychic history. In his system, waking and night dreams are of central importance.

Both Grotstein (1999) and Brown (2011) state that countertransference has thankfully been transformed into intersubjectivity, and Brown adds “Furthermore, *intersubjectivity is a process of unconscious communication*, receptivity, and meaning making within each member of the dyad to bring idiosyncratic signification to the shared emotional field that interacts with an analogous function in the partner” (Brown, 2011, p 7). The analytic field concept used here by Brown had its main source in the work of the couple Baranger: “The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field” (1961/2008). With the translational lag, this fundamental theoretical innovation was thus unknown to most of the psychoanalytic community until recently. The Barangers described *unconscious phantasy of the analytic couple* and emphasize the contribution of phenomena of projective and introjective identification in its structure. About the concept of such co-created unconscious phantasy, they argued: “It is something *created between the two*, within the unit that they form in the moment of the session, something radically different from what each of them is separately . . . We define phantasy in analysis as the dynamic structure that at every moment *gives meaning to the bi-personal field*” (ibid, p. 806-7).

III. B. Specific Developments in Europe

III. Ba. Intersubjectivity in Countertransference and Projective Identification

A more specific relational trend is identifiable in the widening meaning that the concepts of countertransference and projective identification had acquired over many decades.

Since Paula Heimann's seminal paper (Heimann, 1950) countertransference was not anymore conceived solely as an obstacle to the analytic process due to the analyst's unconscious conflicts but mainly as a tool for understanding the mental processes of the patient. As for projective identification, it was originally conceived as an aggressive action to rid oneself of unwanted experiences projected into an object in order to control it from inside (Klein 1946). Bion developed the concept of projective identification, emphasising its communicative quality. He makes a distinction between “normal” and “excessive” projective identification. “I shall suppose that there is a normal degree of projective identification... and that associated with introjective identification this is the foundation on which normal development rests”. (Bion, 1959/1967, p. 103). This benign circle of projective and introjective identifications can be disturbed, either by the mother's inability to receive and understand the infant's projective identifications or by the infant's intolerance of frustration or envy. Both of these might lead to desperate, “excessive” projective identifications from the infant. (see separate entry CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER/CONTAINED).

Subsequently it has been mainly used to refer to a particular clinical event of interpersonal type in which the patient expels and projects parts of the self into the analyst, in such a way as to induce him/her to participate in the projective process: it is precisely this feature - the analyst's participation with his/her subjectivity - that is brought to the fore. In other words, while at the outset the concept of projective identification was conceived in a ‘one-person’ psychological framework, over time and progressively its meaning entered in a more ‘two person’ framework. This is the reason why this concept has gained a great success also outside the Kleinian milieu in which it originated.

Very close to the post-Kleinian way of conceiving projective identification is the concept of role-responsiveness, formulated in 1976 by Joseph Sandler, a distinguished figure of the Anna Freudian Tradition (Malberg & Raphael-Leff, 2012), in order to highlight a kind of the analyst's behaviour that can “[...] usefully be seen as a compromise between his own tendencies or propensities and the role-relationship which the patient is unconsciously seeking to establish” (Sandler 1976, p. 47).

In addition to the broadening meaning acquired by countertransference and projective identification, the relational turn in European psychoanalysis has been influenced by North American relational psychoanalysis, where a combination of elements coming from Ego Psychology, Self Psychology and Interpersonalism has given rise to a number of schools of thought that were relational in nature with a variety of names such as ‘constructivism’, ‘intersubjectivism’, ‘postmodern perspective’ etc. At the crossroad of these conceptual as well

as clinical relational threads there was the concept of enactment (see separate entry ENACTMENT) spreading on both sides of the Atlantic ocean, in U.S. as well as in Europe (Bohleber et al. 2013).

What progressively gave the term of *intersubjectivity* a more specific meaning was the growing value given to the notion of subject in the clinical encounter: the role of the analyst begun to be considered to a lesser degree as a neutral and objective observer of analytic events and a neutral object of transference phenomena and to a greater extent as a person participating to interactional events with his/her own characteristics, making use of his/her own subjective stance for understanding patient's unconscious dynamics (Ponsi 1997). The classical one-sided view of a neutral analyst only occasionally affected by unwanted countertransferential reactions was replaced with a multifaceted view of the analyst's experience, including his/her countertransferential understandings as well as the originating and shaping force of his/her subjectivity. Terms like subjectivity or *intersubjectivity* highlight the novelty and uniqueness of the analytic encounter: by leaving in the background what is predetermined by transference-countertransference patterns what is emphasized is the creative potentiality of the analytic experience (Turillazzi Manfredi & Ponsi 1999).

III. Bb. Intersubjectivity and Infant Research

Studies developed in the fields of infant research and attachment theory, supporting the view of personality organized in terms of an intersubjective matrix of 'self-with-other' that incorporates both the internal and the external world (Ammaniti & Trentini 2009, Cortina & Liotti 2010, Fonagy & Target 2007, Stern 1985) contributed to buttress a conceptual framework in which interaction between two subjects is the necessary requirement for psychic development as well as for psychological cure: an other person, a caregiver as well as an analyst, is needed to experience and develop oneself, or – to say it in other words – to become a subject.

III. Bc. Intersubjectivity – Field Theory

One of the field theory's major representatives in Europe is **Antonino Ferro** who has blended the *field theory* with a *Bionian conceptual framework*. In Ferro's work with Roberto Basile (Ferro and Basile, 2008) the field today is understood as a meeting point of the *multiple characters* of patient and analyst with a life of their own, as if on stage. Transformations of the characters in the session's narratives are seen as representing *the transformations in the analytic field*. Ferro (2009) and **Giuseppe Civitarese** (Civitaresse 2008; Ferro and Civitarese 2013) stress the use of the analyst's mind and body, held in reverie, as a guide to the unconscious processes in the patient and between analyst and analysand.

Ferro's concept of 'bi-personal field' (Ferro, 1999), a structure resulting from a convergence of the analyst's and patient's subjective fields, represents a radical way to conceive intersubjectivity. The entity engendered by the interaction of the two subjectivities is something new, more than the sum of the two individual fields, which are somehow taken over

by this new structure. Insofar as the bi-personal field belongs to the present ‘here-and-now’ brought into being by the two subjects engaged in the psychoanalytic journey, the temporal dimension of individuals is overlooked, outlining a sort of “horizontal modellings of intersubjectivity” (Bohleber 2013. p. 812), a kind of a horizontal conception of the unconscious.

III. Bd. Intersubjectivity – Subjectivation, Intersubjectivation

In a different framework intersubjectivity is conceived as a process that takes place over time. The temporal dimension is captured by the concept of ‘subjectivation’, a term introduced in 1991 by **Raymond Cahn** to address the process of becoming a subject: this process is intersubjective in nature owing to the crucial role played by the object-environment right from the beginning (Cahn 1991, 1997, 2006). In recent years this terminology – becoming a subject, subjectivation, intersubjectivation – has been fortunate, replacing the preceding more common expression of development of the self, in French (Wainrib 2012) and in Italian (Bastianini 2014, Ruggiero 2015) psychoanalytic groups.

III. Be. Intersubjectivity – the Subject and the Person

These different uses of terms made up of “subject”, or built around it, call for a more detailed clarification of its meaning. This is what **Stefano Bolognini** puts forward when he highlights the different meanings of ‘interpsychic’, ‘intersubjective’ and ‘interpersonal’.

Bolognini (2008; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; 2016) differentiates the “Interpsychic” from the “Intersubjective” and the “Interpersonal”: these three concepts are in some cases overlapping and interchangeable, but in his view frequently they differ from each other.

He describes the “Subject” as a human being with a sufficiently coherent self-contact core, able to experience his/her emotions with a good sense of self-continuity.

The cohesive perception of his/her own Self can be at work and can be intensive enough, even if the separation process is not completed and the personal boundaries are still scarcely defined (e.g., many artists are strongly subjective in spite of a low definition – at least partially – of their boundaries as persons).

A “Person” is a human being with a well-defined identity, with very clear bodily and psychic boundaries in his/her self-representation, and with a clear enough psychic distinction from the other.

A relevant part of his/her well-differentiated mental activity can be developed at a conscious level, of course with all the issues and defenses that psychoanalysis has explored; nevertheless, a Person can be defined as such even if having a tenuous contact with his/her subjectivity, as is described in many pathological cases. Because of that, “being a Subject”

does not always amount to “being a Person”, and *vice versa*: one condition doesn’t exclude the other, but it doesn’t grant for it either.

In Bolognini’s view, the Interpsychic is an occasional, natural way of co-experiencing and co-working that connects two individuals, and not a structural and stable condition. It doesn’t necessarily imply that a Person or a Subject is there.

As a prototype of it, when a mother breastfeeds a baby, there is at the beginning no declared personal “status”: a natural cooperation between mouth and nipple that allows both mother and baby to “work together” (Segal, 1994), in a régime of good fusional cooperation. The two are able to exchange interior contents (both bodily and emotional) through their specific organs going into and out of the internal world (Bolognini, 2008): these bodily relations, initially experienced with a low level of mentalization but with a high degree of imprinting, will work as further intrapsychic equivalents mainly at a preconscious level (as happens, i.e., in the majority of cases in the creative processes); they will perhaps also become conscious and will find a full mental representation, but this could also not happen.

In the interpsychic exchange there is no confusion: a pre-subjective and co-subjective area of sensations, feelings and thoughts can be shared, while maintaining at the same time and at other levels, with undissociated continuity, individual ways of psychic functioning, characterized by a condition of good-enough separateness that doesn’t need to be constantly assessed (Guss Teicholz, 1999).

III. C. Intersubjectivity in French Psychoanalysis: Europe and North America

III. Ca. Introduction

French psychoanalytic tradition is not a monolithic tradition. But even though French psychoanalysts have several different psychoanalytic affiliations, it is nonetheless possible to identify some factors that shaped the specificity of post-Freudian French psychoanalysis. Among them, the relation to Freud’s writings, the French translation of Freud, Lacan’s influence, the relation between psychoanalysis and psychology and the emphasis on language appear especially important for understanding the reactions to the US intersubjective orientation in French psychoanalysis. These factors are inter-related and mutually reinforce each other. Furthermore, like in any other country, such factors are themselves determined by other sociological and cultural conditions. Political traditions, law, – including family law –, modes of parenting, gender roles and gender relations, economic and social status of psychoanalytic patients and practitioners, as well as the education and fields of training of psychoanalysts, are also instrumental in bringing to the fore some concepts or elements that become central in a given psychoanalytic culture. These factors may well have played a significant role in the reception of the American intersubjective orientation in French psychoanalysis.

The philosophical influences, cultural conditions and different translations of Freud's opus that shaped psychoanalysis in French speaking countries are different than those that defined the conditions in which psychoanalysis developed in English speaking countries. In opinion of many French psychoanalysts, the translation of Freud's work in English played a role in moving psychoanalysis closer to psychology and to cognitive sciences (Tessier, 2005). The translations in French were less uniform, until Laplanche undertook the publication of the OCFP in the 1980's (Laplanche, 1989a), but contributed greatly to specific directions through lexical and semantic choices. For example the German word *Seele* was translated as "Mind" in English and, in French as "Psychè" - to which Laplanche objected and insisted to use the word *âme* (soul) which changed the philosophical context of the reading. The word "*Vorstellung*" is translated in English by "idea", which is the usual translation, but is very different from the French translation which is "*représentation*". Another example would be *Verdrängung*, in English "repression" and in French "*refoulement*". One can note the social, even penal connotation, of the word repression, and the hydraulic metaphor of the French translation. In line with the above, French also note that in English-speaking psychoanalysis, with the exception of Ego-psychology, splitting has replaced repression in the description of psychic functioning (Tessier, 2005), which is not so in French psychoanalysis.

In the context of the differences in relation to Freud's writings, the importance of language, representation and representability, and what it entails for the understanding of sexuality, of the drives and of the unconscious is stressed in French psychoanalysis. Elaborating on the Freudian metapsychology of the dynamic unconscious, infantile sexuality and drive theory (Freud 1900, 1905, 1914, 1915), French intersubjectivist psychoanalysis explores the dimensions of *otherness* within and without, which lies at the core of existence and expands the concept *nachträglichkeit* or *après-coup*. While in general, contemporary French psychoanalytic theorization postulates the intimate bond between the unconscious and the drive, an important theme is the close examination of the "construction" of drive from basic physiological reflexes. Drive is regarded as mutable, perpetually in transition, proliferating in all mentation, and created anew in certain intersubjective experiences.

Overall, distinct characteristics of French psychoanalysis include: 1. Recognition of the usefulness of the topographic theory (Lacan, 1966) and a specific reading of the structural theory (Green, 2002); 2. Implementation of technical changes in the treatment of non-neurotic patients, especially in the handling of the transference (Green's *l'autre semblable/similar other*, in: Green, 2002) and countertransference (Faimberg, 2005); 3. Study of the manner in which preverbal traumas are inscribed but not represented in the psyche and implementation of new techniques necessary to incorporate them in the psychoanalytic treatment (Green, 2002, 2004); 4. Focus on work with representation, symbolization, and progression from action registers towards thought registers. 5. A different definition of the ego (*le moi*) that is subjective, more a self than the defensive creature of Ego psychology. Within this context, everything that is ego is listened to as emerging from the unconscious. There is an absence of the idea of a conflict free sphere. The *moi* is also composed of unconscious objects and part objects. 6. Analyst's stance involves close attention to patient's reaction to distance. There is an awareness of the analyst as object linked unconsciously with subject. The asymmetry is strictly maintained. 7.

Recognition of close connection between the Drive and the Object, whereby the Object is understood to be the revealer of the Drive (Green 2002). Within the intertwining of Object and Drive connection, analysis includes recovery of Eros (life, love) and Sexuality as its function.

III. Cb. Intersubjectively Relevant ‘Third Topography’/‘Third Model’

The French (Brusset, 2005, 2006) have adopted the term ‘La Troisième Topique’/ ‘Third Topography’, also known as ‘The Third Model’ (see the separate entry OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY) to retrospectively assemble under one metapsychological rubric the work of a number of post-Freudian authors who added the relationship to early caretakers as prerequisite to the attainment of a psychic apparatus capable of operating according to one or the other of the two Freudian models of the psychic apparatus. [The first (Freud, 1900) being the topographical one of a division into consciousness, unconsciousness, and preconsciousness, each with their separate rules of operation and the second (Freud, 1923, 1926) being the structural model, which divides the psychic apparatus into id, ego, and superego.] North American French analysts include in this group also two English speaking authors - Winnicott and Loewald.

The ‘Third Topography’/‘Third model’ posits that in human development, the two-person mind precedes that of the one-person psychic autonomy of drive, defense, and intrapsychic fantasy, described by Freud. While the first and second models have been used to depict neurotic illness as a mind at war with itself, the “third model” describes a state in the pre-history of the individual, when the mind is not always capable of functioning within its own circle of representations and able to judge them as such. To begin with, it is dependent upon the *nebenmensch* (Freud, 1895), the other-near-by, to ensure that the psyche is not overwhelmed by internal and external excitations. The caretaker’s modulation of stimulation, taking on the function of stimulus barrier, allows the baby to eventually recognize libidinal and aggressive impulses as non-traumatic parts of himself. Thus the third model describes a time in the life of each individual before the development of the other two. The third model was discovered last theoretically but describes a situation, which is first in the life of the individual.

From the point of view of the *unconscious subject*, persons in the neurotic-normal range can be said to have an “internal” life while borderlines and psychotics do not experience either their drives or their fantasies as “internal”. In order to move from primary process thinking where wishes are perceived as fulfilled to where wishes can be experienced in a transitional space of truth and untruth, one needs the intervention of a good-enough parent as temporary prosthesis and container. In this model, each human being begins life in a situation of two-person psychic processing where together the baby and the environment are an operative unit and it is only over time with considerable (usually unconscious) psychic work on the part of both parties that a relative one-person intra-psychic autonomy is established. The latter is viewed as an ideal universal development not accomplished by all persons, usually because of deficiencies in the primal two-person encounter. For these retrospectively dubbed ‘third model’

thinkers, a one-person mind is an achievement, a fluctuating one, which may be lost under internal or external stress.

Independently and virtually simultaneously, **Jacques Lacan** and **Donald Winnicott** both formulated the primary human dilemma: in order to become someone, each subject must pass through another, a real, conflicted, individual, other. Both authors wrote of the mirroring function of the object, in Winnicott's (1967) case as an opportunity to find reflected back one's "true" self whereas for Lacan (1949/1977; 1966) this mirroring was the beginning of a lifelong alienation, in which the ego, craving to be the object of the other's desire, takes other forms to be itself.

A former disciple of Lacan, **Piera Aulagnier** (2001[1975]) deepened understanding of the intimate role of the early caretaker in the infant's *activity of representation*. She pointed out that for the *infans* there is an inevitable 'violence of anticipation' in the 'spoken shadow' of maternal discourse. She writes: "It is thus the mother's discourse that is the agent responsible for the effect of anticipation, imposed on the infant, from whom a response is expected that it is not in his power to give. It is also this discourse that illustrates ... the concept of '*primary violence*'" (2001/1975, p. 11). Moreover, she emphasized the central role of the *deferred action of the naming of affect* (deferred because it is occurring after the mother has observed the child's response and before the child knows how to speak of it himself), which by designating the child's *relation* to others cathected by him "identifies and constitutes the I" (ibid., (p 97).

For **Winnicott**, the object (conflicted subject in her own right) also plays an essential role in the birth of a functioning psychic apparatus, one capable of distinguishing fantasy from perception. The object manages this transformation and construction through two main kinds of interactions with the infant. There is firstly the "found-created" of the empathetically timed maternal offering, which appears, just when the baby needs it. Then, the 'object's survival' to being 'used' as the object of drives helps the baby differentiate his wishes from external reality. Winnicott (1960 b, p. 141) claims that for the infant instinctual impulses and affects are as foreign to the ego as a thunderclap. It is through a successful negotiation of the two categories of interaction of '*created-found*' and the '*use of the object*' (1953, 1969) that the child gradually *subjectifies* drive and distinguishes it from environmental forces. Thus the particular character of the "meeting" between the child's spontaneous object-directed thrust and the parent's "response" can be said to literally mold the *subject's intrapsychic experience*. Before the drive can be felt as a part of oneself, it must arc through the external other's response; in this manner, rather than simply "inborn", for Winnicott *drive is essentially "constructed" in the relationship with the other*.

In **Andre Green's** (1997) view, the drive is the matrix of the subject, as in Freudian theory ego arose from the interaction/clash between the drives and the external world. Green added to Winnicottian concept of 'optimal (maternal) presence' his conceptualization of '*optimal absence*' as furthering the processes of symbolization and representation. (Green's dialectic of the intrapsychic and the intersubjective will be specified below.)

Jean Laplanche's ambitious reformulation of the ‘foundations of psychoanalysis’ (1989b) offers another view of the relationship between object and drive. Laplanche (1999a) criticizes the ‘Ptolemaic’ character of the Freudian vision, which placed the individual psyche at the center of his destiny. Rather, Laplanche claims that the fundamental ‘anthropological situation’ of early childhood is completely *decentered by the ‘priority of the other’*, making the little person ‘Copernican’ in her revolution around the adult. The drastic asymmetry between adult and infant emphasized by Laplanche because of its huge consequence for the infant's psychic structure is the fact that the adult is a sexual and speaking being with an unconscious whereas the baby is neither sexual nor able to speak and is not as yet internally divided. Barely intuited by the adult is the triggering of his or her unconscious infantile sexuality in primary intimacy with the infant body. This unconscious sexuality “contaminates” intimate exchanges with the infant in the form of “enigmatic messages” which the baby does not have the cognitive, emotional, or corporeal means to decode and which create drive and unconscious fantasy in the form of an internal “pressure for translation”. For Laplanche, this infantile sexuality, enigmatic in nature, is not innate but an implantation from the real other, though the reality which counts -- in a highly critical derivation and reworking of Lacan – is the reality of the “message”, a third reality Laplanche adds to those of the Freudian psychical and material realities. Thus, for Laplanche human sexuality – by which he means sexuality mediated by fantasy – comes from the other and is ‘*other*’, alienated, and foreign to the ego. (Laplanche’s metapsychological approach to intersubjectivity will be specified below.)

Loewald in the U.S., recent addition to the group by Canadian Francophone analysts (See the separate entry OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY), and, besides Winnicott, its only non-French analytic theoretician, also rejected the independence of object relations and drives in a ‘revision of the instinct concept itself’ (1972/1980). He suggests that instinctual drives, understood as psychic forces, are to be conceptualized as becoming organized through interactions within the primitive mother-child unitary psychic field rather than as constitutional or innate givens. In his emphasis on the Freudian concept of “binding”, Loewald realized the relational implications that are not apparent in Freud where fusion and defusion, binding and unbinding, might be taken to occur in an objectless vacuum. Loewald saw that binding of instincts requires the object’s ‘mediation’ both in the sense of ‘taming’ of them and in the sense of their representation. Though he uses the Strachey translation of ‘trieb’ as ‘instinct’, Loewald’s thinking is seen by contemporary North American French analysts as consistent with the Third Topography/third model contributions as the following extended quote illustrates:

“Anything we can call instinctual drives, as psychic forces, arise and are being organized first within the matrix of the mother-child unitary psychic field from which through manifold interactional processes within that field, the infantile psyche gradually segregates out as a relatively more autonomous center of psychic activity. In this view instinctual drives in their original form are not forces immanent in an autonomous, separate primitive psyche, but are resultants of tensions within the mother-child psychic matrix and later between the immature infantile psyche and the mother. Instincts, in other words, are to be seen as relational phenomena from the beginning and not as autonomous forces seeking discharge, which

discharge is understood as some kind of emptying of energy potential, in a closed system or out of it.” (Loewald 1972/80, p 242).

III. Cc. View from French Canada: French Approaches To Intersubjectivity As Related To The Reception Of USA Intersubjective Orientation

The reception of the US intersubjective orientation in French psychoanalysis is inseparable from the ongoing debates between North American (US) psychoanalysis – as well as, to a lesser degree English-speaking analysis worldwide – and French speaking psychoanalysis. French analysts view the British psychoanalytic school as a bridge between the US and French psychoanalysis. This became more visible as Winnicott and Bion became significant references in the work of prominent French analysts.

Overall, there are three approaches to intersubjectivity reflective of different trends in the reception of the USA (mostly Self Psychology and Relational) intersubjective orientations, in French psychoanalysis: 1) a general refusal of the interpersonal/relational paradigm in psychoanalysis, based mostly in Lacan; 2) a metapsychological approach of the psychoanalytic situation based on the affirmation of the interpersonal nature of the formation of the sexual unconscious, as per Laplanche’s Theory of Generalized Seduction; and 3) a qualified acceptance within the dialectic between the intersubjective and intrapsychic dimensions of the mind of Green, Roussillon, and other ‘integrationists’.

The critiques differ according to the psychoanalytic orientations of their author. They deal with issues having both to do with the psychoanalytic method and with metapsychology. Those coming from orientations closer to classical French psychoanalysis tend to focus on the fact that relational approaches have left out the primary content of the unconscious, more precisely primal fantasies, such as castration and Oedipus. So doing they have overlooked the structuring role of the differences of sexes and of generations on the formation of psychic life. In the intersubjective orientation, countertransference becomes disclosure and its analysis implies that the analyst share his affective experience of the session with the patient. Thus, the symmetry between analysts and analysand induced by the intersubjectivists’ technique and the mutuality of the relation they are fostering prevent the symbolizing function of the Oedipus complex from manifesting itself and from setting in motion a genuine analytic process. On the contrary, in classical analysis, the psychoanalytic frame is designed to point to the Oedipal situation notably through the asymmetry of the relation, which is designed to evoke the difference of generation. These elements are essential for allowing unconscious processes to express themselves. According to the critics linked to the classical approach, the relational orientations have gotten around the complexities of unconscious processes and forgotten about the resistance of these processes to evolution and to educational methods (Anzieu-Premmereur, in: Durieux et Fine, 2000).

Other critics, coming from various analytic orientations, raise a more general questioning of the whole turn taken by North American (US) psychoanalysis, including its hermeneutic, socio-constructivist and narrative approaches (Kahn, 2014). These critics object

to the move taken by the relational schools from drive to affects in clinical psychoanalysis, and to the ensuing disregard for metapsychology it entailed (Anzieu-Premmereur, in: Durieux et Fine, 2000). They voice strong concerns on the role that the emotional engagement of the analyst came to play in North-American psychoanalysis. Empathy, as understood and practiced by the intersubjectivists, is very different from Freud's understanding of the concept of *Einfühlung*, borrowed from Theodor Lipps and is incompatible with Freud's concept of *Versagung* (refusement), linked to the benevolent neutrality of the analyst, an essential ingredient of the psychoanalytic method (Kahn 2014). More precisely, emotional engagement of the analyst, as well as empathy, draws the attention towards the quality and to the content of the affect rather than towards its quantitative manifestations. Furthermore, the conjunction of both elements tend to provide a more soothing environment than the classical analytic frame, thus controlling, obviously with good intentions, the building up of intensity in affective manifestations. Such a regulation prevents the analysis of the quest for excitation characteristic of libidinal processes. Consequently, as viewed from this perspective, the relational approaches do not provide the necessary conditions to properly take into consideration the economic point of view, yet an essential element of Freudian metapsychology and a discriminating sign of unconscious processes at work (Widlöcher, 2004; Kahn, 2014).

Along the same lines, other critics emphasize the insistence on meaning and on the co-construction of meaning featured in the relational paradigm. They underline that this position does not account for the characteristics of unconscious derivatives, which, by definition are resistant to meaning and that it contributes to the assimilation of psychoanalysis with cognitive therapy. They also object to the contingent and secondary role granted to metapsychology, and to, what they regard as the pluralism and eclecticism of relational theories. (Kahn, 2014; Tessier, 2014a).

III. Cca. Lagache And Lacan: Refusal of the interpersonal/relational paradigm

Lagache and Lacan are usually mentioned among the first who referred to the concept of intersubjectivity in French psychoanalysis (Roussillon, 2004), though they both used it in different ways.

Daniel Lagache held that psychoanalysis had a place within psychology, which he envisioned as a unitary field. Though he acknowledged that subjectivity and intersubjectivity were not psychoanalytic concepts, he underlined the intersubjective aspects of the clinical situation and considered subjectivity and intersubjectivity as basic notions on which a preliminary reflection was necessary within psychology, so psychologists can contribute to their subsequent developments (Lagache, 1961).

Jacques Lacan had a very different view on the relation between psychoanalysis and psychology: he considered the two disciplines to be irreconcilable. He objected to a phenomenological approach of intersubjectivity, arguing that such a view was merely describing a relation with a similar other: it remained in the order of the imaginary and neutralized the radical otherness of the unconscious. For Lacan the key notion was the *subject*,

not subjectivity: the “Subject of the unconscious” is preceded by language. The subject is ruled by the symbolic order, an order from which the individual tries to escape through the imaginary formations of the ego, among which stands subjectivity itself. To Lacan, the term unconscious concerns the very idea of how to conceptualize the subject. His whole project is accordingly the *study of the unconscious subject*.

Though Lacan’s definition of the subject may not be the basis of all the contemporary rejection of the relational approaches’ to intersubjectivity, most arguments against it nonetheless revolve around the fact that the discovery of the Freudian unconscious brought about an overall disruption in the notion of subjectivity. Such approach reveals a form of suspicion towards the phenomenological perspective in psychoanalysis.

III. Ccb. Metapsychological account of intersubjectivity: Laplanche’s General Theory of Seduction

Jean Laplanche extended Lacan’s position of the ‘traumatic real’ more clearly into the intersubjective realm by emphasizing the enigmatic messages that partly originate beyond language and are passed from mother to infant before he/she has the capacity to comprehend them. The enigmatic core defies final explanation and can only be endlessly translated and retranslated throughout life. Here, the analyst-patient relationship is fundamentally asymmetrical and analogous to the primary dissymmetry the patient experienced in infancy. Substituting Freud’s idea of repression with that of translation, Laplanche (Laplanche 1999b, 2011) has paved the way for an inter-subjective explanation of the constitution of the unconscious. In the normal communication between an adult and the child the adult transmits enigmatic messages due to the unconscious of the adult. The child will translate these messages as well as it can. What is lost in translation constitutes the unconscious of the child.

Laplanche proposes an original view on the ‘inter-human’ source of psychic life. For Laplanche, metapsychology is not only a conception of the soul: it must account for the therapeutic action of clinical psychoanalysis. Laplanche’s theory is based on the primacy of the other – the historical and concrete adults or older children who take care of the infant – in the formation of the sexual unconscious and of the ego as well (Laplanche and Fletcher, 1993; Laplanche, 1999c; Laplanche 2011). The primacy of the other is also a feature of the analytic situation. Though it may look similar to the relational conception, Laplanche’s theory differs substantially from the intersubjectivist/interpersonal paradigm in the following fundamental aspects:

1) The centrality of infantile sexuality in the formation of the human soul, and consequently, in the formation of the unconscious and of the ego as well (Laplanche defines infantile sexuality in a very different way than the classical French approach and also from the Lacanian perspective. This sexuality, insofar as it involves in the sexual unconscious, is not only perverse and polymorphous, but is auto-erotic and primarily masochistic, connected to fantasy and not procreative: it comes prior to the differences of the sexes, even to the differences of gender.)

2) The role of the message compromised by the unconscious fantasies of the adults as the vehicle for seduction, rather than of the facts and events taking place in the relations between adults and children. The message acts as the mediator between reality and psychic reality;

3) A specific definition of seduction;

4) The asymmetry between adult and child, which is echoed in the analytic situation;

5) The realism of the unconscious which, though formed from left overs of a message coming from another person – the compromised and non-translatable part of this message – acquires a thing-like quality by being cut out from the meaning and from signification (Laplanche, 1987, Tessier, 2014a, Tessier 2014b).

Like other critics of the use of the USA concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis, Laplanche is reluctant to refer to notions such as subject, subjectivity and intersubjectivity; in his view, psychoanalysis was born out of the discovery that the sexual unconscious, manifesting itself like a force which seems alien to the individual, is inaccessible to education or goodwill, and is irreducible to a psychology of needs and motivation. Laplanche's debate with the relational and constructivist approach in American psychoanalysis also revolve around the issue of alienation: in his view, by refusing the "alien" character of unconscious and of the way unconscious fantasies make themselves known, the relational schools have deprived themselves of the possibility of thinking in terms of dis-alienation. In Laplanche's view, they consequently have missed the opportunity of accounting for the emancipatory action of psychoanalysis (Laplanche 1999b,c).

III. Ccc. Green And Roussillon: The Qualified Acceptance of Intersubjectivity Within the Intrapsychic/ Intersubjective Dialectic

Though the US intersubjective orientation as such gets a very reserved reception in French psychoanalysis, British object relations theory and British Middle School gained a considerable influence in French psychoanalytic circles and lead to an integration of the concept of intersubjectivity by way of what is usually called the dialectic between intrapsychic and intersubjective (Green 2002) - or intrapsychic and interpersonal (Roussillon 2004).

André Green (2002) does not usually refer to intersubjectivity as such, but to "*the intersubjective*"¹ (Transforming an adjective into a noun through the use of a definite article substantializes the concept and make it more abstract, more philosophical. It is a common trend in French psychoanalysis, as in: "le sexuel", "l'infantile", "l'actuel", "le négatif", "le pulsionnel".)

In opposition to Laplanche and others who have favored Freud's (first) topography, Green has in his numerous writings pointed to the second topography/structural theory as being more helpful in the work with non-neurotic patients.

Green argues that the dynamic between the intrapsychic and the intersubjective was already present in Freud's theory through the reference to the object. He joins the critical voices against the American relational paradigm in psychoanalysis, insisting on the fact that it reduces psychoanalysis to the mere mutuality of relationships, and thus transforms it into a 'cognitive behavioral' therapy endowed with an experimental science status, granted on the basis of disputable outcome studies. But, at the same time, relying on the work of Winnicott and Bion, Green underlines the necessity to account for the intersubjective in psychoanalysis through an "opening dialectic" based on the relation between drive and object. This dialectic ensures a proper basis for the exploration of the drives as the underground of psychic life.

In his paper "Intrapsychic-Intersubjective" from 2000, Green states: "It is in the intertwining of the internal worlds of the two partners of the analytic couple that intersubjectivity takes on substance" (Green, 2000, p. 2). Two fields were thus defined: that of the intrapsychic on the inside, resulting from the relations between the parts comprising it, and that of the intersubjective, between inside and outside, whose development involves a relationship to the other. For where psychic structuring is concerned, the outside is not only reality, but at its heart, symbolizing the object, which in fact refers to the other subject. "The object is thus situated in two places: it belongs both to the internal space on the two levels of the conscious and the unconscious, and it is also present in the external space as object, as other, as another subject" (ibid, p.3). The intersubjective relationship here connects two intrapsychic subjects. Force and meaning are intertwined and combine their effects.

During his visit in New York in 2004, Green stressed that when we work with patients, we work to create representations. Representations are not the basic primitive elements of the id; they are the transformations of them found in the ego ... The first step is transformation from instinctual impulse to unconscious representation... Transformation is not spontaneous. It operates thanks to the meeting of the instinctual impulse with the object. It is the object that favors the creation of an unconscious representation, a "thing" presentation that will be transformed into a word presentation and give the initial state of the impulse a communicable form through language.

Green portrayed the economic scheme of the psyche in which the unconscious consists of a branching network of drive derivatives (as representations of things) seeking a pathway toward discharge. The dynamic nature of these representations that represent a primary form of the drive, move them toward action or consciousness. The moving, dynamic aspect of the body-based drives of the unconscious always seeking discharge and determining the actions of the individual has everyday clinical resonance (Green, 2002).

By referring to the unconscious as the "unsymbolized" included in it is what was never symbolized (i.e. the so-called "primitive states" or the contents of "primal repression") or what was "*de*-symbolized" i.e. whose links with the rest of the symbolic network were broken (i.e. what was secondarily repressed). In both cases, what cannot be put into some usage (i.e. become conscious) will work its way toward other channels of expression, with enactment and somatization as the two main classes thereof.

René Roussillon (2004a,b) argues in favor of the *integration of the concept of intersubjectivity* in psychoanalysis. Though he considers that the way it is used in the North American (US) intersubjective school is reductive, he states that this notion can become a psychoanalytic concept through a metapsychological approach based on a sound psychoanalytic understanding of the subject, in other words, on a conception of the subject that includes the unconscious dimension of subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Winnicott, but also on Trevarthen's developments about primary intersubjectivity, he defines intersubjectivity as the meeting between a subject moved by drives and endowed with an unconscious life, with an object who is also another subject endowed with drives and unconscious life as well. He emphasizes the need to address the role of the drives and of sexuality in intersubjectivity: according to him the drive serves as a message (*la pulsion messagère*), inasmuch as it seeks for recognition by an object. For Roussillon, intersubjectivity eventually coincides with intentionality (Roussillon, 2014).

Other authors also expressed a qualified acceptance of the concept of intersubjectivity in French psychoanalysis. In his Rapport to the *Congrès des psychanalystes de langue française*, **Bernard Brusset** (2005) emphasizes the need to refrain from opposing object relation theory to drive theory. He underlines that the integration of the two paradigms sheds light on new possibilities of symbolization and '*subjectivization*'. In the field of child analysis, **Bernard Golse** (Golse and Roussillon, 2010) also uses the concept of intersubjectivity as a tool for understanding articulation between two heterogeneous psychic spaces and their ensuing recognition. **Daniel Widlöcher** (2004) is more reserved about the use of the terms "subject" and "subjectivity" in psychoanalysis. Though he reaffirms that intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis should not lead to the 'banalization' of the analytic relation between analyst and patient and to its conceptualization as a mere interaction between two persons, he emphasizes the need to move away from a neutral observer status in psychoanalysis, and to acknowledge that knowledge in the field is gained through access to the *subjective experience of another*. Such a situation implies *psychic interactivity*, a concept, which he summarizes by using the expression "*co-thinking*" (2004, 2014a, 2014b).

III. Cd. View from France: Intersubjectivity in French Psychoanalysis in Europe

In Europe, the specific use of the term intersubjectivity in French psychoanalysis is relatively recent, and frequently linked with the question of the treatment of borderline, narcissistic and psychotic patients. Intersubjectivity was in the past used as a descriptive word mainly in psychology and not fully recognized in psychoanalysis. The French conception of intersubjectivity is quite different from the American conceptions regarding ego psychology (H. Hartmann, E. Kris, R. Loewenstein) or the theory of the self (H. Kohut school) or the theory of objects relations (Edith Jacobson, O. Kernberg). Many French authors give preference to the word *interpsychic* rather than intersubjectivity and the conception of intersubjectivity is coming from the study of the transference counter-transference situation during the session. The great interest in metapsychology in French psychoanalysis prompted most French psychoanalysts to keep the concept of drives and to think about the articulation of the drive with the object. Their

interest is still dominated by the work of Freud and the reflection on the two metapsychologies he proposed. Even if since a long time the role of the object in the psychic structuration of a subject is recognized in French psychoanalysis, the current use of the term intersubjectivity qualify in France the encounter between two subjects, patient and analyst, during the treatment.

III. Cda. The Ego, the Self, the Subject and the Object

The premise of the introduction of intersubjectivity can be found since the fifties, through D. Lagache who used the term of intersubjectivity about the analytic situation, as a psychological description but without theorizing it. J. Lacan who argued for the necessity to read and return to Freud, was more interested in the question of the subject than in intersubjectivity. He considered subjectivity and intersubjectivity as not psychoanalytical. His main concept was the “subject of the unconscious”.

One difficulty should be pointed out in reading Freud concerning translation into French and one consideration is important as regards his way of thinking.

First the problem was and still is of how to translate “Ich”. In French, the term chosen was “moi”, that is the “ego” but it is not fully satisfying. “Ich” means also “je” (e.g. “I”) or “le sujet”, the subject.

The other remark is that nowhere is Freud talking of internal object or external object, something introduced by M. Klein and her followers. Freud is only talking about the object and it covers a lot of aspects – from the object of the world outside to the object of the fantasies – without separation between all the meanings of an object. Through the influence of reading Freud, few French psychoanalysts followed Klein’s conception of an ego and fantasies and internal objects since the beginning. Most French psychoanalysts prefer to use the concept of representation to the one of internal objects, and keep the ambiguity of the notion of the object, between the object of the drive and the external object.

Lacan introduced the idea that the ego is alienated and that the only interest of psychoanalysis was “the subject of the unconscious”, which is not the ego, this one emerging through the “mirror stage” only to be alienated by identifications (1966). There was for Lacan a split between the ego and the subject. It was also a way to fight the conceptions of ego psychology and authors like R. Loewenstein, who was, before his departure to the US, one of the founders and an eminent member of the Paris Society. In another and personal line of research, P. Aulagnier had described the birth of the “je”, the “I” (1975).

Whereas in Great Britain, such authors as W. Bion and D.W. Winnicott were describing the role of the mother in the birth of the psyche of an infant, the French work on the *metapsychological representation* was the following: **Jean Laplanche** described an object whose enigmatic messages were the source of the drive inside the subject (1987). On the opposite side was **André Green** arguing for a drive rooted in the biological body, having to look for the object to become represented (1997).

In French psychoanalysis, few authors had use of the notion of the self, even if all were cautious about the adaptative part of the ego and none could adhere to the Ego psychology idea of an ego without drives related actions and conflicts. The idea of a true self and a false self (D.W. Winnicott) was much accepted but not completely because the idea of the self as really different from the ego was not welcomed. Some authors refer to the self in different ways, not exactly the self of Jacobson or the one of Kohut. The difficulty in using the notion of the self in a clear way was probably a reason it did not had a great success in France (see the separate entry SELF).

Such difficulties led analysts to use the concept of subject with a different meaning than the one of Lacan whose theory and practice were not followed by French IPA psychoanalysts. The idea was that there was a part of the ego integrating the drive impulses through the link with the objects, i.e. the subject. This was the work of **Raymond Cahn** (1991) who put the accent more on the '*subjective appropriation*' process than on the subject itself. This work was followed by a reflection on the *subjectivation process* with main contributions by **Bernard Golse** and **René Roussillon**, in a book edited by François Richard and Steven Wainrib (2006). **Green** (2002), facing this complexity proposed a '*lignée subjectale*' [a subject line].

III. Cdb. Objects Relations, Interactions and Interpsychic

An important French author, **Maurice Bouvet**, worked on object relations theory at the same time as E. Jacobson but in a different way. This line of thinking led to researches on the transference-countertransference dynamic inside the session and **Michel De M'Uzan** (1978/1994) described the '*chimera*' and the '*paradoxical thinking*', something created inside the analyst during the session, coming from the patient and the analyst and figured in the analyst mind, a communication from unconscious to unconscious. It was the description of an intersubjective being, part of the two protagonists of the session. At another level, other authors studied interactions between patient and analyst, always with the preoccupation of the unconscious and of the drives in mind. **René Kaës** (1976) studied the group functioning highlighting the play of intersubjectivity and the creation of a new entity inside a group, the '*group psychic apparatus*' (l'appareil psychique groupal). Investigating mainly psychosis and schizophrenia since the beginning of the sixties, **Paul-Claude Racamier** (1992) described the *links*, the interactions and the roles inside a psychotic family or inside institutions. **Serge Lebovici** (1994) introduced in France the notion of enactment, for him '*mise en jeu*', which was the interpersonal acting repetition inside the session between the analyst and the couple mother and child, coming from the transference and counter-transference interplay. The work of Belgian Francophone analysts **Nicole Carels**, **Marie-France Dispaux**, **Jacqueline Godfrind-Haber**, **Maurice Haber** (2002) was about the role of the interpsychic space, receiving transferential and counter-transferential movements, on the patient's intrapsychic changes. They took into consideration the '*shared acted experience*' (l'expérience agie partagée) and worked on the boundaries between intrapsychic and interpsychic. **Bernard Brusset** (2006) who prefers to speak of *interpsychic* rather than intersubjectivity, too phenomenological for him, introduced, concerning the realm of interpsychic, the idea of '*The*

Third Topography’ (see above) which is a *metapsychology of the links*, where projections and splitting take place and where the question of the boundaries is highlighted.

This line of thought and terminology is influential well beyond French analysis, although sometimes used slightly differently. In the recent work of **Stefano Bolognini** (2016), the ‘*interpsychic*’ is seen as a “functional pre-subjective level where two persons can exchange internal contents, through the utilization of ‘normal’ communicative projective identifications” (Bolognini 2016, p.110). As an extended psychic dimension, it reflects the reciprocal influence of two minds, which is experienced from inside, gaining a new, more specific effectiveness, first in containing and then in symbolizing (Bolognini 2004).

III. Cdc. Intersubjectivity: Considering Two Psyches, Two Subjects and the Relational Dimension

André Green (2002) gave a frame to the French conception of intersubjectivity, taking into account the couple constituted by the drive and the object. The object reveals the drive: “Construction of the object leads, with a retroactive effect, to the drive construction which constructs the object” (2002, p.54, translated). Intrapsychic work and intersubjective work seem to be two faces of the same phenomenon: on one side the drive is pushing toward representation, on the other, the object plays a transformational role in this work of representation. So intersubjectivity is viewed as the double encounter of two persons and of two psychic apparatuses including unconscious and agencies invested by the drives.

René Roussillon (2008) proposed a definition of intersubjectivity, inspired by the work of D.W. Winnicott: “[...] the word of intersubjective permits us to think of the encounter of a subject, moved by drives and having an unconscious psychic life, with an object, who is also another subject, also moved by a drive life in part unconscious” [p.2, translated]. Going further than A. Green, R. Roussillon proposes the messenger function of the drive: If the drive is significant for the psychic apparatus of a subject, the drive is also through affects, talks, action and behavior, a presentation or a representative significantly referred to the object. And this means that the answer of the object to the drive message of the subject is fundamental in the psychoanalytic work. R. Roussillon proposes in “intersubjectivité et inter-intentionnalité” (2014) [intersubjectivity and inter intentionality] the idea that what is at the core of intersubjectivity is the exploration of the unconscious intentionality of each partner during the session.

III. D. Developments in Latin America

III. Da. Introduction

In Latin America, the term intersubjectivity must be subject to specifications in order to indicate to which theoretical perspective it refers and the ways in which it is applied. This

clarification is important because, particularly in Argentina, this concept is used by two different schools: the *link* perspective, and the *relational* perspective.

a) The *link* perspective is based on the British model of object relations developed by Bion and his followers as well as on post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis, especially René Kaës. This approach has been well received in psychoanalytic societies. It is applied to groups, families, and couples.

b) The *relational* perspective has been very well received in Chile and Peru and is steadily growing in Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. This perspective is based on the ideas of Ferenczi, Balint, Fairbairn, Bowlby, Winnicott, Kohut, and, more contemporarily, S. Mitchell, J. Greenberg, D. Stern, R. Stolorow, O. Renik, J. Benjamin, J. Lichtenberg, L. Fosshage, D. Orange, and numerous authors of the North American relational and intersubjective schools. In Chile, a very active chapter of the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (IARPP) was established several years ago that organized a well attended conference in 2013. A small IARPP chapter was also established in Peru in 2017. Some of the members in both countries are also IPA members, while others have received different kinds of training, such as Jungian, cognitive, systemic, and mindfulness training.

Between *link* and *relational* psychoanalysis there are convergences and divergences. Among the convergences are the concept of the transference not just as a repetitive but also as a novel event. Both approaches, moreover, value ‘chance’ and ‘the event’ as psychic motivators. Major divergences are in the following areas:

1) The motivations that drive psychic activity: the link approach does not part ways with the Freudian postulate of infantile sexual desire as the essential motivation, while the relational approach takes Oedipal desire into account but also includes other motivations such as the ones that may be satisfied by specific actions carried out by other human beings (attachment, recognition, and so on). It incorporates psychic regulation, exploration, play, and referred to, among others, by Winnicott, Kohut, Lichtenberg, and H. Bleichmar.

2) The empirical basis: The link perspective, applied to groups, couples, and families, does not include a paradigmatic change. The relational approach is rooted in the paradigmatic change of the analyst’s work. Here, the analyst is no longer considered an interpreter of drives and defenses but, rather, a facilitator of the analyst/patient relationship. As a consequence, this relationship will give rise to the ‘re-edition’ of transferences that generate conflict and to the edition of new experiences developed in the relational field (translation of the “*edición*” and “*reedición*” as *edition* and *re-edition*, despite the difference in usage between Spanish and English, in order to highlight the novelty of the concept, by C.Nemirovsky).

In Latin America, especially in Argentina, there is a need for distinction among different meanings of the term intersubjectivity. Felipe Muller (2009, p. 331) refers to these differences as follows: “In Latin America, and especially in Argentina, we must distinguish among different meanings of the word intersubjectivity. In River Plate psychoanalysis, until a few years ago the word *intersubjetivity* was used primarily by Lacanian groups focused on Lacan’s first seminars or by groups oriented toward group, family, or couple psychoanalysis.”

Link psychoanalysts adhere to the ideas that Isidoro Berenstein and Janine Puget have developed in Argentina since the 1990s. Their conception might be called *interlinking among desiring beings*. Significant contributors to this line of thought, Rodolfo Moguillansky, Julio Moreno, and Miguel Spivacow argue that the idea of the link is present already in Bion's work in the notion of reverie, which is based on the early psyche's failure to process emotions. Such insufficiency requires that the mother metabolize the baby's emotions to enable psychic growth. These authors stress that the other's presence is necessary to metabolize and thus modify the experiences of an immature psyche so that they may be transformed into thoughts. They start from the idea of link. They consider that every steady *intersubjective link* is established on the basis of an experience of fusion, on the illusory belief in a meeting with someone identical or complementary: the One. Its illusory nature does not prevent the One from contributing to the structuring process. The narcissistic consistency of the One is what establishes the new group, and its effectiveness drives group members to become subjects of the link. The group created by subjects, in turn, anchors and creates unconscious places that are also a source of meaning. They generate unconscious significations that determine them, and thus produce new subjectivities. (Moguillansky, quoted in Benhaim, 2012, translation by Nemirovsky)

III. Db. Historical Aspects of Intersubjective Ideas in Latin America

Enrique Pichon-Rivière was a pioneer in the incorporation of other motivations into the conception of how the psyche is constituted and develops. One of the founders of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association in 1942, Pichon-Rivière was always interested in the social aspects of the mind. In 1953 he created the School of Social Psychology. His contributions are based on a social conception of human beings and are reflected in his ideas on the significance of the analytic couple as a relationship. "The link is the minimum observation unit," he would repeatedly tell his students. The vicissitudes of the drives and defenses may be appreciated from a different angle when they are situated within a context in which the analytic link is the operational unit. From this vantage point, we can observe the phenomena that unfold in our consulting rooms. The reductionist drive/defense perspective is strongly modified when the link perspective is incorporated (with its family, microgroup, and cultural variables).

These changes modify the analyst's work during the session. Pichon-Rivière describes some motivations that lead to the establishment of links with other human beings. These are the need for self-preservation, for safety, for dependence, for protection, and for communication. This author incorporated into his theory the ideas of thinkers who had been kept on the sidelines of psychoanalysis, from Adler to the North American culturalists (Fromm, Horney, Sullivan), as well as of theoreticians from other fields, such as Kurt Lewin, who introduced the field theory that the Barangers would develop later on. From these perspectives, the formation of the unconscious and defensive manifestations are considered within an intersubjective context. Alejandro Ávila Espada (2013) points out that one of the key intersubjectively relevant contributions of Pichon-Rivière is the concept of Conceptual,

Referential, and Operational Framework (ECRO), which integrates an explanatory theory and the operational dimension into the social framework of a specific social context. Each agent, each subject positions himself or herself from his or her ECRO, which needs to be identified. Based on their ECRO, therapists must detect the spokesperson in the group (that is, the identified sick person, who is the spokesperson for the group or family illness) and analyze the roles, ideologies, and basic misunderstandings at play in the *link*. At the same time, they must uncover family secrets, splitting mechanisms, helplessness and omnipotence fantasies, and basic triangular situations.

Additionally, **Ávila Espada** (2013) states that Pichon-Rivière did not have direct contact with North American interpersonalists (Sullivan) or culturalists (Fromm). Yet he developed a social theory that interprets individuals as the product of their relationship with both internal and external objects. He thus converges, to a great extent, with Sullivan in the view of *needs* as an alternative concept to the drives and desire. He speaks of three types of needs, namely, self-preservation and safety needs, emotional needs, and the need for personal and social development and fulfillment. According to Espada, Pichon-Rivière sees the unconscious as an intrapsychic field of an interpersonal and group nature, as a quality of the psyche constituted by a series of behavioral patterns accumulated by subjects in relation to the links in which they participate and the roles they play in these links.

Ana Pampliega de Quiroga (1977) claims that Pichon-Rivière defines a group as:

“a restricted set of people, connected by time and space constants and articulated by their mutual internal representation, who implicitly or explicitly engage in a task that constitutes their goal and who interact through complex mechanisms of role adoption and assignment. This association of needs and their satisfaction, the foundation of every task and of every learning experience, defines subjects as subjects of the act, as actors, and situates them, based on their specific tasks, in their historical dimension, in their everyday life, and in their temporality” (Oral Communication with Nemirovsky).

While Pichon-Rivière’s ideas were overshadowed by the simultaneous expansion of Kleinian theory and later by the prevalence of Lacanian theory, they informed the thoughts of many distinguished Latin American analysts such as J. Bleger, D. Liberman, T. Gioia, E. Rolla, H. Racker, S. Resnik, E. Rodrigué, M. and W. Baranger, S. Bleichmar, F. Ulloa, H. Kesselman, N Caparrós, H. Bleichmar, and H. Fiorini, as well as of other mental health professionals outside the field of psychoanalysis. Among them was **Mauricio Goldenberg**, psychiatrist and a pioneer of a groundbreaking conception of mental health that saw illness as the product of complex interactions with the social milieu, who created the first psychiatry ward in a general hospital in Buenos Aires Province, Argentina. There he summoned physicians, psychologists, social workers, nurses, music therapists, and occupational therapists, composing an interdisciplinary team that was consistent with his conception of mental health.

Heinrich Racker (1957), for his part, focuses his attention, following Ferenczi, on analysts’ observation of their own participation in the analytic field. Although he uses Kleinian vocabulary, Racker does not consider aggression a product of the drives, but reactive.

Furthermore, he stresses the healing power of the analyst's love (Avila Espada, 2013), quoting Mitchell (1997). For Mitchell, who brought Racker's ideas into the fuller relational context, transference and countertransference are two components of a unit; they give life to each other and create the interpersonal relationship of the analytic situation.

José Bleger (1967), an eminent disciple of Pichon-Rivière, developed a behavior theory based on structuralist and Marxist ideas. He propounds three levels of behavioral expression, namely, the mind, the body, and the external world. These three levels interact in a dynamic way.

Madeleine and Willy Baranger were French-born analysts who moved to Argentina in 1946 and joined the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (de León de Bernardi, 2000). According to W. Baranger (1959, p. 81),

“based on its practice, psychoanalysis must unravel its own objectivation principles and accept its role as a (in some ways exceptional) science of humankind. It must accept its nature as a science of dialogue (that is, a bi-personal psychology), its nature as an interpretive science (...) with essentially original laws and validation techniques that are different from those that govern the natural sciences. Epistemological research has the primary task of formulating the conditions that will ensure the validity of our interpretations”.

The Barangers' vision, however, differs from an extreme subjectivist or interpretive position that is primarily focused on the analyst's point of view as creator of the interpretation. According to these authors,

“the systematic study of what is taking place in the analytic bi-personal situation is the only road of access to an ideal of validation of knowledge that is truly specific to psychoanalysis. This currently conceivable ideal is realized (without being formulated) in several recent essays that provide a very thorough description of the analytic situation with interpretations and changes occurring in limited temporal sets” (W. Baranger 1959, p. 81).

They also claim that, since analysts' observation involves both the observation of the patient and a correlative self-observation, it can only be defined as observation of the field (M. and W. Baranger, 2008). Later, when they develop the notion of *bastion*, they suggest that analysts can establish a “second look” over the totality of the analytic field, especially over the obstacles to the process, which are posed by both patient and analyst. In their own words,

“this has led us to propose the introduction of several terms: ‘field’, ‘bastion’, ‘second look’. When the process stumbles or halts, the analyst can only question himself about the obstacle, by encircling himself and his analysand, Oedipus and the Sphinx, in a second look, in a total view: this is the field” (M. Baranger, W. Baranger, and J. Mom, 1983, p. 1).

III. Dc. The Relational Perspective in Latin America, with a Focus on Argentina

Álvarez de Toledo (1954) states, in a language similar to Pichon's, that being in analysis, associating, and interpreting involve a relationship among act, image, and object that is actualized in the act of speaking and listening to the analyst. Act, sensation, image, body, and mind recover their unity when patients can integrate the first oral experiences with the corresponding sensations, feelings, and images.

David Liberman (1963, 1970, 1976, 1982), who also studied with Pichon-Rivière, developed his ideas based on communication theory. This author understands illness as an alteration of the learning and communication process that leads to a deficit in subjects' adjustment to reality. His readings of Roman Jakobson, Jürgen Ruesch, and Gregory Bateson, added to his knowledge of Kleinian theory, enabled him to categorize the prevalence of different communication styles in different types of patients. Liberman uses semiotic and linguistic instruments to study the analytic sessions. He believes that psychoanalysis is a science with an empirical basis that may be examined a) during the session, conducted by the therapist on the patient, and b) in the patient, the therapist, or the link. Liberman thought of the analyst-patient relationship as a combination of verbal and nonverbal expressive styles that may or may not favor clinical work.

Silvia Bleichmar (1985, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2006a,b, 2007, 2008, 2009 a,b,c, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2016) views ethics and the relationship between the biological and the social as relevant research topics. Bleichmar points out that the production of subjectivity is not a psychoanalytic but a sociological concept. It is tied to the ways in which societies determine the modes of constitution of subjects who can integrate into systems that grant them a place. It is constituting, or 'instituting', as Castoriadis-Aulagnier (1975) might call it. This means that the production of subjectivity is linked to a set of elements that will produce a socially acceptable historical subject. There is still a psyche that is articulated by defenses and repression. Psychoanalysis cannot leave out the notions of defense and repression. It is something that exceeds the production of historical subjectivity and has to do with the ways in which subjects are constituted (S. Bleichmar, 2003).

Terencio Gioia (1996) focused on the theory of instincts and its correlations with ethology. He emphatically denied the presence of the death instinct in living beings. He based his clinical conclusions on Bowlby and Peterfreund's theories, and argued that fear generates hatred and aggression, and not the other way around.

Hugo Bleichmar (1997, 2000), Argentine author based in Madrid, advanced the Modular Transformational Approach in the 1990s. This is a modular-transformational model of psychic functioning based on the coexistence of diverse motivational systems such as the narcissism, self/hetero-preservation, attachment, and sensuality/sexuality systems. This author claims that the unconscious "is a complex structure, with modules that are governed by different rules of operation and have different origins and contents whose inscriptions have multiple degrees of representability and of intensity or strength (cathexis)" (H. Bleichmar, 1997, p.14).

Bleichmar no longer considers that the unconscious operates in a homogeneous way. Rather, the different modules or systems, generated by way of secondary inscription, primary inscription or non-inscription, are responsible for different modes of operation. According to this author, there are five types of the unconscious: one that generates interactions, one that generates identifications, one where repression prevails (repressed), one where other modes of operation prevail, and a deactivated unconscious.

Bleichmar claims that the modular model goes against the principle of homogeneity in psychoanalytic theory. He describes two conceptions in Freud's work, namely, the modular and the homogeneity conceptions, which prevail alternately. The principle of homogeneity appears in the evolutionary conception of psychosexual development, which is marked by the libidinal satisfaction of bodily zones whose vicissitudes determine not only the shape taken by bonds with objects but also psychopathological syndromes. The organizing principle, which characterizes homogeneity, is applied to the developmental stages of the libido, from which character formations (anal, oral, and so on) and their correspondent sets of symptoms derive. The homogeneity principle also dominates in the field of therapy.

Freud focuses his technique on making conscious the unconscious (on expanding consciousness). He argues that if something is restored to consciousness, it stops having an effect from the unconscious. Bleichmar, in turn, stresses the significance of heterogeneity based on his modular-transformational theory and on the characteristics of the object.

Another original intersubjectively relevant contribution by this author is the notion of "passionate original beliefs." These correspond to the effects on the subject of judgments uttered by others throughout his or her life. These beliefs do not allude only to judgments on the subject that transform into self-representations. They also include rules transmitted by significant others that govern the construction of these mental representations. They are not simple cognitive structures. Rather, they are created in an ongoing articulation with affectivity in a two-way process.

Miquel Hoffmann (2013) has contributed to the development of intersubjective thinking for many years. His book "Más allá del Yo. El Ser, la Persona" [Beyond the Ego: Being, Person] reflects this contribution. In his latest book, this author insists on human beings' need to preserve their ability to be a reflective being, a being in search of an identity, without overlooking the social changes that permeate and shape them. Hoffman urges us to devote time to ourselves so that we can ask ourselves about our desires, tastes, and preferences, about the self, about the forces that help us change.

Hector Fiorini (2007) has worked for many years in the field of targeted therapies and practices a psychoanalysis that he defines as "open." Open psychoanalysis, for this author, is an ongoing development of psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice, including many of the technical innovations introduced after Freud's times. Its organizing core is the conception of therapeutic processes as a systematic work that activates patients and analysts' creative capacities. Fiorini goes deeper into topics tackled by the Jungian, psychodrama, Gestalt,

transpersonal, and bioenergetic schools. He draws from the aspects of Freud's work that go in this direction and introduces categories that were not addressed by Freudian metapsychology.

Thinking of specific situations, that is, of an inquiry into a psyche that is situated rather than abstract, implies an approach of looking at psychic experience in its involvement in real life situations. **Ruben Zukerfeld** (2004, 2009) in his own work and in his collaborations with **Zonis de Zukerfeld**, has often referred to a version of 'third topography', which he defines as a "graphic metaphorical representation of heterogeneity and the coexistence of unconscious modes of functioning with a representational and non-representational structure, which constitutes the metapsychological perspective of multiple memory systems that operate simultaneously." Reviewing psychoanalytic ideas on the early psyche that were developed in the last decades, this author (Zukerfeld 2009) sets forth the concept of tertiary processes. He states in this regard that a 'radical unconscious heterogeneity' is present from the start; almost all post-Freudian thinkers, claims Zukerfeld, speak about different modes of unconscious processing. Bion alludes to beta elements and a beta-screen 'as an unintegrated agglomeration and nameless terror'. Winnicott refers to the fear of breakdown 'as a sign-trace that could not be symbolized'. Lacan points to 'the Real as being outside language and inaccessible to symbolization'. Zukerfeld also includes in this category Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier's (1975) notions of 'the originary' and 'pictogram'; Joyce McDougall's (1991) 'theater of the impossible' and archaic hysteria; M'Uzan's (1978/1994) 'essential splitting'; Pierre Marty's (1990) 'parallel dynamisms'; André Missenard's (1990) concept of 'unrepresentable'; Guy Rosolato's (1978) notion of 'the unknown and unknowable'; Kaës's (1976) idea of the archaic and of 'radical negativity'; Roussillon's (2004a,b) concept of 'pre-repression unconscious'; Césaire Botella's (2005) delegation of the 'non-figurable' and the 'psychic beyond-country'; Green's (1998) ideas of 'the pre-psychic', 'the work of the negative', and splitting; Julio Aragonés's (1999) notion of 'the double immortal'; Norberto Marucco's (2007) 'ungovernable traces'; Christophe Dejours' (1991) 'primary unconscious'; and H. Bleichmar's (1997) 'originary unconscious'.

Carlos Nemirovsky (1993, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2018) aims to articulate theories of drive/defense (essentially Freudian and Kleinian developments) with the principles of relational theory based on Mitchell. Nemirovsky (2017, 2018) developed the concept of *edition* in psychoanalysis as the mechanism whereby it is possible to create psyche based on the meeting between two subjects, one who is willing to trust, and another who is available to respond with a specific action. Such a meeting may generate a hitherto non-existent (neo)formation of psyche. This notion differs from that of Jaime Lutenberg (1995), who, based on Bion's ideas, defines edition as giving rise to the mental birth of facets of the analysand's personality that were never conscious or unconscious because they remained outside the dynamic region of the mind – sectors of the personality that, due to the splitting of the ego and a secondary defense added to it, remained engulfed in symbiotic bonds or embedded inside the personality.

For Nemirovsky (2018), the structure generated by the encounter was not previously present in the psyche. It lacked existence, for the subject had not had the experience that he or

she is now undergoing for the first time. The failures of the deficient environment prevented a meeting from happening at the earliest subjectivation stages. Nemirovsky compares edition to the creation of Winnicott's subjective object. Based on a meeting with an object, a new object is created that had not been in the subject's psyche until then. The created object is different from the object provided by the environment. The term *edition* refers to situations that appear for the first time, that are unprecedented, new (they are not repeated in the treatment but happen there for the first time). It can be clearly distinguished from re-edition or repetition (which Freud uses to describe the repetition of childhood history in neuroses or transference neuroses).

In several papers, and especially in his latest book, "Lo disruptivo y lo traumático. Vivencias y experiencias" [The Disruptive and the Traumatic: Lived Experiences and Experiences], **Moty Benyakar** (2016) describes "interpretations based on lived experiences," which aim to address each patient's unique capacity to internally process their experiences. In this way, we could avoid resorting to general 'causal interpretations', which may be ineffective with certain types of patients. Interpretations based on lived experiences encompass three types, namely, "figurative interpretations," "relational interpretations," and "meaning interpretations".

Gustavo Lanza Castelli (2015) discusses the concept of mentalization, and defines it as a predominantly preconscious activity, often intuitive and emotional. This activity allows us to understand our own and others' behavior in terms of mental states and processes.

Guillermo Lancelle (1984, 1999) introduced Kohut's work to Argentinian therapists, resulting in adoption of Kohut's concepts by many intersubjectivist Latin American authors. Paineira (1997, 2002), Pelento (1992) and Valeros (1977), in turn, would introduce and thoroughly examine Winnicottian thought in Latin America, with similar results.

Abel Fainstein has written extensively from a viewpoint, which is compatible with the intersubjective perspective. In "Lo repetido y lo nuevo: las intervenciones del analista" [The Repeated and The New: The analyst's interventions], Fainstein (2007), raises interesting questions tied to contemporary psychoanalytic practice, proposing that allowing for occasional satisfaction during the treatment of resistant patients by way of calculated fluctuations in analytic neutrality may be of value sometimes greater than however brilliant interpretation (Fainstein, 2007).

Also in Argentina, outside traditional psychoanalytic institutions, **Ricardo Rodulfo** (2010-2012, Oral Communication with Nemirovsky) has made significant contributions to intersubjectivity theory and clinical practice. His original perspective integrates theoretical and clinical propositions of Freud, Klein, Winnicott and their followers, as well as French theorists. He maintains a blog (<http://www.ricardorodulfo.com>), which is especially devoted to child psychoanalysis.

Jeanette Dryzun (2017), based on Hugo Bleichmar, Daniel Stern, Bjorn Killingmo, and Jessica Benjamin, among others, discusses the notion of intimacy within the conceptual field of contemporary psychoanalysis. She understands intimacy as a relational experience that expands the boundaries of the self and creates an emotional and mental mutuality among

participants. Dryzun illustrates different aspects of sharing within a circumscribed relational space. She highlights the phenomena of the meeting of minds between two subjects who are willing to connect and share subjective states. Such sharing performs the role of mutual recognition and affirmation in the context of a perspective focused on the crossroads of the intrapsychic and intersubjective worlds.

Additionally, numerous analysts active at universities and institutes of various Argentinian provinces have made the intersubjectively relevant syntheses of Freud, Winnicott, Piera Aulagnier, and Lacan, applied to conceptualizations of narcissism, self-esteem, shame and depression. Among them are Luis Hornstein, Roberto Arendar (2014) Jorge Rodríguez, Daniel Daniel and Eduardo Smalinsky, Alberto Samperisi and Elena Toranzo, and others. Followers of Bowlby's attachment theory are also growing. Mario Marrone, Elsa Wolfberg, Eliana Montuori, Ines diBártolo, Costanza Duhalde, Maria P. Allona, and Juan R. Aguilar, writing from this perspective, belong to the Argentine chapter of International Attachment Network (IAN), referenced, among others in Lorena Muñoz-Muñoz (2017) paper on "Self regulation and attachment in childhood".

In Chile, **Juan F. Jordán-Moore** (2008), one of the founders of International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (IARPP) in Chile, based his approach on Humberto Maturana's (1978) and Jose Antonio Infante's (1968) contextual perspectives. Starting from phenomenology's criticism of positivism's attempt to eliminate the observer's subjectivity, this author stresses the role of phenomenology in our understanding of the other in a way that is not mediated by conscious representations. Such an approach, claims Jordán, suggests the existence of a corporeal subject and a basic primary intersubjectivity in phenomenological empathy.

The intersubjective approach in Chilean psychoanalysis (ie. Rojas Jerez, Fernández Depetris and others) incorporate the ideas of Jung and the Gestalt school, as well as of Eastern philosophies (especially Buddhism in relation to mindfulness) and psychodrama. This synthetic approach is exemplified by **André Sassenfeld's** (2012) thorough discussion of relational thought. In 2017 Sassenfeld published *El espacio hermenéutico* [The Hermeneutic Space], a synthetic exploration of intersections between philosophy and relational psychoanalysis, with the prologue written by Donna Orange, who underscores that his synthesis is rooted in his knowledge of history of philosophy, especially of existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics, and in his fluency with both German and with North American philosophies and psychoanalysis in their original languages.

In Brazil, contributions of Eizirik (2002) and Belmont (2016) exemplify focus on application of relational theories and intersubjective approach to rich clinical material.

In Mexico, where Erik Fromm lived and trained the whole generation of analysts between 1950 and 1974, Juan Tubert-Oklander and R. Hernández de Tubert (2003) created another synthetic version of an intersubjective school, reformulating Pichon-Rivière and Searles's ideas, and combining them with Winnicott's and Kohut's (Tubert-Oklander J. 2006). Their many positional theoretical and clinical papers can be accessed on the pages of *Aperturas*

Psicoanalíticas. Their paper “La teoría del vínculo y la perspectiva relacional en psicoanálisis” [Link theory and the relational perspective in psychoanalysis] (Tubert 2016), is published on their blog.

In Uruguay, Colombia, Panama, Honduras, and Guatemala, incipient intersubjective developments based on Winnicott’s ideas, are starting to spread.

Overall, Latin American psychoanalysts have moved away from the Freudian and Kleinian traditions that were dominant a few decades ago. Lacanian thought is to a certain extent predominant, especially in academia. However, many psychoanalysts who identify with various theoretical lines of thought, work with their patients in a way which is, in terms of attitude, very close to the practice of a relational / intersubjective analyst. Local analysts don’t, in general, reference the bibliography of the standard authors in the relational / intersubjective field, but they approach the patient in a way which, looking at its characteristics, can be considered to be intersubjective. Empathy as a tool and the attitude of an appreciation of the participative dialogue are prevalent in the region’s clinical practice. This method of working implies a great commitment on the part of the professional in the analytic process, one which prioritises the subjective experience. Furthermore, the need to relate this experience with the cultural contexts in which the members of the therapeutic couple find themselves is highlighted. Gradually, in Latin America, the idea of the shared construction of the experience is developing, advancing thus yet another of the core concepts of relational / intersubjective thought, applied to the clinical encounter. Many Latin American contributions to intersubjectivity may be found in articles published by *Psicoterapiarelacional* and *Aperturas Psicoanalíticas*, both online journals published in Spain.

IV. INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES: NEUROBIOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

In the neurobiological literature of the last 30 years, the right hemisphere has been found to be dominant for subjective emotional experiences (Amanniti 1996, 2009; Wittling, 1997; Schore, 1999, 2003, 2010). In this context, the ‘*interactive transfer of affect between the right brains*’ of the members of the mother-infant and therapeutic dyads is designated as ‘intersubjectivity’ (Schore 2010).

Studies of *psychobiological intersubjectivity* – studies of parent-child relationship by **Ruth Feldman** (2007), in the area synchronicity of biological rhythms, e.g. synchronized heart beat, shared time perspective; also, studies of synchronized levels of cortisol with the babies of depressed or emotionally labile mothers, may be especially relevant.

A distinction is made between two modes of ‘*intersubjective connections*’: A more immediate mode connected to the neuronal *mirror system*, which is activated when one person

meets/sees another person and looks into their face, observing their emotional expression. This usually resounds internally in what **Vittorio Gallese** (2001, 2003, 2006) defines as *embodied simulation*; and a second mode based on *mentalizing* (Frith and Frith, 2005; Kernberg, 2015), which is the capacity to understand and predict other people's behavior by attributing independent mental states to them. This capability is not connected to the mirror system, but rather to the Anterior Paracingular Cortex (Amaniti, 2008).

Delia Lenzi's, Claudia Trentini's et al (2008) studies of mothers who watch their children's expression of distress or joy show the intense mirror system activation, while watching their children's face with more neutral, ambiguous expression activates the fronto-parietal areas of the left hemisphere.

Utilizing interdisciplinary perspective of *affective developmental neuroscience (neuropsychanalysis)*, **Alan Schore** (1999, 2011) pointed to his own consistent findings and those of many others, that the two brain hemispheres have different pattern of cortical-subcortical connections and different roles in various aspects of survival and learning about oneself in the world. Focusing on the early maturing Right Hemisphere, dominant for the first three years of life in the context of developmental neurobiology of attachment led him to propose that "the self-organization of the developing brain occurs in the context of a relationship with another self, another brain" (Schore, 1996, p. 60). Attachment transactions represent right hemisphere affective transactions between mother and infant (Schore, 1994). In the current neurobiological literature, the RH is dominant for 'subjective emotional experiences' (Wittling and Roschmann, 1993). "The interactive 'transfer of affect' between the right brains of the mother-infant and therapeutic dyads is ... best described as 'intersubjectivity' ... Current studies of the right hemisphere are thus detailing the *neurobiology of neurosubjectivity*" (Schore 1999, p.52). Schore proposes that just as the left brain communicates its states to other left brains via conscious linguistic behaviors, so the right brain communicates via prosody, fine facial movements, rapid eye movements, gesticulation, etc. its unconscious states to the right brains that are tuned to receive these communications. Visuo-spacial right hemisphere is described as non-linear, best equipped to reflect and to communicate the emotional states of non-linear pulsing energy flows between the components of a self-organizing, dynamic right-lateralized mind-body system. In this context, Schore (1994) and Shevrin (2010) argue for Freud's economic models, long considered obsolete, needing to be modernized and reintegrated into psychoanalysis. As opposed to the left hemisphere's 'linear' consecutive analysis of information, the right hemisphere shows a high sensitivity to initial conditions and perturbation, a property of chaotic systems (Ramachandran et al. 1996). The right hemisphere utilizes image thinking, a holistic, synthetic strategy that is adaptive when information is "complex, internally contradictory and basically irreducible to an unambiguous context" (Rotenberg, 1994, p. 489). These characteristics also apply to the primary process mentation, a right hemispheric function (Galin, 1974; Joseph, 1996) of the unconscious mind.

Efrat Ginot (2007) examined how implicit, neurally encoded attachment styles unconsciously find repeated expression throughout life and come to life in enactments. She

posits that enactments are intersubjective manifestations of neurally encoded attachment patterns acquired within the context of the primary relationships. This is an example of how seemingly unconnected areas, in this case intersubjectivity, attachment, and neuroscience, inevitably intersect with and illuminate each other.

Bringing together the developmental neurobiological and developmental psychoanalytic studies, **Otto Kernberg** (2015) highlights the dynamic complexity of the earliest weeks and months of life, during which ‘affiliative’ affects and drives related to attachment, play-bonding and erotic stimulation fuel intense attention to the other. One of the possible findings points to bi-directional non-linear strivings for both symbiotic (dual) unity and differentiation of self and other, beginning in the first weeks of life.

It appears that the neurobiological investigations substantiate a potentially inclusive view: right brain as lateralized, unconscious, affectively charged dynamic center of mind-body system, whose self-organization, growth and development unfolds in the inter-subjective context of bi-directional strivings for both unity with, and well as for differentiation from, the other(s). One of the areas where this potentially manifests itself in the psychoanalytic situation is an area of preverbal enactments, where the right-to-right hemispheric connections may facilitate preverbal unconscious communication, a precondition for further work of symbolization and representation.

Specifically in Europe, further point of contact between centrality of *intersubjectivity* in clinical and developmental studies came from neuroscientific research carried out by the group of **Giacomo Rizzolatti**, in Parma (Italy), on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al. 1996, Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). The discovery of mirroring mechanisms has opened up a new scenario for understanding how not only actions but also sensations and emotions grow in a we-centered dimension: when we observe someone performing an action, having a sensation, experiencing an emotion we understand him/her by re-utilizing the very neural circuits which ground our first-person experience with that action, sensation, emotion. This common functional mechanism – the ‘embodied simulation’ (Ammaniti & Gallese 2014, Gallese 2015) – provides a neurobiological foundation for grounding the self in the body, in accord with Freud's assertion: “The Ego is first and foremost a bodily Ego” (Freud 1923, p. 26).

V. CONCLUSION

In North America, emphasis on the importance of intersubjective processes and configurations in the context of development and pathogenesis, of the psychoanalytic situation, of the development, of the capacity for representation, and related contemporary clinical emphasis on enactments are among the connecting elements of all approaches, even if understood, interpreted and theorized differently by different schools of thought.

In their North American application, many relational, self, and intersubjective field theories, intersubjective accounts tend to be experience-near and close to the phenomenological philosophical concepts. In their North American application of the contemporary intersubjective ego psychology and post-Kleinian post-Bionian perspectives, as well as in the many French perspectives, the conceptualizations of intersubjective processes and configurations preserve the importance of drive, the unconscious and the psychoanalytic metapsychology.

Overlaps exist, mainly among the North American Intersubjective Ego psychology, Post-Bionian perspectives, and French perspectives. In North America, significant *differences* are sharpest between the French conceptualizations of Intersubjectivity and the dominant strands of Intersubjective thinking coming out of Self Psychology and Relational movement. In particular, there is a gap between the conditions under which theories are constructed in these two approaches, especially as it regards implication for psychoanalytic metapsychology.

In Latin America, comparable account of convergences and divergences exists between the link perspective and the relational perspective on intersubjectivity. Based in post-Bionian British Object Relations and post-Lacanian French psychoanalytic thought, the link perspective, practiced in the group and family clinical context, adheres to the notion of Freudian infantile sexuality as the essential motivation, and does not involve paradigmatic change. However, the relational perspective, an heir to Ferenczi, Balint, Fairbairn, Bowlby, Winnicott, and Kohut, further develops ideas of contemporary North American contemporary Self, Relational and Intersubjective thinkers, such as Lichtenberg, Mitchell, Stern, Stolorow, Renik, Benjamin and others, contains a paradigmatic shift, where the analyst becomes a ‘facilitator’ of the analyst-patient relationship. The relational approach also expands the view of primary motivation beyond Oedipal desires, emphasizing play, attachment, and recognition, among others.

Among the convergences between the link and relational approaches are the conceptualizations of the transference not just as a repetitive but also as a novel event. Both approaches also value ‘chance’ and ‘the event’ as psychic motivators.

In Europe, various origins of the conception of intersubjectivity include a combination between the development of child analysis, the conception of projective identification, the extension of the notion of counter-transference, and the theoretical reflexion about the subject, the subjectivation process (Cahn) and the object. The field theory and the notion of enactment, originating in the Americas have also been influential. One of the features, specific to Europe, may be the enduring importance of Freud’s metapsychology, and clinically, in depth exploration of the difficulties encountered in analytic work with adolescence, borderline pathology, groups and psychosis. The main stream in Europe consider intersubjectivity as taking into account during the psychoanalytic treatment the presence of two subjects, with drives and the unconscious, both the patient and the analyst, each one acting on the other and having a transformation power, through what is shared, which evoke the role of the object in the development of a subject. In addition, European analysts define a nuanced spectrum of

differences between interaction, interpsychic (Bolognini, Brusset), interpersonal (Bolognini) and intersubjectivity (Green, Roussillon).

Overall, with full exposition of various psychoanalytic approaches to intersubjectivity within their own ‘cultural context bound’ terminologies, rich *multidimensional multilayered picture of intersubjectivity potentially emerges*, within which mutual cross-fertilizing could be achieved by learning to coexist and communicate with each other. More specifically, it is both possible and desirable to compare the conclusions reached by each of these approaches, not only as regards their conception of mental functioning and of the dysfunctions that generate symptoms and character pathologies, but also with respect to the therapeutic proposals that follow on from these. That kind of systematic comparison allows for a rich picture of divergences and convergences to be explored and nuanced.

While the relation between brain and psychic activities is never direct, recent findings coming out of *affective developmental neuroscience and neuroanalytic studies*, seem to substantiate the value of various *descriptively non-conscious and dynamically unconscious intersubjective connectivity* in the context of early development and potentially in variety of nonverbal dialogical situations. How such findings are interpreted and applied to psychoanalytic dialogue and setting may depend on a particular psychoanalytic interest and point of view.

Stated inclusively, the intersubjective paradigm shift and contextualization can be viewed as involving a reconceptualization of the status of the subject, in which all subjective phenomena, including the intrapsychic *and* relational organizations, are structured in and through their intersubjective contexts.

Across all continents and plurality of conceptualizations, intersubjectivity, an important previously undertheorized psychoanalytic perspective brings into focus the subtleties of the analytic relationship and the two-person dimension of the analytic process. It guards against any absolutes, certitude, dogmatism or autocratic rigidity, including old and new orthodoxies. To the degree that it emphasizes bilateral conscious, preconscious and unconscious communication, it also sensitizes the analyst to the potential sources of nuanced knowing and ‘not knowing’ in both partners in the analytic inquiry.

See also:

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

EGO PSYCHOLOGY

ENACTMENT

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

SELF

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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NACHTRÄGLICHKEIT

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

The noun *Nachträglichkeit* denotes one of the most complex and nonlinear concepts created by Freud. It proliferates theoretical corpus of metapsychology and clinical theories of memory, psychic causality and temporality, sexuality, trauma and development. It requires substantive elaboration to grasp its full import.

Multiple meanings and different emphases owing to the complicated evolution of the concept in Freud, combined with different translations and interpretations, led to different accounts and definitions of *Nachträglichkeit* in European, North American and Latin American psychoanalytic thought.

In Europe, starting with Jacques Lacan's revival of the concept (1956, 1966, 1971) as for many French authors who followed, there appears to be the focus on the logic of temporal regression that goes from a recent scene to a past scene in a regressive pathway and process of remembering. In this respect only the manifest expression of the symptom is on the progressive path. In psychoanalytic sessions, then, reminiscences that carry deferred effects constitute the lever of therapeutic action. In the operation of '*après-coup*' ('L'*après-coup*' is the French translation of *Nachträglichkeit*. The literal translation of an "*après-coup*" is an 'after-blow' or an 'after-shock'), the process reveals a temporal structure of a higher order than retroaction. Here, the "after" waits for the "before" to assume its place in a circular and non-reciprocal process.

Following Lacan's "return to Freud", many French authors stress, besides the notion of psychic regressive work and a double causality (from the present to the past and from the past to the present), the principle of overdetermination (overdeterminism) and transposition of unconscious material onto the reality of perception, and its internalization within the psychic reality by means of identification, with the focus on the psychic work of representation and representability. They view *après-coup* as a process that transforms the regressive economy of drives, allowing for a psychic management of the traumatic effects, and promotion of the desire.

Jean Laplanche also follows Lacan and enlarges the latter's logic of temporal regression in his own account of a generalized theory of seduction and implanted maternal messages. In

Laplanche's expansion, Lacan's non-reciprocal circular sequence of *après-coup* becomes a spiral operation where the implantation of maternal messages into a child's early and inchoate ego is received and 're-subjectivized' in successive translations. In psychoanalytic treatment, the transference becomes an infinite 'transference of transference'.

Among contemporary European Dictionaries, Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) present *Nachträglichkeit* as the term frequently used by Freud in connection with his view of psychical temporality and causality, whereby experiences, impressions and memory traces may be revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development. They may in that event be endowed not only with a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness or pathogenic force.

"The Edinburgh Encyclopaedia of Psychoanalysis" (Skelton, 2006) cites Helmut Thomä's and Neil Cheshire's (1991) finding Strachey's translation as 'deferred action' unsatisfactory, because Freud combined the meaning of delayed effect with retrospective reconstruction of the psychological significance of the trauma.

In contrast, the North American revival of late 1980's and 1990's emphasized re-transcription and re-contextualization of memory in a developmentally transformative perspective. In the recent dictionary of The American Psychoanalytic Association, which uses the much debated Strachey's translation of "Deferred Action" (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012, p. 53-54), the process of *Nachträglichkeit* has been defined as the reactivation or reinterpretation of an earlier experience or memory that could not be assimilated at the time of its occurrence, usually because of a deficit or aberration in maturational or developmental function. The process of deferment may be particularly evident in the realm of psychosexuality, because the meaning of sexually charged experiences in early childhood cannot be integrated until the maturational effects of puberty have occurred.

From a Latin American point of view (e.g. Aslan, 2006; Masotta, 1982) the terms temporality, causality and psychoanalytic efficacy demarcate the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*. There exists a complex network of interactions in which each of these terms is in turn affected by *Nachträglichkeit*. The first movement that the operation of *Nachträglichkeit* produces is an unfocusing, an unfolding of time. This unfolding causes a displacement in the determining order, subverts the terms of causality, and enables the analytical action during the session.

Defining the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* is a complex issue. To contemplate the complexity of *Nachträglichkeit*, it is necessary to pinpoint the ways in which the term is interwoven with others, including repression, repetition, sexuality, signification, and trauma—all concepts that involve two periods of time. At the same time, it is necessary to remove the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* from the frame in which it appears, so as not to lose sight of its singularity (Masotta, 1982).

II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT IN FREUD

II. A. The Word *Nachträglichkeit* and its Translations

As was his custom, Freud forged the noun *Nachträglichkeit* (a neologism) from an adjective and adverb in everyday German, *nachträglich*. *Nachträglich* and its derivatives are recorded about 160 times in the works of Freud only six of which concern the noun *Nachträglichkeit*, while the others pertain to the adjective or the adverb (Thomä and Cheshire, 1991); an additional five uses of the noun can be found in the letter to Fließ dated 14 November 1897 (Freud, 1892-1899, p. 268), and a further instance in the letter dated 9 June 1898 (Masson, 1985, p. 544).

In German, the term *Nachträglichkeit* is formed from *nach* (after) and *tragen* (to draw, to pull, to carry, to bear). From a semiotic standpoint, it means *to draw towards an after-effect*. The suffix “*keit*” gives it the feminine gender.

Freud also employs equivalent terms, which can be translated into English by post-effect, post-action, ex-post (i.e. starting from what comes after) as well as expressions using the adverb *nachträglich* in the sense of “after the event”. It is possible to find: additional comprehension, elaboration, compulsion, obedience, action, effect “after the event”; or in French “*après-coup*” (Chervet, 2009).

In French *Nachträglichkeit* is translated by the term *après-coup*. The French term is sometimes used directly in English psychoanalytic literature perhaps because there is no satisfactory translation in English, but mostly because this concept has acquired its specific and deepest meanings in French psychoanalysis.

In English, the official translation is *deferred action* (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012), but some English authors use also *after-effect* or *afterwardsness*, as proposed by Laplanche (1989-90), or *subsequent effect*.

In the United States, Arnold Modell (1989) proposed first another English translation of *Nachträglichkeit*, namely *subsequentality* and Latin *a posteriori*, but he ultimately reverted back to Freud's German original term *Nachträglichkeit*.

An examination of the concept's use in Spanish-language writings shows that it has been translated in different ways, including deferred effect, *après-coup*, retroactive action, re-signification, *a posteriori*. In Latin America, the terms used most frequently are *a posteriori*, retroactive action, *après-coup*, and also the German word *Nachträglichkeit*.

II. B. The Two-Stage Process

In Freud's writings, the noun *Nachträglichkeit* gradually came to refer to an *unconscious psychic process* and its manifest results, initiated by an event of traumatic character, a “shock” which turns into a “shocking” event. More precisely, it refers to a dynamic process

linking an initial traumatic event, its repression during a period of undetermined length, and a regressive psychic work transforming the libidinal economy of the repressed event, and the promotion of “posthumous returns” of the repressed event, according to variable manifest forms, which are substitutive psychic products.

The adjective and the adverb, *nachträglich*, emphasize the diachronic organization of the thought process *in two stages*, and the causal and determinant link that exists between them.

The concept of the *après-coup* is thus a process (*Proceß*) that consists of two manifest stages and a latent one which involves unconscious psychic processes (*Vorgang*).

It is worth pointing out that Freud far more frequently refers descriptively to this two-stage process than using the noun *Nachträglichkeit*.

II. C. The Birth of the Concept

In the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895a,b), only the adverb appears in connection with the case of Emma. Freud insists on the precociousness of the *sexual unbinding* and its *subsequent* consequences. Then, in 1896, he speaks of the *posthumous effect of an infantile trauma*. In 1897, he forges the noun in his letters to Fließ.

In “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900) the two-way movements (from the present to the past, and from the past back to the future/present) are apparent in a humorous recount of a patient (an admirer of feminine beauty) stating that he wished he had taken a full opportunity of his wet nurse breastfeeding him in the past, while – as an adult – observing another attractive wet nurse breastfeeding a baby. From this point on, the phenomenon loses its specificity in the realm of pathogenesis of psychoneuroses and it becomes a part of everyday thinking, including humor and wit.

In “Little Hans” (1909b), his interpretations follow the rationality of the after-effect without naming it as such. This was not to be the case in the text on “The Wolf Man” (1918c) in which he gives greater complexity to the concept by considering the sessions themselves and the transference as the third after-effects necessary to the aim of the treatment. The famous dream of the wolves and the phobia of the wasps were both the first and second *après-coups* of the primal scene which happened earlier and which was not assimilated at this time. In this text, the notion of time becomes very important to Freud who tries to date each of the events.

Remarkably enough, from 1917 onwards the term *Nachträglichkeit* disappears – with a few minor exceptions – from his writings, whereas the implication of the two-phase process becomes more frequent.

Freud created this concept at a time when his research was dominated by his *aetiological* preoccupations. The latter became isomorphic with the tendency, already observed by Breuer, to recall by following a *backward* temporal path. Breuer had described a *retrogression* (i.e. the fact of taking up history from a precise point in the past and of repeating it with the aim of reconstructing it and freeing oneself from it) that had allowed him to conceive

the cathartic method (Freud & Breuer, 1895a). Freud followed the path of this *temporal regression* and added to it an obligation to express itself by means of verbalization, thus by the production of verbal deferred effects. He made use of this tendency to regress, associated with a constraint to maintain a verbal link with consciousness, in the service of the therapeutic aim. He thus promoted a new method, the psychoanalytical treatment defined by its *protocol*, its *fundamental rule*, which requires the verbal *free association*, and a specific psychical work, the work of the *deferred effect*.

In his observation of Emma, in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology”’s part II, chapter 4 “Hysterical Proton Pseudos” (1895b, p. 352), Freud gives a precise description of “deferred action” (*Nachträglichkeit*) by concentrating on the temporal regression within the sessions. He divides the first stage, that of the event, into two regressive scenes, of which one (scene I of two shop clerks mocking her dress when Emma is 12 years old) is recent and reconstituted, and the other (scene II of repressed memory from the time Emma was eight years old and was sexually touched through her dress/molested by a grocer) is earlier and unconscious in the strict sense of the word. He grounds his thinking in the theory of trauma of Charcot which he had already expounded in the “Studies of Hysteria” (Freud & Breuer, 1893-1895), with the diachronic creation of symptoms in two stages, and the cathartic method of retrogression and associative elaboration of Breuer, but he differentiates himself by his thorough etiological research. He emphasises the *backward direction* of cathartic remembering as it takes place within the sessions and the sexual content of what has been repressed. Thus, he inverts the course of events and time. He calls scene I, the recent scene, “Emma’s memory of being laughed at by shop assistants on entering a shop when she was thirteen”, and scene II, the older one, “the repressed memory of being sexually molested in another shop by the grocer when she was eight”. The second, symptomatic event was the agoraphobia involved in entering a shop alone. The two events are separated by a period of latency.

The case of Emma, suffering from agoraphobia of shopping alone (later referred to as ‘Emma’s model of *Nachträglichkeit*’ in Post Freudian European and North American theorizing on the subject, and as a paradigm by Latin American theorizing) captures Freud’s early definition of *Nachträglichkeit*, but also his early understanding of the role of trauma, temporality and memory, sexuality, development, as well as defense, in neurogenesis and in the clinical work, as summed up in his timeless statement: “Here we have the case of a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as an experience, because in the meantime the change [brought about] in puberty had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered. ... We invariably find that a *memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action*” (Freud, 1895b, p. 356; italics added). In this statement, *Nachträglichkeit* is in the relationship between the terms memory-repression-trauma. The entire quote is the definition of the concept, whose dynamic results from the interplay between the three terms and their determining order among them: in relation with what is repressed, how it is repressed, how it becomes trauma, how memory reaches significance.

It was already Jean-Martin Charcot who had described the chronological organisation of the symptoms of hysteria *into two stages* with a third, called the period of psychical incubation

or psychical elaboration, located between the traumatic event (the shock) and the manifest after-effect (the symptom).

As a pupil of Charcot (Freud was his German translator) and concerned to free psychical symptoms from the aetiological impasse of the theory of degeneration, Freud took seriously the chronological references of the Master of the Salpêtrière Hospital. Consequently, he focused his attention on the intervening stage, and the non-visible psychical work, which unfolds there.

II. D. The Period of Latency and the Regressive Psychical Work

“The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900a,b) was the product of the attention Freud paid to the specific psychical work that takes place during the intermediary period designated by Charcot as the period of psychical incubation or psychical elaboration, and which Freud renamed the period of latency. This allowed Freud to take into account a new but commonplace psychical operation, the act of *latency*.

A period of latency can easily be observed within the development of human sexuality with its two phases, but it also is seen in ordinary mental functioning. The act of putting into latency is an operation involved in the theory of dreams, in the oscillation between day and night, and is particularly observable from its after-effects during the sessions of hypnosis and analysis. The intervening events, namely, the night and the session of analysis, constitute periods of latency occupied by specific unconscious psychic work. The dream-work and its results, the libidinal regeneration on awakening, memory and the dream narrative, become prototypes of *regressive psychical activities accomplished in the passivity of latency* (Chervet, 2009).

The logic of associative temporal regression, scene I (recent) – scene II (from the past), is part of the process of remembering which follows the retrogressive path. For Freud, only the manifest expression of the symptom is on the progressive path.

Remembering is the link between adolescence and childhood, beginning with adolescence. It is the sexual precociousness of the *traumatic event* (scene II), which is reactivated in scene I during the resurgence of drive impulses in puberty. The common sexual dimension between (II) and (I) is clearly apparent.

Consequently, what is referred to as deferred effect and initial shock, varies according to the point of view taken, whether that of the genesis of the symptom or that of the discourse of the sessions. According to the logic of the shock, it is the appearance of the symptom which is the deferred effect; according to the logic of looking for a cathartic effect, it is the successive memories which, beginning with the symptom, are the deferred effects; and according to psychoanalytic logic, each recall is a deferred effect of an unconscious memory which has acquired, subsequent to its repression, the value of a traumatic event (Freud, 1895b). In the first model, the effect is linked to a traumatic event; in the second, to the memory; and in the third, to the transference on to the analysis of the regressive attraction and the necessity of verbalisation.

Freud then generalised this model to memories as a whole and the returns of the repressed. The idea of return becomes a corollary of after-effect. In “The Wolf Man” (1918c) the session is not only the promoter of deferred effects, it itself becomes, along with the transference, a deferred effect.

II. E. The Sessions as Reminiscences and Deferred Effects

But the analytic situation superimposes and intermingles the particular deferred effects of each protagonist; hence the creation of a neo-production, the *analytic deferred effect*, the ego/non-ego specific to the session, a neo-reality full of cross reminiscences.

The analytic deferred effect is the lever of the therapeutic action. In each session it has its place within the sequences and the totality of the treatment. The *precession* (i.e. “the act of going before”- English Collins Dictionary) of each analyst’s countertransference (Neyraut, 1997) is involved in a mixed variety of emotional, figurative and theoretical forms.

In the session, *regressive attraction* (Freud, 1925) promotes the re-actualisation of the traumatic effect through remembering, repetition and construction. The results of the deferred effect are *overdetermined* recollections. The conception of *generalized reminiscence* (Freud, 1937) involves the notions of historic reality, of ontogenetic and phylogenetic traces and, through the function of *Nachträglichkeit*, of historical truth created by the psyche.

II. F. The Last (Dual) Drive Theory and the Process of Deferred Action

It was the elaboration in 1920 of a fundamental quality of all the drives, the tendency to return to an earlier state, and ultimately to the inorganic state, which was decisive in the disappearance of the use by Freud of the concept *Nachträglichkeit* (Chervet, 2009). This last theory of drives, the dual drive theory, involves the introduction of the death drive, i.e. the duality Eros and Thanatos.

The importance given to the progressive direction by the word *Nachträglichkeit* does not sufficiently take into account the other aspect of the process, the major role of the regressive psychical work produced by the process of “deferred action” on the traumatic and regressive attraction, an essential aspect which is fulfilled on a daily basis by the dream function with regard to the many traumatic incidents of the day before the dream.

While initially only linked to the genesis of hysterical symptoms, the process of “deferred action” gradually became the essence of the diphasic nature of human sexuality connecting the oedipal period to puberty, interrupted by the period of latency. It was then extended to ordinary mental functioning and to the oscillation between night and day, involving both the regressive and progressive paths. Thus its generalization was reinforced at a time when the term itself ceased to be used.

II. G. The Evolution of the Theory of Regression and Trauma

The fate of this concept, with its emergence and its disappearance following the diphasic processual reality that it indicates, may be explained by the internalization of the notion of traumatism within metapsychology.

At the beginning of his works, Freud linked the trauma to a too early seduction (Freud, 1893-1895) involving *another real person*, the seducer. The event of the traumatic seduction precipitates the temporality of the development of sexuality or of the ego, which are awaked too early, leading to precociousness of the sexuality or prematurity of the ego.

Then the definition of the traumatic event evolves in Freud's writings. He thought that the traumatic effect comes from unconscious fantasies, which become efficient after their repression. Thus, the psychic traumatism appears *nachträglich*.

Within his theory of narcissism, the trauma is due to a conflict involving the re-sexualisation of narcissism under the influence of instinctual drive demands, the conflict between sexual impulses and ego impulses. This conflict is an effect of the negative attraction from the primal repression. This conception links up with the one present in the 1893-1895 "Studies of Hysteria" of an attraction coming from the traumatic core subject to repression. In 1915, Freud (1915a) adds that this repression takes place under the influence of the negative attraction from the primary repression, which is the original unconscious act.

As from 1917, this negative effect of the traumatic event continued to gain importance due to the study of war neuroses. This resulted in the recognition of a traumatic neurosis outside the domain of the pleasure principle. This situation challenged to some extent the theory of dreams. From now on, they were not always accomplishments of wishes.

In 1920, Freud (1920) linked the notion of trauma to a quality inherent in the nature of the drives themselves, their generic tendency to return to a previous state, and ultimately to the inorganic state. The traumatic dimension is internalized. The event becomes endo-psychic. It may be triggered by an external event, a *trauma*, but may also have an endogenous origin.

This negative attraction searches, changes and co-opts, even sometimes creates, an external event allowing for the elaboration of a false connection, a false causal theory with the aim of modifying this negative power of the regressive economy.

III. POST-FREUDIAN DEVELOPMENTS

III. A. *Nachträglichkeit* in French Psychoanalysis

The account of this concept does not stop there, however. It continues a trajectory, which completes the enactment of what it designates. Following a first period of manifest emergence, and a disappearance that went unnoticed, it resurfaced in France with Jacques Lacan. At this

point it became a fundamental concept of French psychoanalysis, linking up again with the French origins (Charcot) of the process itself, and its diphasic character.

Following the same method as Freud, Lacan coined the noun, *l'après-coup* (a neologism), on the basis of the common adverb and adjective *après coup*. But two spellings were possible, with and without the hyphen. Later on, in order to stabilize a difference of spelling between the noun and the adjective or adverb, some authors such as Jean Laplanche coined two terms in French: “après-coup” and “effet d’après-coup”, or suggested (Chervet 2006) that the dash be reserved for the noun: thus “l’après-coup” (noun) and “après coup” (adjective and adverb).

Thanks to this accentuation of *Nachträglichkeit*, Lacan voiced concerns about the devaluation suffered by psychoanalysis in the post-war years, marked by a psychologising and developmental ‘geneticismus’, a theory of linear and chronological temporality, and by the ego-psychology. Through his very style, Lacan attempted to take possession of the process of *après-coup* (Chervet, 2010). Advocating a return to Freud, he maintained that the operation of *après-coup* is “never over” (1971); “the nature of the construction of the symptom is to be *nachträglich*” (1956); “all points of view are obliged on each occasion to start from basic principals, as *nachträglich, après-coup*” (1969, p. 295-307, original italics); “the *nachträglich*, (let us recall that we were the first to take it from Freud’s text), the *nachträglich* or *après-coup*, by which the trauma is involved in the symptom, reveals a temporal structure of a higher order (than retroaction)” (1966, p. 839/2006, p. 711, original italics). And referring to the two phases and to the act of putting into latency, he writes: “The after was kept waiting [*faisait antichambre*] so that the before could assume its place” (Lacan, 1966, p. 197/ 2006, p. 161).

Lacan clearly saw the devaluation that the concept of *après-coup* suffers when it is reduced to a temporal adverb and to a linear determination between two successive events. However, he avoids the economic implications of the process of *après-coup* regarding the real nature of the traumatic event that it accomplishes thanks to its regressive work; and he only insists on the role of overdetermination involved in the verbal chain “by the deferred action [*après coup*] of its sequence” (1966 [1958], p. 532/2006, p. 446). Thus it is once again at the heart of Lacanian causality a primacy granted to progressive temporality.

The operation of *après-coup* is thus a restructuring of past events, a resubjectivization of an unconscious past, which is transcribed in a formation of the unconscious. Later on, Lacan put forward the image of the torus to exemplify the process of *après-coup*. Speaking in the sessions turns into *verbal digressions* made necessary by the presence in this torus of a break, a gap, the division of the subject himself. These verbal digressions enable the torus to become a *Moebius strip* and an expressible message. The operation of *après-coup* is then represented by contortions, reversals and inversions of these verbal digressions.

Lacan described the psychical causality of the operation of *après-coup* “as being circular and non-reciprocal”, perceiving accurately the dissymmetry that exists between the two scenes II and I, as well as in sessions between the two protagonists.

Jean Laplanche was to follow this conception by integrating it into his personal theory of a *generalized seduction* in which the maternal messages implanted in the child's unconscious continue to produce after-effects or successive translations owing to their enigmatic valency linked to their sexual nature. The transference becomes an infinite "transference of transference".

The whole of French psychoanalysis in the second half of the 20th century has taken advantage of this stimulus given by Lacan. There are many French writers who have continued to explore in depth the notion of *après-coup* (Le Guen, 1982; Laplanche, 1989-90; Chervet, 2006, 2009, 2010; André, 2009), or who have used this concept in their work on psychical functioning, causality, temporality, etc. (Fain & Braunschweig, 1975; Fain, 1982; Green, 1982; Guillaumin, 1982; Faimberg, 1993, 1998; Neyraut, 1997). Several conferences and volumes of the French psychoanalytic journal 'Revue française de psychanalyse' have taken "L'après-coup" as their theme (see *Revue Française de Psychanalyse* 1982, 46, 3, "L'après-coup"; and, *Revue Française de Psychanalyse* 2006, 70, 3, "L'après-coup revisité"). French psychoanalysis as a whole has no difficulty in referring to this concept, often limiting it to its temporal definitions.

III. B. Nachträglichkeit in British and European Psychoanalysis

In the continuation of the dynamic emergence – disappearance – return, it is useful to emphasize that the phenomenon of *après-coup* has become a *shibboleth* concept between French, British and American psychoanalysis.

Admittedly Melanie Klein and her successors interested themselves more particularly in the first phase of the traumatic event and in the experiences of fright and terror which accompany it, thus in a situation of traumatic neurosis in which the process of *après-coup* no longer has any effect.

If for French psychoanalysis the archaic element is constructed afterwards (A. Green, 1982), for the Anglo-American schools it is already there, and the psychic apparatus has to fight against the disorganising primitive feelings of anguish. The model of a commensal relationship (a kind of relationship in which two objects share a third in favor of the three) (Bion, 1970), and of a necessity to support development and accomplishment (by the way of a *symbiotic* relationship), play a much more dominant role than that of elaboration and working-through by frequenting the regressive path and by interpreting this negative attraction. As in the Kleinian model, it is necessary to fight against this regressive destructivity. This struggle is carried out thanks to creativity (Winnicott, (1989 [1963])), against a basic traumatic internal experience, the 'fear of breakdown' (Winnicott, 1970), or "nameless dread" (the *parasitic* relationship) (Bion, 1962).

The relationship to pain and to masochistic functioning, to mourning and to the lost *object*, is dominated by regression to dependence and by the transformation of the responses of the family entourage. Attention is paid to the emotional experience between the analyst and the

analysand, and this can be considered in terms of analytical deferred effect. Bion (1962) situates the process of transformation, establishing the alpha function and alpha elements, in *maternal reverie*. The psychical work of the intervening stage takes place first outside the mind of the child, in the mind of the mother. The ideas of assistance, of a helping object, of positive and negative projective identification, find their coherence and justification in this point of view.

III. C. Contemporary European Scene: Complexity in Progress

The dynamic of a deferred action including the two protagonists in analysis has been the object of numerous studies, among them Winnicott's *transitional space and object*, Michel de M'Uzan's *chimera*, André Green's *analytic object* and Thomas Ogden's *analytic third*. It is the result of the deferred action, which is targeted by the studies on transitionality and play (Winnicott, 1971) on *shared animism* and *working as doubles* (César & Sara Botella, 2005).

Referring to the "analytic site", Jean-Luc Donnet (2006) emphasizes the random dimension of the realization of the deferred action. It comes into conflict with the determinism that weighs on this process. So the subject searches to find and create (or not) the perceptions and perceptive traces which this process needs in order to be accomplished.

Bernard Chervet has pointed out that in the last (dual) drive theory the regressive attraction is no longer subject to limits or checks. Regression no longer stops at the memory of the scene of seduction (Freud, 1895) or at the return to the absolute narcissism of the maternal bosom (Freud, 1914c). An *extinctive regressivity* (Chervet, 2006) becomes apparent which requires in exchange the intervention of an *imperative of inscription* (Chervet, 2009) and psychical elaboration under the aegis of the superego. This is the work that is carried out by the process of "après-coup".

The latter thus finds its function and the reasons for its specific *diphasic* form in two manifest phases and an *intermediary* latent phase. "Après-coup" is the method available to the psychical apparatus for dealing with this primitive quality of the drives that is brought into play by the numerous traumas of daily existence, and for establishing the pleasure principle.

To accomplish this task, the process is divided into three phases with three operations. Initially, it follows the regressive path, then transforms the regressive libidinal economy, and finally directs it along the progressive path. The latter is then inscribed within the mind in the form of drive impulses reprised by human desire and its many vicissitudes. It is animated by a *regressive attraction* and a *necessity* to produce progressive material. It proves to be the model for an ideal mental functioning, and thus a *reference* for all evaluation of psychical material.

Actually, Chervet develops a conception of après-coup as the process of realization and fulfilment of all the thoughts and all the psychic productions; it is the process of thought itself. Thus, it is the basic process of the psychoanalytic cure that makes healing possible.

On both sides of the English Channel, writers puzzled by this difference between the two currents of psychoanalytical thought, one including the after-effect while the other does without it, have attempted to reduce it and to interpret it. Haydee Faimberg (2005a,b; 2006) linked also the *après-coup* to the concepts of multi-directional psychic temporality and causality (Faimberg, 2006, 2013), and she enlarged this notion towards the anticipated ‘not yet known’ future and towards Winnicott’s ‘Fear of Breakdown’ (1963), about a trauma which had already happened in the past but which is anticipated in the future. Faimberg applied the broadened *après-coup* to analytic ‘listening to the listening’, where conflicts are re-signified through a link across three generations (1998; 2005a,b; 2013). Some British analysts (Birksted-Breen, 2003; Sodr , 2007, 2005; Perelberg, 2007) have stressed the complementarity of what they view as the long-time-span (LTS) of Freud’s original *Nachtr glichkeit*, over a longer period of time; and short-time-span (STS) *après-coup*, moment by moment “micro changes” in the transference within each session.

Finally, all these authors tried to make links between Winnicott’s notion of the fear of breakdown and the notion of *après-coup* in French psychoanalysis. This shows that this fear accompanies the inaugural regressive movement of the process of *après-coup*.

In Italy also, for example Paola Marion (2011) emphasizes the fact that *Nachtr glichkeit* is a mechanism which describes how the psyche proceeds and which regulates the treatment of psychoanalysis.

In fact, exchanges, debates and studies take place and are published, showing that the link between the two currents is possible and that incompatibility results from simplification. Two facts may need to be considered. On the one hand, and this has been true since Freud, the phenomenon of *après-coup* is often active, and indeed recognised, without being named. On the other hand, the term *après-coup* is very frequently used by analysts in its current simplification as temporal displacement and anterograde reflexivity, not involving the attractions of the unconscious and the consequent work required to the same degree as the concept itself.

Finally, all psychoanalytical studies can also be considered as after-effects of what motivated Freud’s own work. To be sure, by following him closely they develop, refine and give new meaning to his propositions. Furthermore, by facing up to aspects of reality that remained unexplored in Freud’s work, they enrich it and modify it in its fundamentals. A return to the conceptions of the traumatic source is then necessary to allow a new area of thought to emerge and be integrated with the previous work and to reorganize the whole.

III. D. *Nachtr glichkeit* in Latin American Psychoanalysis

From a Latin American perspective, what Freud refers to as *Nachtr glichkeit* is a conception of nonlinear, retroactive temporality, an interplay between ‘before’ and ‘after’. It is agreed that the concept of *Nachtr glichkeit* is associated with what is known as the return to Freud’s writings. Despite the dominance of Kleinian thought in psychoanalysis in the Rio de

la Plata region until the end of the 1960s, Freud's nonlinear conception of psychic temporality was never absent from its transmission (Pontalis, 1968).

The operation of *Nachträglichkeit* thus requires two scenes: 'after', which constructs-constitutes 'before'. These scenes have a different materiality and are asymmetrical: in the 'after' scene, there is a subject who makes him or herself present and is involved in creating the 'before' scene where what is present is the object.

It is only in this 'after', with the advent of the subject, that it is possible to construct as trauma the 'anterior' scene, in which there is/was only an object, in a circular, non-reciprocal movement between the two scenes which allows us to regard causality in psychoanalysis in a non-deterministic manner.

In this way, it is possible to see how significance and temporality are interwoven in *Nachträglichkeit*, revealing the difference between the mechanisms of retroactive action and regression. If each scene signified itself (if the 'anterior' scene was traumatic in and of itself), then retroactive action would transform into regression.

Retroactive action does not involve a regression to something that has already been constituted; instead, the movement of retroactive action is what results in the anterior scene and its significance being constituted. It is the subject's constitution that enables the signification of something that previously could not be signified.

The studies of the two cases of Emma and the Wolf Man are generally regarded as paradigms when it comes to attempting to pinpoint the problem of *Nachträglichkeit* in Freud's writings: "Project for a Scientific Psychology" and "Wolf Man".

About Emma, the symptom described by Emma in her analysis with Freud (the compulsion of not being able to enter a shop *alone*) is not dependent on the trace of the scene that took place when she was seven (scene II, with the grocer), but instead on the multiple transformations it undergoes after the scene that occurred when Emma was twelve (which Freud calls scene I, with the shop clerks), which is the scene the patient associates with during the session. The two scenes are linked via *superficial ties* (*laughter, dresses*). In this way, the trace takes on significance and becomes traumatic when the symptom is constituted. The sexual assault, *per se*, does not explain the symptom.

However when approaching this idea from a Latin American perspective the problem that arises would be what takes place when the concept is viewed in this way. This view might suggest an evolving reading closer to that of "Three Essays" (Freud, 1905) that could contradict the very nucleus of the concept. That could lead the reader to wonder if the theory could be constructed or updated.

The continuous presence (Pontalis, 1968) of the idea of *Nachträglichkeit* was not altered by the discovery of infantile sexuality, which is constituted by this very retroactive action. Nor did the term disappear with the formulation of the death drive, since in this case it is not a question of returning to an anterior state—it is not a pure action *a tergo* of the drive, it is rather

one of mnemonic traces that are ‘corrected’ by new experiences. Far from excluding *Nachträglichkeit*, both of these concepts are in accordance with the term.

Looking at the Wolf Man from a Latin American perspective it can be said that what is at stake is the relationship between the visualisation of the primary scene and the dream of the wolves.

When the patient dreams, the conditions are given so that, via retroactive action, the re-signification of the traces of the primary scene is produced. There would be no primary scene without the dream.

This calls into question the notion of determinism, according to which it is possible to know what will be traumatic beforehand. Scenes belonging to early infancy are not reproduced as memories but rather are constituted *a posteriori*. It is here that the controversy between the definition of a traumatic scene and a regressive fantasy arises.

III. E. Specific Contributions from Latin American Analysts

In psychoanalytical writings by Latin American authors, *Nachträglichkeit* is given different modulations. The selection of excerpts that follows will make it possible to view the various aspects of the concept that are emphasised by different authors and the multiplicity of thematic fields that this plurality of approaches gives rise to.

When discussing the subject of temporality in psychoanalysis, some authors place *Nachträglichkeit* alongside other forms of temporality with which it coexists, despite the contradictions between them. Other authors debate the centrality and permanence of the concept in Freud’s work. They read *Nachträglichkeit* as a concept that was progressively substituted or underwent transformations as a result of the appearance of other concepts such as infantile sexuality or the death drive.

In other analyses, *Nachträglichkeit* is given a central position and a hierarchy is established among the terms with which it is in accordance with: cure, therapeutic efficacy, causality, and signification. In these readings, *Nachträglichkeit* takes on a greater density and complexity and is shown to have connections with other concepts that disseminate the characteristics of the primary process.

Leticia Glocer Fiorini (2006) emphasizes the coexistence of two distinct temporalities in Freud’s work: progressive temporality and retroactive temporality.

“In Freud’s work, evolving temporalities of progressive movements, for example the psychosexual evolution of a girl and boy and their desirable goals (Freud, 1925), coexist with the concept of retroactive temporality, which assigns significance to an ‘anterior traumatic incident’ *a posteriori*. The linear chronology is thus disarticulated and the material incident must be re-signified (Freud, 1918)” (L. Glocer Fiorini, 2006, p.18)

Ricardo Bernardi (1994) describes the different modes in which temporal relationships can be found in Freud's work, modes that Freud does not consider exclusive.

A) A model in which before determines after.

B) The model of *Nachträglichkeit* [which Bernardi translates as *a posteriori*] in which an anterior event posteriorly acquires new meaning and psychic efficacy by virtue of it being modified when it becomes part of a new context.

C) The phenomenon of retrospective fantasy, *Zurückphantasieren*, which results in attributing something to an anterior moment that occurs after it.

Bernardi (1994) argues that it is possible to find modifications to the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* once Freud discovers infantile sexuality.

Carlos M. Aslan (2006) stresses that *Nachträglichkeit* is a mode in which the apparatus works. For Aslan, the term is relevant to day-to-day experiences and should not be reduced to its relationship with traumatic situations.

“One need only remember the Freudian concept of an *a posteriori* mechanism which, as Blum has noted, is not exceptional but rather habitual, and not only in traumatic situations; [it can occur in] day-to-day experiences when a modifying effect relates to the meaning of a mnemonic trace [anterior structured events]. It occurs not in material reality but rather in the subject's historical psychic reality. Once it is structured, the [historical psychic reality] will influence the perception and interpretation of new experiences, and this will continue in a successive manner. In this way, not only are new structures produced but, to reiterate, anterior structures are modified” (Aslan 2006, p. 71).

Along the same lines as Aslan, **Madeleine Baranger, Willy Baranger, and Jorge Mom** (1987) argue that Freud's readers have not given *a posteriori* adequate importance. They emphasize the concept's participation in the constitution of the fantasy, *limiting* the economic aspect of the trauma. A trace of an event remains in the psyche without constituting a trauma in and of itself until subsequent events retroactively convert it into such, assimilating this first mute period into the death drive.

“It is not simply a question of a deferred action nor of a cause that remains latent until the opportunity to manifest itself arises, but rather of a retroactive action causation from the present towards the past” (M. Baranger, W. Baranger, J. Mom, 1987 p. 750). The authors emphasize that “temporality and retroactive action is what makes it possible to carry out the specific therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, which would be impeded if we remained within the categories of causality and temporality when understood linearly” (M. Baranger, W. Baranger, J. Mom 1987, p.750). In this manner, they articulate *Nachträglichkeit* with what remains inassimilable in the analytic process.

They emphasize that the first period, which is mute, unnamable, unrepresentable as the death drive is, needs the permission of *Nachträglichkeit* to be constituted in trauma.

Haydee Faimberg, Argentinian trained, resident of France for many years, discusses the concept of temporality in Freudian texts and she reformulates the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* (Faimberg, 1981, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2005, 2012) by creating a broader conceptualization of the term, both different and congruent with Freudian thought. This broader conceptualization also arose from her clinical work and readings of Winnicott's clinical accounts and his underlying assumptions.

She states (Faimberg, 2007) that the broader conceptualization is essential both in the retroactive assignment of new meaning, through interpretation, and in the assignment of meaning for the first time, through construction.

She localizes two moments, one anticipatory stage, as already there, and other stage of assignment of retroactive meaning, which gives psychic existence to the anticipatory phase.

Faimberg (Faimberg, 2012) also localizes the implicit presence of the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* in Winnicott's writings and defines a type of interstitial presence of the concept in his work, a presence that is in operation even if it is not named.

Her reading of Winnicott's texts "Fragments of an Analysis" (1955) and "Fear of Breakdown" (1971) are a link between the psychic temporality and the cure experience itself.

She moves one step further in the formulation of temporalization and signification, (Faimberg, 2013) articulating them not only with the compulsion of repetition but also with the paternal function.

The author describes that Winnicott creates conditions that enable the advent of that which never took place. In the situation that has not yet arrived she locates the possibility of the advent of paternal function in the psychic functioning.

This creation of something that does not exist is implicitly associated with the operation of *Nachträglichkeit*. These are operations that are carried out and that constitute psychic places, permitting the advent of the subject.

These formulations of *Nachträglichkeit* show how psychoanalysis produces a psychic change.

Jaime Szpilka, Argentinian psychoanalyst, Spanish resident, begins his paper (Szpilka 2009) with a statement about the question of *Nachträglichkeit*. He considers it is essential to the theory and psychoanalytic direction of treatment.

He questions the motives behind the concept being pushed into the background, something he believes occurs not only in post Freudian authors but also in Freud himself.

Szpilka (2009) discovers that Freud maintains *Nachträglichkeit* and implements it in different ways as he incorporates other concepts into his works. The author puts forth the idea that *Nachträglichkeit* should not be discussed in chronological terms but rather in logical ones, distancing himself from any connection to empiricism. The 'before' is not a product that precedes, but instead it is an inherent formulation of the 'after'. He breaks down the modes in

which the operation of *Nachträglichkeit* is present and decisive in developing different concepts: history, memories, fantasies, primary repression and the problem of meaning.

Szpilka (2009) regards *Nachträglichkeit* as an articulating concept between Oedipus and Narcissism, mute and empty are the forms he describes Narcissism without Oedipus and Oedipus without Narcissism.

Luis Kancyper (1985) stresses the central role played by the Freudian concept of a posteriori in connection with the phenomena that characterise adolescence, a privileged moment of retroactive re-signification of the a posteriori, since it constitutes a new libidinal stage where a genital sexual identity – a psychological and social phenomenon – is attained for the first time.

Pertinent to the theme, he distinguishes between two concepts, which can be readily conflated in the analytic theory and practice: the concept of development and the concept of ‘the historical’.

Zelig Liberman (2015) entails a heterogeneous temporality that is present in different expressions of the psyche.

The concept of *après-coup* transformed the notions of psychic causality and temporality. It refers to a phenomenon in two periods: mnemonic marks are remodelled based on posterior incidents that, because of their symbolic relationship with incidents of the past, confer meaning and psychic efficacy on them.

Liberman attempts to emphasise the specificity of the phenomenon of *après-coup*, highlighting its traumatic and transformative aspects, a point of view that differs from the predominant perspective in psychoanalysis of late or retrospective understanding.

III. F. Developments in North America

III. Fa. Arnold Modell’s Revival of the Concept: Recontextualization of Memory and Time, and Expansion of Psychic Reality

For a long time, the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* remained in latency, for most of the English speaking North American psychoanalysis, until Arnold Modell, in a series of publications (1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2008) brought the concept back to life. His 1990 publication “Other Times, Other Realities” remains the most comprehensive representative of North-American developments around *Nachträglichkeit*. Finding Strachey’s translation misleading, Modell prefers to use the original term *Nachträglichkeit* and continues to link the concept firmly to memory, in terms of its re-transcription (or intervening countless re-transcriptions and re-contextualizations) at a later date, within a different developmental, motivational and emotional, and existential context.

Modell's revival of *Nachträglichkeit* comes in the wake of his friend and Nobel Laureate Gerald Edelman's independent discovery of a similar biological mechanism in the brain, of the continuous re-contextualization or reconfiguration of neural maps, within Edelman's Theory of selection of neural groups (TSNG), redolent of Freud's model described in the "Draft G" of December 1894. Obviously, it is possible to find an analogical link between the two realms.

Modell's understanding of the concept and its firm connection with memory goes back to the beginnings of the formulation of the 'seduction' theory. "Freud and Breuer (1893-95) observed", Modell (1994) writes, "that the affective memory of trauma was lodged in the psyche like a foreign body which continued its agency long after the traumatic event" (Modell, 1994, p. 92). It was in this paper that Freud and Breuer wrote, "Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" (Freud and Breuer, 1893-95, p.7). Freud, three years later, developed a more sophisticated theory of the re-contextualization of memories (Modell, 1990). Modell, who offers a more accurate English translation of *Nachträglichkeit* - subsequentiality – recognizes its awkwardness and continues to use Freud's German term *Nachträglichkeit*. He notes that Freud maintained his conviction of the primacy of memory in the therapeutic process long after he gave up his seduction theory of hysteria, and recounts Freud's 1914 paper "Remembering, repeating and working through", where Freud re-states that one aim of psychoanalysis is "to fill in gaps in memory ..." (Modell, 1994, p.92).

Connecting development and psychopathology to *Nachträglichkeit*, Modell (1994), in his paper "Memory and Psychoanalytic cure" circles back to Freud's original use of the concept, where Freud saw psychopathology as resulting from an interference with the process of re-transcription of memory. Freud described this as a failure of translation of the memory, which was his original understanding of the mechanism of repression (and the etiology of hysteria). Model makes a 'developmental' conjecture that later, after the formulation of Oedipus complex and psychosexual stages of development, Freud viewed the stages of psychological development as analogous to different languages and that experiences held in memory are repeatedly re-transcribed, retranslated and re-contextualized by subsequent development(s). According to Modell's understanding of *Nachträglichkeit*, the memory of a traumatic event in childhood occurring at age x, is modified when that child enters age y and again is modified at age z, and so forth. Freud's timeless insight was that memory is continually modified by subsequent experience, that "the past changes the present and the present can also modify the past and change our expectations regarding the future" (Modell, 1994, p.92).

Modell (1994) linked the re-categorization of affectively charged memories, activated within the transference with the resultant expansion of meanings. Within this context, the pathological outcome of traumatic experience may be understood as a lack of ability to generate new meanings. The expansion of meaning in turn depends on free access to old memories that can be re-categorized by means of current perceptions. The paradox implicit in *Nachträglichkeit* also supports the notion of multiple psychic processes and multiple subjective realities, inherent in the early and later developments, in reciprocal regressions and progressions; and inherent in the dialectics of the illusory, actual and real within the clinical

setting and process, variously participating in creation of transference, countertransference, and enactments, verbal and non-verbal communications. Included in this definition of *Nachträglichkeit* is the view of multiple realities of transferences and those of the clinical setting: it is both real and illusory, both a repetition and creation; the past being active in the present and the present altering what has been past. Unassimilated trauma can be re-transcribed and, in this fashion, worked through. Writing on the “Psychoanalytic Setting as Container of Multiple Levels of Reality”, Modell concludes, (1989) “It is healing to experience past trauma in the new context of the safety of the current object tie to the analyst. But the paradox is that the analyst also represents simultaneously several levels of reality: the dangers of the past as well as the safety of the present...” (p.85).

The concept of *Nachträglichkeit* implies a cyclical view of time and memory, and their affective re-contextualization of memories and time. The traumatically frozen time can be connected with the frozen metaphoric symbolization function, both linked with affective meaning (Modell, 1995, 1997). Affective re-contextualizations of memories can open the previously foreclosed metaphoric process itself, leading to broadened paths of creative adjustments (Modell, 2008).

III. Fb. Developmental Transformation of Trauma

The developmental-trauma angle was emphasized by Harold Blum (1996), who, examining the concept from a perspective of seduction trauma, the complementarity of memory and fantasy, representation and pathogenic development, the modification of memory with life experiences and analytic experience, writes, “because of its relation to temporal and causal issues, I propose *Nachträglichkeit* ... as an unrecognized precursor of the contemporary concept of developmental transformation” (p. 1155). Blum broadens the developmental perspective onto the full life span and the trauma aspect onto the full experiential continuum, underscoring the reciprocal influences of past and present, and memory and fantasy. He writes, “The developmental alteration ... may be detrimental or beneficial, regressive or progressive. Transformations occur in different phases of development, and recapitulations are new editions rather than replications” (Blum, 1996, p. 1156; also Novick and Novick, 1994). Addressing specifically the *Nachträglichkeit* conceptualization in the Wolf Man, Blum (2011) writes: “Freud's (1918) concept of ‘deferred action’ or ‘après coup’ might be best understood not as an experience first becoming traumatic at a later developmental phase, but as a transformation of the confluence, influence, and meanings of past and present trauma (Blum, 2008, 2009). The preoedipal trauma of the Wolf Man may have had as much or more of an influence on psychic structure and conflict than the later Oedipal trauma formulated in Freud's pioneering, yet fanciful reconstruction...” (Blum, 2011, p. 609). Blum (1996) also contemplates an interaction of the developmentally determined Oedipal fantasy and the pre-oedipal trauma: “The Wolf Man's dream fantasy, however, was presumed to transform an earlier nontraumatic preoedipal memory into a new trauma. Development here largely occurs in a fantasy world, isolated from the child's life. The enduring psychic reality of the dream became more important than the actual past experience or its memory, ongoing developmental change, or current pathogenic

experience” (p. 1154). The interaction of the trauma and unconscious fantasy throughout early development until young adulthood was investigated and elaborated on in the longitudinal clinical studies of children who were re-analyzed as adolescents and young adults (Papiasvili and Blum, 2014, 2015). On several occasions, the traumatic events, reported by a parent, were not remembered, but enacted in play therapy with the puppets, then drawings at the end of child analysis; and subsequently symbolized in nightmares and dreams, and enacted in transference at age 19-21 years old. When the dream-nightmare and transference enactment were analyzed, the re-signification of the event and its historization was made possible, although the event itself was not remembered. The complexity of the manner as to how *Nachträglichkeit* mediated between events and experiences came to a full exposition in the clinical work, where it was illustrated how events became experiences and took on a traumatic meaning, not so much at the moment when they happened, but in the memories and in their reconstruction after a certain delay. The primary referents of reconstructions were found in prehistoric traces left in the absence of any psychic representative proper. Psychically, these traces did not have a meaning; to take on a meaning, they had to be situated in the context of a narration that always came after the fact. The findings concurred with Gerhard Dahl’s statement, “*Nachträglichkeit* manifestly entails the action of a force, analogous to that of the compulsion to repeat, that seeks to symbolize the unfamiliarity and confusion of the original experience — whether as a real event that was not understood or as a diffuse primary-process scene — so that it can subsequently [*nachträglich*], in accordance with the reality principle, be structured, thought, understood, and perhaps also mastered” (Dahl, 2010, p. 740).

In a comprehensive review of transcultural literature, Joann K. Turo (2013) emphasized two time vectors of the Freudian *Nachträglichkeit* – the deferment and retroactive revision. In her view, the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, as differentiated from psychotherapies, lies “in the psychoanalytic process of converting traumatic memories in the repetition of the transference from unassimilated to assimilated through interpretation resulting in retroactive revision to new perspective, new experience, and new meaning, especially notable in the working through phase of the process” (Turo, 2013, p. 2).

III. Fc. Intersubjective and Relational Perspectives: Nonlinearity and the Unexpected

The Intersubjectivist and Relational views highlight the nonlinearity, fluidity and the unexpected character of the clinical dialogue and dialogues across history, in their thinking about *Nachträglichkeit*. Often regarded as Freud’s most *nonlinear* concept, *Nachträglichkeit*, in intersubjective perspective, anticipates the current valuation of multiple subjectivities and multiple temporalities involved in the analytic process.

Adrienne Harris (2007) notes the role of *Nachträglichkeit* in shaping the clinical narrative, evocative of potential unconscious dialogues across history and time that arises in clinical work. She writes: “Past is not merely recovered but remade or made for the first time...” (Harris, 2007, p. 660).

Jay Greenberg (2015, personal communication with Eva Papiasvili) uses the French *après-coup* term because there is no adequate English translation. In his mind, the *après-coup* reminds us that whatever happens – in the consulting room or in life generally – has no fixed meaning and cannot be fully understood at any moment. Rather, meanings evolve and shift as the context within which events are experienced changes. He connects *après-coup* with Madeleine Baranger's idea that everything is, at the same time, something else; adding the temporal dimension – everything is, has been, and will be something else. Working with this in mind deeply affects the understanding of clinical process; reminding one not to celebrate the “successful” interventions or to drown in the “mistakes,” because everything will evolve in ways that illuminate what has happened in unexpected ways.

II. Fd. Nachträglichkeit – as an Essential Characteristic of Unconscious Functioning in General

In this overview of the currents occurring in North American thinking about *Nachträglichkeit* can be seen a tendency to view it as characteristic of unconscious psychic functioning in general. However, different authors have honed in on separate aspects of this inherently complex phenomenon. One way to make sense of the multiple uses of the term is to consider the ‘Emma model’ (above) of an initial childhood sexual experience, which comes to have traumatic meaning only after puberty as a subset of a larger psychic capacity for the re-interpretation of memory, keeping in mind that it is not strictly speaking of a particular recollection which is changed at a later time but rather its meaning which in a new ‘blow’ is altered in a significant way. In the ‘incubation period’ between the two ‘events’, an unconscious and passive elaboration appears to take place, which produces a new understanding either blocking or facilitating further development. While Freud himself resorted to the ‘translational’ metaphor of re-inscription, at times this linguistic reference does not do justice to the radically modified intersubjective position which accompanies certain ‘re-categorizations’ of memory (such as can occur after the discovery of betrayal, transgression, or suicide). North American French-Canadian analysts also include the role of the *Other* in *après-coup* theorizing, mindful that the original tools for re-transcription are borrowed from early caretakers – the real others’. Consequently, the quality of interpsychic interaction available in the early environment can be an important, hidden, part of the historical reality of the original experience of trauma and the possibility of its re-transcription.

III. Fe. Nachträglichkeit and Contemporary (Mostly North American) Interdisciplinary Studies

If the differences between the fields of inquiry with their different methodologies are recognized and not confused, the interdisciplinary connections, applications, and cross-fertilization between psychoanalysis and other fields of inquiry can lead to fertile analogies and new hypotheses. Such was the method of Freud's theorizing process. In order to continue his theoretical progress, he called upon other fields, such as science, anthropology, linguistic,

archaeology, art, literature, etc., and he based himself on their analogical link without confusing them.

III. Fea. Nachträglichkeit and neuroscience

The concept of *Nachträglichkeit* at the basis of psychoanalytic theory of memory, temporality, in relation to libido and instinct theory, anticipated contemporary neurobiological findings. Interdisciplinary thought about dynamic connections between the contemporary neuroscience and various aspects of *Nachträglichkeit* have been developed particularly in the United State, Canada and Italy.

Nachträglichkeit, as the re-transcription of memory, is analogous to some of the characteristics of a current neurobiological theory of memory as re-categorization (Edelman, 1987, 1989; 1992; Freeman, 1995). According to Edelman's Global Theory of Brain Functioning (GTBF), what is stored is potentiality (categories) awaiting activation. In addition, Freud repeatedly stressed that the affective traces of the earliest non-represented and non-symbolized scenes of events happening prior to age 1-year-old — their 'quota of affect' — are inscribed in the mnemonic system. He was convinced that the non-'discharged' quota of affect remained fixed as a representative of the drive, so that its mnemonic trace was stored in memory. The recent neuroscientific proof of this proposition has been celebrated by Mark Solms as a "triumph of psychoanalysis" (Solms, 2006, p. 849).

Dominique Scarfone (2006, 2015) reviewed different types of memories, as formulated by contemporary developmental, cognitive and affective neurosciences, in relation to psychoanalytic concept of *Nachträglichkeit*:

a) A relatively stable and organized form of memory that was described by Freud in the 1895 *Project* as a network of well "facilitated" neurons, recognizable as the precursor of the Ego or Self: a constellation of traits, habits and tendencies that induce a sense of continuity in the midst of personal growth and evolution. A *Self* or an *Ego*, is the *objective memory* of the traces left by the most significant experiences and encounters of one's lifetime. This form of memory is sometimes referred to as the character or personality organization, with individual's characteristic defense mechanisms, object-relations etc.

b) A relatively stable, but not so well organized form of non-declarative memory, which manifests itself in the various clinical modalities of *repetition compulsion*. These can vary from the very subtle expressions of transference to more spectacular forms of enactments, both accompanied by affective tonality. Repetition is here at work at every level, ascribed usually to deeply ingrained engrams, not readily transformed into symbolic thinking. This kind of memory manifests itself through forms of action, which require the psychoanalytic method of investigation to integrate them in a more "usable" form of memory. Memory, manifested primarily in embodied form, or appearing in the form of action, is at the heart of work on trauma (Van der Kolk, 1996) and on implicit knowing (Reis, 2009; Boston Process Study Group, 2007). It can be seen without any accompanying representation in the usual way this term is

intended. The task of analytic work on embodied or enacted memories entails the re-transcribing of such experience into representational form (Mancia, 2006). See also separate entry ENACTMENT.

c) Memory can take a hallucinatory form, manifested in dreams, daydreams, reveries and other forms of mainly sensory or pseudo-sensory experience. These experiences, too, require a thorough psychoanalytic investigation to be eventually amenable to being genuinely thought (Mancia, 2006; Papiasvili, 2016).

d) Finally, memory can manifest itself in the form of *memories* i.e. narratives richly connoted with words and affects describing a past experience. Among these, one can distinguish between spontaneous “screen memories” resulting from displacement of affect, and after-the-fact “constructions” or “reconstructions” that induce a strong conviction about their truth-content, although there is never an indisputable “final version”.

The concept of *Nachträglichkeit* is relevant to all memory’s varied forms: memory is a *living system*, constantly reconfiguring itself through a dialectical process of preserving the old while integrating the new. From both a neurobiological and a psychoanalytic point of view, periodic reconfiguration instantiates the very living character of memory, but it is also the locus of a struggle within the human psyche. This happens whenever memory’s active ‘imprints’ or ‘engrams’ threaten to gravely disrupt the stable memory structure of the Ego or the Self, or when that structure was so badly damaged or distorted in its growth that it cannot easily integrate new experiences and is condemned to repeating old patterns instead of introjecting or integrating new experiences. In this sense, all psychopathology can be ascribed to *a difficulty in the necessary reconfiguration of memory*.

Clinically, psychoanalysts are constantly dealing with memory, whether in terms of *recollections* or of *repetitions* outside of any awareness that these are other ways of ‘remembering’ (Freud, 1914b). A detailed study of the matter from the standpoint of *time* led Scarfone (2006, 2015) to suggest that what is referred to in psychoanalysis as the patient’s ‘past’ is in reality never truly ‘past’. The non-declarative forms of memory actively press the patient towards repeating, so that, while from a 3rd person point of view they belong to a time past, in the 1st person experience, the ‘pressure’ is happening ‘now’, hence the ‘Unpast’. What repeats itself in the *transference* is a form of memory that was not yet captured and stabilized within the category of the past. Based on such clinical findings, Scarfone (2015) suggested a supplement to the cognitive classes of memory:

While cognitive psychology distinguishes between declarative memory and non-declarative memory, the declarative memory having semantic, episodic, and autobiographical subsets, and non-declarative memory having procedural and affective components, psychoanalysis needs to approach any of these forms of memory according to whether they refer to ‘past’ or ‘unpast’ experience. While non-declarative memory is a good locus for ‘unpast’ experiences, it is important to consider that *any* of these forms of memory can be captive of the ‘unpast’ (e.g. temporarily forgetting a name or, at the other end of the spectrum, intrusive episodic memory of traumatic events). The ‘situated’ nature of psychoanalytic

investigation entails, that any form of memory can be summoned within the transference relationship, and therefore enter a more complex dynamic of *Nachträglichkeit* than what can be observed in standardized laboratory experiments.

III. Feb. Nachträglichkeit and historical-societal context: transgenerational transmission of destructive aggression

In the United States, Maurice Apprey (1993, 2014) coined the terms “dreams of urgent, voluntary errands”, “pluperfect latency” and “pluperfect errands” in order to capture enigmatic and uncanny *returns* in his work on transgenerational transmissions of destructive aggression in both traumatized individuals and communities that have endured prior catastrophic traumatic events (Apprey, 2003).

‘Errand’ here speaks to the idea that there is someone’s intentionality that will come to be remembered or has come to be made one’s own. *Implicated in the psychological use of the word ‘errand’ is a composite idea that there is a potential ‘error’, a ‘wandering away’, a ‘mistake’, and a ‘mandate’ to be carried out by the subject for an internal object.*

Referencing Claude Romano’s (2009) *return to oneself*; Nicholas Abraham’s (1988) *phantom*; Faimberg’s (2005) *telescoping of generations*; and Vamik Volkan’s (2013) *chosen traumas* and *chosen glories*, capturing mental representations of *collective memories*, Apprey (2014) constructed a ten-fold mnemonic metasyntesis of all the above contributions to the transfer of memory from catastrophically destructive *events* of history to a ‘resubjectivized’ and recontextualized *sense* of history: 1. *Something is injected* from an anterior source. 2. That hitherto *injected pro-ject* is housed in a hospitable place for storage for an indeterminate time. 3. That same *something* is now suspended and its transfer is deferred. 4. That something becomes a *project* that carries a mandate for an errand to be obeyed. 5. The mandate is accommodated with an *urgent voluntary reception*. What is urgent is the ancestral mandate injected into the early and inchoate ego. What is voluntary is the subject’s own resubjectivization of the mandate. 6. The subject awaits a suitable new object to reawaken the *project* so that the self-same project or a derivative project can return to a public space. 7. By this time the *subject* shall have lost sight of who originally sent whom. 8. Active and passive have by now become interchangeable. 9. A middle voice that is neither entirely active nor entirely passive speaks in an invisible and inaudible way. 10. Through a middle-voiced happening the *subject* returns to itself or to some representation of beginnings in the form of an unending spiral reproduction of transference(s).

This circular taxonomy suggests that sedimentations of history (Husserl, 1977/1948) are reactivated and then reconfigured through transference wishes that have the intentionality of overturning a deadly, mandated, or received *errand* in the safer contemporary arena of the clinical situation through reciprocal *connection* and reciprocal *corrections within the transference-countertransference continuum* (Apprey, 2006). Moving beyond reciprocal connections into a spiral domain of endless analyses of transferences and psychologically

charged external fields of reference back into the internal world, *the fold between inside and outside continues* (Deleuze, 1986/1988).

III. Fec. Nachträglichkeit and art

The bi-directional circular process of *Nachträglichkeit* has been found to be operative in artists' work in a condensed form (Marion, 2011) or over a period of time (Wilson, 2003).

Paola Marion (2011) writes about a condensed dream scene of a "Sacred Allegory" painting by Giovanni Bellini (1430-1514) as portraying and representing "the multidimensionality of time, and in particular a special form of temporality that we psychoanalysts call *Nachträglichkeit*" (p.24). In her interpretation, Bellini's painting gives "shape and visibility to the contemporary presence, in one single space, of the multiple temporal lines that pass through space itself" (p.24).

Laurie Wilson's (2003) studied reconstruction of a transformative *après-coup* moment in Alberto Giacometti's life and work. After a prolonged work-inhibition and compulsive miniaturization of his sculpted figurines many of which he destroyed, the celebrated Swiss born artist, Alberto Giacometti (1901-1966) was "suddenly" free in 1946 to make normal size figures and thus launch his new 'filiform' post-war style of standing women and walking men. As a young boy, Giacometti had watched his ambivalently loved mother emerge from months of a comatose state after having almost died from typhoid fever. She was skeletally thin and grey haired. The unassimilated traumatic experience from the artist's childhood was reactivated in 1946 when he returned to Paris and saw concentration camp survivors in his neighborhood. The artist was able to experience the new trauma of seeing people nearly dead from typhoid fever, and be liberated from the obsessional defenses against his own aggression, which had paralyzed him since before the war. Giacometti could see the difference between the actual sadism of the Nazis and his own hostile wishes and fantasies. The comparison of his remembered frightening images of his nearly dead mother thirty-six years ago, to the actual view of nearly dead people in post-War Paris assisted with the assimilation of these earlier traumatic memories. The retroactive revision of the hostile wishes toward family members of his childhood could now be transformed into sculpted icons of survival.

IV. CONCLUSION

Freud's early observation that certain memories had greater traumatic power upon recollection than they had when they were originally registered, led to his formulation of one of his most complex and non-linear conceptualizations of *Nachträglichkeit*. The points of view gathered in this entry illustrate the evolution of the conception of trauma, from a disorganizing

event of infantile sexuality, in early relation to an elementary regressive quality of the drives, remaining silent for a long time, only to find expression at a later second stage. If the second stage is qualified as traumatic, it is revealed afterwards that the first silent one was the real traumatic event time. The history of the concept itself follows a similar process in two stages as it describes.

In Europe, French psychoanalysis was in the forefront of the concept's revival. Lacan coined the term *après-coup* to emphasize that the operation of *après-coup* is never over; that it draws towards an after-effect. It reveals a temporal structure of a much higher order than "retroaction"; and importantly, the "after" awaits until the "before" shall have assumed its rightful place. Contemporary French analytic authors further refine and retain the spiral circular dynamic of emergence-disappearance-return as core dynamic formulation of constructive aspects of psychoanalytic processes. Most of them paid a particular attention to the work realized by the process of *après-coup* on the traumatic regressive economy of the drives, and to its goal concerning the elaboration of desire, thought, and the whole mental functioning. Actually, this concept refers to the process engaged in all the modalities of psychic elaboration, as it is principally involved in the whole installation of erotic life and thought itself.

In contrast to French psychoanalysis, where *archaic elements and primal repression are constructed against regressive attraction*, for contemporary British object relation theorists, following Klein and Bion *the primitive anguish is already there*. Within the context of contemporary British authors then, it is the work of psychoanalysis to combat and transform such fragmentary and disorganizing feelings of terror.

Overall, in Europe, there is a notion that all psychoanalytical studies can also be considered as after-effects of what motivated Freud's own work, giving new meaning to his propositions, and developing previously under-theorized and unexplored aspects of psychoanalytic theory in Freud's work, enriching and modifying it in its fundamentals.

From a Latin American perspective, without losing sight of the indisputable relevance of the two cases generally regarded as paradigms when it comes to attempting to pinpoint the problem of *Nachträglichkeit* in Freud's writings: "Project for a Scientific Psychology" and "Wolf Man", the concept is present in Freud's writings in a reiterated, continuous and on occasion surreptitious manner. The persistence of *Nachträglichkeit* should not be overlooked, as the concept is a code to the unique temporality of the unconscious.

The notion of *Nachträglichkeit* is a central element in the Freudian conceptual building, a mark related to the temporality associated with the laws of the primary process, causality, the logic of the unconscious, sexuality, repression, and repetition. As an operation of temporality, and as a means of constructing significance, *Nachträglichkeit* may not appear in an explicit manner and yet be present where repression occurs, and signify a memory where a memory becomes a trauma.

In North America, *Nachträglichkeit* is seen by many as the birth of the developmental model in psychoanalysis which, in a complex manner includes the nonlinearity of unconscious

contents and processes; and a pre-cursor of the concept of developmental transformation, which, within the interplay of various editions of trauma and unconscious fantasy throughout life, includes the bi-directionality of regression and progression, the dialectics of the underlying force seeking symbolization as well as repression and repetition.

In other strands of North American thinking, psychoanalysis itself can be viewed as the study of the *Nachträglichkeit* of early-life events, through multiple realities inherent in the psychoanalytic setting, which (re)construct symbolic bridges between the unassimilated traumatic events and their re-signification and transformation into representable experiences, process which can facilitate creation of qualitatively new subjectivities and expansion of meanings, spanning across generations.

Overall, in the contemporary North American exposition, the two temporal vectors of *Nachträglichkeit* of deferment and retroactive re-transcription/re-signification are seen as complementary and as corresponding to dialectics of both (multi) deterministic as well as hermeneutic reconstructive and constructive psychoanalytic process.

Among contemporary inter-disciplinary references, contemporary neuroscience emphasizes memory, in all its varied forms, as a *living system* that reconfigures itself through the medium of the psychoanalytic *dialogue*. In this reconfiguring operation, both neurobiology and psychoanalysis endorse the active dynamism and *living character of memory*. In this context relevant to *Nachträglichkeit*, psychopathology becomes a disturbance of reconfiguration of memory; and psychoanalysis fosters the construction and integration of new experiences and overturns the peremptory urge to repeat rigid and disturbed imprints that compromise the very structure of memory and integrity of the ego, and the dynamic fluidity of the overall psychic structure.

In the entire world, many authors have shown and emphasized the importance of the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* in the whole of Freud's works (Eickhoff, 2006). B. Chervet remarked that Freud stopped to use the words *Nachträglichkeit* and *nachträglich* in 1917 with a few minor exceptions in favour of the two-stage process and the value of the psychic work into both realms of regressive and progressive ways. On both sides of the Atlantic, after a period of 'concept latency' and its Lacan's subsequent retrieval, the Freudian *Nachträglichkeit* underwent further elaboration, refinement and transformation of growing complexity. It has become one of the basic concepts of a theory of thinking including temporality, causality, memory, trauma, representations, affects, sexuality and erotogenic sensuality.

See also:

ENACTMENT

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OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES (ORT)

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

Historically, the term ‘Object Relations Theory’ was coined by W.R.D. Fairbairn (1943, 1944). Generally, it denotes a variously defined set of psychoanalytic developmental and structural hypotheses which place the child’s need to relate to others at the center of human motivation. More specifically, it is a psychoanalytic theory, or set of related theories, in which people are seen as motivated from the beginning of life by a need to make contact and form relationships, rather than merely satisfying impulses in order to discharge energy. Communicative interaction with both internal and external others, called ‘objects’, is accorded primacy in the understanding of human life, starting with the construction of primitive emotional ties between infants and their actual caretakers. Primitive emotional and bodily interaction, along these lines, accounts for the way in which external as well as internal ‘objects’ are perceived and experienced by the subject.

The definitions of Object Relations hypotheses and theories in contemporary literature and regional dictionaries of all three psychoanalytic continents (Moore and Fine 1990; Auchincloss and Samberg 2012; Skelton 2006; de Mijolla 2013; Borensztein 2014) vary, as exemplified in the following selection of definitional statements. Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theories present “A system of psychological explanations based on the premise that the mind is comprised of elements taken in from outside, primarily aspects of the functioning of other persons. This occurs by means of the processes of internalization. This model of the mind explains mental functions in terms of relations between the various elements internalized” (Moore and Fine 1990). Similarly, Skelton (2006) proposes that object-relations theory is primarily concerned with “innermost fantasies about relationships”; while Hinshelwood (1991) allowing for a broadly defined notion of object-relations approaches, Kleinian and non-Kleinian, focused essentially on “the state and character of the objects.” In a recent example of intermingling of the psychoanalytic cultures, Kernberg contributes the following definition to De Mijolla’s (2013, p. 1175) *International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*: “Psychoanalytic object relations theories may be defined as those that place the internalization, structuralization and clinical reactivation (in the transference and counter-transference) of the earliest dyadic object relations at the center of their motivational (structural, clinical, and genetic and developmental) formulations.”

The abovementioned variability can be classified according to the breadth of the definitions:

1. In the broadest terms, psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory refers to the psychoanalytic study of the nature of interpersonal relations, and of the development of intrapsychic structures deriving from internalized relations with others in the context of present interpersonal relations and overall personality organization and functioning. In this widest context, psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory would include all the vicissitudes of the relationship between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal fields. From this vantage point, psychoanalysis as a general theory is in fact an Object Relations Theory. Thus broadly defined, psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory has been referred to as an intermediate ground - a “middle” language between the metapsychological and clinical “languages” (Mayman 1963; Rapaport and Gill, 1959). In North America, this wide conceptualization was used and integrated with Ego Psychology by Schafer (1968) and Modell (1968).

2. In a more restricted ‘middle’ definition, Object Relations Theory refers to the gradual construction of “dyadic or bipolar intrapsychic representations (self- and object- images) as reflections of the original infant-mother relationship and its later development into dyadic, triangular, and multiple internal and external interpersonal relationships” (Kernberg, 1977, p 57). The core commonality among many variations is the essentially dyadic bipolar nature of the internalization within each unit of self- and object image established in a particular affective context. This approach draws historically on the British school of Melanie Klein (1934, 1940, 1946), Fairbairn (1952), Winnicott (1955, 1958, 1960a,b, 1963), Bowlby (1969); the Ego psychological approaches of Erikson (1956), Jacobson (1964), and Mahler (1968; Mahler, Pine, Bergman, 1975); and in different ways also the Cultural, Interpersonal schools (Sullivan, 1953). Today, this definition also includes various widely defined Relational psychoanalytic approaches (S. Mitchell, 2000; Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Harris, 2011). Thus understood, Object Relations Theory, in its metapsychological, clinical and sociological implications, has variable overlap, although on admittedly different premises, with many ideas of Loewald (1978, 1988), Lichtenstein (1970), Green (1985, 2002), Rosenfeld, (1983), Segal, (1991), Volkan (2006), and the ‘Third Model’ of some French and French Canadian psychoanalysts.

This definition provides a “major integrative framework which can link the psychosocial approach to ... the subjective and experiential nature of human life...with the intrapsychic structures...in general metapsychology...” (Kernberg, 1977, p 58). This quality of ‘integrative framework’ within a historical perspective has also been emphasized by S. Mitchell, when, in his tribute to John Bowlby, he states (1998): “major relational authors have contributed to our clinical understanding of different facets and implications of human relationality and attachment. Fairbairn explored the psychodynamics of attachments to physically or emotionally absent parenting figures. Winnicott illuminated the subtle ways in which secure attachment facilitates the development of a personal sense of self and the ways in which the absence of such parental functions adaptively forecloses such development. Loewald's innovative theorizing suggests that the apparent separation between the subject who attaches and the object of attachment overlays a primary process level of organization in which

self and other exist in various degrees of undifferentiation from each other. Loewald (1988) suggests that healthy object relations consists not so much in a clear separation of self from others but in a capacity to contain in dialectical tensions different mutually enriching forms of relatedness. And, finally, Sullivan and contemporary interpersonalists have contributed to our understanding of the ways in which the vicissitudes of early attachment experiences play themselves out in current relationships, including the transference-countertransference relationship with the analyst. At this point in the evolution of psychological ideas, attachment theory and psychoanalytic [Object Relations] theory offer an exciting possibility for a convergence that is mutually enriching” (Mitchell, 1998, p. 193).

Post-Freudian interest in the role of the object in the development of the psychic apparatus is an intense arena of overlap with work emanating from France and Montreal, where Contemporary French analysts speak about the "third model": a model of the psychic apparatus which postulates a first phase of human life in which the baby's mind must be considered in the context of the care-taking environment (two-person model) before it differentiates into one or the other of the two (one-person) Freudian models, topographical and structural. In human development, the two-person mind precedes that of the one-person psychic autonomy of drive, defence, and intrapsychic fantasy, described by Freud. Green read Winnicott in this way, and Brusset (2005b, 2006), Reid (2008a, 2008b), and others have followed up on this lead. This may be yet another common ground of psychoanalytic research which has emerged internationally in addition to that of transference and countertransference suggested by Gabbard in 1995. Loewald's (1960) statement, "instinctual drives are as primarily related to 'objects', to the 'external world,' as the ego is. In other words, instinctual drives organize environment and are organized by it no less than is true for the ego and its reality... It is the mutuality of organization, in the sense of organizing each other, which constitutes the inextricable interrelatedness of 'inner and outer world'..." (ibid, p. 23.), has resonance with Contemporary French analysts on both sides of the Atlantic.

Many European Object Relations and North American Relational schools also include Sandor Ferenczi and Michael Balint's conceptualizations of 'primary love' and Balint's 'basic fault' and others, as a groundwork for future enrichment of Object Relational thought and technique.

3. The narrowest definition of Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory limits the term to the "British Psychoanalytic School" of Melanie Klein and Fairbairn and related approaches of Guntrip (1961, 1971), Winnicott (1955, 1963), Wisdom (1963,1971), Sutherland (1963). This understanding of Object Relations Theory has been traditionally counterposed to Ego Psychology in both North America and Europe.

Latin American Object Relations conceptualizations (below) are primarily related to this British Object Relations (narrow) definition, in their specific understanding of Kleinian theory and it's developments mainly in Bion, Meltzer and Winnicott.

Recently, Auchincloss and Samberg (2012), described Object Relations Theories according to their similarities and grouped them according to some of their differences. Below is the updated somewhat modified version of such a perspective.

Object Relations Theories **share** several following features:

1. Object relations are the basic unit of experience. 2. The human mind is viewed as object-seeking from birth; the basic motivation for object-seeking is not reducible to any other motivational force; 3. Internalized object relations are built up in the course of development through the interaction of innate factors (such as inborn affect disposition and cognitive equipment) and relationship with others (caregivers). 4. Interpersonal relationships reflect internalized object relations; psychopathology, especially serious psychopathology such as psychosis or borderline and narcissistic personality disorder, are conceptualized in terms of object relations. These shared features lead to theoretical attitudes about basic aspects of the psychoanalytic model of the mind, including motivation, structure, development and psychopathology. Object relations theories provide a natural link to the study of family and group dynamics, as much as to the study of development, as in developmental psychology.

Object Relations Theories **differ** from each other along several criteria:

1. Relationship to drive theory: Klein, Jacobson and Mahler stayed intimately connected to drive theory. Loewald, Kernberg, Sandler, Winnicott are examples of object relations theorists who maintained a version of drive theory with the concept of drive variously modified, placing the emphasis on affect and object relations as the building blocks of drives. Fairbairn, Guntrip and Sullivan are generally viewed as most distant from the Freudian drive theory. 2. The importance of aggression in psychic life: While often Klein is viewed as focusing on aggression, Kleinian analysts believe it would be more accurate to say her theory focuses on splitting, which can include the split between love and hate, that takes a central role in psychic life. 3. The importance of actual versus fantasied interaction: Sullivan's interpersonal theory emphasized real interaction; Klein's theory emphasized 'phantasy' as the representation of instinct and how such representations colored the object. 4. The question of whether the clinical situation is shaped primarily by internalized object relations or by the real, dyadic patient-analyst interaction: Klein and Kernberg emphasized the former; Greenberg and Mitchell emphasized the latter.

II. HISTORY - ROOTS: BUILDING BLOCKS AND/OR THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

Object-relations emerged as a theoretical problem in the history of psychoanalysis prior to Klein's contribution in the 1920s and the subsequent formulation of object-relations theory in Britain in the 1940s and 1950s. The concept of object-relationships does not form part of

Freud's metapsychology, nor does classical drive theory accord particular significance to developmental history further to the theory of libidinal stages. The problem of object-relations, however, is inherent in classical theory, insofar as "instincts are directed towards objects and objects can only be of significance if the individual has some drive to relate to them" (Rycroft 1995: 83-4).

While object relations and drives are not necessarily intrinsic opposites in a *formal* sense, nonetheless the distinction can apply when it comes to practical evaluations and clinical discriminations, especially from the British Object Relations point of view. Consequently, historically, psychoanalytical perspectives have been often viewed as divisible into instinct theories and object-relations theories.

II. A. Roots in Freud – Building Blocks Perspective: Significance of Identification and Object Loss in Structure Formation

Freud used the term *object* throughout his writings on many aspects of the development of his theory, including motivation, structure, development, psychopathology, etc. (Freud, 1905, 1914, 1915, 1917a, 1919, 1920, 1923, 1926). The Freudian *object* is always firmly and primarily linked to the drive, in developmental or pathological transformation alike (1905, 1938). In his writings Freud explored various complexities of the mechanisms of internalization and externalization, and identificatory and projective mechanisms, relevant to the later object relations theories. Examples are his work on Melancholia (Freud, 1917a) and the formation of the Superego, an heir to the Oedipal complex (1923, 1931, 1938). His paper on Narcissism (Freud, 1914), frequently considered, together with Mourning and Melancholia (Freud, 1917a) as containing roots of object relations theories, articulates the concept of *object choice*, distinguishing between developmentally early narcissistic type and later anaclitic type.

When using the term *object relations* first in Mourning and Melancholia (Freud, 1917a) he speaks of identification as 'a preliminary stage of object-choice': "... the first way in which the ego picks out an object, ...the ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development at which it is, it wants to do so by devouring it" (pp. 249-250). What Freud seems later to have regarded as the most significant feature of this paper was precisely its account of the process by which in melancholia an object-cathexis is replaced by identification. A few years later, in Group Psychology (1921), where the subject of identification is taken up again, a change in the earlier view—or perhaps only a clarification of it—seems to emerge. Identification, there, is something that precedes object-cathexis and is distinct from it. In addition, returning to the topic of identification, in Group Psychology Freud used the word 'introjection' at several points. He writes: "First, identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct (Freud, 1921, pp.106-107).

This view of identification is consistently emphasized in many of Freud's later writings, as, for instance, in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), where he writes that primary identification with the parents “is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis” (p 31). He argued that this process is not restricted to melancholia but is of quite general occurrence. These primary identifications were to a large extent the basis of what we describe as a person's ‘character’. But, more importantly, he suggested that identifications deriving from the dissolution of the Oedipus complex form the nucleus of the super-ego (cf. J. Strachey 1957, p. 240-242). (See also entries THE UNCONSCIOUS, CONFLICT, EGO PSYCHOLOGY)

Writing on Freud's connection to relational theories, Modell (1995) states: “Freud's later theories emphasized the significance of identification and object loss in structure formation ... Freud posited that what was internalized represented a relationship between persons. For example, in *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (Freud, 1940), he described the superego's function in relation to the ego as carrying on the functions performed by people in the outside world. Fairbairn essentially extended Freud's concept of internalized object relations. Although Freud never developed a relational theory as such, for he never embraced the concept of a self, in my 1968 monograph *Object Love and Reality*, I noted that there is in fact a latent Freudian theory of object relations” (Modell, 1995, p. 109). Indeed, on more than one occasion, Freud (see 1917b, p 347 and the accompanying footnote) evoked the notion of a ‘complemental series’ in questions of aetiology, that is, a varying complementarity between internal and external factors, depending upon the instance. In his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud warned against dichotomy between the internal and external factors: “It is true that individual psychology is concerned with the individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual impulses; but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is individual psychology in a position to disregard the relations of the individual to others” (Freud, 1921, p. 69).

II. B. Roots in Freud - The Problem of Object-Relations: Object Relations as Secondary to Drives

The problem of object-relations is evident throughout Freud's writings. It surfaces early on, for instance, in the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, where Freud writes: “There are...good reasons why a child sucking at his mother's breast has become the prototype of every relation of love. The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (1905: 222). The libidinal object, however, is viewed by Freud – within the general metapsychological framework of the instinctual source, aim and object – specifically in terms of object-choice and drive satisfaction/frustration. In classical theory pleasure points the way to object-choice (Freud 1909: 108). And by emphasizing, for the most part, what satisfies or frustrates drive, Freud thereby privileged a biological perspective on object-relations, giving priority to the energetic and economic dimension in human experience.

The emphasis on the instinctual roots of object-relations means that the object is seen as a consequence of the genital organization of the component instincts and erotogenic zones. Object-relations remain a function of drive for Freud, where stimulation is explicable without reference to the object-relational context. Compare the following statement to the previous passage from the *Three Essays*: “If an erotogenic zone in a person who is not sexually excited (e.g. the skin of a woman’s breast) is stimulated by touch, the contact produces a pleasurable feeling...it is at the same time better calculated than anything to arouse a sexual excitation that demands an increase of pleasure” (1905: 210). Here, as elsewhere, excitation is explicable in the Freudian interpretation without reference to the interpersonal context.

The concept of the object, if not the object-relationship, undergoes certain changes in the second topography or structural model. Endogenously arising, biologically determined drives remain the underlying motivational principle for Freud; while at the same time, more emphasis is given to early relationships – that is, within which the multiple demands of drive are organized and realized. The problem of object-relations is now linked to a conceptual series that anticipates the formulation of the structural model: narcissism (1914); the new instinctual dualism introduced in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920); the fusion of instincts; instinctual sublimation; and identification (1921).

The capacity of the object to influence the nature of psychic structure is set out, against the background of this conceptual development, in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917a): “An object-choice...had at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from the loved person, the object-relationship was shattered...the free libido was not displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego...it was not employed in an unspecified way, but served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus, the shadow of the object fell upon the ego” (1917: 248-49). The process described in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ – i.e. an alternation of the ego on the basis of an earlier object-relationship following object-loss – is generalized in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) as a phenomenon of normal psychology. These conceptual developments notwithstanding, the notion of object-relationship is not accorded explanatory value in the second theory of the psychical apparatus any more than it was in the first (topographical) theory.

The developmental implications of object-relations are nonetheless elaborated further in *The Ego and the Id*, with reference to “a setting up of the object inside the ego” (1923: 29). The structuration of the ego and the superego depends on a series of object losses. Freud thus advances the supposition that “the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object-choices” (1923: 29). Structures with a developmental history, relics of object-relationships, are included alongside constitutionally determined drives and their vicissitudes or transformations. The effects of the Oedipus complex on the structuration of the psyche are viewed, accordingly, in terms of identifications in place of abandoned cathexes.

II. C. Roots in Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank

Further to the problem of object-relations in classical drive theory, where objects are created by the subject out of the experience of drive satisfaction/frustration, Sándor Ferenczi was one of the first analysts to explicitly acknowledge (i) that object-relations exist from the beginning of life, and (ii) that object-relationships may be found in the deepest structures of the mind (Haynal 1988; Kohon 1986). Together with his seminal contributions to the theory of clinical technique, based on the analysis of regressed patients, Ferenczi's emphasis on early environmental failure and infantile trauma forms the background to the development of object-relations theory in the British school of Klein, Fairbairn, Balint and Winnicott. (See also entries COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, INTERSUBJECTIVITY)

Otto Rank's book *Grundzuege einer genetischen Psychologie [General outline of a genetic psychology]* (1927) introduced the concept 'pre-oedipal' under the chapter headline "Genesis of the object relation", thus adding significance to the idea that there is a developmental phase before the Oedipus complex, also formed an essential part of the origins of object-relations theory. Rank's contribution represents one of a series of decisive breaks with the Freudian interpretation of psychosexual development: "The Oedipus saga is certainly a duplicate of the Sphinx episode, which means psychologically that it is the repetition of the primal trauma at the sexual stage (Oedipus complex), whereas the Sphinx represents the primal trauma itself" (Rank 1924, p.144). The identification of the Sphinx – i.e. the 'strangler' – as "the nuclear symbol of primary anxiety" posits trauma as a relational phenomenon occurring at the beginning of life, in particular with reference to separation and individuation.

III. HISTORY OF FURTHER EVOLUTION: BRITISH OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

It was possible to advance the idea of object-relationships only so far from the structural point of view of the second topography. Freud continued to view impulse as a derivative of drive tension, and saw impulses as directed towards objects secondarily – that is, when objects present themselves and prove efficacious in reducing tension, experienced as pleasure. The development of object-relations theory required a more or less extensive revision of Freud's instinct theory. Some authors argue that the term 'object-relations school' applies to a specific group of analysts in the Independent tradition – most notably, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Michael Balint (cf. Kohon 1986; Hinshelwood 1989; Spillius et al. 2011).

However, leaving aside the more organized notion of a 'school', and further to the *problem* of object-relations in Freud, the *theory* of object-relations has developed along two axes within British psychoanalysis: on the one hand, the Independent tradition within the British Society after 1945; on the other hand, the work of Klein and the contemporary Kleinians (Schafer 1997), for whom the importance of unconscious internal object-relations is seen in

terms of the processes of projection and introjection. Isaacs (1948) makes a seminal contribution, here, concerning the idea of the internal object as an unconscious phantasy of the relationship between the drive and the object.

III. A. Klein: Internal Objects and the Intentionality of Drives

Melanie Klein laid the foundations for object-relations theory, which has continued since the 1970s to extend beyond its point of origins in the British school. In the general psychoanalytic framework that remains applicable to the contemporary Kleinian group in Britain (Schafer 1997), Klein retained Freud's view of the drives as the underlying motivational principle in human life; while at the same time redefining the concept of the 'drive' itself.

Klein judged her account of the internal origins of human experience as continuous with classical Freudian theory; she saw her work, essentially, as an amplification of Freud's work and, in particular, sought to articulate her account of the internal world in terms of Freud's (1923) theory of the structure of the personality (cf. Caper 1988). The superego, for instance, is seen as a composite of "the various identifications adopted on the different levels of development whose stamp they bear" (1929: 204). And yet *contra* Freud, the drives are conceived by Klein as irreducibly psychological or subjective in nature and experientially available – that is, inextricably linked with the infant's emotions and anxieties. Thus, Klein's use of the term 'object-relations' is based on her "contention that the infant has from the beginning of post-natal life a relation to the mother (although focusing primarily on her breast) which is imbued with the fundamental elements of an object-relation, *i.e.* love, hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences" (1952a: 49).

Drives are conceived from the point of view of primary object-relatedness. For Klein, "there is no instinctual urge...which does not involve objects, external and internal; in other words, object-relations are at the *centre* of emotional life" (1952a: 53). Internal objects furnish the content of unconscious phantasy for Klein, where phantasy is seen as a primary component of the drives themselves. This position is evident above all in the way that Klein viewed the relationship between objects and the body. While the body is central to the phenomenology of the internal world, Klein continued to emphasize the corporeal expression of drives, rather than bodily tension itself, as a source of instinctual energy. This provided an alternative to the regulatory principles of classical drive theory.

The term and concept 'internal' may refer variously to 'mental', 'imaginary' or 'inside' (Strachey 1941). Kleinians have continued to debate this question. Karin Stephen, in an early attempt to clarify the nature of internal objects, notes that "the belief in these fantastic internal objects originates in actual bodily experiences of very early childhood, connected with violent, often uncontrollable, discharges of emotional tension" (1934: 321). Paula Heimann, while still loyal to the Klein group, in turn underlines the basic assumption that *drives are object-seeking* from the point of view of the body: "Under the sway of hunger and oral desires the infant in some way conjures up the object that would satisfy these impulses. When this object, the mother's breast, is in reality offered to him he accepts it and in phantasy incorporates it" (1949:

10). More recently, Robert Hinshelwood has drawn attention to the fact that the primitive experience of internal objects “creates an animistic world in which everything [animate and inanimate] feels and has *intentions*” (1989: 75; emphasis added).

The attribution of intentionality to psychic energy, to both the life and death drives, is seen from the Kleinian perspective as applicable from the beginning of life: “love and hatred, phantasies, anxieties and defences are...operative from the beginning and are *ab initio* indivisibly linked with object-relations” (Klein 1952a: 53). From the beginning, according to Klein, “the ego introjects objects ‘good’ and ‘bad’, for both of which the mother’s breast is the prototype” (1935: 262). Unlike Freud, for whom the object is always the object of an instinctual aim, Klein posits object-relatedness as an ‘additional’ primary determinant of human action (1952a: 51). This applies to both love and hate understood as purposive or intentional force relations inherent from the beginning. In the case of libidinal attachment, Klein proposes that “feelings of love and gratitude arise directly and spontaneously in the baby in response to the love and care of his mother” (1937: 311). Destructive impulses are understood along the same lines as a manifestation of innate purposive hatred, and envy of the all-powerful, good object (1959: 249). “In the very first months of the baby’s existence it has sadistic impulses *directed*, not only against its mother’s breast, but also against the inside of her body” (1935: 262; emphasis added).

The Freudian notions of ‘libido’ and ‘aggression’ are reconceived as directional emotions. As such, Klein seeks to integrate drive theory and object-relations theory; in fact, her account of the drives as inherently purposive phenomena is a theory of the origins and nature of the object. This raises questions concerning the constitution of the psyche, with respect to the balance of constitutional and environmental factors. The balance of internal and external factors – i.e., the complex of biological and personal elements and the nature of the early environment – is expressed differently at different points in Klein’s writings.

Klein, in a consistent line of argument, posits a state of “innate unconscious awareness of the existence of the mother” (1959: 248); objects are seen as inherent in the drives and, in that sense, relatively autonomous from external objects, in particular the baby’s actual mother. Instinctual knowledge, or innate preconception, is understood as “the basis for the infant’s primal relation to his mother” (1959: 248). The idea that the first objects of the drives are actually extensions of the drives themselves, rather than actual relational events, is supported on two counts. Klein presupposes first that libidinal desire is always the desire for something (intentionality of drives), and secondly, that object-relations are established specifically by the intrapsychic mechanisms of introjection-projection. “By projection, by turning outward libido and aggression and imbuing the object with them, the infant’s first object-relation comes about. This is the process which, in my opinion, underlines the cathexis of objects. Owing to the process of introjection, this first object is simultaneously taken into the self” (1952b: 58).

The omnipotent nature of primitive unconscious phantasy means that the external object at first, in the early paranoid schizoid position, is experientially indissociable from the introjected object, while projection results in what feels like a real loss of parts of the self or the internal world. A feeling of depersonalization or fragmentation may result from excessive

projective identification, where parts of the self have been located in external objects. The concept ‘internal object’ is used in this way to refer to the primitive belief in a physically present object (Money-Kyrle 1968), or the experience of objects as concretely real. And real people, including the actual parents, are assigned a role or an identity against the background of this concretely imagined internal world, where object-relationships are formed of universal a priori *imagos*. Most notably, the superego of the child, according to Klein (1933: 249), “does not coincide with the picture presented by its real parents, but is created out of imaginary pictures or *imagos* of them which it has taken into itself”. Klein came to a view early on about the intrapsychic origins of introjected and internal objects; in recounting her analysis of Rita from 1923, she writes that the prohibition due to an internal persecutory object did not emanate “from the *real* mother, but from an introjected mother” (1926: 132).

Nonetheless, Klein doesn’t avoid reference to the real, external world, but views projection-introjection as an ongoing process of interaction or “interplay” of environmental and intrapsychic factors (1936: 292):

“From its inception analysis has always laid stress on the importance of the child’s early experiences, but it seems to me that only since we know more about the nature and contents of its early anxieties, and the continuous interplay between its actual experiences and its phantasy-life, can we fully understand *why* the external factor is so important.” (Klein 1935, p. 285)

Klein states that from “the very beginning of psychic development there is a constant correlation of real objects with those installed within the ego” (1935: 266). Object *imagos* are seen in this way as “doubles” of real situations (1940: 346). The notion of “doubles” presupposes a theory of psychic mentation (internal objects, representations and symbols) based on the idea of correspondence (rather than verisimilitude), a view that is maintained on the grounds that internal *imagos* are “a phantastically distorted picture of the real objects upon which they are based” (1935: 262). More than a mechanism of defence, the process of projection-introjection is seen as a normal mode of encounter, a way of relating to the outside world in general. On this reckoning, the internal object *imago* is formed around a core of real perceptual experience; the internal world is populated by objects derived from the infant’s actual environment and interpersonal history.

As cycles of projection and introjection continue, at a certain point (beginning, according to Klein, at 4-6 months) the infant realises that the hated object who is expelled and viciously attacked in phantasy is the same as the nourishing, loved object whom the infant wishes lovingly to take in. The infant thus has a dawning awareness of his attacks on the loved object. If this confluence of loved and hated figures can be borne, instead of the persecutory, survival anxiety of the early so called ‘paranoid schizoid position’, where phantastic ‘part objects’ reign, anxiety begins to centre on the welfare and survival of the other as a more real and complexly perceived ‘whole object’. Gradually persecution gives rise to remorseful guilt and poignant sadness, linked to deepening of love. With pining for what has been lost or damaged by hate comes an urge to repair. Ego capacities enlarge and the world is more richly and realistically perceived. Omnipotent control over the object, now felt as more real and

separate, diminishes. These are the beginnings of the depressive position. Maturation is thus closely linked to loss and mourning; as Roger Money-Kyrle (1955) points out, Klein's theory has a built-in, natural morality based on love and guilt, which is discovered during the course of development rather than taught.

Recognition of the other as separate from oneself encompasses the other's relationships, which means that awareness of the oedipal situation inevitably accompanies the depressive position. Ronald Britton (1989, 1992) goes on to show in more detail how the depressive position and the Oedipus complex are not just developmentally concurrent, but that working through one necessarily entails working through the other.

In the paranoid schizoid position Klein (1932, 1952a) posits the phantasy of a fearful and persecuting 'combined parent figure': the maternal body containing the father's penis and rival babies. This primitive version of a couple, phantasised as in continuous intercourse, exhibits sadistic oral, urethral and anal features due to projections of infantile sexuality and sadism. In the depressive position, however, there is an awareness of a true third object, internal and external, which although giving rise to feelings of jealousy and envy, also adds stability to the internal situation.

"The infant's capacity to enjoy at the same time the relation to *both* parents, which is an important feature in his mental life and conflicts with his desires, prompted by jealousy and anxiety, to separate them, depends on his feeling that they are separate individuals. This more integrated relation to the parents (which is different from the compulsive need to keep the parents apart from one another and to prevent their sexual intercourse) implies a greater understanding of their relation to one another and is a precondition for the infant's hope that he can bring them together and unite them in a happy way (Klein 1952c p. 79f, fn)."

If development proceeds normally the good, loved object is increasingly established inside as the stable core of the ego. However, depressive pain may be unbearable, and is often countered by manic and obsessional defences, and by retreat to the splitting and paranoia of the paranoid schizoid position. The depressive position is not a once and for all achievement, but has to be worked through over and over again throughout life, although in good circumstances there is a lifelong trajectory towards a deeper, more three-dimensional relationship to self and other, and a greater capacity for re-integration after collapse into a paranoid schizoid mode of being.

Klein describes the process of increasing perception of reality thus:

"It seems that at this stage of development the unification of external and internal, loved and hated, real and imaginary objects is carried out in such a way that each step in the unification leads again to a renewed splitting in the imagos. But, as the adaptation to the external world increases, this splitting is carried out on planes which gradually become increasingly nearer and nearer to reality. This goes on until love for the real and the internalised objects and trust in them are well established." (Klein 1935, p 288)

Overall, building on Freud's views, Klein (1927, 1932, 1937, 1952a, 1952b) proposed that the entire internal world is built on multiple internalizations, or internal objects, through processes that begin in the first days of life. In the Kleinian view, the internal object is: 1. A phantasy; 2. A body part, for example "the breast" or "penis"; 3. Suffused with internal experiences of pleasure and pain; 4. Experienced as an alive presence; 5. Defensively split into "all good" and "all bad" parts as protection against aggression. If the development proceeds optimally, these Part objects become integrated into whole objects. 6. While Internal objects can be good, Klein's work focused (although not exclusively) on Internal 'Bad' objects; 7. All representations of *object* and *self* are constructed through ongoing processes of projection and introjection; consequently, these representations of *object* and *self* cannot be ever fully differentiated from each other; 8. The Internal Object is distinct from the External Object: The External Object is defined as a representation of the object that has not been taken inside of the body. Psychological development proceeds from the Paranoid-Schizoid position, which is dominated by the defensive processes of splitting and projective identification and characterized by part objects (and parts of the self), towards the Depressive position of tolerance of ambivalence and by the integration of various part objects into whole objects. Psychopathology reflects fixation to or revival of aspects of paranoid-schizoid or depressive positions.

In Klein's view (1929, 1946), all internalization processes (related to internal objects) are related to the management of anxiety over the flooding of one's good objects by aggression. Although Klein did become more identified with the trend toward observing and addressing aggression (point 6 above) for many reasons, one of which was to extend Abraham's view that had been somewhat neglected thus far, her theoretical view also addressed innate libidinal inclinations and focused upon contributing factors inhibiting the introjection of and sustaining the good internal object and aspects of self. Her theoretical concerns focused on the *early and unresolved* Oedipal conflicts, dominated by the mechanism of splitting:

"[...] one of the unexpected phenomena I came across was a very early and savage super-ego...I found that young children introject their parents...in a phantastic way, and I was led to this conclusion by observing the terrifying character of some of their internal anxiety within the ego, but...they are split off in a manner different from that by which the super-ego is formed, and are relegated to the deeper layers of the unconscious..." (Klein 1958, p.241).

Klein underlined the need for splitting early on to move from diffuse to paranoid-schizoid (persecutory) anxieties, those concerned with preservation of the self. She underlined how such early anxieties color the perception of the object, *before* these anxieties can be integrated into what she comes to call depressive anxieties: those that cluster around concern for the object. This focus allows a more detailed view of how the object is 'known' through love and hate in constant interaction. The aim of this understanding enables the ego, weakened by destructive impulses, to regain the goodness and therefore strength and hopefulness of the object.

Though noting the not always apparent role of early environmental influences in Klein's work, Mitrani (2007) cites her paper "On the Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego." Here, Klein (1930) presented findings from the analysis of a four-year old autistic boy whom she called Dick, and she introduced the concept of "premature ego-development" (p. 227) to sum up Dick's dilemma. She described this child's precocity as a "premature empathy" (p. 227) for and "pre-mature and exaggerated identification" (p. 223) with the mother. She proposed that Dick suffered as a result of a far-too-early onset of the depressive position. In other words, in the transference, Klein observed and inferred *Dick's untimely concern as a very young infant with issues related to the survival of his mother.*

There are countless references in Klein's work about the infant's projection of libidinal aspects of its self into the mother to flesh out what's missing, to repair her (i.e., the depressive position both premature and not so premature), and also her emphasis on the necessity of the infant's good objects residing at the core of the ego.

Klein's interplay between good and bad objects emerges particularly succinctly in her paper "On the Sense of Loneliness."

She states that

"the ego exists and operates from birth onward. At first it is largely lacking in cohesion and dominated by splitting mechanisms. The danger of being destroyed by the death instinct directed against the self contributes to the splitting of impulses into good and bad; owing to the projection of these impulses onto the primal object, it too is split into good and bad. In consequence, in the earliest stages, the good part of the ego and the good object are in some measure protected, since aggression is directed away from them. These are the particular splitting processes which I have described as the basis of relative security in the very young infant, in so far as security can be achieved at this stage; whereas other splitting projective processes, such as those leading to fragmentation, are detrimental to the ego and its strength." (Klein, 1963, p. 300).

The drive toward integration "increases with the growth of the ego, and based on the introjections of the good object, at first represented by the mother's breast, although it could be other aspects of mother as well. If the good internal object is established with relative security, it becomes the core of the developing ego." (Klein 1963, p. 301).

"...integration, if it could be achieved, would have the effect of mitigating hate by love and in this way rendering destructive impulses less powerful. The ego would then feel safer not only about its own survival but also about the preservation of its good object...However, integration is difficult to accept. The coming together of destructive and loving impulses, and of the good and bad aspects of the object, arouses the anxiety that destructive feelings may overwhelm the loving feelings and endanger the good object. Thus, there is a conflict between seeking integration as a safeguard against destructive impulses and fearing integration lest the destructive impulses endanger the good object and the good parts of the self." (Klein, 1963, pp. 301-02).

The preservation of the good object inside is the primary thrust of her theory. There is indeed a special focus on the effect of destructive forces on that internal good object being held inside, but the therapeutic focus is to help the constructive, loving forces to prevail. To quote Klein, “A contented baby who sucks with enjoyment, allays his mother's anxiety; and her happiness expresses itself in her way of handling and feeding him, thus diminishing his persecutory anxiety and affecting his ability to internalize the good breast” (1963, p. 312).

Like Freud's, Klein's theory is drive based. Their differences lie in terms of the time parameters, the substance of the final stage of development (and of therapy), and the relative importance of internal vs. external (environmental) factors in the development and etiology of psychopathology: Klein's theory posits the attainment of the depressive position (and full resolution of the Oedipal conflicts with a fully structured superego) within the first 18 months of life, in terms of the integration of attitudes of love and hate towards the object. This differs from the integration of various partial components of the drive, as in the psychosexual stages posited by Freud, which results in gradual internal structuralization with resultant superego formation around age five. In Klein's system, in terms of the relative importance of the internal and external (environmental) factors in the development and pathogenesis alike, the phantasy is dominant, while the impact of the external factors, including maternal anxiety or depression, is minimal. There is no equivalent of the explicit acknowledgement of complex complementarity, as in Freud's 'complementary series,' and only rare hints that the quality of parental psychic processing might have an impact on the child's "level" of splitting.

Yet, the concept of 'unconscious internal objects' represents Klein's major enduring contribution to psychoanalysis and object-relations theory. The Kleinian development rests on this discovery, where descriptions of the paranoid-schizoid position (1946) and the depressive position (1935; 1940) provide the framework for addressing drive as a determinant of motivation, precisely, from the standpoint of internal objects.

III. B. Bion

Wilfred Bion expanded Klein's theories of projection-introjection., most notably, with respect to the communicative role of projective-introjective processes in normal human development: “I shall suppose that there is a normal degree of projective identification, without defining the limits within which normality lies, and that associated with introjective identification this is the foundation on which normal development rests.” (1959:103). In this case, projective identification is understood as the infant's link to the breast, which makes it possible for him to cope with “feelings too powerful to be contained within his personality” (1959:106). Bion indicates the extent to which this fundamental link can be disturbed, “attacked,” in two ways, either by the mother's refusal to receive the infant's projective identification or the infant's envy of the good breast or a combination of the two. In either case, this results in “excessive projective identifications” where the original communicative intention of the projective identification is destroyed leading to a “severe arrest of development...[T]hanks to a denial of the main method open to the infant for dealing with his

too powerful emotions the conduct of emotional life, in any case a severe problem, becomes intolerable... an [internal] object is installed which exercises the function of a severe and ego-destructive superego” (1959:107). In his subsequent writings, Bion (e.g. 1962, 1963) developed the theory of projective-introjective process along the lines of “contained” and “container,” terms which he introduced to describe the interplay between the infant’s projective identifications and the mother’s receptive function both in its creative, life-promoting and destructive aspects. (See also entry CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED).

III C. Fairbairn: Object Relations and Dynamic Structures

Ronald Fairbairn (1952) remodelled mid twentieth-century psychoanalysis in affording primacy to human interaction. In what amounts to a genuine paradigm shift, actual relational events are privileged over “a psychology of impulse” (1943: 59). In a series of papers written during the 1940s (cf. 1952, Part I), which comprise arguably the single most original contribution to object-relations thinking, Fairbairn set out a systematic and coherent alternative to classical drive theory. The Kleinian development was crucially important for Fairbairn, particularly the idea that the object is inscribed in the drive from the beginning. It is only in the light of Klein’s concept of internal objects, according to Fairbairn, “that a study of object-relationships can be expected to yield any significant results for psychopathology” (1943: 60).

Taking the purposive nature of the drive as a critical point of departure, Fairbairn advanced two further propositions: (i) *the ultimate goal of libido is the object* (1941: 31 *et passim*); and (ii) *energy is inseparable from structure* (1944: 126). Taken together, these two fundamental propositions underpin “a relationship psychology conceived on a basis of dynamic structure” (1944: 128), a psychology that not only recast the underlying scientific principles of classical libido theory, but also redirected the Kleinian development in British psychoanalysis towards a thoroughly relational objective. Fairbairn thus constructed the first coherent theoretical model of object-relations along three related axes: (i) an original theory of emotional development; (ii) an alternative theory of psychical structuration; and (iii) a revised psychopathology of the psychoses and psychoneuroses.

1. Fairbairn posits a *process* of development characterized by the mode and quality of object-relatedness. Set out in terms of the relational criterion of maturity, the developmental schema comprises three stages: (i) the stage of infantile dependence (which is equivalent to oral dependence), characterized predominantly by an attitude of ‘taking’, which is further subdivided into a pre-ambivalent ‘early oral’ stage (incorporating, sucking or rejecting) and an ambivalent ‘late oral’ stage (incorporating, sucking or biting); (ii) a transitional stage which corresponds to Abraham’s (1924) two ‘anal phases’ and the ‘early genital (phallic) phase’; and (iii) the stage of mature dependence, characterized predominately by an attitude of ‘giving’, where ‘accepted’ and ‘rejected’ objects are exteriorized (1941: 39).

2. Fairbairn’s 1944 paper on ‘endopsychic structure’ elaborates a theory of structuration based on the developmental schema. The infant’s real relationship to the actual mother is characterized as either ‘gratifying’ or ‘non-gratifying’. The criterion of gratification is based

on the need for contact rather than the satisfaction of drive. As such, the gratifying aspects of the mother are experienced during the earliest stage of absolute dependence by the original unitary ego (the ‘central ego.’). On the other hand, it would appear that non-gratification refers to the unavoidable experiences of frustration, and that the splitting of the ego pertains invariably to the existential dilemma of human beings: “some measure of splitting of the ego is invariably present at the deepest mental level” (1940: 8). There is an explicit borrowing from Klein, to begin with at least, in postulating the basic position in the psyche as a schizoid position. Although, as Fairbairn (1944: 81) points out: “Freud’s theory of the mental apparatus was...developed upon a basis of the depressive position; and it is on a similar basis that Melanie Klein has developed her views. By contrast, it is the schizoid position that constitutes the basis of the theory of mental structures which I now advance”.

Fairbairn thus describes “a situation of emotional frustration in which the child comes to feel (a) that he is not really loved for himself as a person by his mother, and (b) that his own love for his mother is not really valued and accepted by her” (1940: 17). The situation is seen as ‘highly traumatic’ resulting in the formation of a ‘bad object’ and, at the same time, the transference of intimate human relations to an ‘inner reality.’ The latter thus comes about under traumatic conditions, namely, the “intolerable external situation” (1944: 111), where frustration results in the internalization of objects for defensive purposes. The central defensive mechanism is splitting: the internalized bad object is split under adverse conditions into an ‘exciting’ and a ‘rejecting’ object – both of which are subject to repression by the ego. The exciting object consists of the promising and enticing aspects of the mother; the rejecting object represents the depriving and withholding aspects of the mother. The former is attached to the ‘libidinal ego’ as the repository of hope; the latter, to the ‘internal saboteur’ or anti-libidinal ego as the agent of hatred.

The resulting situation is defined as “the basic endopsychic situation” – that is, a central ego employing various defence mechanisms in relation to (i) the libidinal ego and the exciting object and (ii) the anti-libidinal ego and the rejecting object (1946: 147). The central ego comprises pre-conscious and conscious, as well as unconscious, elements; whereas the subsidiary egos are ordinarily unconscious. The use of Freudian terms notwithstanding, the tripartite structure of the personality along these lines does *not* correspond significantly to the structural model of classical psychoanalysis. Unlike Freud, Fairbairn postulates the organization of actual relational events into separate self-object formations, or structures, based upon the repression of internalized objects: central ego/ideal object; libidinal ego/exciting object; and anti-libidinal ego/rejecting object. The inseparability of ego and object is presented on this model in terms of “inherently dynamic structures resulting from the splitting of an original and single dynamic ego-structure present at the beginning” (1946: 148). Furthermore, while the structural ego, in the classical Freudian sense, is seen as a derivative of the unstructured id in the second topography, Fairbairn regards “the libidinal ego (which corresponds to the ‘id’) as a split off portion of the original, dynamic ego” (1946: 148). The difference in fundamental theoretical principles (methodological similarities notwithstanding) renders the theory of endopsychic structure incompatible with Freud’s structural model.

3. For Fairbairn, generally speaking “psychology may be said to resolve itself into a study of the relationships of the individual to his [external] objects, whilst, in similar terms, psychopathology may be said to resolve itself more specifically into a study of the relationships of the ego to its internalized objects” (1943: 60; cf. also 1941). Again, the departure from classical theory is evident in the fact that the object-relations perspective does not proceed along the classically defined trajectory from drive, through fantasy, to conflict and repression; but rather, introduces an alternative sequence and source of conflict. The process of maturation itself constitutes the core conflict, where the *developmental tendency* towards maturity comes up against a *regressive tendency* in the attachment to infantile dependence (1941: 38). Whereas the psychopathological model of classical theory is based on the idea of regression to different stages of libidinal development, Fairbairn focuses instead on the various defensive manoeuvres (‘techniques’) deployed during the process of maturation.

The theory of psychopathology is set out from early on in terms of two ‘great tragedies’ attendant on the splitting of the ego, concerning (i) individuals who feel their *love* to be destructive of those they love and (ii) those who become subject to a compulsion to *hate* and be hated in the process of driving their libidinal objects away (1940: 26). In particular, pathological states and mechanisms of defence are considered in terms of object-relationships at different developmental stages and phases, including, early and late oral fixations: “the emotional conflict which arises in relation to object-relationships during the early oral phase takes the form of the alternative, ‘to suck or not to suck’, i.e. ‘to love or not to love’...the conflict which characterizes the late oral phase resolves itself into the alternative, ‘to suck or to bite’, i.e. ‘to love or to hate’” (1941: 49). The former characterizes the schizoid state; the latter, the depressive state. The defining problem for the individual is how to love without destroying by love or by hate, respectively. The schizoid dilemma is marked by futility; the child feels his love is at fault. By contrast, the depressive is subject to ambivalence and guilt, where it is felt that hate is to blame.

The revised psychopathology from 1941 outlines a typology based on four ‘techniques’, understood as ways of manipulating the ‘accepted’ and ‘rejected’ objects formed in the course of the schizoid position. The nature of the object-relationships established during the stage of infantile dependence determines which of the four techniques is employed, or the extent to which each is employed, during the transitional stage between infantile and mature dependence. The typology comprises: (i) obsessional neurosis, in which both the accepted and the rejected object are internalized; (ii) the paranoid technique, in which the accepted object is internalized, and the rejected object is externalized; (iii) the hysterical defence, in which the accepted object is externalized, and the rejected is internalized; and (iv) the phobic position, in which both the accepted and rejected object are externalized (1941: 46).

The splitting of the ego is seen as the underlying factor in all psychopathology. Thus, the aetiological distinction based on defences against specific instinctual urges (sucking, biting) gives place to a thoroughgoing object-relations theory of psychopathology. The theoretical and clinical emphasis of Fairbairn’s revised model of psychoanalysis is evident above all in his contention that patients who are diagnosed ‘depressive’ are often ‘schizoid’ in character; the

dissociated phenomena of hysteria, for example, “involve a split of the ego *fundamentally identical* with that which confers upon the term ‘schizoid’ its etymological significance” (1944: 92; emphasis added). The diagnostic generalization extends to the ‘normal’ as well as the pathological on the grounds that “internalized bad objects are present in the minds of all of us at the deeper levels” (1943: 64-5).

Fairbairn (1952) criticized Klein for never satisfactorily explaining how fantasies of incorporating objects orally can give rise to the establishment of internal endopsychic structures. In his view, unless such an explanation is provided, such internal objects cannot be spoken of as structures, but remain figments of fantasy. He attempted to connect Klein’s mechanisms with a structural model. His analysis of splitting - observed in patients with schizoid tendencies - is of lasting clinical value and provided fertile background for the understanding of the structural models of the internalization of object relations to come (Kernberg, 1977). While Fairbairn replaced dual instinct theory with a radical object relations theory when he stated that the “Impulses must be regarded as... representing the dynamic aspect of ego structures...and they necessarily involve object relationships...” (Fairbairn 1951, p. 167), and therefore left the issue of a decisive fundamental failure on the part of the environment open, his ‘exciting object- libidinal ego’; ‘rejecting object- anti-libidinal ego’; and the ‘ideal object central ego’ are major intrapsychic structures that have been later criticized for oversimplification. On the other hand, his clinical studies, demonstrating that the pathology of sexual development is intimately linked with the evolving patterns of intrapsychic and interpersonal development, have been widely acknowledged and remain a lasting contribution.

III. D. Ferenczi and Balint: Primary Object-love and the Theory of Clinical Technique

The tradition of object-relations thinking in the Budapest school, more particularly, the work of Ferenczi, enters the British school of psychoanalysis through the contribution of Michael Balint. Drives and relations are seen as equally significant at the beginning and while Balint does not depart from classical drive theory in the manner of Fairbairn and others in the Independent tradition, nonetheless, he advances a series of important relational propositions. Most notably, he proposes (i) that “relationship with the environment exists in a primitive form right from the start” (1968: 63) and is a necessary condition of emotional development; (ii) that primitive object-relations are characterized by passive forms of object love (1937: 98; cf. Ferenczi, 1924), but also by “active seeking-out of contact with the environment” (1968: 135); and (iii) that the experience of “primary love” (1937; 1968, ch. 12) is the groundwork of object-relationship.

1. The theory of primary love and the concomitant use of regression as a therapeutic agent form the basis of Balint’s psychoanalytic thought. For Balint (1937: 101) “vestiges and remnants of [primary object-love] can be demonstrated in all the later [phases of mental life].” The experience of primary love is described in terms of the infant’s attempt to recreate the situation of libido in foetal life, with its intense cathexis of the environment. The latter, according to Balint, “is probably undifferentiated; on the one hand, there are as yet no objects in it; on the

other hand, it has hardly any structure, in particular no sharp boundaries towards the individual; environment and individual penetrate into each other, they exist together in a ‘harmonious mix-up’” (1968: 66).

Balint contends that birth interrupts the state of ‘equilibrium’ and, thereby, precipitates or forwards the separation of the human being and its environment. In a direct echo of Rank (1924), the trauma of birth occasions object-relations: “Objects, including the ego, begin to emerge from the mix-up of substances and from the breaking up of the harmony of the limitless expanses” (1968: 67). The earliest phase of extra-uterine life is not seen as narcissistic, but oriented towards objects on the basis of pre-natal experience. Initially, Balint (1937: 98-99) viewed this early object-relationship as passive, and described the infant’s motivational attitude as follows: “*I shall be loved and satisfied, without being under any obligation to give anything in return*”. This is and remains, according to Balint, “the final goal of all erotic striving” (1937: 99).

Primary object-love “is not linked to any of the erotogenic zones; it is not oral, oral-sucking, anal, genital, etc., love, but is *something on its own*” (1937: 101; emphasis added). As such, Balint (1951: 156) sought to extend the experiential range of early, primitive human life in addition to the ‘oral sphere’. This did not lead to a break with classical drive theory, however. Balint maintained *contra* Fairbairn that the libido is both pleasure-seeking and object-seeking. The hypothesis of ‘object-seeking libido’ is revised, accordingly: “in addition to the hitherto well-studied quality of libido, i.e. its pleasure-seeking tendency, clinical observations have proved beyond doubt that its object-seeking tendency is at least equally important” (1956: 291).

2. Mature, active object-love, as Balint describes it, involves a recapitulation of primordial satisfaction of need along so many developmental ‘by-paths’ or pathways: “The successive stages of development...anal-sadistic, phallic and finally genital object-relations – have not a biological but a cultural basis” (1935: 63). By the same token, primary phenomena of Freudian drive theory are understood in terms of early environmental failure resulting in a ‘basic fault’. Most notably, aggression is understood as a reaction to frustration rather than an aim in itself; more particularly, for Balint (1951) hate is always a reactive, secondary phenomenon and not one of the basic primary drives of the individual. Similarly, primary narcissism is redefined in terms of a libidinal investment in auto-erotism, precisely where the child has not been sufficiently provided for, or given ‘too little’, to begin with.

3. The distinction between ‘benign’ and ‘malignant’ types of regression (1968: 146) may be viewed in terms of a clearly defined ‘mixed model’. The former is seen as manifest in the therapeutic relationship on the basis of primary relational needs; the latter, on the basis of infantile instinctual pleasure.

Accordingly, Balint treated the therapeutic aspects of regression in the context of his revised object-relations psychopathology (See the eparate entry REGRESSION). The classical Freudian model – based on interpretation of resistance aimed at insight – assumes that patients are capable of internalizing or ‘taking in’ what is available in the analytic relationship; that

interpretations are experienced as interpretations and not as something else; and that the ego is adequate to the task of working-through. The revised model is required in the case of severely narcissistic, borderline and psychotic patients – that is, where the centrality of the Oedipus complex cannot be assumed; but also, where the immediate interpretation of primitive pre-oedipal states runs the risk of generating a negative therapeutic reaction or else bringing about a compliant posture in the patient. Balint makes a major contribution along these lines, in the tradition of Ferenczi and the Budapest school, to our understanding of the therapeutic relationship in the case of regressed patients. The relational view of human nature is combined here with a drive-based, pleasure-oriented view of human motivation, a combination which Balint saw as theoretically and clinically irreducible.

III E. Winnicott: Primitive Emotional Processes and Interpersonal Relationships

Donald Winnicott presented his contribution to psychoanalysis as essentially part of the Freud-Klein tradition; while at the same time proposing a radically new theory of object-relationships. This continues to be a matter of debate among his readers, some of whom insist on the Freudian sources and foundations of Winnicott's theoretical advances (Green 1999: 199-200; Abram 2013: 1), while others are no less adamant in placing him in complete opposition to classical theory (Rycroft 1995: 197; Fulgencio 2007; Loparic 2010).

1. Winnicott furnished object-relations theory with a model of normal development in which “continuity of being is health” (1988: 127). This is a basic assumption of psychoanalysis for Winnicott (1954: 281), the idea that “health implies continuity in regard to...evolutionary progress of the psyche and that health is maturity of emotional development appropriate to the age of the individual”. Winnicott thus describes a related series of ontological movements as so many developmental achievements: (i) “from a relationship to a subjectively conceived object to a relationship to an object objectively perceived” (1960: 45); (ii) from absolute dependence through relative dependence towards independence, implying an internalized environment (1963b); and (iii) from the primary unintegrated state of the personality to the organized individual personality characterized by oedipal structure.

The inherited potential or primary creativity of the immature infant achieves “unit status” (1960: 44) – i.e. the infant becomes a whole person capable of interpersonal relationships – on condition that the mother meets the infant's relational needs in different ways at the various stages of individual development. The primitive relationship between mother and infant isn't seen as “a derivation of instinctual experience, nor of object relationship arising out of instinct experience” (1952: 98). Rather, maternal provision is seen as independent of the satisfaction of instinctual needs. It is the environment which allows for the possibility of experiencing drives, or enables the infant to make use of instinct: “it is not instinctual satisfaction that makes a baby begin to be...It is the self that must precede the self's use of instinct” (1967: 116).

Winnicott posits an initial experience of omnipotence in which potentiality is realized as illusion. The mother's adaptation, when good enough, provides an “opportunity for the

illusion that her breast is part of the infant...that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant's own capacity to create...the breast is created by the infant over and over again out of the infant's capacity to love or (one can say) out of need" (1951: 12-4). The correspondence or overlap embodied in illusion (cf. Milner 1952; 1977), the infant's sense that what he creates really exists "(as a 'subjective object' rather than an 'object objectively perceived')", sustains the vital continuity of being, and in turn constitutes the area of experience to which 'transitional objects' and 'transitional phenomena' belong.

Illusion is part of an emotional process, which includes the graduated withdrawal of illusion; hence the unitary process of illusion-disillusionment. The mother's heightened responsiveness ('primary maternal preoccupation') to the infant's initial want-to-be gives way to the gradual failure of adaptation as a further condition of development. Failure of adaptation at this stage is not a failure of reliability so much as an expression of the good-enough fallible mother, who proceeds with the process of disillusionment by presenting the object-world to her baby in small, manageable doses. This process enables the separating-out of the object-world from the infant's emergent sense of self: "From a state of being merged in with the mother the baby is at a stage of separating out the mother from the self, and the mother is lowering the degree of her adaptation to the baby's needs" (1971: 126).

2. Winnicott, like Balint, treated the therapeutic aspects of regression in the context of a revised object-relations psychopathology, with a clear insistence in Winnicott's case that babies become ill. Psychological illness is seen as an expression of environmental failure, which, according to Winnicott, "can be severely crippling" and includes: infantile schizophrenia or autism; latent schizophrenia; false-self defence; and schizoid personality (1962a: 58-59). As the result of traumatic impingement and the failures of basic provision at the beginning, psychotic anxieties (or 'primitive agonies' as they came to be described) precipitate a series of defensive manoeuvres ('reactions'), whereby the infant seeks to protect its core self. Winnicott (1963c) elaborated on these primitive states in his posthumously published paper, 'Fear of Breakdown', as follows: a return to an unintegrated state (defence: disintegration); falling forever (defence: self-holding); failure of indwelling (defence: depersonalization); loss of the sense of reality (defence: exploitation of primary narcissism); and loss of the capacity for object-relatedness (defence: autistic states, relating only to self-phenomena). Most importantly, he postulated that psychotic illness is "a defence organization relative to a primitive agony" (1963c: 90).

3. Winnicott introduced therapeutic techniques that allow for regression alongside "ordinary analysis as designed for the management of the depressive position and of the Oedipus complex in interpersonal relationships" (1954: 294). In terms of 'ordinary analysis', in his paper 'The Aims of Psycho-Analytical Treatment' Winnicott confirms that "I am all the time manoeuvring into the position for standard analysis" (1962b: 166). And by 'standard analysis' he means "communicating with the patient from the position in which the transference neurosis (or psychosis) puts me" (1962b: 166). In this position or situation, the analyst is simultaneously a subjective object for the patient and a reliable internal setting based on reality-testing.

In terms of ‘modified analysis’, the important point is that the analyst finds himself “working as a psychoanalyst rather than doing standard analysis” (1962b: 168). As Winnicott (1962b: 169; emphasis added) puts it, “I do psychoanalysis when the *diagnosis* is that this individual, in his or her environment, wants psychoanalysis. I might even try to set going an unconscious communication, when conscious wish for analysis is absent...When I am faced with the wrong kind of case I change over into being a psycho-analyst who is meeting the needs, or trying to meet the needs, of that special case”. Furthermore, Winnicott held that an analyst who is trained in the standard psychoanalytic technique, is best placed for this type of non-analytic work.

Winnicott (1962b: 169) was keen to point out that he based his analytic work on diagnosis, and that diagnostic criteria made it possible to differentiate clinically between patients who regress, in the course of treatment, as part of the transference relationship; and patients who are regressed (borderline or schizoid) and in need of a holding environment in the analytic setting. For the latter ‘management’ may become “the whole thing” (1954: 279) and: “In the very ill person there is but little hope of a new opportunity. In the extreme case he analyst would need to go to the patient and actively present good mothering, an experience that could not have been expected by the patient” (1954: 281-2).

Where early environmental failures have not been altogether disastrous, Winnicott treats regression in terms of an unconscious belief, which may become a conscious hope, “that certain aspects of the environment which failed originally may be relived, with the environment this time succeeding instead of failing in its function of facilitating the inherited tendency in the individual to develop and mature” (1959: 128). If it is to be realized, however, faith in renewed experience has to be genuinely met – that is, within a setting that is “making adequate adaptation” (1954: 281). What the analyst does and how he behaves is no less important, here, than communicating with the patient in the transference by means of interpretation. Clinical regression means *organized* regression, whereby the analyst responds to the patient’s need for an internal as well as an external setting. This involves the provision of a living or potential space, wherein patients may find new ways of reclaiming themselves; hence “regression in search of the true self” (1954: 280).

Overall, together with Guntrip (1961, 1968), Winnicott (1954, 1960) is generally regarded as having emphasized the essential importance of a failure of the mothering object (‘environmental deficiency’) in the early etiology of pathological development, which subsequently may result in the constellation of the false self: superficial, externally oriented, and basically inauthentic as opposed to the true self, implying integration of the individual’s conscious and unconscious internal world. Moreover, Winnicott’s treatises on developmental value of aggression (1951), use of the object (1969) and his theories of transitional objects and transitional phenomena (Winnicott 1953, 1965), transference-countertransference (1949) and others have wide ranging applicability in studies of development, clinical theory and technique and interdisciplinary studies of creativity and art.

III. D. Bowlby

Having been supervised by Melanie Klein, John Bowlby was dismayed by what he saw as her exclusive interest in the child inner phantasy life and dismissal of the child's real relationship with his mother. In his detailed analysis of early infant development, especially effects of traumatic separation from the mother or mother's emotional inaccessibility, Bowlby (1969) viewed the attachment to mother as the primary drive. In contrast to Fairbairn's 'primary object drive', he does not attend to the internal structuralization, stressing rather behavioral and interpersonal patterns. Diamond and Blatt (2007) saw his work as providing an account of behavioral expression of the internalized object relations within the mother-infant dyad.

III. E. Sandler

In Britain, Sandler (1963), and Joffe and Sandler (1965) suggest that cognitive development, affective development, and the development of the structures representing internalized object relations are intimately linked. Focusing on the studies of development of self-structures, they arrive at a position similar to that of Jacobson in North America (1964), namely that identification, necessarily involving a modification of self-representation under the influence of object-representation depends on the extent to which a particular self-representation fits into the individual's overall defensive configuration.

IV. FURTHER AND CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND RELATED CLINICAL APPLICATIONS IN EUROPE

IV. A. Kleinian Developments

Bion (1963) completes the shift in Klein's thinking from a theory of successive developmental stages to a theory of 'positions' – namely, the paranoid schizoid and depressive positions. Thus rather than thinking in the form of PS → DP he uses the equation PS ↔ DP, indicating how the positions oscillate throughout life. John Steiner (1981, 1987), building on the work of Joan Riviere (1936), Herbert Rosenfeld (1964, 1971), Donald Meltzer (1968), Hanna Segal (1972) and Edna O'Shaughnessy (1981), shows how a so-called 'pathological/defensive organisation' can provide another position, one that defends against both persecution and depressive guilt, stabilising but at the same time stultifies and damages the personality.

In analysis, the emergence of pathological/defensive organization and oscillation between the two positions can be schematically described as:

Pathological organisation



PS position ↔ Depressive position

A pathological organisation is seen as forming a defensive structure under conditions of severe environmental failure and/or an excess of envy and destructiveness in the personality. The ordinary integration of good and bad objects has not properly occurred, because rather than ordinary binary splitting into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ self and object in the paranoid schizoid position, excessive fragmentation and confusion of good and bad has occurred, leading potentially to an unbearable psychotic or near- psychotic state where the inner world is full of persecuting and confusing fragmented objects. The pathological organisation enables patients to avoid overwhelming persecutory and depressive anxieties by avoiding emotional contact with others and with internal and external reality. It functions by gathering the fragmented and confused part objects into a perverse, hatred-suffused structure. One form of this is the ‘gang’, or ‘mafia’ described by Rosenfeld (1971). Such an organisation of the personality often eventually shows itself in analysis in dreams or associations about criminal gangs which control and intimidate the ‘sane’ or healthy parts of the personality, promising shelter and relief from persecutory or depressive anxiety. The apparently healthy parts of these complex structures are however likely to be involved in collusive and perverse relationships within the pathological structure. (See also entry CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED)

Steiner’s later (1993) work on ‘psychic retreats’ broadens and develops the idea of pathological organisations. He shows how such retreats are ubiquitous and can take many forms, but always exist to maintain psychic equilibrium in the face of unmanageable anxieties.

IV. B. Developments in the Independent Tradition

IV. Ba. Bollas: Transformational Object

Christopher Bollas (1987, p. 14) introduced the term “*transformational object*” in the wake on Winnicott’s notion of the ‘environment’ mother, suggesting that in the early infant-mother interaction “the mother is less significant and identifiable as an object than as a process.” Before the mother is “personalized for the infant as a whole object.” Bollas (1987, p. 28) argues, “she has functioned as a region or source of transformation.” Thus, while “not yet fully identifiable as an other, the mother is experienced as a process of transformation, and this feature of early existence lives on in certain forms of object-seeking in adult life, when the object is sought for its function as a signifier of transformation.” (1987, p. 14)

Bollas expands the psychoanalytic understanding of object-relations, particularly with respect to what he calls “the integrity of the object.” “I have found it rather surprising”, writes Bollas (1992, p. 4; emphasis in the original), “that in object relations theory little thought is given to the distinct structure of the object, which is usually seen as a container of the

individual's projections. Certainly, objects bear us. But ironically enough, it is precisely *because* they hold our projections that the structural feature of any one object becomes even more important, because we also put ourselves into a container that upon re-experiencing will process us according to its natural integrity”.

IV. Bb. Šebek: Totalitarian Object

The concept of ‘totalitarian objects’ (internal and external), as formulated by Michael Šebek (1996; 1998), is based on psychoanalytic work conducted under the totalitarian communist régime in Czechoslovakia. The concept helps in linking external totalitarian power with intrapsychic totalitarian forces. The latter are seen as partially internalized and part of the archaic unconscious mind. Šebek notes that insofar as totalitarian régimes and tyrants exist throughout human history, this supports the likelihood of the trans-generational transmission of totalitarian objects. The ‘omnipotent’, ‘omniscient’ and ‘almighty’ character of these objects, according to Šebek (1998, p. 2017), reveals a process of primitive idealization – including, the recourse to totemism, various Gods, monarchs, dictators, charismatic authoritarian leaders, political extreme movements and ideologies. The destructive and abusive character of the object is hidden or disguised by these various forms of idealization.

Šebek proposes that totalitarian objects are essentially ‘ambiguous’: saving and also penetrating (aggressive); possessive, haunting and controlling function over the internal psychic space, causing internal oppression and unfree existence. As such totalitarian objects block development to maturity, support the formation of dogmatic ideologies, and impede spontaneous creative thinking. Šebek further maintains that when a person perceives the world through the lens of totalitarian objects, located mostly in the unconscious Ego, he/she does not see independent objects but only objects being in his or her possession/manipulation. These objects function as part of the split-off, destructive self, or are located in a severe, sadistic superego. They may also be projected as the basis of paranoid thinking. For Šebek, totalitarian objects in their various forms can cause the negative therapeutic reaction, or a type of therapeutic impasse. They remain mostly unconscious and, in this unrecognized form, exist as gods, ghosts, devils and monsters; timeless objects of the unconscious, they enter into a dream, fantasy, behavior and even the conscious mental space. In sum, Šebek proposes these objects represent an unconscious structure for the basic uncertainty in the world leading to adherence to external saviors, or populist, totalitarian and fundamentalist leader.

V. FURTHER AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AMERICA

V. A. 1950s – 1970s

V. Aa. Infant Studies

René Spitz (1945, 1965, 1972), studying institutionalized infants, coined the term of ‘anaclitic depression’ for the impact on infants of long term separation from their caregivers. He was also the first one to note the difference between the affectionate and mechanical caregiver’s behaviors. In this view, it was not just the effect of prologed separation but also the mechanical administering to the infants in an institution, akin to a ‘dead mother’, that effected the ‘anaclitic depression’. Spitz stressed affectionate ‘holding’ of the infant by caregivers, which promotes rich tactile affective nonverbal communication between the infant and their caregiver.

Following Bowlby (1969) in England, Ainsworth (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall, 1978) in the USA developed contemporary attachment theory as the behavioral correspondence of internalized object relations under the influence of the early mother-infant relationship (Diamond and Blatt, 2007). Ainsworth et al. (1978) defined attachment as an affective bond between the infant and a caregiver (Blum, 2004), and categorized several attachment types, allowing for highly individualized differences along a continuum from secure to insecure (avoidant, ambivalent, disorganized) attachment. Distress of the infant was inferred from the overall infant-mother relationship rather than from a specific traumatic experience.

This tradition continued within the Ego Psychology orientation with Mahler (Mahler, Pine, Bergman, 1975) and various Relational theoretical orientations in the infant research of Beebe (Beebe and Lachmann, 2005), and the work of the Boston Change Process Group (Stern et. al. 1998).

V. Ab. Mahler

After Hartmann, the most influential expansion to the drive model encompassing new dimensions of psychological development came from Margaret Mahler. Mahler’s original interest in the child’s earliest object relations derived from her study of severe pathology in children – autism and symbiotic psychosis - where she noted an extreme inability to form a nurturing relationship with caregivers (Mahler, Ross and DeFries, 1949; Mahler, 1952; Mahler and Gosliner, 1955). This led to the development of a theory of normal child development in which object relations and the self were seen as outgrowths of instinctual vicissitudes. Following Hartmann, “The problem of ‘adaptation’ in her work is specifically construed as coming to terms with the human environment” (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p.272).

For Mahler, the benchmark of successful development was not the establishment of genital primacy following a successful oedipal resolution but rather a developmental movement from embeddedness within a symbiotic mother-child relationship to the achievement of a stable individual identity within a world of predictable and realistically perceived others. This process was termed “Separation-Individuation” or the “Psychological Birth” of the child. Separation and Individuation are complementary but distinct developmental processes. Separation is defined as the child’s emergence from a symbiotic fusion with the mother; Individuation consists of those achievements leading to the child’s assumption of his own individual characteristics (Mahler et al, 1975, p.4).

Although Mahler’s organizing principles were based on the relationships between self and objects, with an emphasis on the transactional aspects of growth and development, they were derived from classical drive theory. The child, in Mahler’s view, was less someone struggling with conflictual drive demands than one who must continually reconcile a longing for independent, autonomous existence, with an equally powerful urge to plunge back into the symbiotic fusion from which she had emerged.

Development evolved over time with regard to the timing and characteristics of specific subphases. At first, Mahler’s theory assumed that the child develops from “normal autism” through a period of symbiosis and then to four sequentially unfolding subphases of the Separation-Individuation process. (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975).

She later importantly relinquished the concept of the first two months of neonate’s life Normal Autistic Phase based on primary narcissism and a stimulus barrier, realizing that from birth children show signs of ongoing awareness of their environment and the objects in it, and the stimulus barrier is rather a ‘stimulus filter’, term suggested to her by Blum (Blum, 2004b).

From the second month – the Symbiotic Phase - the infant was supposedly only dimly aware of objects and is in a state of “delusional-somato-psychic” fusion (Mahler et al, 1975, p.45). This was considered to be a positive state of relatedness which occurred in an intrapsychic context with an absence of boundaries between self and other (Fonagy, 2001). During this phase affect mirroring is regarded as critically important. The attuned mother establishes and maintains an appropriate affectomotor dialogue with the infant through eye-contact, facial expression, touch, holding, etc., contributing to the infant’s integration of affect modulation and regulation (Blum, 2004). The Separation-Individuation Phase, 4-5 months to 18 months consists of several subphases. The first is what Mahler refers to as “Hatching” where the child begins to differentiate the representation of the self from the mother/other (Mahler et al., 1975) by moving from the tendency to mold herself to her mother’s body to a preference for more active, self-determined exploration.

“More than any other psychoanalytic theorist, Mahler recognized the importance of walking, a maturational achievement that ushers in the Practicing Subphase of separation individuation” (Blum, 2004b, p.542). During this second subphase the child practices locomotion to increase physical separation from the mother and to literally continue the differentiation process. This is the period during which Mahler situates the actual

“psychological birth” of the child. With upright locomotion, the child’s horizons expand and the child becomes excited as the “world becomes his oyster”. In Greenacre’s (1957) phrase, it is the height of his “love affair with the world”. It is, as Mahler conceptualizes it, the height of both (secondary) narcissism and object love (Mahler et al., 1975). At this time, as well, the child reaches “the peak of his ‘magical omnipotence’ derived from his sense of sharing his mother’s magical powers” (Fonagy, 2001, p.66).

The Rapprochement subphase from 15-18 to 24 months brings with it an awareness of separateness, separation anxiety and an increased need to be with the mother (Mahler et al, 1975). The child who was becoming increasingly independent now begins to realize she is a very small fish in a very large sea which brings with it a loss of the ideal sense of self and the reappearance of a kind of separation anxiety. For the child, there is the dawning realization that the mother is actually a separate person who may not always be available to her. This brings about the “Rapprochement Crisis”, lasting from approximately 18 to 24 months. According to Mahler, the attitude of the child is affectively ambivalent swinging between a need for clinging onto the mother and a powerful need for separateness. This is the period during which splitting is at its height (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). It is also the period during which there are rapidly evolving autonomous ego functions most notably highlighted by rapid gains in language and by the appearance of reality testing. Gender differences and gender identity are coming into awareness, interacting with the differentiation process. During Rapprochement, the waning of infantile omnipotence is compensated for by selective identifications with the competent, tolerant, affectionate mother (Blum, 2004b).

Mahler emphasized the attainment of Object Constancy (based on the tolerance of ambivalence) and Self Constancy as the final subphase of Separation-Individuation. This occurs in the third year of life and is a major developmental milestone. The two principal tasks of this period are the development of a stable concept of the self and a stable concept of the other, and are organized around the co-participants in all the child’s object relationships (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). As a result of these developments, the child can now maintain a sense of her own individuality, as well as a sense of the other as an internal, positively cathected presence. She can function separately in the absence of the mother/other, attaining the capacity to more fully understand the separate experience of self and mother, her separate mind and the other’s interests and intentions. As the toddler has now internalized her mother’s benevolence and regulatory functions, she can now more easily tolerate separations, frustrations, and disappointments, and has more ability for autonomy, individuation, separateness and independence.

Mahler was able to create an interface between classical drive theory and the developmental theory of object relations by using the concept of symbiosis to refer to both a relationship in reality and to a libidinally determined internal fantasy (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Mahler’s use of Hartmann’s concepts of an average expectable environment (Hartmann, 1927 [1964] and of adaptation (Hartmann, 1939) “moved the drive model in a direction which implicitly granted relation with other a much more central explanatory role...” Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p.282). In order to specify the ‘average expectable environment’ Mahler

referred to Winnicott's (1960) concept of the "ordinary devoted mother" (Mahler 1961; Mahler & Furur, 1968). In this way she equated the child's early environment with the specific person of the mother.

In summary, Separation-Individuation theory includes the real mother and infant, as well as the concepts of internalization, and internal representation. Mahler's theory correlates analytically informed observation with intrapsychic developmental transformations: "The intrapsychic changes can include a shift in ego boundaries, the differentiation of self and object representations, the cohesion or spitting of these representations and the achievement of self-object constancy. Both dyadic partners need to be considered" (Blum, 2004b, p 551). In the proposed contemporary modification and reformulation, Blum (2004b) integrates findings of later developmental research (Stern 1985; Pine, 1986; Bergman, 1999; Gergely, 2000; Fonagy, 2000). His modification involves the symbiotic phase as well as separation-individuation, with particular attention to differentiation and rapprochement. He stresses that the neonatal "differentiation precedes the emergence of intra-psychic self and object representation" (Blum, 2004b, p. 541) and that the infant is pre-adapted for "reciprocal communication, interaction and regulation that begins with initial nurturing and proceeds to a dialogue replete with feedback loops..." (p. 541). During rapprochement, the pivotal role of language is highlighted (Blum, 2003).

Though currently marginalized by attachment and other object relations theories, Mahler's concept of Separation-Individuation is an important contribution to the understanding of the pre-oedipal period of development. (See also entry EGO PSYCHOLOGY)

V. Ac. Erikson

Erik Erikson's (1950, 1956, 1968)'s contributions to the study of early object relations and their influences on the development of ego structures, too, comprises a bridge between Ego Psychology's structural theory of the 1950's and the clinical study of the vicissitudes of object relations. Erikson has postulated the succession of introjection, identification, and ego identity, which has been followed up on in some of the influential strands of the present-day North American Object Relations School (Kernberg, 1977), albeit not without modification. Erikson did not differentiate between the organizations of self and object representations. It was Jacobson (1964) who importantly clarified the differentiation between the self and object representations of early introjections and the development of these structures.

V. Ad. Jacobson

Like Mahler, Edith Jacobson (1964) was able to reconcile Freud's emphasis on the constitutional with the developmentalists' emphasis on the environment by proposing their mutually, ongoing influences on each other throughout development. She described the development of the ego and superego in tandem with self and object representations, placing a major emphasis on the role of affect. Her contributions were crucial in introducing the

conceptualization of “images”, or representations of self and other as the key determinants of mental functioning (Fonagy, 2001). She believed that an infant acquires self and object representations with good (loving) or bad (aggressive) valences depending on the experiences of gratification or frustration with the mother. “She introduced the term representation to stress that this concept refers to the experiential impact of internal and external worlds and that representations are subject to distortion and modification irrespective of physical reality” (Fonagy, 2001, p. 56). Self concepts were seen as complex structures including “the unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious intrapsychic representation of the bodily and mental self in the system ego” (Jacobson 1964, p 19).

In her seminal work, *The Self and the Object World* (1964), Jacobson essentially revised Freud’s ideas about the development of libido and aggression and extended the functional impact of the drives. Her purpose was to merge relational with classical metapsychological theory, i.e. to align the economic point of view with the phenomenology of human experience because she felt that it was this experience which highlighted the role of relations with others. She used two complementary theoretical strategies to achieve this goal. The first was a focus on the child’s experience of herself in her environment – what Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) termed the “representational world”. The child’s representational world was derived from an innate psychobiological substrate. Jacobson proposed that the instinctual drives were not “givens” but rather “innate potentials” that were shaped both by internal maturational factors as well as by external stimuli, particularly in the context of early relationships, which in turn shaped the child’s representational world. This biological approach allowed her to maintain ties with earlier drive/structural models.

Her second theoretical approach was a revision of the economic principles themselves leading to the conclusion that “energy theory must be brought into greater synchrony with the vicissitudes of object relations” (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p 306).

In Jacobson’s view the infant’s experience of pleasure or unpleasure is the core of her relationship with her mother (drive/structure model). From the start, experience is registered in terms of how it feels to the baby. She postulated that the feeling tone of one’s earliest experiences contributed to the consolidation of libido and aggression and lay the groundwork for self and object images determining how we ultimately feel about ourselves and others. Frustrating or upsetting experiences produce images of a frustrating, withholding mother and an angry frustrated self while more positive experiences lead to an image of a loving, giving mother and a happy contented self. Jacobson’s theory therefore addressed the interplay between actual experiences and drives. Jacobson (1954) noted that in the infant, before the formation of self-other boundaries, when the earliest images are fused rather than distinct self-contained units, at the level of mental representation the child’s perception of the other directly shaped the experience of the self. In this state of primitive fusion objects become internalized parts of self images and ultimately one’s most profound sense of self is an outgrowth of these earliest images.

Jacobson noted that the integration of good and bad images i.e. both the “good” and “frustrating” mother facilitated the ability to integrate conflictual feeling states. Ultimately,

affectively integrated images of self and other allowed for an increased capacity for more complex emotional experience. Early preoedipal experiences of maternal constraint and prohibitions produce early images around which the superego is then formed.

Freud (1940) described libido as a force that brings together while aggression breaks connections. Jacobson applied these ideas to separation-individuation with libido acting to integrate opposing images of good and bad objects and good and bad self while aggression promoted separateness and differentiated images of self and other, pointing to an integration between classical drive theory and object relations theory.

V. Ae. Loewald

Hans Loewald was among the Freudian revisionists of 1960's, 1970' and 1980's, who forged a connection between Freudian Ego Psychology and Object Relations Theory to create a psychoanalytic theory that he felt stayed closer to peoples' experience of their lives. His main concerns addressed the most fundamental assumptions of psychoanalytic theory building, and basic preconceptions about the nature of mind, reality and the analytic process.

Loewald believed that Freud postulated two different understandings of the drives. The first was before 1920 with drives as discharge-seeking. The second came with his introduction of the concept of Eros in 1920 in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where Freud radically altered his definition of the drive as no longer discharge-seeking but rather as connection-seeking "not using objects for gratification but for building more complex mental experiences and for re-establishing the lost original unity between self and others" (Mitchell and Black, 1995, p.190). Loewald's revision of Freud's drive theory required a radical reformulation of Freud's traditional psychoanalytic concepts. While for Freud the id is an unchanging biological force clashing with social reality, for Loewald the id is an interactional product of adaptation rather than a constant biological force. The mind is not interactive secondarily but is interactive by its very nature.

Loewald theorized that in the beginning there is no distinction between self and other, ego and external reality, or instincts and objects; rather there is an original unitary whole composed of both baby and caregivers. He proposed that "*Instincts understood as psychic and motivational forces become organized as such through interactions within a psychic field, consisting originally of the mother-child (psychic) unit.*" (Loewald, 1971, p118). It is because of statements like these, that French speaking analysts in Canada find Loewald, self identified as an Ego psychologist, exemplary of 'Third Model' thinking described below.

By putting Freud's instinct theory and ego psychology together, Loewald's work can be seen as building a vital bridge between a "one-person psychology" and a "two-person object relations psychology" (See also separate EGO PSYCHOLOGY entry).

V. Af. Sullivan

Harry Stack Sullivan (1953, 1964), the founder of the quintessentially American Interpersonal Psychoanalysis, proposed that: “1. Striving for security and the satisfaction of drives are indissolubly linked; 2. The integrated force of these impact upon the evolving interpersonal relationships and is in turn affected by them; 3. What is called the ‘self’ is nothing but a collection of reflective appraisals of early caregivers; 4. Anxiety, a threat to safety, can only occur in an interpersonal context; 5. The self maintains its integrity by selective inattention to those aspects of behavior that stir up anxiety; 6. The foundation of moral concepts lies in the child’s perception of parental approval or disapproval; 7. Sexuality is important but not the central motivating force in life; 8. Psychopathology results from the eruption of self states that were dissociated and the expression of which causes anxiety; 9. Treatment ought to focus on the relational context of anxiety; and 10. As a result, active participation of the therapist is more desirable than his laid-back anonymity. Countertransference plays a central informative and guiding role in treatment” (Akhtar 2009, p 151). Sullivan is generally viewed as paying only a little attention to the processes of the psychic interior, and the genetic roots of transference.

V. B. Contemporary Developments

V. Ba. Kernberg

Since the late 1970’s, Otto F. Kernberg has been developing a version of Object Relations Theory within Freud’s Structural Model and Hartmann’s Ego Psychology. In his approach, object relations are seen as “an essential ego organizer” (Kernberg, 1976, p. 38) and ‘self-object-affect units’ (Kernberg, 1976) as the primary determinants of the overall structures of the mind (id, ego, superego). In his latest level of theory integration, Kernberg (2004, 2015) proposed a general developmental frame that integrates the psychoanalytic theory of development, rooted in Object Relations Theory, with neurobiological aspects of development. His general conclusion relates to parallel and mutually influential development of neurobiological affective and cognitive systems, ultimately controlled by genetic determinants, and psychodynamic systems, corresponding to both reality and motivated distortions of the internal and external relations with significant others.

In this model (Kernberg, 2004, 2014, 2015, 2016), the relevant areas of neurobiological development, namely the activation of affective systems, the differentiation of self from others, the development of a theory of mind and of empathy, the evolution of the self-structure, and the development of the processes of mentalization, are integrated within the context of the Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory.

Bringing together the developmental neurobiological and developmental psychoanalytic studies, Kernberg (2015) highlights the dynamic complexity of the earliest weeks and months of life. Already during the ‘symbiotic phase’ of ‘delusional-somato-psychic’

fusion (Mahler et al. 1975, p. 45), marked by an absence of boundaries between self and other (Fonagy, 2001), when the baby and the mother are an ‘operative unit’, not only the major primary affects, but also the early strivings for differentiation of self and other - the prerequisite of the theory of mind - and the rudiments of empathy are emerging. During the first 6 to 8 weeks of life (Gergely & Unoka, 2011; Roth, 2009), infants show different reactions to animate faces and inanimate patterns, are able to differentiate their mother’s voice from other voices, present a smiling response to ‘not me’ interactional experiences, and have a capacity for multi-modal transfer - to visually identify a specific object in terms of its shape previously held in the baby’s mouth. These early indications of the capacity to differentiate experiences originating in the self from external experience develop dramatically during the first several months of the ‘symbiotic’ era. The capacity for empathy for the other also emerges during the first few weeks of life. Mediated neurobiologically by various brain functions, during the first two weeks of life, a ‘contagion’ of feelings among infants can be observed that may involve an ancient phylogenetic subcortical system. In addition, the ‘gating function’, by which affiliative affects related to attachment, play-bonding and erotic stimulation fuel intense attention to the other, may play a role.

Finally, empathy is strongly influenced by the mirror neuron systems: firstly the primordial cortical system, but later, widely distributed mirror functions involving insula, as well as the parietal and temporal cortex, contribute to a general ‘cognitive-emotional recognition system’ (Bråten, 2011; Richter, 2012; Roth and Dicke, 2006; Zikles, 2006; Kernberg 2015). Initially, structures with affective activation, such as brain stem and subcortical limbic circuit regions, are primarily involved; but gradually, cognitive activation structures, such as orbitofrontal cortex, prominently participate. It would appear that these new neurological findings support the hypothesis of a non-linear dialectic of simultaneous strivings for *symbiotic (dual) unity*, as well as for *differentiation between self and other*, both emerging during earliest development. This further substantiates previous statements (Stern, 1985; Blum, 2004b) about earlier differentiation, than previously thought by Mahler, but puts the onset of rudimentary differentiation still earlier. The degree to which this could be theorized as a neuro-developmental underpinning for the contradictory motions observed in the adult clinical situation towards unconscious re-union and merger with objects, on the one hand, and internal separation, on the other, could be an intriguing and controversial, yet fruitful, area of future multidisciplinary study.

Kernberg’s version of Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory recognizes two basic levels of personality organization (borderline and neurotic), implying two basic levels of development:

First, under the dominance of peak affect states, a dual psychic structure is built up during preverbal years. This dual structure consists of, on one hand, idealized self representations relating to an idealized object (infant and mother) under the dominance of strong positive (affiliative) affective states; on the other hand, an opposite dyadic set of relationships develops under the dominance of strongly negative (aversive, painful) affects, constituted by a frustrating or aggressive representation of the object connected to a frustrated,

enraged, and/or suffering self representation (Kernberg, 2004). Separate internalization of all good and all bad object relations leads to an intrapsychic structure characterized by primitive mechanisms of dissociation or splitting, and the derived mechanisms of projective identification, primitive idealization and devaluation, omnipotence and omnipotent control, and denial.

Concomitantly, under conditions of low affect states, early cognitive development proceeds driven by nonspecific instinctive “seeking” impulses (Wright and Panksepp, 2014) to learning about reality. This leads to early concept-formation and understanding of the surrounding animate and inanimate external world, which is developing in parallel with the emotional experiences of peak affective states, internally regulated by splitting and dissociative mechanisms.

In these early circumstances, it is assumed that neither an integrated sense of self nor an integrated view of others yet exists. The representations of self and others would be split and/or dissociated into idealized and/or persecutory partial self-object representations, according to the associated peak affect state. Such development corresponds roughly to the Pre-Oedipal, Pre-Object Constancy era (Mahler et al., 1975); and the ‘paranoid-schizoid position’ (Klein, 1952a, b). Psychopathology on this level – a borderline personality disorder - reflects the lack of achievement of the integration of ego identity, typical for the syndrome of identity diffusion. The predominant primitive defensive operations centering around splitting, and certain limitations in reality testing apparent in subtle aspects of interpersonal functioning characterize this level of development and - if fixated on this level - a pathology of severe (borderline) personality disorder. The intrapsychic conflicts on this level of pathology would be between two opposing units of sets of internalized object relations, whereby each unit consists of self and object representation under the impact of a drive derivative (clinically manifested as affect disposition).

At the second level of development, gradually emerging over the first three years of life, the progressive realistic comprehension of the surrounding world, and the predominance of good (gratifying) over bad (frustrating) experiences, facilitates the gradual integration of contrary emotional experiences. The tolerance of ambivalence, of combined positive and negative emotional relations with the same external objects, gradually leads to an integrated sense of self and the capacity for an integrated view of significant others, the two essential components of ego identity. This second level of development corresponds roughly to Klein’s “depressive position” (without its truncated time-table), and to reaching the Oedipal development in Freud’s formulation.

It signals achievement of object constancy, development of a *normal* neurotic level of organization, and predominance of higher level defenses centering around repression and its related mechanisms, including higher level projection, negation, intellectualization, and reaction formation. This higher level of personality organization is also importantly reflected in internal structuralization: clear delimitation of a repressed, dynamic unconscious – an “Id” – constituted by unacceptable internalized dyadic relationships reflecting intolerable primitive aggression and aspects of infantile sexuality. The “Ego” now includes the integrated coherent

self-concept, and the integrated representation of significant others, together with development of sublimatory functions reflected in adaptive expression of emotional needs regarding sexuality, dependency, autonomy, and aggressive/assertive self-affirmation. Internalized object relations that include ethically derived demands and prohibitions transmitted in the early interactions of the infant and child with his psychosocial environment, in particular parents, are integrated into the “Super-ego.” This latter structure is constituted by layers of internalized prohibitions and idealized demands, significantly transformed into an individualized and abstract personal morality (Kernberg, 2004, 2012). Unconscious conflicts on this level of personality organization are inter-systemic conflicts between impulses and defenses, with all three agencies of Id, Ego, and Super-Ego participating.

The intrapsychic structures presented by Object Relations Theory constitute a secondary, intrapsychic level of organismic organization, based upon a primary, neurobiological one. It is speculated that primitive mental mechanisms of splitting and their derivatives are based on subcortical limbic developments of separate positive and negative affective systems, and that their potential integration depends on cortical levels of processing of emotional experience originally sharply dissociated (Roth, 2009). Current knowledge of early neurobiological development supports the theoretical assumptions of psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory, and provides a neurobiological basis for the developmental assumptions of personality organization (Gemelli, 2008). The fact that positive and negative affects are strictly separated at lower limbic levels, and can only be integrated at the level of prefrontal and preorbital cortex and anterior cingulate level of elaboration of affective-cognitive experience reinforces the basic tenets of Object Relations Theory.

Clinically, the integrative developmental psychoanalytic object relations frame deepens understanding of the multifactorial etiology of the severe (borderline) personality disorders, including reciprocal interaction of neurobiological features, severe childhood trauma adversely effecting attachment and the capacity for symbolization and reflection. Kernberg (2015) also presents the modified analytic treatment of choice for such conditions, the so called “transference focused” psychotherapy (TFP). TFP is a direct treatment of the personality structure, targeting the normalization of pathological consequences of insecure attachment, play-bonding, and erotic affective systems. Transference focused psychotherapy places central importance on the interpretation of transference distortions from the position of the ‘third’. (See also entry CONFLICT, TRANSFERENCE)

V. Bb. Ogden

Thomas Ogden (1989) has been able to bring about an original version of the sensitive integration of Klein’s and Bion’s contributions (PS<->D). He extends the work of Bick, Meltzer and Francis Tustin by recognizing a primitive, pre-symbolic, sensory-dominated mode he calls the *autistic-contiguous mode*:

“This mode is a primitive psychological organization operative from birth that generates themost elemental forms of human experience. It is sensory-dominated in which the

most inchoate sense of self is built upon the rhythm of sensation, particularly at the skin's surface. It is difficult to capture in words. This mode reflects the rhythmicity of early relations with the nursing experience, of being held in the mother's arms. It is a relationship of shape to the feeling of enclosure, of beat to the feeling of rhythm, of hardness to the feeling of edginess. Sequences, symmetries, periodicity, skin-to-skin 'molding' are examples of contiguities that are the ingredients out of which the beginnings of rudimentary self-experience arise" (Ogden, 1989, pp.30-31).

The core contribution here is that the contiguity of surfaces generate an experience of a sensory surface, rather than a feeling of two surfaces coming together either in differentiating opposition or in merger.

V. Bc. Relational Models

Various relational models in the North American conceptual landscape have stressed analytic subjectivity, issues of gender and sexuality, trauma, early development and primitive states (Harris, 2011). Surveying the landscape, Harris states, that "while there are many strands, many influences, and many signal figures, ... it is Mitchell (1988, 1993 a and b, 1997, 2000) who was ... the catalyst, the writer and thinker...who launched this movement" (p. 704).

V. Bca. Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell

In their publication "Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory" (1983), Greenberg and Mitchell argue that the focal point of clinical psychoanalysis has always been the patient's relationships with others. How do these relationships come about? How do they operate? How are they transformed? How are relationships with others to be understood within the framework of psychoanalytic theory? They argue that there have been two basic solutions to the problem of locating relationships within psychoanalytic theory: the drive model, in which relations with others are generated and shaped by the need for drive gratification; and various relational models, in which relationships themselves are taken as primary and irreducible. They trace the divergences and the interplay between the two models and the intricate strategies adopted by the major theorists in their efforts to position themselves with respect to these models. They demonstrate further that many of the controversies and fashions in diagnosis and psychoanalytic technique can be fully understood only in the context of the dialectic between the drive model and the relational models. The publication considered such diverse writers as Klein, Winnicott, Kernberg and Kohut, as joined in a commitment to the primacy of object ties and to the 'relational' experience.

After 1983, Mitchell (1988, 1993, 1997, 2000) further developed the relational perspective, considering metapsychological matters, clinical process, models of mind, and a dyadic flow of analytic work. In 1993, in his "Hope and Dread" publication, Mitchell outlined the relational revolution, with a small r: a revolution in "what the analyst knew (echoes of Lacan...) and a revolution in what the patient wanted (echoes of Ferenczi)" (Harris, 2011, p.

704). Later, through reconnecting with Loewald's lens on early development, Mitchell began to attend to those aspects of relationality that emerge in earliest attachments.

V. Bcb. Basic Concepts of the Relational Thought

Among the basic concepts of various Relational Models are:

1. Two person psychologies: The idea that the mind emerges in the matrix of social relationships; the mind is interpersonal as well as individualized. Through the work of Ghent (1990, 2002), Winnicott's dyadic view of transitional space and transitional objects became strong components of relational thought. For analysts-researchers like Beebe (Beebe and Lachman, 2005), Seligman (2003, 2005), and the Boston Change Process Study Group (Stern, Sandler, Nahum et al., 1998), these ideas flow from infant-parent observations. The infant observation studies established grounds for understanding of early relational life, with implications for clinical theory and technique of relational psychoanalysis, such as 'mutual regulation', 'rupture and repair', 'heightened affective moments' (Beebe and Lachman, 2005), and transformative properties of 'now' moments (Stern et al. 1998). Hoffman's (1998) temporal dimension of the intersubjective and the intrapsychic, whereby the past is constructed along with the future along the lines of social construction of shared and individual realities; Benjamin's (1988, 1995, 1998) work on complementarity, distinct kinds of thirdness, the dyad being always more than two-ness; and Donnel Stern's (2010) recent 'witnessing' in clinical process, depicting the fragility, instability and uncertainty of boundaries within the interpersonal and relational context of 'knowing one another', are examples of the conceptual richness of the Two-Person psychologies coming out of the diverse Relational schools.

2. Social constructivism: Social regulation influenced by Fromm (1941) and Levenson (2006), is drawn from the interpersonalist tradition which regards culture as a major influence on the individual's psyche. With respect to gender and sexuality, the insights of Foucault (1988) and Althusser (1970), have been influential. Contemporarily, in North America, Dimen (2003) and Goldner (1991, 2003) are among those who work in this tradition, focusing on the dialogue of the Unconscious and the Social, the body and the culture, in regard to psychoanalytic feminism and other culturally transformative themes. Corbett (1993, 2009), deconstructing masculinity, positions his work within both a relational and queer theory.

3. Multiple self-states: Relational metapsychology reflecting a preoccupation with states of identity and powered by dissociative process of varying intensity accounts for much of relational analytic dyadic work. 'Hybridity', 'Multiplicity', 'Shifting self-states', 'vertical splits' and 'dissociations' can be the signs of trauma as well as be part of normative models of mind (Bromberg, 1998, 2006; Davies and Frawley, 1994). In this vein, the early interest of Ferenczi (1911, 1932) in the unconscious communication of traumatic experiences, his concepts of identification with the aggressor and of the wise child, is continued in the present day by focus on trauma and its intergenerational transmission in speech, body, and in other ways of relating. Some of the contemporary relational work on embodiment in the context of problematic attachment (Gentile, 2006; Anderson, 2009; Seligman, 2009; Corbett, 2009) and

work on resultant shame (Lombardi, 2008) are examples of contemporary directions in this area.

4. Development, motivation, emergent function: Originally opposed to what he termed a ‘developmental tilt’ in the classical Freudian theory, Mitchell, in his turn to Loewald’s notion of human subjectivity as emergent within the relational matrix, one characterized “from the earliest moments as a site of primal density from which object states and subjectivity emerge” (Harris, 2011, p.714), became increasingly developmentally oriented. An example of the two person account of emergent sexuality, making use of Laplanche’s “implantation” and “excess of the other” concepts, was presented by Stein in her conceptualization of ‘sexuality as excess’, arising out of the interaction between the adult and the child (Stein, 2008).

5. Clinical process marked by the emphasis on the ubiquity of countertransference: Following the early footprints of Ferenczi (1911, 1932), Heimann (1960)’s ideas of countertransference, and Bion’s (1959) developmental work on Projective Identification, the Relational clinical theory “operates as a ...radical systems theory” (Harris, 2011); it places emphasis on the bi-directional influences between the analytic pair. Authenticity, honesty, possibly disclosure (Davies, 1994; Renik, 2007) of analyst’s missteps and errors may be put into practice in a variety of ways but they are the grounding of relational clinical practice, just as are the ‘analyst’s vulnerability’ and ‘impasse’ (Aaron, 2006; Harris and Sinsheimer, 2008).

Among the many contributions of the Relational thought and clinical approaches listed above, the contemporary controversy involves the degree to which the analytic dyad is viewed as an a-historical co-construction, and at the same time a replica of a mother—infant unit. (See also entries CONFLICT, INTERSUBJECTIVITY)

V. Bd. Self Psychology: Self Object

Self Psychologists caution that one must be a bit wary of the concept of “internalization” inasmuch as it is a figure of speech which need not, nor should not, be taken too literally. Thus when it is said that “Object Relations Theory” refers to a gradual construction “of dyadic or bipolar representations (self- and object-images) as reflections of the original infant-mother relationship” (Kernberg, 1976, p 57) it should not necessarily be seen as indicative of transposition of activity in the world to a stage of theatre inside of the head where miniature replicas or “representations” or “images” are re-enacting the world outside. “Internalization” is best seen as applicable to concepts that need not have a physical or geographic meaning. Arnold Goldberg (1992), the editor of the annual series “Progress in Self Psychology” and a major contributor to the expansion of Heinz Kohut’s theory, exemplifies (2015a, oral communication with Eva Papiasvili): “We put money in the bank, we are in love or in trouble without attributing the dollars being stored physically in the building where the transaction took place or imagining that ‘love’ and ‘trouble’ are places. These are figures of speech that too easily become concretized. This lack of clarity has often been replicated in our assuming that the mind is somehow situated within the brain which in turn is situated within

the skull; and so the process of having something or someone in mind is but an act of translocation, and this is simply and readily accomplished by a representation.”

In sharp contrast to the seduction of the mere transposition of one’s life to a miniscule drama in the brain is the theory of the extended mind (Rowland, 2013). Inasmuch as theories are best thought of as useful tools which can be employed when needed rather than as illustrative of true states of affairs, the notion of the extended mind is presently employed to alter the manner in which we consider object relations. Although this theory of the extended mind was originally introduced as applicable to cognition, it is readily and easily employed in psychoanalysis in theories involving the self or the person. In brief it states that the mind is not to be thought of as confined to a small place inside of the head but rather is extended to encompass persons and events in the environment. One of the best and easiest ways to think of this is by way of the phenomenon of “staring.” Experiments had shown (Sheldrake, 2013) that people are able to tell when others are staring at them without their being able to visually confirm this. Of course there are a multitude of ways to think about how the mind reaches out into the world about it, and indeed this is the “normal” way that children think about the world. However, we see the theory of the extended mind in our daily psychoanalytic practice in the form of certain particular transference configurations.

When Heinz Kohut (1971) began formulating his ideas about the psychology of the self, he realized that some patients developed meaningful transferences in which he became a significant component of his patients’ selves. He was not an object of old which was reactivated by way of regression and which enjoyed a separate and distinct existence, but rather was a reactivated part of the self which experienced the analyst as a constituent of that person or self. These transference configurations were able to be categorized as either mirroring, or idealizing, or twinship transferences and were further to be seen as moments of normal self development. Inasmuch as they were essentially components or parts of a patient’s self development they were established as “selfobjects” as opposed to separate and distinct objects. They demonstrated how the mind goes beyond the skull to capture others as part of its expanded repertoire. All of us utilize others to join in the construction of our selves; and this is not a stage, which we pass through and overcome, but is a continuing process by which we regulate and maintain ourselves.

Seeing others as necessary aspects of ourselves requires a modification of our psychology from a two-person psychology, which focuses upon the relations between objects, to a one-person psychology which examines the relations between the self and its selfobjects.

The implications of the selfobject concepts goes far beyond those of object relations posited on drive gratification or drive frustration. They are in accord with Fairbairn’s (1944) definition of object relations theory, which denotes a set of psychoanalytic and structural hypotheses which place the child’s need to relate to others at the center of human motivation. However these “relations” or “relationships” are not interactions which are represented or replicated in the brain but rather are mental processes that are being realized in the world. The sad and unfortunate equation of mind and brain has led to this state of confusion. Although the mind is certainly generated by the brain, it cannot be seen as nothing more than the brain as so

many choose to do (Kandel, 2012) as seemingly in the interest of the economy of words. The brain, the mind and the self are three distinct and different entities. The brain is an organ which generates the mind. The mind is a concept of thought and feeling which encompasses the world. The self is the person who exists in the world and with other persons. These three entities should not be collapsed into one.

In words of Goldberg (2015b, oral communication with Eva Papiasvili):, “Imagine, if you will, a person who enrolls in the business school at Harvard. He or she is in the business school but may rarely be physically present in the building that houses the school of business. The parents of the imaginary student come to visit in order to see the university that their son or daughter attends. They are shown the administrative building, the library along with the business school but one innocent question seems to baffle their tour guide. The mother of our student wishes to know where the university is and can only be told that the university is both everywhere and more. Harvard is neither a mere collection of buildings or at all capable of being located. It is something akin to an idea just as the mind and the self are neither fixed nor bounded. Harvard means different things to different people very much as do object relations”. (See also entries TRANSFERENCE, SELF PSYCHOLOGY)

V. Be. The Rise of Proposed “Third” Models Of Psychic Functioning

On both sides of the Atlantic, French analysts (Brusset, 1988, 2005, 2006, 2013) have adopted the term “The Third Model” (‘Le Troisième Topique’) to retrospectively assemble under one metapsychological rubric the work of a number of post-Freudian authors on the role of the object in the development of the psychic apparatus. The designation #3 refers to the fact that this model has been progressively elaborated by various leading thinkers who have felt the need to add the relationship to early caretakers as prerequisite to the attainment of a psychic apparatus capable of operating according to one or the other of the two Freudian models of the psychic apparatus: The first being the topographical one (Freud 1900) of a division into consciousness, unconsciousness, and preconsciousness, each with their separate rules of operation; The second Freudian model (1923, 1926), the structural model, divides the psychic apparatus into three fields: id, ego, and superego. Implicit in Freud's earlier elaborations is that the subject is somewhat aware of drive as a part of himself and that he has been forced to repress it as defence against the unacceptable (to the ego) nature of this drive. The second model proposes a far more ambiguous situation in which even in the ideal conditions of a clear internal differentiation of the psychic apparatus, significant portions of the ego and superego remain unconscious and the id is filled with material which has never become conscious. Freud's latter writings struggle with the theoretical and technical implications of these discoveries. Nevertheless, the claim that both models represent "one person" is defensible.

Both Freud's models depict neurotic illness as a mind at war with itself rather than at war with the outside world. Already in “Studies on Hysteria” (Freud, 1893-1895) describes women who fell ill after becoming the subject of an “unacceptable” thought, one deeply at odds with their moral ideals or pride. In these women, and without recourse to outside help, the

mobilisation of an internal defensive operation quarantined the unacceptable thought. These women were both capable of representing the forbidden wish and equally - albeit briefly - able to recognize it as an unacceptable part of themselves. Moreover, their defence of repression did not destroy this representation. The case of Lucy R. is exemplary: she acknowledged under Freud's questioning that she knew she was in love with her employer but "I didn't know--or rather I didn't want to know. I wanted to drive it out of my head and not think of it again; and I believe latterly that I have succeeded" (p 117). When Freud offered his interpretations, Lucy R. was able to accept them as reasonable accounts of an internal conflict and to distinguish fantasy or wish-fulfillment from external reality.

The "third model" describes a very different state of affairs in the pre-history of the individual before his psychic apparatus reaches the sophistication of the Freudian mind as depicted in the "Interpretation of Dreams" (Freud 1900). According to the third model, the mind is not always capable of functioning within its own circle of representations and able to judge them as such. To begin with, it is dependent upon the *nebenmensch* (Freud, (1950 [1895]), the other-near-by, to ensure that the psyche is not overwhelmed by internal and external excitations and furthermore dependent upon the caretaker's reliability, reverie, and tempered response to gradually learn to distinguish fantasy from reality. The caretaker's modulation of stimulation, taking on the function of stimulus barrier, allows the baby to eventually recognize libidinal and aggressive impulses as non traumatic parts of himself. Thus the third model describes a time in the life of each individual before the development of the other two. The third model was discovered last theoretically but describes a situation which is first in the life of the individual. "The Wolf-Man" (Freud, (1918) reveals a quite different kind of mental functioning from Lucy R.'s subjective sensations of "burnt pudding." In the hallucination of the loss of his finger, the Wolf-man does not recognize the impulse as his own and has projected it outside of himself. His hallucination is not qualified as "subjective." His later episode of psychosis further demonstrates that he had not reached the "neurotic" one-person level of functioning. Freud's interpretation along the lines of castration anxiety, linking cutting the finger to cutting the tree had no impact: the Wolfman had not reached the level of a psychic apparatus capable of appreciating the displacing richness of metaphor when referring to drive.

From the point of view of the unconscious subject, persons in the neurotic-normal range can be said to have an "internal" life while borderlines and psychotics do not experience either their drives or their fantasies as "internal" (though from the point of view of an outsider they come from inside). In order to move from primary process thinking where wishes are perceived as fulfilled to where wishes can be experienced in a transitional space of truth and untruth, one needs the intervention of a good-enough parent as temporary prosthesis and container. In this model, each human being begins life in a situation of two-person psychic processing where together the baby and the environment are an operative unit and it is only over time with considerable (usually unconscious) psychic work on the part of both parties that a relative one-person intra-psychic autonomy is established. The latter is viewed as an ideal universal development not accomplished by all persons, usually because of deficiencies in the primal

two-person encounter. For these retrospectively dubbed “third model” thinkers, a one-person mind is an achievement, a fluctuating one which may be lost under internal or external stress.

V. Bea. The Object, the Real Other, and the Drive

While the opposition posited between “object-seeking” and “pleasure-seeking” in the constitution of the psyche stimulated a burst of creative post-Freudian thinking in the United States, a significant body of reflection has from the beginning questioned this opposition. A similar assessment might be made concerning the controversy about the relative importance of “real” persons/objects versus internal objects or the need to address “deficit” rather than “drive.” No psychoanalytic theory can spare itself a confrontation with the double status of the object (Green, 1975): fantasied and real, internal and external, represented and perceived. Proponents of the addition of a “third” metapsychological model to our theoretical armamentarium, in pointing out how deeply interrelated drive and object relations are, might be seen as in agreement with the relationists who, as noted above, advocate a “dialectic” between drive and relational models. It might be more accurate to refer to the third model in the plural since different authors have approached the role of the object in such fundamentally disparate ways that a “unified” theory does not yet, nor may never, exist. As awareness of the convergence across theoretical orientations and continents of intense study of the role of the object in the development of the psychic apparatus becomes more widespread, there will be precious opportunities for cross-fertilization and debate. To illustrate the diversity of point of view, six authors whose contributions to this area of reflection have been particularly influential in North America will be briefly mentioned here: Lacan, Winnicott, Green, Laplanche, Reid, and Loewald.

Independently and virtually simultaneously, Lacan and Winnicott both formulated the primary human dilemma: in order to become someone, each subject must pass through another, a real, conflicted, individual, other. Both authors wrote of the mirroring function of the object, in Winnicott’s (1967) case as an opportunity to find reflected back one’s “true” self whereas for Lacan (1977 [1949]) this mirroring was the beginning of a lifelong alienation. In which the ego, craving to be the object of the other’s desire, takes other forms to be itself. The “reality” of the other’s intrusion preoccupying Lacan, however, concerned not concrete details about personality or aspects of the other’s behaviour but “the signifiers” as it were swallowed with breast milk. It was identificatory skewering or “pinning” of the unconscious subject by the combined discourses of the ‘near’ other of the early caretaker and the ‘far’ other of community and culture which led to the emphasis on detecting key “signifiers” in treatment. A former disciple of Lacan, Aulagnier (2001[1975]) deepened understanding of the intimate role of the early caretaker in the infant’s “activity of representation”. She pointed out that for the *infans* there is an inevitable “violence of anticipation” in the “spoken shadow” of maternal discourse. Moreover, she emphasized the central role of the “deferred action” of the naming of affect (deferred because occurring after the mother has observed the child’s response and before the child knows how to speak of it himself) which by designating the child’s *relation* to others cathected by him “identifies and constitutes the I” (p 97).

For Winnicott, the object also plays an essential role in the birth of a functioning psychic apparatus, one capable of distinguishing fantasy from perception. The object manages this transformation and construction through two main kinds of interactions with the infant. There is firstly the “found-created” of the empathetically timed maternal offering which appears just when the baby needs it. Then, the object’s “survival” to being “used” as the object of drives helps the baby differentiate his wishes from external reality. Winnicott (1960 b, p. 141) claims that for the infant instinctual impulses and affects are as foreign to the ego as a thunderclap. It is through a successful negotiation of the two categories of interaction of “created-found” and the “use of the object” (1953, 1969) that the child gradually subjectifies drive and distinguishes it from environmental forces. Thus the particular character of the “meeting” between the child’s spontaneous object-directed thrust and the parent’s “response” can be said to literally mold the subject’s intrapsychic experience. Before the drive can be felt as a part of oneself, it must arc through the external other’s response; in this manner, rather than simply “inborn”, for Winnicott drive is essentially “constructed” in the relationship with the other.

Another major Winnicottian insight into the object’s role has been intensely studied by Green (1975, 1985, 2005, 2007, 2011), that is, the quality of psychic presence offered by the external care-taking other. Too much and too little both overwhelm the nascent ego with stimulation, handicapping the transformative potential of the *nebenmensch*. Green pointed out that the Winnicottian “capacity to be alone in the presence of the other” (1958) required of the good-enough parent a capacity to remain at an optimal distance, that is, optimally absent. This absence Green says is not loss but “potential presence, a condition for the possibility not only of transitional objects but also of potential objects which are necessary to the formation of thought” (1975, p 14). In this reading of Winnicott, Green creatively extends the Lacanian two-fold insight into the role of “absence” in psychic life: that language is founded on the capacity to represent an absent object and/or to abstract oneself from its concrete presence, exemplifying distinction between the dyadic phantasmic plenitude of the Imaginary and the triadic castration of the Symbolic.

Green (2007) eventually coined the term “objectalisation” to refer to the capacity “in a solitude peopled by play” to generate a new category of objects by investing elements in the external world and in the transitional space of culture and ideas with drive. Further deepening his appreciation of absence at the core of psychic structure, Green (1999) came to the notion of the “work of the negative” to describe the many different ways in which the ego defends itself against disruption. These are examples of qualitatively different psychic processes which differ in the extent to which the subject is able to “absentify” the object inside itself, that is, to symbolise the object rather than needing its concrete presence or substitute. Thus what is at stake is not an incorporation of the object but the creation of an “absence” at the heart of the self (Pontalis, 1988). Green calls this a “structuring emptiness”, similar to the space inside a vase. The function of the object is thus paradoxal; it is there to stimulate, to awaken drive and at the same time to contain it. An object, which is lacking too early, or is overly intrusive, places the subject in an intolerable situation of excess. Deficient parenting, instead of rendering drive tolerable, makes it even worse: By exposing the baby to instinctual and drive overload,

too much object “presence” paradoxically prevents rather than facilitates the unfolding of the baby’s representational potentiality.

Laplanche’s ambitious reformulation of the “foundations of psychoanalysis” (1989) which offers another view of the relationship between object and drive. Laplanche, like Green, has been particularly influential amongst French-speaking Quebec analysts. Laplanche (1993, 1999) criticizes the “Ptolemaic” character of the Freudian vision which placed the individual psyche at the centre of his destiny. Rather, Laplanche claims that the fundamental “anthropological situation” of early childhood is completely decentred by the “priority” of the other, making the little person “Copernician” in her revolution around the adult. The drastic asymmetry between adult and infant emphasized by Laplanche because of its huge consequence for the infant’s psychic structure lies in the fact that the adult is a sexual and speaking being with an unconscious whereas the baby is neither sexual nor able to speak and is not as yet internally divided. Barely intuited by the adult is the triggering of his or hers unconscious infantile sexuality in primary intimacy with the infant body. This unconscious sexuality “contaminates” intimate exchanges with the infant in the form of “enigmatic messages” which the baby does not have the cognitive, emotional, or corporeal means to decode. Such enigmatic messages of unconscious sexuality of the adult create the drive and unconscious fantasy in the form of an internal “pressure for translation” on part of the baby. For Laplanche, this sexuality, enigmatic in nature, is the infantile sexuality discovered by Freud. This sexuality is not innate but an implantation from the real other, though the reality which counts – in a highly critical derivation and reworking of Lacan – is the reality of the “message”, a third reality Laplanche adds to those of the Freudian psychical and material realities. Thus, for Laplanche human sexuality – by which he means sexuality mediated by fantasy – comes from the other and is “other” (foreign to the ego).

Another author who has reflected deeply upon the role of the real, individual, caretaker in transforming the psychic apparatus is Reid (2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2015). He and others such as the Botellas (2004, 2007), Brusset (1988, 2005b, 2006, 2013), and Seulin (2015) argue not only that Freud’s discovery of primary process thought has revealed an entirely unconscious hallucinatory mode of functioning as the dominant human infantile state of mind as it were, but also that the installation of the pleasure-principle at the heart of the psychical apparatus is not a given but a result of pleasure shared by environment and baby around the satisfaction of need. The Freudian ‘state of mind’ as revealed in the “Interpretation of Dreams” is a mind capable of distinguishing representation from perception, wish from external fact. Whereas as Freud observed in 1897 regarding the unconscious, a wish cathected by affect is virtually indistinguishable from a perception. As such the unconscious constantly operates in a potentially traumatic fashion where thought is immediately presumed to mean action. The transformation, or perhaps more accurately, the addition, of a second mode of cognitive functioning inhibiting the first – the secondary process designated by Freud – requires felicitous benevolent intervention from the object. Inadequate holding, reverie, and response from early caretakers have the unfortunate added effect of leaving large swathes of the subject’s unconscious processing at the magical and inherently traumatic level. In contrast when the environment has been good-enough, “reality” itself becomes simultaneously perceptual and

hallucinatory as the child's encounter with the external world is buoyed up by the creative illusion of his own drives. From this point of view, the death drive is the toxic by-product of the failure of the infusion of representation with drive.

A contemporary of Lacan, Winnicott and Green, Loewald in the U.S. also rejected the independence of object relations and drives in a "revision of the instinct concept itself" (1972, p 324). "It is suggested that instinctual drives, understood as psychic forces, are to be conceptualized as becoming organized through interactions within the primitive mother-child unitary psychic field rather than as constitutional or innate givens" (p 324). In his emphasis on the Freudian concept of "binding", Loewald realized the relational implications that are not apparent in Freud where fusion and defusion, binding and unbinding, might be taken to occur in an objectless vacuum. Loewald saw that binding of instincts requires the object's "mediation" both in the sense of "taming" of them and in the sense of their "representation." In this way, he seems to echo Winnicott's notion of "ego needs" about which Winnicott complained that "[a] great deal of misconception has arisen out of the slowness of some to understand that an infant's needs are not confined to [the mere satisfaction of] instinct tensions, important though these may be" (1965, p 86). Though he uses the Strachey translation of "Trieb" as "instinct", Loewald's thinking belongs under the rubric of third model contributions as the following extended quote illustrates:

"Anything we can call instinctual drives, as psychic forces, arise and are being organized first within the matrix of the mother-child unitary psychic field from which through manifold interactional processes within that field, the infantile psyche gradually segregates out as a relatively more autonomous center of psychic activity. In this view instinctual drives in their original form are not forces immanent in an autonomous, separate primitive psyche, but are resultants of tensions within the mother-child psychic matrix and later between the immature infantile psyche and the mother. Instincts, in other words, are to be seen as relational phenomena from the beginning and not as autochthonous forces seeking discharge, which discharge is understood as some kind of emptying of energy potential, in a closed system or out of it." (Loewald 1972, p 321f).

Loewald was also explicit about the necessary asymmetry in the "two levels of psychic organization" involved in this process: mother/child, analyst/patient. It is an indication of the continuation of reflections about the two solitudes that Roussillon can publish a paper in 2013 with the title "The function of the object in the binding and unbinding of the drives" which does not contain a single reference to Loewald's work. The ineluctable asymmetry of the "fundamental anthropological situation", was also a point Laplanche (1999) was adamant about, though he was less concerned with the taming than with the disruptive sexual character of the caretaker's unconscious intrusion. Both of these functions have to be taken into account in order to englobe the entire range of the object's impact upon the subject. In Seulin's (2015) opinion, the "demonic" character of (some) sexuality insisted upon by Laplanche and Freud is more a consequence of the object failing in its role than of the enigmatic quality of its "messages". See, however, Stein (2008) for an opposing point of view.

Several of the authors here grouped retrospectively together as “third model” developers seem to have reached similar conclusions about the relative inefficacy of classical interpretative work with persons operating below the ‘neurotic’ spectrum. Therapeutic value is displaced to the analyst’s function as a container and as a facilitator of the patient’s capacity to feel, to verbalize, and to represent. Winnicott wrote of “holding and handling” and the “capacity to play”, Bion (1962a, 1962b) referred to “reverie”, Green (2003/2005) proposed the “putting to work of representation”, Aulagnier (1977) stressed the right to secret thoughts of one’s own, Reid (2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2015) referred to the access to transitionality and “tertiary” psychic processes, Roussillon (1991; Casoni et al, 2009; Daoust, 2003) to the “malleable medium”, and Loewald (1960, 1970, 1971, 1972) to the “mediating” and “integrating interactions” of the parent and analyst. Apparent in these works is another correlative which appears to converge with the direction of many other psychoanalytic orientations, and with which Freud himself would have been in agreement, that is, the conclusion that mental health and resilience are associated with an optimal fluidity among the intrapsychic structures as well as a relative identificatory freedom in relationships. (See also entries THE UNCONSCIOUS, INTERSUBJECTIVITY)

VI. LATIN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

The conceptualizations pertaining to object relations theories in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, have been related to the Kleinian theory and its developments mainly in Bion, Meltzer and Winnicott.

The early genealogy of Klein’s theory emerged from her psychoanalysis of children’s play. Klein observed that the child’s play personified his or her feelings and thoughts. The toys stood in for people, situations, hated feelings, persecutory enemies, loved wishes, wild theories of sexuality, bodily implosions, and so on.

Play was not only a way for the child to control what must at first feel unknowable and dangerous. The toys themselves were treated as if they had feelings: they lived, worried, died, and tried to destroy. In this sense objects can be defined as phantasy apprehensions of the external world. Internal objects are not ‘representations’, as they might be in memories or in conscious phantasies (daydreams). Objects are felt to make up the substance of the body and of the mind” (Hinshelwood 1991, pp. 71–72).

The concept of “internal objects” is understood in the context of the whole of the Kleinian metapsychology, in interaction with other main hypothesis such as: the existence of life and death drives, a theory of early mental functioning which formulates the existence of an ego capable of perceiving anxiety, the development of the ego of primitive defence mechanisms, the hypothesis of unconscious fantasies and the theory of paranoid-schizoid and depressive position. (Bianchedi, 1984).

The work of mourning leads directly to that of the construction of an inner world in and through the depressive position. The state of external relations is governed by that of internal relations. Klein stresses the concrete and even physical character of the experiences relating to this inner world. The theory of the inner world organizes relations between objects in that world. The substance of this world consists of unconscious fantasies, deep and early, which surface into consciousness through memories in feelings or memories in sensations, often hypochondriacal in character.

VI. A. Original Conceptualizations From Latin America

VI. Aa. Horacio Etchegoyen: Early Transference

Etchegoyen (1982) considers that one of two differentiated explanatory principles lies at the basis of all conceptual frames: primary narcissism and primary object relations. These two principles call for a decision between one and the other

This differentiation is questioned by Diana Rabinovich (1990). The theory of Symbiosis described by Bleger (1967) as the *glischrocaric* stage could be considered as an intermediate alternative between narcissism and object relations. Bleger's description starts from a primary narcissistic stage in which the subject believes that the object is part of himself and it is only through repetitive experiences of frustration that he recognizes that something different from him exists and that it does not belong to him.

For Etchegoyen, though, Freud's whole work is based on the concept of primary narcissism. The object to which Freud refers to in "Three Essays on a Sexual Theory" (1905) is the object of the drive, only contingent and without entity to the point that a stable relationship with the object is considered pathological and defined as a point of fixation. Object relations are conceivable to Freud only after the new psychic act inaugurates the constitution of the Ego (Freud, 1914).

Etchegoyen considers the theory of object relations as patrimony of the British School: Jones, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, Balint, Paula Heimann among others. The common feature in these authors is the recognition of the importance of object relations and of an internal world which results from processes of introjection and projections.

According to Etchegoyen, Jones paper "Hate and anal erotism in the obsessional neurosis" (1913) marks a turning point in the history of psychoanalytic theory. It is in this paper that for the first time anal erotism is not understood as an autoerotic manifestation but as a love and hate relationship with the mother that trains and takes care of the child. In Jones's concept of *aphanisis* it is possible to find rudimentary elements of the theory of object relations but the more consistent development of it belongs to Melanie Klein and years later to Fairbairn.

An important contribution of Horacio Etchegoyen to the exploration of early object relations in the psychoanalytic process is his clarification of *early transference* as a particular

form of transference neurosis which demands interpretation. The central points that define the concept of early transference are: the existence of object relation from the beginning of life (M. Klein 1955) and the notion of unconscious phantasy. The existence of an early transference that reflects early development allows for the possibility to investigate those pre-verbal phases, where there is no pre-conscious registering of memories and which covers the pre-Oedipal stage described by Freud (1931, 1933). This opens the path to test the theories that try to explain early phases of development and conflict.

VI. Ab. Leon and Rebeca Grinberg: Modalities of Object Relations in the Psychoanalytic Process

The Grinbergs (1981) consider that object relations cannot be understood outside their link with the notions of “object” (the nature of the object with whom the subject relates) and the “space” and “time” in which it takes place. The authors consider that the functioning quality of a determined object relation will depend on the psychic and emotional state of the subject, on the nature of the object, and the space and time in which this relationship takes place. Different levels of the functioning of these relationships will depend on the predominance of the psychotic or neurotic personality and on the interaction between the two members of the analytic couple.

Among the different types of object relations that can be present in the clinical exchange they describe three types: those who tend to establish a “one-ness link” with the object- analyst, those who try to create a “duality link”, and those in which the triangular relationship predominates (whether with part or total objects).

“*One-ness link*”: some patients regress to a stage of no integration of a very primitive level. They feel fragmented and need the analyst to hold their multiple parts and to integrate their fragments. The need to find a container leads to a frenetic search for an object until the time when a containment function can be internalized. Until then there is only a very rudimentary internal space with all the confusions regarding not only one’s own identity but also the identity of the object. In the analytic situation, when the patient regresses to a state of no-differentiation and no-discrimination, he/she tries to establish a relationship with the analyst with a predominance of magic and omnipotent phantasies. The authors distinguish two modalities of relationship of unity: one pathological which usually predominates in moments of separation when the patient has the absolute certainty that the analyst knows all about the patient, all about his/her phantasies and feelings without him/her having to verbalize them. The other is a creative relationship of unity, the product of a benign regression that promotes a state of fusion with the object, a state of illusion of unity that brings trust and security for the development of a creative process. If the analyst is capable of distinguishing between the two types of relationships keeping an optimum distance – not too close to lead to confusion nor too far to become a container, it will allow the patient to develop towards the relationship of duality.

“*Duality link*” has its origin in the primitive dyadic relationship of the baby with his/her mother; container and contained. The authors describe different varieties of dual links:

*Those living in a bi-dimensional world will feel glued to the surface of the object, becoming thus the object and imitating his/her appearance and behaviour.

*Another type is described as stifling or symbiotic in which there is a mutual submission between the two members of the relationship.

*Yet another type takes the form of taking turns in the projection of psychotic anxieties.

*When a more mature and integrated part of the personality is involved in a dual relationship, the emotional link between the couple will be more solid and positive, preserving the autonomy of each member.

“Triangular link: the authors maintain discrimination between a triangular relationship based on a simultaneous relationship with two partial objects and the relationship involved in the Oedipal Conflict characterized by love, jealousy and rivalry with total objects, sexually differentiated and autonomous objects. Either the idealized or the persecutory object may be projected in the transference while the other is projected onto an external figure. At other times the two objects – persecutory and idealized- may be projected on different aspects of the analyst. (See also entries ENACTMENT, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE)

VI. Ac. Madeleine and Willy Baranger: The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field

Baranger and Baranger (1961-1962) consider the analytic situation as a bipersonal field. The analytic situation is a couple-field structured on the basis of an unconscious fantasy, which does not belong to the analysand alone but to both parties. In this sense the theory of the dynamic field may be considered as a contribution to the theory of object relations as expressed in the analytic situation. The task consists not only of understanding the basic fantasy of the analysand, but also of finding access to something that is constructed in a couple-relationship. This unconscious bipersonal fantasy, the object of the analyst's interpretation, is a structure constituted by the interplay of the processes of projective and introjective identification, and of the counter-identification that act, with their limits, functions and characteristics in different ways in the analysand and in the analyst.

The Barangers integrate here the theories of the Gestalt with Susan Isaacs' concept of unconscious fantasy, Klein's two modalities of identification (projective and introjective) and Grinberg's theory of projective counteridentification.

VI. Ad. Elizabeth Tabak de Bianchedi: From Objects to Links: Discovering Relatedness

Tabak de Bianchedi (1995) stresses the significance of the link and of the linking or linkage functions in Bion's work as expressing basically the many aspects of relatedness. Tabak Bianchedi points out that while the importance of objects (internal and external, part and whole, etc.) has been stressed by Fairbairn, Balint, Winnicott, and Klein, it is Bion who pays special attention to the relationship, more than to the objects, by using the concept of the link.

She thinks that his idea of the link or the linking function which connects two objects (two human minds) is one of Bion's major contributions to the analytic way of thinking, understanding, and working.

One of her contributions to the theory of object relations has been to clarify Bion's proposal about what is it that is introjected by the baby in his/her early relationship with the mother. This clarification is based on her understanding of Bion's reconsideration of Klein's idea of the good part-object (the mother's breast) as the nucleus of the baby's Ego, which is introjected in the first months of life. Tabak Bianchedi clarifies how Bion changes the more concrete, morphological or anatomical concept of the good breast to a functional/physiological one. She specifies how the linking/understanding aspect of the mother's mind (her containing mental function) will be introjected, and how the nucleus of the infant's Ego will become the containing and understanding function of himself (alpha function, psycho-analytic function of the personality).

In addition she emphasises and specifies the clinical relevance of the Bion's model of the container-contained, with the emotions suffusing them and creating different types of relationships. Her rich description of the basic emotional links illustrates the relatedness as the basic feature of Bionian thought. In this context, Emotion itself has a linking function, and the links between (human) objects are 'emotional experiences'. An emotional experience cannot be conceived in isolation from a relationship.

V Ae. Janine Puget and Isidoro Berenstein: Object Relations vs *lo vincular*

Object relations and links defined within a very specific frame which includes "lo vincular" have been an object of interesting discussions, controversies and confrontations among analysts. In some Latin American analytic cultures the notions of link and *lo vincular* have acquired a unique slant. Greenberg (2012) stresses such uniqueness, and states that *lo vincular* cannot be translated into English or French because it is specific to the Rio de la Plata. Analogically to narcissism vs object relatedness, object relations and *lo vincular* demand making a decision between one and the other as well as point to a need for clarification.

According to Janine Puget (2017), the link, as *lo vincular*, defines a relationship between two or more subjects that leads to the emergence of practices specific to the current situation. It favors the effects of interactions in the space between two people, of immanently doing together with another or others. It is difficult or impossible to 'inscribe' the events taking place within the link in the logic governing the dynamic of identification processes.

Therefore, besides conflicts pertaining to each individual, one must take into account the product of the overlap. In other words, one must make room for the alterity of each of the subjects inhabiting the relationship, an alterity that cannot be reduced to sameness.

The singularity of each participant sets in motion a work that starts from difference. Following Derrida (1967), difference is understood as *différance*, that is, as deferred present. What emerges from *différance* cannot be symbolized; it exceeds representation and depends

on presentation. Presentation does not oppose representation. It belongs to the logic of the effects of the present, of a relationship between two subjects who do not lose their alterity in the encounter.

VI. Af. Pichon Riviere's Contribution

Enrique Pichon Riviere helped found the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association and was a formative influence in the personal development and intellectual productivity of many of its leading thinkers, such as José Bleger, Willy and Madeleine Baranger, David Liberman, Heinrich Racker and Horacio Etchogoyen. A part of the vibrant bohemian, artistic, literary and journalistic culture of early 20th century Argentina, Pichon Riviere has often been referred to as the psycho-social face of Argentine psychoanalysis.

Pichon Riviere (1965/1971) insisted on the intimate connection between individual and social psychology. His conceptualization of links emphasized the significance of the social group in the constitution and preservation of personal identity, as well as the important role of the intrapsychic – unconscious phantasy and personal psychology, in the shaping of culture and the social surround.

He maintained that social psychology should be viewed as psychoanalytic, while psychoanalysis itself should be understood as a social psychology. For this author, the developing personality and identity, the self and sense of self, was constituted more by the world of interaction [interpersonal, intersubjective, relational experience] than [simply] by excesses of inborn drives but also that the unconscious aspects of the link inside the patient modifies the meaning of all interactions.

Pichon's ideas were a powerful forerunner of the Barangers' formulation of the analytic field and of various movements towards and elaborations of the intersubjective dimension of the analytic process, the positive role of the analyst's countertransference, a tentative theory of act and action in the cure and many other formulations that have given contemporary Latin American psychoanalysis its particular flavor.

He also enlarged the conceptualization of the Oedipus Complex to include all triangular relations, beginning with the way a third person in the mother's mind modifies the link between mother and child, and continuing to the general principle that the presence of a third person always modifies two-person links. In this way, the individual is, from the beginning, formed in a triadic structure so that the early relationship is bicorporal and tripersonal. Thus, while the early relationship is apparently dyadic, the third functions permanently and from the beginning in the mind of the mother.

Bernardi thinks that Pichon's, as well as Bleger's, most important contribution, in terms of the history of ideas in Latin America, is that the *object is also a subject* and that there is a dialectical relationship between them, a point not readily accepted by many other contemporary Kleinian authors. In this vein, broadening the concept of object relations, Pichon Riviere described what

he called “vínculo”, a complex structure in which subject and object are always mutually interacting in processes of communicating and learning.

VI. Ag. Jorge García Badaracco: Maddening Object

García Badaracco, one of Pichon’s followers, refers to Pichon’s thought that in the internal world of psychotic patients there are internal objects (multiple “imagos”) articulated through a progressive process of internalization and that in that internal world it is possible to recognize the dynamics of reconstructions of external reality. Badaracco continued working on these ideas along with his own concept of the “maddening object”.

“*Maddening Object*”, a concept presented first at the IPA Congress in Hamburg in 1985, is an object, which unconsciously induces the person to behave in a sadistic and malignant way. It simultaneously makes the person feel evil and wicked because the parents, due to their deficiencies, instead of acting as a buffer to the primitive drives of the subject, amplify the subject’s anxieties, especially envy and sadism. Such a sadistic parental treatment, which lacks recognition of the child’s helplessness, results in the subject experiencing his own spontaneity as threatening and dangerous. Therefore, in the search of an experience of satisfaction and due to the lack of resources of the ego, the person yields to the needs of the others, or may enact the way how they themselves were mistreated, leading to the cycle of traumatizations and retraumatizations.

This formulation highlights the contribution of the structuring object to the psycho-emotional development, as regards the level of pathology in a subject. The concept, thus depicting the internal “presence” of the other, expanded the classical metapsychology and opened a new perspective to understand serious mental illnesses from the psychoanalytical point of view: “... what we call 'mental illness' of a person appears as a 'type of mental functioning' that is being 'conditioned', in large part, by other people (...). These 'other' people may be acting from the real world, or they can 'act', from a 'presence' in internal world, as in what I designated years ago as 'maddening objects'” (*García Badaracco, 2006a, p.6*).

Badaracco’s theory and clinical practice are based on the “‘lived feeling experiences’ (‘vivencias’ in Spanish orig.) and presuppose that an emotional disturbance has to do first, with an outer, then, an inner presence of the *others in us*. In this context, serious mental illness is a result of sickening and maddening presences, which have prevented the development of ego resources and stall psychoemotional growth. Thus, the true self is smothered, taking away the possibility of expressing oneself from a healthy virtuality.

The psychotic breakdown, which is usually preceded by an inner change, presents an “opportunity to make a change,” not only from the patient’s point of view, but within the dynamics of the whole family. Referring to Freud’s Structural Theory of Id, Ego and Superego, Badaracco sees the Superego, the intrapsychic representative of society, as depicting the *others in us*. He expands the psychoanalytic thinking of the drive theory in viewing the mind as taking part in a field of *reciprocal interdependencies*. Viewed this way, the existence of the *others in*

us is a universal phenomenon of the functioning of the human mind. The relationship of *interdependence* with those *others in us*, which was traumatic at some point during childhood, remains in the internal world of the person, exerting a pathogenic power and effect and producing pathological feeling experiences:

“... the 'constructive experiences' are those that condition the creation of new 'ego resources', while 'negative experiences' condition what we call 'traumatic experiences'; these will tend to create pathological and pathogenic 'ego resources', and will have a tendency to repetition, as always looking for a new opportunity for what some authors have called 'a new beginning' (Balint) or a re-development (Winnicott). Continuing with our way of thinking, traumatic experiences can be interpreted as experiences that leave pathological identifications, that is, they condition 'presences' of others inside us, with the pathogenic power they had at the time of the traumatic experience itself.” (García Badaracco, 2006b, p.4)

When the need of a child is frustrated or not recognized due to the deficiencies of the parental objects, these may turn into maddening objects. In contrast to Melanie Klein, who considers the good object as only satisfying and the bad object as only frustrating (Klein, M., 1980), García Badaracco states that the good object is the one which provides, with its structuring function, the conditions for the frustrating experiences to be more tolerable and for the satisfactory experiences to have a limit. On the other hand, he describes the bad object as the one which, due to its own deficiency, cannot provide those necessary elements. On the contrary, the bad object magnifies frustrations, envy and primitive hatreds, which is also characteristic of a maddening object.

The many years of experience in public hospitals and in his own Multifamily Structured Therapeutic Community, addressing complex pathologies, allowed García Badaracco to discover the importance of reciprocal interdependencies in order to understand the mental pathology. To him, the mind is always comprised by normative reciprocal interdependencies, which provide security, and/or maddening pathogenic interdependencies. Through many years of clinical experience with seriously mentally ill patients and their families, he formulated his core idea of a basic component of mental functioning as a back and forth exchange between two minds: one, which is, developing and growing, and the other, which has already reached a particular level of development.

Extending the understanding of Ego mechanisms of defense to encompass deeper aspects of the functioning of the mind, García Badaracco thought in terms of a subject to subject relation: two subjects with different characteristics in reciprocal interdependencies, which leads to conceptualization of “*maddening presences*.” In this context, the concept of “fixation” would be understood as the persistence of a bond with an object which contains the characteristics of a maddening object/presence within the psyche. Such a presence is fed from outside by a real parental object, which imposes at the very beginning, the condition of being essential to the person's life. “The experienced feeling when separating from a mother, who despite of causing suffering, functions as a ‘necessary poison’ to neutralize psychic pain, is experienced as a threat of death by both mother and child” (Mitre, 2008, pp. 6). The fact of

depending on people without resources leaves the patient exposed, due to his or her defenseless position to any traumatic situations.

García Badaracco held the view that within the psychic apparatus of a seriously mentally ill person a pathological symbiosis of master and slave can be formed, with interchangeable roles yet both mutually indispensable. It is in this permanent fixation to that maddening object that neither member of that symbiotic relation can reach a true individuation or autonomy. The mentally-ill patient is trapped in a relationship of two. This sickening, maddening plot can only be deconstructed by a third party, who provides a structuring function for the defenseless and immature ego.

To be looked at and be seen as the ill or crazy person is potentially sickening. Yet, there is always a healthy virtuality within the person however ill he or she may be. Only when the *true self* is rescued by others, and so long as the necessary conditions are given, the self is able to gradually de-identify itself from the presences to the extent it feels it is “looked at” as healthy and not ill (ill being the way it was “*seen*” by the parents). It is only then that one can *count on* another person or others and relinquish the omnipotence with which one maintains the symptoms as a defense, to avoid establishing a healthy interdependent relationship.

It is in this function of the third party that the therapist can perceive beyond the pathogenic and pathological identifications, the undeveloped *potential healthy virtuality*, refrained and masked by identifications and characters which hide it, the way Winnicott describes as false self. "A defensive organization in which there is a premature taking charge of the care functions of the mother, so that the baby or the child adapts to the environment while at the same time protecting and concealing the true self, or the source of impulses" (Winnicott 1989, pp. 47). Such concealed potential virtuality corresponds to aspects of the Ego dissociated and halted during its development. A character is built up in order to keep the true hidden person ‘alive’.

That soothing-structuring presence, which fosters the development of Ego resources to defend itself from the psychopathic actions imposed by others, follows the model of alterations of the Ego described by Freud in *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* (Freud 1937).

What emerges then is what Balint called the ‘New beginning’: "... (a) going back to something ‘primitive’, to a point before the faulty development started, which could be described as a regression, and (b), at the same time, discovering a new, better-suited, way which amounts to a progression” (Balint, 1968, pp.159). Thinking about it from the point of view of García Badaracco, this moment is related to the disidentification of those sick but indispensable presences that were worn out in the therapeutic process of psycho-emotional re-development. "There is a period of disidentifications of the maddening objects in which the patient feels he can not return to what he was before. The pathogenic characters with whom he used to identify have become blurred and a series of transformations arise within the psychic apparatus. Such new configurations being very new, still do not present a coherent picture” (García Badaracco, 1980, pp. 271). However, García Badaracco cautions that the internal de-identification with maddening presences is a long gradual painstaking process as the patient may confuse the de-

identification of a certain presence within him with a feeling of emptiness or death which led him/her to becoming ill, in the first place.

VI. Ah. Willy Baranger: “Half Dead Half-Alive Object”

Willy Baranger (1961-1962) described a particular structure of the object that seems to occur in all mourning processes and depressive states, though not exclusively, in which the object is experienced as half dead – half alive.

Clinical experience and products of fantasy (myths, legends, novels, etc.) reveal a great variety of such structures, some of which are persecutory, others damaged and depressed. In some cases, the genesis of depression seems to focus around the half dead-half alive object, which occupies a place of primary importance in the world of the unconscious. It has, as a corollary, a certain type of idealized object, both being distinct from the superego. He described the rigidity of this structure of the object, and its difficult assimilation by the ego. Taking into consideration the previous existence of an important symbiotic situation between the ego and the object allowed him to shed some light on its genesis.

Baranger observed that understanding the tension between the impoverished ego and the hypertrophied and sadistic superego was insufficient to effect change. Only taking into account the relationship of the self with its dead-alive object and its idealized object, both of which are distinct from the superego, can make a difference. In prolonged depressive states, the process of grieving cannot take place and the subject remains, in a more or less concealed form, tied to an object that can neither return to life nor completely die. The person in a depressed state lives subjected to a dead-alive object. Only by means of analytical work does this object manifest itself more and more clearly, allowing us to study its structure and its characteristics.

Some dead-alive object types closely resemble persecuting objects: at one extreme, we are faced with a series of structures in which there are dying objects that the self/the ego must preserve at any cost and, at the other extreme, objects are presented that cause a mixture of depressive anxiety and paranoid anxiety in the ego / self.

Among the many different deads-alive objects Baranger describes, the most important variety is the dying object of the depressive states. Here, the subject is "inhabited" by an internal ‘almost dead’ object, which keeps the subject enslaved and obliges it to a sterile activity of reparation, which always remains incomplete. This unconscious situation determines the depressive anxieties related to external objects, such as guilt, inhibitions and other defenses found in depressive states.

In states of grief/mourning and depression, he recognizes the existence of two different objects, both ambivalent, although differing in structure and function. Both feed off of the ego/the self, impoverish it, and lead the ego/the self to adopt a masochistic attitude. One dead-alive object has the function of containing sadistic fantasies and allows control of depressive anxiety. The second, the idealized object, serves as a refuge for the ego/the self, who deposits

in the idealized object a part of her or his own potential and reparation capacity to preserve them from masochism and danger of death. The ego/the self, feeling impoverished and fragile, searches for safety in a strong and intensely alive object. This is often observed in transference manifestations: the analyst becomes the representative of this idealized object, and the self/the ego of the analysand participates in a symbiotic way in the vitality of the analyst.

This symbiosis, not previously sufficiently valued, led Baranger to the conclusion that one of the bases of pathological grief/mourning is a previous symbiotic situation of the self/the ego with the lost object. It needs to be differentiated from its paranoid-schizoid counterpart that essentially functions on the basis of projective identification, this being assigned to control paranoid anxiety and eliminate all ambivalence. On the contrary, the depressive symbiosis works with introjective as well as projective identification, and the parts of the self/the ego and the object, projected or introjected, have undergone the special process of depressive cleavage/splitting. In other words, the idealized object contains fragile or dying aspects of the self/the ego together with its own vital potential. This is observed in transference, where the depressive patient's fear of losing the analyst or fear of his or her destruction can be intense, and the process of bringing the analysis to its conclusion raises acute problems that cause relapses.

VI. Ai. Carlos Mario Aslan: The Shadow of the Object

Based on the idea that Freud had not reformulated Mourning and Melancholia after describing the structural theory and the death drive, Aslan (1978) related this to the avoidance of grief/mourning in psychoanalytic literature and culture, where all rituals were being abandoned in an attempt to deny one's death and that of loved ones.

His developments aimed at sustaining the meaning of grief/mourning as duel or combat, as a persecutory process which is generally dismissed in favor of grief/mourning as *dolus* or pain. He thought that the clear difference between introjection and identification, between primary and secondary identification, between temporary and structuring identifications and the central role of the theory of internal objects, made for a better understanding of grief/mourning. He also stated that Freud's "pathognomonic introjection" of the object after its loss could no longer be sustained, arguing instead that this has a strong presence, a psychic existence within the self/the ego, prior to its loss. For this reason he preferred to talk about internal object rather than representation. He supposed that "internal object", unlike "representation", better reflects the alive, dynamic, relational character with the self. He thought that representation, as we use it, is more photographic, more static than internal object, unlike *Vorstellung*, which denotes also a theatrical presentation. Along this line of thinking, Asian argued that what is internalized and can be lost is an object relation, as determined by the Self, understood as a precipitate of drive investments, in object relations.

Later, Asian (2003) describes a synchrony and a diachrony of the grieving/mourning process that would be played out in the psychic representation of the lost object which he called internal object, a complex ego/superego structure of preconscious and unconscious ideal

qualities. Following the loss, an immediate libidinal withdrawal from the internal object would take place, with de-neutralization of the death drive released in the form of destructiveness against self and others during the most persecutory stage of grief/mourning. This would lead to a rapid deterioration of said object, potentially harmful to the self, who is transiently identified with the dead in what he called thanatical identifications. A defensive process would then begin, the central mechanism of it being a huge counter-investment, a libidinal recharge of the internal object in order to neutralize the death drive. From the identification with the dead, one then transits to the fear of death, and to an excessive identification with the dead.

The work of mourning continues with a passage from more thanatical to more erotic identifications, the diminution of the persecutory qualities based on the dead-alive object described by Willy Baranger, the passage from the concern for the mourning subject to the concern for the lost object, and a Self, enriched with positive identifications, would be part of this process. Aslan (1978) described it, paraphrasing Lagache, as "how to kill the dead without dying in the attempt", and citing Garma's (1978) idea of "giving life to the dead".

VI. Aj. Jorge Mario Mom: Objects in Phobia

For Tazma de Maladesky (2003), a collaborator of Mom, interchangeability in terms of functions, relativity, and control of phobic and accompanying objects, is one of the highlights of Jorge Mom's contributions. Here, anxiety is not only at the root of the symptom, it is the primary symptom.

Mom (1961-1962) extends Freud's second theory of anxiety, in which anxiety precedes repression, signalling displeasure to the ego. In Mom's extended version, anxiety appears as a central function in the psychic economy of the subject: The subject, the 'phobic object' and the 'accompanying object' can alternate their functions according to a situational context. Mom talks about 'phobic situation' and 'accompanying situation', which account for the plasticity and mobility of the process. However, mobility also produces a confusing and dangerously undifferentiated situation for the phobic patient, who tries to avoid it by means of rigorous control. Thus, for Mom, phobia becomes the interplay of the entire phobic-accompanying situation: The subject who structures phobia initially seeks an object for establishing order. When the object is lost, loss of the boundary function occurs.

This is followed by the 'phobogenic object' fulfilling a differentiating function, which leads to discrimination between the phobic object, accompanying object and subject. Frightening as it may be, this differentiation is sought as a solution to a terrifying catastrophic undifferentiation without limits, characterizing the phobic individual who feels he is going mad. The phobia prevents such a catastrophe: it helps to resolve the absence, it settles in place of what is absent, and it conceals the absence with its presence. The phobic object is necessary for the creation of the accompanying situation. The accompanying anxiety shields the phobic individual from even greater anxiety of 'anxiety-as-a-signal-of-not-having-anxiety'.

The phobic does not avoid the phobic object. He seeks it. In contrast, the 'phobic situation' is represented by the loss of the desired relationship. For the phobic, anxiety is necessary, structuring, and rigidly maintained. It is the essence of the phobic's life, his true 'accompanying object'. The statement that the objects are interchangeable does not mean that they are not different from each other. The interchangeability occurs at the level of their function. The course of phobia is an exhibition of limitation, mutilation and castration. The true companion of the phobic is anxiety, and anxiety is the object.

VI. Ak. Uruguay: Female Development from the Object Relations Perspective

In Uruguay, a group of authors, closely linked to the work of the Barangers, studied hypochondria and feminine development from the Object Relations Theory perspective. Citing general observations and psychoanalytic experience Madeleine and Willy Baranger, Aida Fernández, Mercedes F. de Garbarino, Selika A. de Mendilaharsu and Marta Nieto (1964) found the universal presence in women of disturbances of a hypochondriacal type, related specially to their sexual functions, as a specific feature of female development. The fantasy known as that of the 'sewer' appears to be at the center of these disturbances and to correspond to a specific type of "confusional" anxiety. The 'sewer' is felt as an intermingling of undifferentiated contents belonging to all levels of instinctual development (corporal substances, parts of objects, etc.). In certain cases, the ego reacts by isolating the 'sewer' within the corporal scheme and setting it up as a separate nucleus, contained within a 'wrap'. This is expressed in fantasies which center on having a 'bag' or a 'cyst.' A frequent defense to ward off the anxiety which results from the 'hypochondriac cyst' consists in the belief of the possession of a 'ghost penis', another alteration of the corporal scheme which is intended to deny hypochondriac anxiety. The 'hypochondriac cyst' seems to be related to 'female masochism', to marked erotism of the skin, to 'narcissism' in women and to their exhibitionism. It is normally overcome with the experience of maternity, although it may also contribute to make maternity more difficult, and it occurs in all psychological or psychosomatic pathology of female sexuality.

Marta Nieto (1960) wrote about the relationship between obsessional and hypochondriac defences. In her elaborate system of assumptions, thesis and conclusions, she includes the concept of hypochondria which embraces a variety of phenomena having in common the expression, through body experiences, of the relationship with internal objects, located in the body. Her studies result in wider understanding of obsessive neurosis based in the first place on a wider concept of analytic including phantasmatic relationships of expulsion-retention of any object through the intervention of any zone not only of the anus ("dirty mouth". "dirty look", etc.) and in the second place on the acknowledgement of the hypochondriacal foundation in many obsessive cases, since hypochondria implies indiscrimination of phantasies, impulses and zones. She hypothesizes that the presence of obsessive mechanisms always indicates that the object they fall on include projected body experiences linked to phantasies about corporalized object relationships. She also formulates the existence of a

specific relationship between obsessive defense and hypochondriacal defense characterized by a) an attempt of an ego to reinforce the hypochondriacal splitting through obsessive control; b) intensification of obsession when hypochondriacal defenses break down; c) the concrete, corporeal modality of obsessive defenses when they control the body itself and its contents. Among examples is an obsessive exploration of the object through the smell in hypochondria as a technique using the *renifleur's* trends, in order to control confusion. Nieto also writes on the implications for psychoanalytic technique: Since obsessive mechanisms work in two stages, they must be reduced following those two ways in the direction of regression. In the first stage, the displacement is from the object onto the body (or a part of it) and in the second stage it works from the body towards some thought or feeling. If the interpretation skips over corporality and tries to link up directly mental phenomena with internal objects it is not effective, because it leaves the basic defense untouched.

VI. Al. Brazil: Object Relations Theories Extended: Ruggero Levy and Raul Hartke – Intersubjective Dimension and Trauma

Ruggero Levy (2014) studied the evolution of the concept of object, from Freud to Klein, Bion, Winnicott and Meltzer. He concludes that the changes in the concepts of object and object relations occurred because of the continuous expansions of the psychoanalytic metapsychology beyond its classical dimensions (Meltzer, 1984).

Initially, in Klein, the expansion of metapsychology included the dimension of the geography of mental spaces. Her notable deepening of the understanding of the projective and introjective processes constituting the baby's inner world, made it possible to appreciate the prominent role of the object in the construction of the subjectivity of the subject. Later, with contributions by Bionians, an additional epistemological dimension was added to psychoanalytic metapsychology (Meltzer, 1984). To understand mental functioning, it became necessary to understand if it allows for learning through experience. The notion of a containing/transformational object appears through its alpha function of the subject's subjectivity. In this way, it adds meaning and transforms the nameless emotions of the baby. For Levy, Bion considers that all new knowledge, through the expansion of the symbolic network, occurs in the K-link (knowledge), to which he almost grants the status of a drive. This leads to knowing and learning from emotional experience, thus promoting mental growth.

If initially the core idea, upon which the construction of the psychic apparatus was understood, was in the vector drive / in the experience of satisfaction / in memory / in desire / in psychic representation, it was diverted and the emphasis went on to the subject-object relation. As of Klein, the presence of the other, of the object, of her or his mind, acquires prominence. Advances of Bion, Winnicott and Meltzer led to the idea that the presence of the other and their mind provoking an emotional experience. The mind of the subject is affected by protoemotions, by emotional and sensorial experiences from the encounter with the object and sensations coming from somatic excitations that need to be symbolized. This model goes on to consider the founding / transforming object of the subjectivity of the subject, and this has

profound implications for psychoanalytic technique, which incorporates the notions of psychoanalytic situation as a dynamic bi-personal field.

Levy highlights that for contemporary field theorists like Ferro (1995), the vertex of listening that results from the confluence of Bion and Baranger's concepts, is just an angle of listening, and adds that it is no longer possible to listen to the patient without taking into account the impact on the objects and the objects on him. The structuring emotional experience that has occurred between the subject and the object, in both directions of the relationship, can no longer be left aside.

For his part, Raul Hartke (2005) articulated the mixed model of the object relations theory and psychoanalytic intersubjectivity, rooted in the contributions of Bion and the Barangers with implications for analytic work with traumatized patients.

Following Bion, for Hartke the function of the object is not only to satisfy or frustrate the drives of the subject, but to influence the genesis and the development of the capacity to think in the child, or, on the contrary, to hinder, inhibit or orient the child in an erroneous way. He notes that from a Bionian perspective, the Freudian notion of stimulus barrier (*Reizschutz*), which refers to the protection from the potentially overwhelming stimulation on the level of the drives, especially relevant for traumatized individuals, would correspond to that of an internal containing object, which is the result of the introjection of an external containing object.

VII. CONCLUSION

Object Relations Theories and perspectives have contributed immensely to both psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice. The impact reaches across the board of various psychoanalytic orientations and across all continents. Overall interest and appreciation of rich dynamics of the earliest preverbal life experiences, of primitive and archaic states and defenses, the growing recognition of the contemporary concept of a two-person analytic process, of intersubjectivity in the analytic setting, of the importance of the non-interpretive aspects of the analyst's functioning, and a changed understanding of countertransference are just a few examples out of many of this impact.

The contemporary trends in European object-relations psychoanalysis, theoretical and clinician, may be seen – i.e., against the historical backdrop of British object-relations theory – in terms of two main lines of development: the contemporary Kleinian development and more recent contributions form the Independent tradition within the British school as well as further afield in Europe.

Contemporary trends in Kleinian thought remain firmly based on (i) the concept of 'unconscious internal objects', (ii) the central mechanisms of projection-introjection, and (iii)

the revised theory of drives as the main determinants of motivation in conjunction with ‘internal objects’. The increasing emphasis in post-Kleinian thinking on the oscillation throughout life between the ‘paranoid schizoid’ and ‘depressive’ positions, continues to yield new clinical findings. The developments range from new insights into aspects of constitutional envy, types of pathological organisation, and primitive and psychotic forms of the Oedipus complex to ongoing developments in Kleinian technique – including, the dynamics of psychic change, working-through in the countertransference, and ‘patient-centred’ and ‘analyst centred’ interpretations. The whole range of the contemporary Kleinian development in theory and practice remains underpinned by the contributions of child analysis and child psychotherapy, particularly with non-neurotic structures. Contemporary developments in Independent object-relations psychoanalysis are rooted in an alternative series of theoretical and clinical preoccupations: human interaction, affect, environment, trauma, and attachment. The contemporary trends in this perspective, or set of perspectives, reflect the historic realignment of the classical Freudian model of the mind in terms of broad conceptualization of drives (including, most notably the life drive or ruthless love), rather than simply appetitive drives and climactic satisfactions. External reality, therefore, continues to be seen by Independent analysts as a major source of the objects that become internalised, with a concomitant technical emphasis, in the analytic encounter, on the affective response of the analyst to the patient’s conscious and unconscious communications. A contemporary generation of psychoanalysts in the Independent tradition are engaged in the explorations of an object-relations approach to, for instance, temporality, modes of incorporation and types of ‘invasive object’, types of blank pain, the nature of illusion, the meaning of psychic home, aspects of listening in the transference-countertransference, idleness and the work of the negative, and the psychoanalysis of hope.

Similarly, in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, where the early genealogy of object relations emerged from Klein’s psychoanalysis of children’s play, the regional elaborations of object relations theories have been rooted in the Kleinian theory and its developments mainly in Bion, Meltzer and Winnicott.

In this context, Pichon Riviere, ‘the psychosocial face’ of Argentine psychoanalysis, initiated an important regionally specific trend with his idea that social psychology should be viewed as psychoanalytic, while psychoanalysis itself should be understood as a social psychology. This idea, followed by many of his disciples, allowed for many original theoretical formulations of different kind of objects: good, dead, half dead half alive, maddening, phobic, and the effects of the shadows of those objects especially in mourning and melancholy. In addition, clinical explorations of early transferences, modalities of object relations in the psychoanalytic process, the analytic situation as a dynamic field, the discovering of relatedness through objects to links, and “*lo vincular*” confront the clinical frontiers of contemporary object relations theory. These, together with important theoretical and clinical explorations of ‘the feminine’ and hypochondria, and inquiry into the intersubjective dimension of object relations, especially in regard to traumatized patients, represent the main contributions and trends in Latin America to object relations theories and related clinical practice.

Contemporary trends in North American psychoanalytic culture, with respect to Object Relations theories, include various integrative conceptualizations of intrapsychic object and self-representations, regarded today as dynamically evolving in conjunction with drive, affect, memory, and cognitive processes. The interaction of drive, affect, internalized object relations, and external object relationships in the development of psychic structure is viewed as paramount to developmental continuities and transformations from variety of psychoanalytic perspectives. Reviewing historical divisions between object relationships and drive theory, some point to a 'false dichotomy' between them, as they are both interwoven in development and throughout life. The intrapsychic (self and object) representational world is partly derived from interactions with the 'real' external object world, but it is also molded by its internal dynamic 'motors'. In contemporary North American psychoanalysis of all orientations, there is a growing recognition that the initial formulations of the drive theory did not take sufficiently into account the real attributes of the object and identification with the real object.

Paradoxically, alongside these integrative tendencies in the North American psychoanalytic literature, new contemporary controversies emerge and outline potential fruitful areas of further study, such as assertion of the early neurobiological and dynamic developmental appearance of bi-directional non-linear strivings for both symbiotic (dual) unity and differentiation of self and other, beginning in the first weeks of life. Another area of fruitful contemporary controversy surrounds the manner of applicability of early infant-caregiver dyad developmental findings to the adult clinical situation. This is a matter of continuing discussion and further research, and requires caution not to sidestep the complexities of further developmental transformations and adjustments to life events

For many North American authors, a true integrative theory of psychic development requires embracing new epistemological models such as systems and complexity theory, which provide for nonlinear and emergent phenomena.

The human subject's radical dependence on others, particularly in early childhood but partially throughout life as well, is an undeniable fact appreciated by psychoanalysts of all theoretical orientations. Since Kant, we have known that it is impossible to literally 'swallow an external object' or to have direct access to it. There is always the filter and the process of the subject's mind in between perception and representation. But the *particular articulation and weight between constitutional factors/potentialities and the human environment in the fashioning of the unconscious mind and the rest of the psychic apparatus and their technical implications in the analytic session* remain hotly contested and lie, depending upon the theorist, all along the "complementary series", supported by Freud.

See also:

CONFLICT

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

EGO PSYCHOLOGY

ENACTMENT

REGRESSION (coming soon)

SELF

TRANSFERENCE

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Projective identification, a concept introduced by Melanie Klein in 1946, is both a primitive defense mechanism as well as a fundamental mode of unconscious communication with oneself and with the world. It allows the self to disavow unwanted experience while affording a modicum of control over the object of the projection.

Projective identification is a *bi-directional unconscious movement* that ignores the boundaries between the Self and the other and deals mainly with part-objects and parts of the Self. By projecting them into another person, first real, then also fantasized, the subject – first, the *infant* – evacuates – first, into the mother – painful body experiences, death anguish and other emotions and feelings that overwhelm his/her capacities to contain them within him/herself.

However, such a denial does not prevent the subject from keeping unconscious links with these expelled objects and parts of the Self; s/he *also* identifies him/herself with characteristics of the person into which s/he projected these elements.

Melanie Klein added *projective identification* to the first set of defenses – *splitting*, *denial* and *idealization* – that she had sorted out and specially dealt with in her 1946 paper, because she observed that it appeared simultaneously with these in the *infant*.

Projective identification is made of two main psychoanalytic concepts – projection and identification. However, apart from the fact that both are unconscious psychic movements, these two concepts *do not have the same level of complexity*:

- *Projection*-and-introjection are the basic *mechanisms* required for a psychic life to exist, in the same way as inspiration-and-expiration are the necessary *mechanisms* of breathing in biological life.
- *Identification* is a much more complex *process*, made of a mosaic of relational micromovements, and never completed.

Melanie Klein contends that projective identification functions from birth to death, underlying the more articulate and conscious means of relation and communication progressively set in place in the course of development.

Projective identification is a hybrid and dynamic concept that applies to intrapsychic life as well as to interpersonal dynamics and economy (Guignard, 2017-2020). It enhances the importance of a first object fit for the newborn to have good enough relations: the helplessness and pre-maturity of the human baby make it necessary for him/her to get from the outside (from the mother) a fundamental means of communication, in order to have a grip on a ruthless reality. The newborn needs to meet the caring and thinking capacities in the mother in order to welcome and try to soothe those projected parts of him/her.

Projective identification cannot be understood separately from “introjective identification”, a concept rarely made explicit in clinical descriptions. Together, they constitute the feeling of *identity* of a person, a feeling always in motion and never achieved.

II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

Projective identification developed as a combination of Freud’s (1915 – “Instincts and their vicissitudes”) concept of projection – which he viewed as a means for the ego to rid itself of painful, threatening mental contents – and of his concept of identification. In his papers on metapsychology (e.g. 1917, 1923) Freud wrote that identification is the first form of object relation to appear at birth. It could be said that his 1914 essay on narcissism resulted in such an insight about a common psychic movement that installs simultaneously object relation and identification.

In 1938, shortly before his death, Freud clarified the primitive defense mechanisms of *splitting, denial and idealization*. In particular, he stressed the difference between the violence of the primal defenses compared to the secondary ones – linked to the secondary repression. By studying these defenses in relation to perversions, he focused on their pathology, not on their structure.

Melanie Klein’s concept of projective identification might be considered as having its roots in Freud’s considerations mentioned above. However, one should add to it Klein’s discoveries of the role of *splitting* in the world of objects – not only of the Ego, as Freud described it – that gave rise to the rich and complex universe of part-objects relations and identifications.

Projective identification addresses *psychic* objects projected – transferred – onto various people, the first of which is obviously the mother in the beginning of life, or her substitute, first as a part-object – “the breast” – then, as a total object – the person of the mother.

In 1946, Melanie Klein viewed *projective identification* as an intrapsychic means by which the infant relieves itself of unwanted affects, objects and parts of the self and a mechanism by which it takes control of the mother in [unconscious] phantasy. She also made clear that these projected aspects could be either good or bad. She introduced the notion that projective

identification, fueled by unconscious envy, serves to destroy – once again in phantasy – the object of envy. As Klein viewed the infant's project as keeping the bad out and the good in, she noted that projective and introjective identification go hand in hand.

She observed that a pathological use of projective identification keeps the subject in an illusory phantasy of being able to avoid the long and painful process of mourning described by Freud (1915) and thus – in the Kleinian framework – impede the move from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position. Klein thought of projective identification as an unconscious phantasy – both the 'projection' and the 'identification' parts are unconscious. The object or part-object who is the recipient of the projection does not have to be present and does not have to know about the projection at all. Klein stressed the fact that this mode of functioning – splitting / denial / idealization / projective identification – erases the boundary between external reality and psychic reality and allows the subject to gain power – in phantasy – over the whole or part of an external person or of an internal object. The unconscious phantasy of projective identification is a powerful process. It will always have real effects on the mind of the person projecting (who will have lost part of himself and may for example feel very certain and righteous or may feel very empty after a massive projection). And it can under certain circumstances have real effects on the person who is the recipient.

Wilfred Bion expanded Klein's notion of "projective identification as a defensive phantasy" to include its function as *a normal, pre-verbal form of communication that actually occurs between mother and infant*. He felt that these early communicative experiences were extremely consequential and saw the development of the capacity to think as dependent on how mother and infant are able to adjust to one another. From 1962 on (Bion 1962a, 1962b) he describes how the child's development of the capacity to think (i.e. alpha function) is dependent on primitive sensorial experience (beta elements) being managed and thus transformed in the mother-child relationship. Bion's development of the theory of mind was revolutionary in considering that the infant's capacity to think about and thus manage experience is dependent on the relationship with the alpha function of another human being, i.e., the mother's.

Along the lines of Kantian philosophy, Bion considered that thinking is called into existence to cope with thoughts, that thinking is a development forced upon the psyche by the pressure of experience and not the other way around.

Bion believed that, based on the need to survive, the baby has an inbuilt expectation (a *pre-conception*) of the existence of a satisfying breast and when she/he experiences this satisfaction, both physically and emotionally (a *realization*) she/he begins to build an as yet unnamed concept (a *conception*) which becomes the basis for healthy development. As the baby will inevitably experience distress, the capacity to tolerate frustration will facilitate the development of the capacity to 'think', which in turn helps the baby to manage the frustration. This process is dependent on the mother's ability to "contain" the baby's projections of "pain and anguish" into her. (see entry CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED)

Under the best of circumstances, the personalities of both mother and infant are able to adapt to one another so that the infant, with its rudimentary reality sense, is able to produce behaviors

reasonably calculated to arouse in the mother feelings that the infant wishes to get rid of. The mother can then process those feelings, during what Bion calls their *sojourn* in her, returning them to the infant in digestible form by means of the mother's ministrations. Her ability to "contain" the toxic material projected onto her relies on her *capacity for reverie*, i.e. her ability to "think" or "dream" about the projecting subject. Reverie is a factor of the mother's *alpha-function* (Bion, 1962b) and the child's repeated experience of this process enables him/her to develop thoughts and a thinking mind capable of managing emotional distress.

In contrast to this situation, when the infant's pre-conception of a satisfying breast is repeatedly disappointed with a *negative realization* (i.e. deprivation), a bad object (no breast) is formed. If the mother is unable to receive and contain the baby's defensive negative projections, or if the infant has a low tolerance for frustration, the bad object, fit only for evacuation (Klein's projective identification) will remain in place. For Bion, the ways in which mother and infant manage these projective identifications will determine the developing child's capacity to regulate affect and maintain effective ego functioning. Bion's conceptual model has had vast implications for the psychoanalytic process and for our understanding and use of the countertransference in the clinical setting.

Returning to Melanie Klein, she described – as mentioned above – projective identification as closely linked to the primal set of defenses. She thus opened up the exploration of the vast field of part-object relationships and, in addition to her own contributions to the study of the pathology of these defenses, she was then able to give a more realistic and complete picture of the psychic world, *both* of the infant *and* of the unconscious functioning all lifelong.

Today, it is possible to be more precise from a conceptual point of view: due to the heterogeneous complexity of the concept described above, projective identification has to be considered as a *primitive psychic function produced by the first set of defenses*. Projective identification is the means of communication *par excellence* of the Preconscious. From a conceptual point of view, it is inappropriate to mix up the unconscious fantasies arising from the various situations of projective identification with the function that allows them to appear.

At the beginning of life, such a function fills a vital aim: to allow the helpless newborn to survive and to have a relationship with his first environment. From birth to death, projective identification is used to maintain the feeling of existence and of object cathexis, in particular by internalizing the absent or lost object. It is the central tool in any situation of mourning. In melancholia, the function of projective identification has been totally destroyed by the attacks of the Superego against the Ego and the Id.

Being a function of the mind that develops according to the characteristics of each person, projective identification may result in empathy for, – or in a paranoid grip on, – the object involved; a rich communication of feelings and thoughts – or a dictatorial submission of one protagonist to the other; an increase of discoveries in the common field of interest of the two persons – or a phobic flight from the relationship by the subject to avoid any proximity with the elements he/she has projected into his/her protagonist.

Klein's discovery of projective identification is an answer to the question of the object in

the primary narcissistic state: this state can no longer be regarded as objectless, since virtually any split part of the Ego may be combined with any split part of an object, either external or internal. Freud (1921) had already observed that narcissistic identifications were based upon a single detail of the person unconsciously chosen as a model. His remark about the necessity to mourn every detail of the lost object to complete a real process of mourning (Freud, 1917) enhances the importance of the link created by projective identification, both in object relations and in the feeling of identity.

II. A. FURTHER BRITISH AND EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS

Influenced by Bion's development of the concept of projective identification and his model of the development of the capacity for thinking, Esther Bick and Donald Meltzer utilized their experience in the field of infant observation and the clinical treatment of autistic children to discern, delineate and differentiate an even more elemental maneuver, related to but not the same as projective identification. They coined the term adhesive identification (later termed adhesive identity) and differentiated this more primitive defensive operation from projective identification.

Esther Bick (1968, 1986) delineated an elemental type of *narcissistic identification*, which developmentally precedes that which is implied in Klein's theory of projective identification. She hypothesized that very young babies may initially experience the absence of boundaries sufficiently capable of holding together their mental and emotional contents, not yet completely distinguishable or differentiated from their bodily contents. Bick proposed the notion of a "psychic skin", which ideally serves to passively bind together the experiences or parts of the nascent self. The development of this "psychic skin" occurs through *experiences of continuous interaction between a physically and emotionally "holding" and mentally "containing" mother, and the surface of the infant's body as a sensory organ*. This notion is one which Freud (1923) alluded to when he suggested that "the ego is first and foremost a bodily; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (p. 26).

Bick (1968) further hypothesized that "later, identification with this [psychic skin] function of the object supersedes the unintegrated state and gives rise to the [ph]antasy of internal and external spaces" (p. 484). She forwarded the idea that this phantasy of space is the essential basis for the *normal adaptive splitting and projection* necessary to the processes of idealization and separation described by Klein. However, Bick warned that

"... until the containing function has been introjected, the concept of a space within the self cannot arise ... [and] construction of an [internal containing] object ... [will be] impaired... Faulty development of this primal skin function can be seen to result either from defects in the adequacy of the actual object or from fantasy attacks on it, which impair introjection. Disturbance in the primal skin function can lead to a development of a 'second skin' formation through which dependence on the object is replaced by a pseudo-independence, by the inappropriate use of certain mental functions, or perhaps innate talents, for the purpose of creating a substitute for this skin container function." (p 484)

Donald Meltzer's work with Bion's theories led him to propose a classification of the *pathology of projective identification*, according to whether the disorders are primarily in the field of *projection* or mainly in that of *identification* (Meltzer, 1986).

Pathology of projection has to do with the way the inner world of the object is fantasized; here we are in the field of phobias, especially agoraphobia and claustrophobia. Fantasies about the nature and quality of the atmosphere that could prevail within the object are also found in some psychotic states of confusion, especially those observed during adolescence. Meltzer also mentions the syndrome of distorted perception, which he calls the "delusion of clarity of insight", namely, the conviction of knowing exactly what another person is thinking.

The most common *pathology of identification* consists in an immediate appropriation of the object's qualities. Hysterical conversion is the classic example of it is, but it is also present in manic-depressive psychosis, in hypochondria and in states of pseudo-maturity, where the subject may be stuck in his projective identification with an idealized object, without proceeding further to a work of mourning of the latter in order to build, first, an intermediate state of heterogeneous hyper maturity, then, to then reach a balanced ideal of the Ego.

Some years later, Meltzer (1992) explores the unconscious choice of the part-object into which projective identification is accomplished. He notes that it involves different parts of the fantasized mother's body – genital apparatus, anus, breast, head – and develops his clinical exploration into the different pathologies according to the choice of a particular container, respectively: sexualization/excitement, secret/robbery, and omnipotent generosity/idealization.

The situation of "good" and "bad" objects will also vary depending on the pathology of projective identification. Melanie Klein had already noted that, in addition to keeping the good objects inside of the Ego and projecting the bad objects outside the Ego in order to protect it from them, the opposite and complementary situation is also very common: when the inside of one's own mind or body are experienced as bad and dangerous – as for example, in melancholy – the patient projects his good objects and the good parts of his Ego into an external object in order to protect them against his own bad, attacking parts.

Frances Tustin (1992) suggested the use of the term, "adhesive equation" to describe autistic children who are chronically "stuck" to their mothers in such a way that there can be no space between them. Tustin emphatically underscored the point that without an awareness of psychic space, no true object relationships can exist and that without relationship, the self building processes of identification cannot be set in motion. It might be said that adhesive equation or adhesive identity serves to establish a *sensation of existence* rather than a *sense of self and object*.

It would seem that a "skin object" must be incorporated very early on in mental development in order to allow for a space within the self to develop so that the mechanism of *projective identification, as the primary method of non-verbal communication between the mother and the baby* in search of detoxification and meaning, can function without impediment. Indeed, the work of Mauro Mancina (1981) supports the notion of a potential for this early development of a psychic skin in *utero*.

Herbert Rosenfeld (1971/1988) wrote extensively about projective identification and his now classic definition deserves to be quoted in full:

“Projective identification” relates first of all to a splitting process of the early ego, where either good or bad parts of the self are split off from the ego and are as a further step projected in love or in hatred into external objects, which leads to fusion and identification of the projected parts of the self with the external objects. There are important paranoid anxieties related to these processes as the objects filled with aggressive parts of the self become persecuting and are experienced by the patient as threatening to retaliate by forcing themselves and the bad parts of the self which they contain back again into the ego”. (1988; p.117)

Greatly influenced by Bion’s ideas, **Betty Joseph** made additional contributions as she directed our attention to the nature and function of projective identification in the analytic setting.

Joseph (1998) came to realise that, in the session, the patient unconsciously induces or “nudges” the analyst into participating in various enactments, which sometimes takes the form of the analyst making him or herself too comfortable with the patient or sometimes becoming unnecessarily harsh. These pressures take the form of small projective identifications of aspects of the patient, or the patient’s objects, into the analyst through the use of verbal language, tone, tempo and ineffable prompts. In other words, she thought that an atmosphere was created by the patient that had an *actual* effect on the analyst. This is in keeping with Bion’s notion of “realistic projective identification”. Thus, Joseph underscored the link between projective identification and the transference.

Spillius (2007) points to three central ideas in current use concerning projective identification. First that it is an unconscious phantasy that can be actualized by evocative activity – but that the latter is not a necessary part of the definition. Secondly how any attempt to distinguish between “projection” and “projective identification” is probably not useful. And thirdly that countertransference is to a considerable extent a response to the patient’s projective identifications.

D. Meltzer may be considered as the psychoanalyst who passed on to new generations a synthesis of Freud’s, Klein’s and Bion’s discoveries in clinical practice and metapsychology (Meltzer, 1978).

Amongst many others, Salomon Resnik (1999, 2006, 2011), Mireille Fognini (2014), José Juis Goyena (2020, 2012), Florence Guignard (2017-2020, 2021), François Lévy (2014) in France; and Mauro Mancia (1981, 2004, 2006), Claudio Neri (2006, 2013), Fernando Riolo (2019), Antonino Ferro (2017), and Giuseppe Civitarese (2017) in Italy, utilized Bion’s psychoanalytic developments in their everyday clinical work and keep on teaching them in their respective psychoanalytical societies and in their circles of influence. In Sweden, Johan Norman (2001), Björn Salomonsson and Majlis Winberg-Salomonsson (2014-2016) developed also new ways of application on Bion’s ideas. (See below: “Projective identification in the analytic work”).

II. B. NORTH AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONCEPT

In the United States, **Otto Kernberg** (1987, p. 94), maintaining Klein's view of projective identification as a pathological defense, describes it as a four-fold sequence where: (i) the projecting subject expels intolerable aspects of intrapsychic experience into a receptive object; (ii) subject maintains empathy with that which is projected; (iii) in a defensive move to control anxieties due to the expulsion, subject attempts to control the object; and (iv) subject induces in the object, what was once expelled into the object, through an actual interaction with the receptive object.

Some analysts in North America, working from an *interpersonal/relational perspective* have come to view projective identification as a bi-directional process that is not merely a phantasy (Klein's view) but involve real interaction between patient and analyst.

Along these lines **Ogden** (1982), sees projective identification as a normal form of communication between patient and analyst that can be more or less pathological in nature depending on the nature of the mental contents extruded. He describes the process as follows:

"The projector has the primarily unconscious fantasy of getting rid of an unwanted or endangered part of himself (including internal objects) and of depositing that part in another person in a powerfully controlling way. The projected part of the self is felt to be partially lost and to be inhabiting the other person. In association with this unconscious projective fantasy there is an interpersonal interaction by means of which the recipient is pressured to think, feel, and behave in a manner congruent with the ejected feelings and the self- and object-representations embodied in the projective fantasy." (pp. 1-2)

Clearly acknowledging the bi-directionality of projective identification, Ogden developed a concept of a patient and analyst co-creating an *analytic third*, which includes projective identifications both processed and unprocessed. Jessica Benjamin (2004) has further elaborated her version of an *analytic third*, unique to each analytic dyad and in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Grotstein is regarded in North America as bringing Bion's communicative projective identification into the intersubjective realm. His formulation is rooted in Freud-Klein-Bion metapsychology of unconscious communication, with direct clinical implications.

Regarding Bion's concept of communicative projective identification as primary and inclusive of Klein's earlier unconscious, omnipotent, intrapsychic mode, Grotstein (2005) postulates intersubjective "*projective transidentification*". Here, in building on the operation of an unconscious phantasy of omnipotent intrapsychic projective identification solely within the internal world of the projecting subject, Grotstein adds two other processes: 1. conscious and/or preconscious modes of sensorimotor *induction*, which would include signaling and/or evocation or prompting gestures (mental, physical, verbal, posturing or priming) on the part of the projecting subject; and, consequent, 2. spontaneous empathic simulation in the receptive object of the subject's experience in which the *receptive object* is inherently 'hard-wired' (pre-wired) to be empathic with the prompting subject.

Developmentally, the infant or infantile portion of the personality, under the strain of accumulating emotional distress, *induces* a symmetrical state in the vulnerable-because-willing mother so that the mother unconsciously surveys (self-activates) her own inventory of past actual or possible experiences within her conscious and unconscious self, selectively recruits the most pertinent of them, and then *generates* thoughts and/or actions to address the distress in the infant.

The most significant clinical aspect of intersubjective projective *transidentification* is (unconscious) communication *between two psychic realities*. During the process of analysis, as in infant-mother transactions, the vectors of the transactions of projective transidentification operate *bi-directionally*, that is, the object instantly becomes a sender, and the originating projective sender thereupon becomes a receiver, that is, *a dialogue* is taking place. Grotstein stresses that such an unfolding dialogue (including the analyst's thoughts and actions) prominently include interpretation of the analysand's participation and the overall multiply layered exchange.

In this context, Grotstein also addresses Ogden's experiential intersubjective conceptualization of the 'subjugating third' of psychoanalysis, and posits his own metapsychological version of the preternatural unconscious presence of the "*ineffable subject of the unconscious*" (Grotstein, 2000 p. 19), a "*dramaturge*" (the creator-architect and director of the drama), or demon that is located only in the unconscious of the analysand, co-opts the subjectivities of the analysand and analyst to create a play in which the relevant unconscious theme is able to become enacted and thus known (Grotstein, 2000).

Stephen Mitchell (1995), viewing projective identification from a relational/interpersonal approach, notes this process provides "a bridge between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal". He emphasizes that such a viewpoint need take into account what actually occurs between patient and analyst and is thus fully constitutive of a two-person psychology. Tansey and Burke (1989) describe how projective identificatory processes may play an essential role in the development of empathy. While projective identification had been identified with Racker's concordant identification and empathy with complementary identification (see below under Latin American contributions), they note that the reception of a projective identification can be an essential aspect of a truly empathic outcome when successfully processed by the receptor. In fact, they note that "an analyst's achievement of empathic contact with the patient always involves some degree of projective identification from the patient." (p. 63). These relational perspectives on projective identification emphasize the communicative aspects of projective identification and demonstrate that "enactments" in psychoanalysis can only be understood by examining projective identifications as they move back and forth between patient and analyst. Slavin and Kriegman (1998) understand enactments from the point of view of interpersonal conflict and negotiation, which they view as elemental and evolutionary. They conceptualize the intersubjective field as a place where the clash of identities of patient and analyst can serve to create the necessary conditions for a genuine renegotiation of the patient's internal representations.

If projective identification is viewed as an inevitable, normal aspect of communication that is necessarily bi-directional, involving both conscious and unconscious elements, the focus of study necessarily shifts from either the patient or the analyst to the field they co-constitute. The notion of a bi-personal field that is indivisible and includes both patient and analyst was proposed

by Sullivan (1953). Using field theory from social psychology, Sullivan insisted that an individual was always part of the social field that surrounds him. While he never used the concept of project identification *per se*, he clearly viewed the analytic process as a two-person field with each member having an effect on the other.

Edgar Levenson (1972, 1995, 2017) has put forward a radical interpersonal view of the analytic interaction by insisting that the analytic couple is truly indivisible and that the central datum of a treatment is the structured interaction of its participants. He notes that in an analysis, “The cardinal question for the patient may not be ‘what does it mean?’ but ‘what is going on around here.’” For Levenson any interaction consists of an infinite regress of messages and meta messages, both conscious and unconscious, such that ‘meaning’ in the conventional psychoanalytic sense is elusive.

Maurice Apprey looked at the implications of projective identifications deriving from the *mother’s conception of her baby in utero*. In his work with at-risk mothers, Apprey (1987) suggested that maternal misconceptions of the baby in utero in the third trimester gave rise to fears of separation resulting in *violent projective identifications* which destroy the mother’s capacity to accommodate her conception of herself as a mother in her own right and her conception of her infant as a separate person. For these mothers the *physical delivery* of the baby can represent the loss of their own mothers, giving rise to massive regression resulting in post-natal depression or psychosis with confusion between self and object representations. These confusions can span three generations as terrified high-risk pregnant mothers may feel: “I am pregnant but I cannot tell my mother because she will kill me”; or, “it will kill her”. If the baby itself is used as a container of its mother’s violent projections, it can be seen as evil and become the container of its mother’s violence during post-natal depression or psychosis. Such a disturbed mother might come to believe that “the baby needs to be baptized”, that is, drowned in a bath-tub in order to “spare it and the world of evil.” Apprey proposes that psychoanalytic interventions, informed by an understanding of these transgenerational processes, can transform destructive projective identifications into empathic communication with her infant.

Judith Mitrani (1993) delineated the ways that deficiencies in the containing object or in the capacity of the infant to use a containing object can precipitate a variety of pathological responses. Severe limitations in the mother’s capacity for reverie (possibly due to fears of being taken over, being penetrated, absorption, injury) can result in unmodified dreads being returned to the baby. This rejection of the baby’s distress can lead to massive projections of parts of her helpless infant-self in a frantic search for a containing object and curtail the development of a mind for thinking about and modifying experience. Sensory experience that is denied access to a maternal psychic apparatus fails to be transformed into food for thought and remains fit only for evacuation. Similarly, limitations in the mother’s alpha-function (perhaps due to the mother’s inability to tolerate the infant’s and/or her own pain, fears of death and destruction, and/or an inability to mentalize painful, primitive dread) may result in the infant’s reintrojecting not only its own unmodified fears, but his mother’s fears as well. Worse yet, if the required alpha-function is not only absent but is actually reversed, in the case of an object which unthinks, misunderstands,

or elaborates lies and hallucinations in service of evasion (Meltzer, 1975), the infant's projections may be stripped of what little meaning they may bear and be returned as nameless dreads (Bion).

Finally, mothers who fear separation or loss of part of themselves in identification with their infant may fail to give back what is projected. Winnicott (1971, p. 114) describes this as the failure in "mirroring" of a depressed mother. Mitrani (1993) proposes that, in some cases, a black-hole depression in the mother may prevail. The "deadness" of such a mother may absorb all aliveness in the infant, sucking in or swallowing up the infant's dynamic, though painful, projections, without echo, re-coil or reflection, leaving the infant with an experience of depletion and emptiness. She observes that this experience, of what she terms an absorbent mother, could result in a diminution of normal projective identification as a means of communication with the mother in an attempt on the part of the infant to preserve the nascent self. Additionally, mothers may reflect back to the infant elements more terrifying and unthinkable than those originally projected, resulting in the infant's loss of the ability to utilize an adequately containing mother. In this instance, normal projective and introjective activities are curtailed and the development of an apparatus for mentation is truncated.

In all the above-mentioned cases, the obdurate, absorbent and unthinking objects involved in a deficient containing experience can lead either to massive unmodifiable projections, an insatiable search for maternal sanctuary or the inhibition or atrophy of projective and introjective functions. As a consequence, a mind for thinking, or even the thoughts themselves, may fail to develop.

Donnel B. Stern, an interpersonal analyst heavily influenced by the work of Sullivan and Levenson, notes that the analytic interaction involves the constant interplay of both conscious and unconscious aspects of analyst and patient. In such a process, the projective identifications are embedded in the interaction and the process is bi-directional and fluid. In his model, the roles of patient and analyst are both mutual and reciprocal. Stern studies the analytic dyad from the standpoint of "the interpersonalization of dissociation", redescribing projective identification as a form of "dissociative enactment" which can be described as the: "attribution of one's dissociated parts to the other, whom one then treats as the alien, dissociated part of oneself" (Stern, 2011).

Philip Bromberg's work (Bromberg, 1998, 2006, 2011) focuses on the analytic situation as a complex field of projections and introjections wherein the patient's dissociated self-experience can be processed and reclaimed by the patient. He describes the process by which dissociated self-states in the patient triggers associated self-states in the analyst in an unconscious communication to be then decoded by the participants. One commonality between the relational view of *enactment* and Bionian projective identification is that for each the therapeutic effect is achieved by the transformation of "raw" experience that cannot be used in making meaning (Bion's beta elements [1962,1963]) into a form that can be *thought about* by both patient and analyst (Bion's alpha elements) (Stern, 2011). One element that distinguishes Baranger and Ferro's field theories (see below) from that of Bromberg and Stern's is that, as interpersonalists, they more emphasize the *separateness* of patient and analyst as co-participants in the process. Both Stern and Bromberg also put a great emphasis on what is *actually happening* between patient

and analyst and view the exploration of these reality interactions and their possible meanings (i.e. the processing of the projective identifications) as at the heart of the analytic process.

II. C. LATIN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

M. Klein's ideas had a great acceptance in Argentina in the 1950s and '60 and, from there, spread in Latin America where development continued. They were used in a creative way generating new points of view that enriched the original ideas of M. Klein and her followers.

Contributions by Heinrich Racker (1910-1961), Willy and Madeleine Baranger, Leon Grinberg, Enrique Pichon Riviere, Arminda Aberastury, José Bleger, Angel Garma, Marie Langer, may be considered the main Latin American original contributions in the field of projective identification.

As projective identification is often the only means for patients to communicate mental contents that are too painful to be articulated, the reception and understanding of the patient's projections is a tool par excellence in working with difficult cases. The Argentine analyst Heinrich Racker, in his pivotal work on countertransference, described *concordant* and *complementary identifications* as intrinsic parts of the therapeutic relationship. In a *concordant identification*, the analyst uses aspects of him/herself to find a way to understand the paths and meanings of the patient's internal conflicts, a process often referred to as empathy. Simultaneously, his/her trying to understand his unconscious *complementary identifications* will allow him/her to find out which internal object of the patient he/she is representing in the transference, in the *hic et nunc* of the analytic session, often one that has been disavowed and projected in the form of a projective identification. (Racker, 1953, 1957).

Within this enlarged view, the countertransference as informed by projective identification becomes an indispensable tool by which the analyst is able to understand more of the patient's object world. The analyst can then use that experience to help, in time, to process and return a modified form of the projection much like a mother does for her infant. Bion describes this process as helping the patient develop the capacity for alpha-function, i.e. thinking (see entry COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).

For Racker, complementary identifications necessarily involved the patient's activating aspects of the analyst's unconscious. His Argentine colleague, **Leon Grinberg** (1956, 1979) developed the concept of "projective counter-identification" to describe clinical encounters with the aim of defining

"... a number of disturbances introduced in the psychoanalytic technique on account of the excessive role played by projective identifications in the analysand, giving rise to a specific response in the analyst [...] whereby he is 'led' to perform, in an unconscious and passive way, the different roles assigned to him or her" (1956, p. 507).

In one of his texts on this subject, Grinberg (1979) discussed the difference between Racker's notion of complementary countertransference (Racker, 1953) and his own idea of

projective counter-identification. He considered that Racker's concept derived from the analyst's identification with some of the patient's inner objects felt as objects from his/her own childhood past. The analyst's emotional response was based, then, on his/her own anxieties and conflicts with inner objects similar to those of the analysand. On the other hand, in the projective counter-identification

"The analyst's reaction stems, for the most part, independently of his own conflicts and corresponds in a predominant or exclusive way to the intensity and quality of the patient's projective identification. In this case, the origin of the process comes from the patient and not the analyst. It is the patient who, in an unconscious and regressive manner, and because of the specific functional psychopathic modality of his projective identification, actively provokes a determined emotional response in the analyst, who (1979, p 234)... may have the feeling of being no longer his own self and of unavoidably becoming transformed into the object which the patient, unconsciously, wanted him to be (id, ego, or some internal object), or to experience those affects (anger, depression, anxiety, boredom, etc.) the analysand forced onto him." (ibid, 231)

Grinberg's concept can be useful in understanding some *enactments* that occur between patient and analyst.

Willy and Madeleine Baranger (1961-62, 2008), heavily influenced by Bion, have developed a theory of the analytic field that emphasizes the interdependence of the co-participants in the analytic dyad and explores the role of the analytic dyad in the formation of "defensive bastions" in the course of the analytic treatment. They assert that every analytic couple is unique and neither member can be understood without the other. They consider the analytic field as being the real object of observation and analysis, as it is a co-creation of projective identifications of both the analyst and the patient. They refer to an analytic session as a co-constituted "fantasy".

"The basic phantasy of a session is not the mere understanding of the phantasy of the patient by the analyst, but something that is constructed in a couple relationship"... This phantasy "is constituted by the interplay of processes of projective and introjective identification and of the counteridentifications that act with their different limits, functions and different characteristics in the patient and the analyst". (W. & M. Baranger, 2008)

III. PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION IN THE ANALYTIC WORK

Projective identification is a concept describing the pre-conscious and spontaneous way to approach another person. It functions both in the psychoanalyst and in the analysand, and is not an artificial tool the analyst might decide to choose or not to choose. Whatever his

theoretical framework, there will be between him and his patient, a two-way continuous stream of projective identifications.

Projective identification is a dynamic concept to describe the means by which a human relation is developing, including the way any analytic relationship is processing. As such, it facilitates reflection around more classical and static concepts such as “transference and countertransference”, “transference neurosis”, “countertransference neurosis” and so on. It further emphasizes the analyst’s self-analytic capacity as a spontaneous ongoing self-observation of the impact of the continuous flux of projective identification; how the analyst’s own character and neurosis influence projective identification, and what is the impact of the patient’s specific movements of projective identification on the analyst. It may be possible to discern the analyst’s own defensive movements against psychic pain and try then to detect with which internal object or part of the patient’s Self the analyst is projectively identified in this moment of suffering, anger, or compassion.

The advantage to thinking about analytic work in progress during any psychoanalytic session in terms of projective identification lies in the better use that can be made of the analyst’s own experience of analysis and auto-analysis to discern the nature, the intensity and the pathology of the patient’s projective identifications, in relation to the various internal objects – generally part-objects – that s/he projects onto the analyst in a given moment of the session, as well as the causality of such a movement.

Bion’s work with groups and psychotic patients led him to propose important developments in the concept of projective identification. In the clinical field, through the conceptualization of the pair container/contained, the violence or excessiveness of projective identification became a function of the receiving container too, i.e. the unconscious psychic functioning of the analyst, including his character, mode of object relations and theoretical background.

It also led him to rethink the concept of “negative therapeutic reaction” and to add to the classical components of such a pathology – such as envy, masochism, jealousy and unconscious guilt – the pathology of the relation container/contained (Bion, 1970). By observing the patients’ need for a particular kind of containment, he recognizes in them a *structural defect*, mainly linked to a poor capacity to install basic organizing defenses by healthy splitting, denial and idealization, and a tendency to regress to *confusion*.

From 1990 onwards, psychoanalytic infant research has been developing new observations and new links with neurosciences on the topic of projective identification and the container/contained configuration (see in particular the team of the Tavistock Clinic created in Italy by Donald Meltzer and Martha Harris, with the works of Suzanna Maiello (2012) Michael Rustin and Margaret Rustin (1989, 2016, 2019). In the field of autism, the outstanding work of Geneviève Haag (2018) is studying in full detail the difference between projective identification and adhesive identity in autistic pathologies.

IV. SOCIAL/CULTURAL/POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF PROJECTIVE-IDENTIFICATORY PROCESSES

The concept of projective identification has been utilized by some psychoanalytic writers to help comprehend phenomena such as abuse, malignant prejudice and genocide. **Vamik Volkan** (1988) has written extensively on the question of why people commit murder in the name of shared ethnic, national, religious or ideological sentiments. Following Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). Volkan (Varvin and Volkan, 2003; Volkan, 2014a, Volkan, 2014b) focused on large group psychology and the ways such groups deal with shame through disavowal and the fostering of identify through externalization and projection. He coined the term "depositing" to help explain how hatred is passed along the generations as traumatized adults, due to experiences such as war or genocides which threaten large group identities, depositing traumatized self-images into the developing psyches of their children. **Grotstein** (2004), writing from a Bionian perspective, notes the rampant use of projective identification that colonialists employed to subjugate indigenous peoples based on an alleged moral imperative to purify the heathens. **Kernberg** (2003a,b) attempts to come to grips with massive social violence by describing a large group's need to identify with and follow a charismatic leader to meet their ego ideal and adopt a paranoid ideological rigidity. An "other" thus becomes dehumanized and becomes the repository of all projected "badness", not only justifying horrific violence, but at times raising it to the level of a moral imperative. **Susan Grand's** *The Reproduction of Evil* (2000) utilizes a contemporary relational perspective to understand the nature of evil on an interpersonal level as it functions in the form of a relationship between perpetrator and victim. She describes the process by which the "soul murder" of a victim generates the formation of an unbearable "no self", which can only be eradicated through a transformation into a perpetrator who has evacuated this dehumanized aspect into his victim. Grand explains that the "othering" that the creation of a sacrificial human life requires involves the formation of an "I-it" relationship (Buber, 1937) whereby the oppressed loses its humanity becoming a thing. This thing-victim then must be destroyed, as it has become the repository for the perpetrator's "dread". Thus, Grand is able to vividly explicate how evil is created and reproduced across the generations and helps us comprehend how people come to hate and destroy one another.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Melanie Klein's introduction of the concept of projective identification in 1946 has had a great impact on psychoanalytic theoretical and clinical thinking worldwide. She developed this concept from her psychoanalytic experiences with children and adults. It has its roots in Freud's concepts of projection and identification. Klein viewed *projective identification* as an

intrapsychic means by which the infant relieves itself of unwanted affects, objects and parts of the self, and a mechanism by which it takes control of the mother in [unconscious] phantasy by projecting these aspects into the mother. As Klein viewed the infant's project as keeping the bad out and the good in, she noted that projective and introjective identification go hand in hand.

Klein stressed the fact that this mode of functioning erases the boundary between external reality and psychic reality and allows the subject to gain power – in phantasy – over whole or part of an external person or of an internal object.

She viewed *projective identification* as one of the primal sets of defenses together with *splitting*, *denial* and *idealization*, with which it goes hand in hand. She observed that a pathological use of projective identification keeps the subject in an illusory phantasy of being able to avoid the long and painful process of mourning described by Freud (1915) and thus – in the Kleinian framework – impede the move from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position.

Wilfred Bion expanded Klein's notion of 'projective identification as a defensive phantasy' to include its function as *a normal, pre-verbal form of communication that actually occurs between mother and infant*. According to Bion, projective identification is the infant's primal mode of communication with the mother. The infant projects unwanted, unthinkable, sometimes horrifying experiences (beta-elements) into the mother, who receives and "contain" them and through her alpha-function – where "reverie" is an important factor – transforms the beta-elements into alpha-elements which, when re-introjected by the infant, can be used for the building of primitive thoughts. Thus, projective identification is the basis for the infant's development of a capacity for thinking.

The fundamental theories of Klein and Bion on projective identification have been developed and elaborated in all the three IPA regions.

In **Europe**, especially in England, several analysts have deepened the understanding of projective identification. In the field of infant observation and in the clinical treatment of autistic children, a stage prior to projective identification (adhesive identification) has been described, and in adults light has been shed on how the splitting and projective processes of projective identification lead to paranoid anxieties, where the self feels persecuted by the aggressive and hateful aspects that have been projected into external objects. The clinical usefulness of the concept of projective identification is illustrated by several authors, making it possible for the analyst to catch and understand how the sometimes subtle pressure from these processes influences the transference and countertransference. Donald Meltzer can be considered as the European analyst who has contributed most to the understanding and development of Klein's and Bion's theories on projective identification.

In **North America**, Melanie Klein's theories were first received with resistance, especially because of her emphasis on destructiveness and envy. However, in 1968, Bion moved from London to Los Angeles and stayed there for almost 10 years, working as an analyst and giving seminars. His theories, not least on the communicative aspects of projective identification, gradually had a strong impact on North American psychoanalysis. Many analysts

in North America, working from an *interpersonal/relational perspective* have come to view projective identification as a bi-directional process that is not merely a phantasy (Klein's view) but involve real interaction between patient and analyst. Along these lines, projective identification is seen as a normal form of communication between patient and analyst that can become more or less pathological in nature depending on the nature of the mental contents extruded. Projective identification thus provides a bridge between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal and the focus of study shifts from either the patient or the analyst to the field they co-constitute.

In **Latin America** Melanie Klein's ideas had a great acceptance, first in Argentina in the 1950s and '60s and, from there, spread to psychoanalytic societies in other Latin America countries, where development continued. Latin American analysts have developed sophisticated theories about the analyst's countertransference in relation to projective identifications – his/her reception and understanding of the patient's projective identifications. The analyst's concordant or complementary identifications become unavoidable tools by which the analyst is able to understand more of the patient's object world. Also, Bion's work has been and still is important in Latin American psychoanalysis – he visited both Argentina and Brazil. Not least have his theories been influential in the formulations of the “analytic field” as a co-creation of projective identifications of both the analyst and the patient.

Since Melanie Klein in 1946 formulated her theories about projective identification, the concept has been developed and elaborated in rich, complex and sophisticated ways in all of the three IPA regions and this development is still proceeding.

See also:

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION(S)

As is the case with most concepts in psychoanalysis the concept of the field or the analytic field has developed from many different inter-disciplinary, cultural and psychoanalytic traditions in different parts of the world.

In Latin America, most contemporary field theories and conceptualizations are based on the concept of “Psychoanalytic Field” [campo psicoanalítico] as a dynamic configuration in the intersubjective dimension, as defined and described in the Argentinian Psychoanalytic Dictionary (Borenzstejn, 2014). This, today classical concept, was coined in 1960’s by Willy and Madeleine Baranger (1961-62, 1964, 1966), and is viewed by contemporary theorists as a macro-concept and an example of a complex conceptual thought (Kancyper, 1998). It emerged in the clinical practice of the Barangers (1993) as a way to avoid the crystallization of the time flux and to stimulate in some degree the hopeful opening of a potential psychical change. Its effects are manifest in the analytical process or the lack of it, and it becomes visible when the thought and affect content is lost in the intersubjective dynamics, in which case an adventitious structure called ‘bastion’ is generated and, in the most extreme cases, there is a “parasitizing” (Baranger, Baranger, and Mom, 1978).

In contrast with other views of the ‘field’ in the analytic situation that contributed to the theory of technique, the Barangers’ field is characterized by the presence of what they called “the basic unconscious fantasy in the intersubjective dynamics,” that is, an original and recurrent structure based on which the transference and countertransference of the field members created. The basic unconscious fantasy both “translates” and “produces” (Baranger, M., 2004).

This fantasy is a shared original “phantom” assemblage (Baranger, Baranger, Campo, Mom 1970), in which the history, identifications and traumas of every participant (i.e., both the analyst and the analysand) are involved. (The English term “fantasy” is used here to translate the Spanish “*fantasía*” and “phantom” to translate the Spanish “*fantasma*” or its derivative “*fantasmático/ca*”). Since the time this third fantasy-object, the product of the collusion among several phantoms, is generated, it commands the unconscious aspects of the dynamics of the relationship.

Besides the entry of the “Psychoanalytic Field”, the Argentinian Psychoanalytic Dictionary (Borenzstejn 2014) also carries several other Field entries, specifying the concept further: “Baluarte” (a ‘bastion’) defined as an extreme parasitic paralysis of the field, which can be viewed as the clinical manifestation of the repetition compulsion, that is, of the death drive. Its manifestation in the analytical process or non-process becomes visible when the mobility of the ideational and/or affective content is lost in the intersubjective dynamics. “Perverse field” is another entry that specifies functional and dynamic aspects of Baluarte: homoerotic field, masking as ‘innocent mother-child’ relatedness, sado-masochistic field and voyeuristic field.

In addition, in Latin America, there is also Roosevelt Cassorla’s conceptualization of ‘dreaming field’ (and ‘non-dreaming’ field) related to his studies of enactment, and Fabio Herrmann’s concept of “Multiple Fields Theory”, which has a different meaning and could be viewed as an ‘interpretation of the field of Psychoanalysis’.

In Europe, with 20 years of a translational gap, the Barangers’ conceptualization became very gradually a dominant influence for all further developments of the concept, especially in Italy and to a lesser degree in France and Belgium. This point is substantiated by the fact that the only psychoanalytic dictionary coming out of Europe that mentions the concept is Alain de Mijolla’s International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (2002/2005), where the concept of the field is under the entry “Willy Baranger”, written by Madeleine Baranger. She writes: “The concept of the psychoanalytic situation as a ‘dynamic field’ leads to an unconscious bipersonal fantasy of the session, in which transference and countertransference are extracted from a situation that possesses its own dynamism and outcomes, aside from the specific contributions of the analyst and analysand. For example, “a ’bastion is a resistance produced in the psychoanalytic field by the unconscious collusion of the analyst and the analysand, which immobilizes the process” (in: De Mijolla 2002/2005, p. 150).

A lesser acknowledged influence may stem from Europe’s strong philosophical tradition of ‘encounter’ in the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Martin Heidegger (Bohleber 2013), giving rise to a particular psychoanalytic understanding of intersubjectivity, transcending the matrix of transference-countertransference. Similarly, Antonio Ferro notes a homegrown conceptualization of the field as an encounter, which was introduced by Italian psychoanalyst Francesco Corrao. Corrao (1985) defined the field as being generated by the encounter between the internal dynamics of both patient and analyst, or rather, by a ‘Big Bang’ of sorts which occurs whenever the analytic couple meets creating a single unit where once there were two distinct internal worlds.

In North America, the use of the field concept is shaped by the influence of several different traditions of thought outside of psychoanalysis, some arriving with the vast immigration of scholars in response to the catastrophe of the Second World War and Nazi oppression, and others developed from homespun traditions in philosophy and social anthropology.

Among the existing contemporary North American psychoanalytic dictionaries, Salman Akhtar's (2009) "Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychoanalysis" carries an entry "Bipersonal Field", defined as "the temporo-spatial space within which the psychoanalytic interaction takes place" (p. 37), originating in the work of Madeleine and Willy Baranger (1966), and elaborated upon by Robert Langs (1976, 1979). As defined here, "The field contains both participants and embodies interactional and intrapsychic mechanisms. Every event in the field receives contributions from both participants" (Akhtar 2009, p. 37). Langs' elaboration is seen primarily in terms of 'ground rules' of the psychoanalytic situation delimiting and contributing to the field's communicative properties, and his pertaining specification of three forms of the 'interactional-communicative field': Type A, where symbolic communication and realm of illusion is possible; type B with projective identification and action predominating; and type C where all communication is destroyed and the field is emptied of meaning (ibid, p. 37).

In Elizabeth Auchincloss' and Eslee Samberg's (2012) "Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts", the concept 'field' is referred to in the entries of "Intersubjectivity", "Relational Psychoanalysis" and "Interpersonal Psychoanalysis". Here, the phenomenological philosophy and contextualism derived 'Intersubjective field' of Robert D. Stolorow, Bernard Brandchaft and George E. Atwood (1987), located at the intersection of the two subjectivities, and generated by the interplay of the transference and countertransference, is at the center of the entire psychoanalytic framework and psychoanalytic exploration (Auchincloss, Samberg 2012, p 122). Rooted in Harry S. Sullivan, influenced by Erich Fromm and Sándor Ferenczi, among others, 'Interpersonal Field' of Donnel Stern (1997) is presented as related to the potential 'unformulated experience', whereby the explicit form the experience takes depends on the nature of the 'interpersonal field', within which the formulation of experience takes place. It is noted that in his later writings, Stern (2010) expands these ideas into the realm of enactments (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 119). The central theme of broadly based Relational Psychoanalysis (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983) is its description of two-person psychology in which "...patient and analyst together function in an interpersonal field, co-constructing a transference/countertransference matrix and co-creating an intersubjective space in which analytic work transpires" (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 222).

The above heterogeneity of North American definition(s) reflects some of the complexity of how different key threads of ideas and traditions intersect while others traverse separate and parallel paths.

In what follows, different sources and pathways of the concept will be traced as taken up by psychoanalysis and as it pertains to the evolution of the concept in Latin America, North America and Europe. The purpose is to facilitate understanding of the contemporary complexity, proliferation and cross-fertilization of psychoanalytic field theories and concepts in and across all IPA regions, as explicated in the subsequent sections of the entry.

As a matter of style, the terminology concerning ‘countertransference’ and ‘bi-personal field’ are unified, unless stated differently within a particular conceptual framework or in direct quotations. The terminology of ‘psychoanalytic field’, ‘the field’ or the ‘Field’ are used according to a particular conceptual network or an author, unless specified otherwise.

II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS WORLDWIDE

II. A. INTERDISCIPLINARY ROOTS: PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY

Starting in the mid-19th century in philosophy and the physical and social sciences there was a loosely grouped tradition of thought that was critical of the accretion of knowledge based on either classification or reduction to basic element connected through ‘mediums’. In 1873, **Michael Faraday** introduced the term “magnetic field,” and his “lines of force” were augmented by James Clerk Maxwell into a theory of the electromagnetic field. For example, unlike the earlier concept of ether, that held that there must be a ‘medium’ between different objects to account for “action at a distance,” field properties describe *the inherent relationship of parts that constitute the whole* without a magic medium. The interwoven network of relationships in the field thereby constitutes a system. It was the eminent physicist and philosopher **Ernst Mach** who saw this field description as applicable to perceptual phenomena. Mach (1896) noted that sensations organized into forms, into temporal and spatial patterns that were independent of the sensations themselves. A melody, for example, is recognizable from one key to another even though the notes of the melody played at different keys are not the same. It is *the relationship between the notes* rather than the notes themselves that constitutes the essence of the melody. Likewise, the form quality of objects persists even when the sensations of objects change. A coin will continue to look circular when seen from different angles, will retain the same features when seen in light of different intensity, and so on. Mach held that the complexity of perception cannot be reduced to its elements alone. Sensations by themselves can never have meaning; perception is not simply of ‘raw’ sensation, but also of relationships. Mach saw human awareness and indeed all natural phenomena in terms of dynamic processes rather than solely in terms of causal chains. He came to his ideas through his research in physics and physiology (Mach & McCormack, 1906), where he was known for a wide array of studies in dynamics. The Mach field, for example, postulates that the inertial dynamics of a given body are determined by its relationship to every other body in a system.

During the same period, **Franz Brentano** (1874/1973), who counted Freud among his students, influenced a generation of thinkers with his Act Psychology, addressing the activity of consciousness rather than the contents toward which consciousness is directed. From his perspective, one distinguishes between the psychological activity of hearing a tone, for example, from the non-psychological content of the tone heard, focusing on the intentionality

or directedness of consciousness. Brentano's students, especially **Christian von Ehrenfels**, **Carl Stumpf**, and **Edmund Husserl**, integrated Act Psychology with Mach's work on dynamics. Von Ehrenfels in particular elaborated Mach's concept of form quality (*gestaltqualitäten*) addressing the ways in which form is automatically given in perception rather than being a causal result of sensory combinations (=associanism) (B. Smith, 1995). Stumpf and Husserl each elaborated a system of "phenomenology," focusing on the first-person experience of intentionality. Husserl in particular initiated a radical challenge to dualistic thinking that influenced much of later Continental philosophy. The distinction between intentionality and other scientific explanations has roots in a differentiation between causal and teleological explanations as discussed in ancient Greek philosophy but was taken up by 19th- and 20th-century thinkers to differentiate positivist and descriptive orientations in the physical and social sciences. (See Dilthey (1883/1967), Lewin (1935), and Wright (1971) for expositions on these traditions of thought.)

Three of Stumpf's students (**Max Wertheimer**, **Kurt Koffka**, and **Wolfgang Köhler**) began a series of studies evolving from Stumpf's assertion that *the whole is different than the sum of its parts*. Although Gestalt psychology began with studies of perceptual organization, the three thinkers, along with their most prominent students, **Kurt Lewin** and **Kurt Goldstein**, gradually elaborated general principles of the dynamics of behavior and experience applicable to learning, cognition, creativity, motivation, group dynamics, and other social phenomena. It is through the integrations of *Gestalt principles that the concept of the field* came to prominence in relation to psychological processes. The first implicit use of the field concept was made in the examination of visual-perceptual phenomena. Drawing from the work of von Ehrenfels, Wertheimer (1925/1938) demonstrated that perception organized into meaningful wholes that were experienced prior to the elements that constituted the whole. In addition, he showed how the nature of the whole or form is determined by the inter-relationship of its parts, and by the context in which the form is found. This is to say that every figure has its background or field; that a figure never exists in isolation without a field. The characteristics of the ground reciprocally determine the characteristics of the form in meaningful configurations. Further, forms (gestalts) are created in the act of perception, not simply at the level of brain activity. They are the outcome of the complex whole of the perceptual process. This early use of the field concept, emphasizing contextualization and interdependence in perception, was generalized to other kinds of phenomena. For example, a seemingly simple motor reflex changes significantly in different fields. If one's foot gets caught behind a root when hiking, the flexor muscles of the foot suddenly relax to prevent a fall. But if one missteps when descending a steep hill, the flexor muscles contract. Rather than understand these reflexes as elementary stimulus-reaction associations, they are seen as holistic reactions where "the stimuli appear in different total situations, or to put it differently, when they have different meanings for the organism" (Goldstein, 1939, p. 166). Each reflex, although stimulated similarly, takes place in a different field as a "total situation" (p. 166), and thus is organized differently. Put another way, the particular kind of engagement and meaning of experience takes shape in contexts.

The field was further elaborated as a “fundamental Gestalt concept” (Koffka, 1935, p. 41) with its meaning extrapolated analogously from its use in physics. In this view, the dynamics of any system are derived not from single isolated objects but from “the mutual relations of the factors in the concrete situation, that is, essentially, from the momentary condition of the individual and the structure of the psychological situation” (Lewin, 1935, p. 41). The psychological field, like the electromagnetic or gravitational field, was understood as a dynamic system of forces shaping the behavior of individuals within that system (Koffka, 1935, p. 42). “Force” in a psychological field was described diversely as needs, intentions, tensions, predispositions creating “valences” or directions in the field. Especially in the hands of Lewin, field theory provided a means of describing complex systems without resorting to causal deductions or reductions in the direction of either instinct or environment. Field properties, as proposed by the Gestaltists, emphasized concrete events in immediate situations. The field integrates the individual into an “interdependent system with others” (Wertheimer, 1925/1938, p. 6), where actions of one can only be considered in relation to others in the system.

The field concept took several different turns from its Gestalt origins. One turn elaborates distinctly American themes, while the other elaborates an influence on Continental philosophy and psychiatry.

In Latin America, the Gestalt perspective, particularly the work of Kurt Lewin is valued because it prioritized the individual's ‘life space’ (environment) and its dynamics among the determinants of his or her behavior. As both a Gestaltist and the founder of Social psychology, Lewin refuted associationism and emphasized the importance of perception of structures (forms/‘gestalts’) that permit the discovery of new dimensions of reality. Latin American theorists emphasize how this dimension of the Gestalt theory in turn influenced Maurice Merleau Ponty's (1945/2005) phenomenology of perception, depicting the dialectic interrelation between subject and object while emphasizing the function of observation, and perceptive phenomena as indicators of reality. Ultimately, Latin American analysts link it with Heinrich Racker's participant observer analytical stance.

Lewin, Koffka and Wertheimer emigrated to the United States in the 1930s as part of the pre–World War II diaspora. Lewin, in a small but providential encounter, went first to England where he worked with a young psychologist Eric Trist (Trist followed Lewin to briefly study with him at Cornell), who brought Lewin's work to his position at the Tavistock Clinic. In collaboration with John Rickman and Wilfred Bion, Trist helped found the Tavistock Institute (Harrison, 2000). Their war efforts in England included the “Northfield Experiments,” developing a therapeutic community for returning WWII traumatized veterans focusing on basic assumptions in group process developed by Bion (1959). Lewin's early collaboration was crucial to the direction of the Tavistock's group field research (Neumann, 2005).

Wertheimer emigrated to New York, and as a professor at the New School for Social Research, collaborated with the anthropologist Franz Boaz at Columbia, influencing his students, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and the linguist **Edward Sapir**. Benedict's work in particular examined the patterned interdependent relationships between thought and action that

constitutes the “gestalt” of a given culture. Benedict (1934) argued that far from a catalogue of customs and traits, one must study the whole configuration or field of a culture, discerning patterns of relationships (p. 50). Mead introduced Koffka’s work to Edward Sapir, who indicated that Gestalt psychology “provides a background for a philosophy of culture . . . an echo telling me what my intuition never quite had the courage to say out loud” (King & Wertheimer, 2005, p. 300).

Sapir (1929/1949) was a brilliant field researcher whose methods for investigating Native American dialects took into account the effect of the researcher on the subjects of study. He examined the relationships between verbal expression (phonemes), thinking and personality in constituting culture as a dynamic system, how language itself is an act of relatedness. His interest in how individuals change within their culture led him to interdisciplinary studies and to a collaboration and friendship with Harry Stack Sullivan beginning in 1926. Sullivan was already adept in his own field work with his Pilot Ward at Sheppard Hospital, but he lacked a larger theoretical context for his developing ideas. Sapir and his colleagues at the Chicago School provided such a context, helping him elaborate a critique of individualism and an integration of his psychiatric studies with the social sciences (Conci, 2010).

George Herbert Mead had brought his colleague Sapir to the University of Chicago where **John Dewey** was well on the way to developing his pragmatic approach to psychological and social theory. Dewey (1896), a student of Josiah Royce and C. S. Peirce, had published “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” arguing against a linear stimulus-response understanding in favor of a “circular” description where the designation of a stimulus in relation to a response depends on the nature of the situation. Mead also had a strong pragmatic background from study with William James. These pragmatic thinkers, like the Gestaltists, rejected causal and reductionist explanations in favor of descriptions of actual experience, examining the development of self in the objectivity of the social world. For Mead (1982), “the individual mind can exist only in relation to other minds with shared meanings” (p. 5). Meaning is created through human action and interaction, where the self emerges through a social process.

Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal field is sensible in this rich context. The field for Sullivan is not a psychoanalytic concept but refers to the profound interdependence of individuals in an interpersonal situation, where the person is social, where self is found in the reflected appraisals of others. Given pragmatic influence, this is a field that can be observed, concerning what people do with each other, not what they fantasize (Levenson, 1981). Clearly, this rich context of thought informed his formulations regarding interdependence as a field concept. This was bedrock in his thinking providing the ground for interpersonal psychoanalysts leading to the relational turn, something to be discussed later in this entry.

Although Gestalt principles were prominent throughout Europe in the first half of the 20th century, they took a central role in the work of an increasingly influential thinker in French philosophy. **Maurice Merleau-Ponty**, a close friend to Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, taught first at the Sorbonne and then was Chair of Philosophy at the College de France from 1952 until his untimely death in 1961. He was introduced to Gestalt thinking by

Aron Gurwitsch, a student of Stumpf and Husserl who emigrated to Paris before accepting his position at the New School in New York. Merleau-Ponty never considered himself a Gestaltist (he was a prominent figure in Phenomenological philosophy) but used Gestalt thinking to argue for a philosophy of the embodied subject in the world. “World,” following Husserl and his student Heidegger, is the world as lived, “le monde vécu” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 57), an interrelated but ambiguous structure of meaningful engagements. Gestalt phenomena provided an avenue for examining the nature of behavior, thought, and perception, where the meaning of perception is expanded from simply visual phenomena to the entire range of embodied experience.

Early in Merleau-Ponty’s work, he noted how the most familiar definition of gestalt was in fact a definition of what a gestalt is not: It is different from the sum of its parts. Instead, Merleau-Ponty (1933/1971) offered a positive definition that begins to clarify how the concept of field is interwoven into gestalts: “The ‘Gestalt’ is a spontaneous organization of the sensuous field which makes the alleged ‘elements’ depend on ‘wholes’ which are themselves articulated into more extended wholes” (p. 193). Gestalts are organizations of the field that are in turn organized as elements of other gestalts in larger fields. Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) offered a view that entails a layering of organizations or structures that comprise the “phenomenal field” (p. 54). **Merleau-Ponty** (1942/1963) suggested three types or orders of field as a way of countering the dualistic division of material or body (*res extensa*) and mind (*res cogitans*). The physical/vital/human orders, elsewhere noted as *umwelt/mitwelt/eigenwelt*, are interdependent fields interpenetrating and mediating between interiority/connectedness/exteriority. At base, he returns to the figure-ground concept:

“A figure on a ground is the simplest sensible given that we can obtain. ... [This is] the very definition of the phenomenon of perception, that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be perception at all. The perceptual “something” is always in the “milieu” of something else, it always forms a part of a field” (p. 4).

Forms are given in context, and without context, we do not have form. This is true of physical systems, but Merleau-Ponty (1942/1963) asserted that the systems of natural science are not the foundation from which we analogously conceptualize an understanding of a phenomenal field (p. 142). Rather, perception itself is the ground; embodied experience offers an organizing structure from which we discover and elaborate the lawfulness of nature, which in turn illuminates our structure. In addition to emphasizing the structural interdependence of form and field, this perspective brings the perceiver into the creative process of what is perceived. The perceiver is part of the field. The object of experience is never separate from the subject who experiences it. Put another way, perception or experience is always situated. We find ourselves in meaningful situations that we shape and that shape us in turn. Merleau-Ponty emphasized a phenomenological definition of structure that takes the place of the term “gestalt.” Structure was seen as the relationship of component parts that constitutes the whole, where that relationship comprises the meaning of the phenomenon in question.

Psychoanalysis was a fascinating foil for Merleau-Ponty’s thinking throughout his career. Merleau-Ponty (1960/1982) noted, “The accord of phenomenology and of

psychoanalysis should not be understood to consist in phenomenology's saying clearly what psychoanalysis said obscurely. On the contrary, it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils as its limits—by its latent content or its unconscious—that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis. ... Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better, they are aiming toward the same latency" (p. 71).

It is interesting to note that he used the figure-ground concept (i.e., the concept of the field) to articulate formulations of unconscious process. In order to know ourselves we need a certain distance that we are not able to take by ourselves.

"It is not a matter of an unconscious that would play tricks on us; the problem of mystification stems from the fact that all consciousness is privileged consciousness of a 'figure' and tends to forget the 'ground' without which it has no meaning (cf. Gestalt theory). We do not know the ground although it is lived by us. ... For knowledge to progress . . . it is necessary for what was ground to become figure" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 113; trans. Phillips, 1999, p. 71).

At this point of his thinking, Merleau-Ponty understood the unconscious as referring to an "unseen ground," to perceptual processes where there is a failure to distinguish between figure and ground, a failure to recognize the ground that discloses the figure and gives it meaning (Phillips, 1999, p. 71). Thus, for example, repressed traumatic experience is not perceived due to the insistence of a familiar field, a context within which the traumatic has no form. "Traumatic experience does not subsist as a representation in the mode of objective consciousness. ... Rather, its nature is to survive only as a style of being and only to a certain degree of generality" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 85). The trauma is felt bodily as generalized anxiety but is not known in any specificity, as there is a perseverative insistent attending to the familiar contours of a nontraumatic field.

Merleau-Ponty's frame in relation to psychoanalysis took a new turn in his Sorbonne Lectures (1950/2010) and Lectures from the College de France (1968) where he was increasingly interested in intersubjective process, and where his conception of the phenomenal field emphasized "transitivism" and then "reversibility" in his final work. These concepts will only be touched upon below, but they are crucial in clarifying a radicalization of Merleau-Ponty's view on the field, one that emphasizes interpenetration. In these lectures, he examined psychoanalytic concepts in light of phenomenology, emphasizing the reciprocal movement between self and other: "A connection exists between relations with others and the relation with oneself. ... The relations with others pass through the relation with oneself" (Merleau-Ponty, 1950, p. 267). He saw Melanie Klein's use of projection and introjection as seminal in this process, situating their action in the body in his reading of Klein: "The distinction between the fantasized and the real is less sharp. Between corporeal activity (sucking, swallowing) and introjection there are no longer well-established boundaries" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 368; trans. Phillips, 1999, p. 76). Phillips shows how Merleau-Ponty finds in Klein a different field. Through Klein, psychoanalytic concepts can be understood "in terms of corporeality taken as itself the search for the outside in the inside and of the inside in the outside, that is, as a global and universal power of incorporation" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 130). Merleau-Ponty turned

these concepts from “mental operations” to “modalities of the activity of the body,” one’s access between interior and exterior (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 319).

In this later work in the 1950s, Merleau-Ponty’s view of the unconscious and the field changed further from a perceptual field that is not seen to a structure of experience where the reciprocity between inside and outside, between self and other is experienced in embodied responsiveness. Projection and introjection are not just part of the more pliable and less differentiated structures of the young child but are universalized as a dimension of adult experience, something that Merleau-Ponty saw as Freud’s “most interesting insight” (Phillips, 1999, p. 77). Merleau-Ponty and Lacan both draw from Freud’s (1915) work on reversals and the negative. “Transivitism” refers to the substitutions that occur between self and other. A 3-year-old knocks her leg and doesn’t react, while her little friend cries in response to this knock and rubs his own leg. Although contemporary research has challenged the view of the undifferentiated infant, these transpositions are still readily found in experience and become a new way of conceiving unconscious process. In this reciprocity, Merleau-Ponty (1968) saw the quality of dreaming in waking life where, on the level of bodily experience, separateness and differentiation recede into the permeability of sensation, of our receptivity to others where we find ourselves in others and others in ourselves. Our waking relations with objects and others especially have an oneiric character as a matter of principle: others are present to us in the way that dreams are, the way myths are, and this is enough to question the cleavage between the real and imaginary (p. 48). Rather than finding the unconscious behind consciousness, the unconscious is the dreaming aspect of all waking consciousness that makes relationships possible (Phillips, 1999, p. 79). Phillips (1999, p. 80) referred to a wonderful quotation by Merleau-Ponty published posthumously that captures this last vision of the unconscious:

“One always talks of the problem of “the other,” of “intersubjectivity,” etc. . . . In fact, what has to be understood is, beyond the “persons,” the existentials according to which we comprehend them, and which are the sedimented meaning of all our voluntary and involuntary experiences. This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our “consciousness,” but in front of us, as articulations of our field. It is “unconscious” by the fact that it is not an object, but it is that through which objects are possible, it is the constellation wherein our future is read—It is between them as the interval of the trees between the trees or as their common level” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b/1968, p. 180).

In this formulation, the unconscious is the field of “existentials” that transcend our individuality, structures of signification lived rather than known, “like all structures, between our acts and our aims and not behind them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b/1968, p. 232). This “between” is an unknown “invisible” significative matrix, Merleau-Ponty’s sense that self and other are part of a superordinate structure where unconscious process is part of the sedimented structure of language and symbol, not limited to the bounds of our separateness. The visible field is held together by an invisible structure of meaning. Subjectivity is fundamentally expressed in this structure that organizes in the interwoven relationship of subjects (not simply reduced to their interaction), having the structure of a gestalt where the whole (the unconscious

field) is understood to emerge from that interweaving of parts (embodied subjects), which in turn constitutes the subject.

In Latin America (de Leon de Bernardi 2008) especially, there is a link between Gestaltists' views on perception and Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the function of observation, and perceptive phenomena as indicators of reality. Ultimately, Latin American analysts see here a principal influence on Heinrich Racker's participant observer analytical stance, instrumental in the Barangers' concept of the field.

Among unique interdisciplinary roots in Europe, the notion of 'encounter' in idealistic philosophy of Hegel and phenomenology of Husserl, is viewed by some (Bohleber 2013, pp. 807-809)) as a precursor of a version of psychoanalytic intersubjectivity of a *dialogical encounter*, which transcends the transference-countertransference dynamics. This, in turn may have provided a philosophical background for Corrao's psychoanalytic concept of the field generating a Big Bang encounter.

II. B. PSYCHOANALYTIC ROOTS

Globally, Merleau-Ponty's work and the Gestaltists influenced Pichon Riviere, Jose Bleger, and the Willy and Madeleine Barangers in the River Plate region of South America, whose work shaped Italian thinkers Ferro and Civitarese, and North American Robert Langs.

In Latin America, the Barangers' classical concept of 'Psychoanalytic Field' underwent its own development in dialogue with other influential Latin American authors within the psychoanalytic culture rooted mostly in Freudian and classical British Object Relations tradition.

In Europe, where the Barangers' concept became gradually known only in 1980's and 1990's, their 'Psychoanalytic Field' conceptualization became dominant in all further field conceptualizations, yet admittedly, there are also other 'homegrown' roots, in the concept of 'encounter' of Francesco Corrao, and British Object Relations theorists, particularly Wilfred Bion.

Specific to North America, where the Barangers' concept was introduced by 1976 by Robert Langs, there are several other important points of entry, such as Leo Stone's 'psychoanalytic situation', developments coming out of Harry Stack Sullivan's Interpersonal theory, and those coming out of broadly based British Object Relations tradition.

In all continents, earlier and later developments of the field theories and concepts were shaped by the wider socio-historical influences of the broader culture which surrounded it.

II. C. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS IN LATIN AMERICA

II. Ca. The Barangers' Classical Concept and its Roots

Madeleine and Willy Baranger wrote "*The analytic situation as a dynamic field*" in the early 1960's. It is a product of their original thinking gestated in dialogue with other regional psychoanalytic contributions from the late 1940s and through 1960s. The major influences come from **Enrique Pichon Riviere, Heinrich Racker, Luisa Alvarez de Toledo, Jorge Mom, Leon Grinberg** and **David Liberman**. Moreover, there is a discernable influence of a much broader cultural context of psychoanalysis and its links with social psychology, as well as philosophical and literary ideas. The complex intertwining of various influences and the gradual emergence and development of Madeleine and Willy Barangers original conceptualization of the Psychoanalytic Field were thoroughly researched by Beatriz de Leon de Bernardi (2008).

The Barangers came to Argentina from France in 1946 when the group of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (APA, formed in 1942), was assembling. Its pioneering members were Celes Carcamo, Guillermo Ferrari Ardoy, Angel Garma, Marie Langer, Enrique Pichon Riviere and Arnaldo Rascovsky. Willy Baranger, Professor of Philosophy and Madeleine Baranger, Professor of Classics in France (Kancyper, 1999; Melgar, 2001), underwent their psychoanalytic training in Buenos Aires. They were members of a second generation of analysts of the APA, together with Arminda Aberastury, Luisa Alvarez de Toledo, Jose Bleger, Leon Grinberg, Salomon Resnik, David Liberman and Jorge and Teresa Mom. The Barangers subsequently moved to Montevideo from 1954 to 1965 with the aim of contributing to the constitution of the Uruguayan psychoanalytic group. In 1966, they moved back to Argentina permanently and became an integral part of the institutional life of the APA, where they worked as analysts, teachers, and promoters of psychoanalytic thinking in Latin America.

The theoretical-technical concept of the dynamic field developed while the Barangers were living in Uruguay. The dynamic field conceptualizes the central phenomena of analysis seen as a profound encounter involving two subjectivities intensely committed to the task of enhancing the patient's psychic transformations. The notion of dynamic field provided a new context that made it possible to articulate general notions of psychoanalysis such as transference, countertransference, resistance, interpretation, etc., in the phenomenological context of the concrete psychoanalytic experience (de Leon de Bernardi, 1999). The new notions that further developed from it, such as the 'bastion' and the 'second look', proved to be extremely useful for clinical work.

The conception of the dynamic field also emerged partly as a response to the Barangers' methodological and epistemological concerns regarding the problems of clinical investigation and validation in psychoanalysis. In his earlier paper, *Métodos de objetivación en la investigación psicoanalítica* [Methods of achieving objectivity in psychoanalytic investigation], Willy Baranger (1959) reviewed contributions by Glover (1952), Escalona

(1952), Bellak and Brewster Smith (1956), among others. He proposed discarding the quantitative and, in his view, mechanistic methods inherent within the natural sciences. Instead, he considered psychoanalysis a ‘science of dialogue’ in the frame of a ‘bi-personal psychology’ that can find its own principles of objectivity and validation. To this point, he wrote: “Psychoanalysis must, on the basis of its practice, discover its own principles of objectivity and accept its role as a science—in many ways privileged—of humanity. It must accept its character as a science of dialogue—that is, of bi-personal psychology—its character as an interpretive science... with essentially original laws and techniques of validation different from those that rule the natural sciences. The first task of epistemological investigation is to formulate conditions that ensure the validity of our interpretations” (Baranger W. 1959, p. 27).

However, specifying that his was not a subjectivist or interpretive position considering the analyst's purpose as creating interpretation, Baranger wrote: “The systematic examination of what occurs in the bi-personal analytic situation is the only means of accessing an ideal of validation of knowledge that truly pertains to psychoanalysis. This ideal, as we now conceive it, is achieved—although not formulated—in various papers in recent years that provide a very exhaustive description of the analytic situation with the interpretations and modifications occurring in limited ‘time ensembles’” (Baranger W, 1959, p. 29).

In the opinion of de Leon de Bernardi (2008), this perspective is based on the conceptual frame of Merleau Ponty’s (1945/2005) phenomenology of perception and Heinrich Racker's notion of the analyst as a participating observer, both of whom depict the dialectic interrelation between subject and object while emphasizing the function of observation, perception, and perspectives on external reality. Racker emphasized the analyst's need of self-observation of the different aspects of his or her participation. In Willy Baranger's view (1961-1962), Racker's ideas led to a broadening of the analyst's perceptive and reflective capacity regarding the interpersonal situation of analysis. With respect to Racker's work on the knowledge of countertransference, Willy Baranger points out that the analyst's ego must be positioned “by means of a process of relative division, as an observer of the interpersonal situation” (Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 168). Consequently, “Since the analyst's observation is both the correlative observation of the patient and self-observation, it can only be defined as observation of this field” (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 4).

Later, the Barangers developed the notion of ‘bastion’, and proposed that the analyst should establish a ‘second look’ at the analytic field, especially regarding obstacles to the process involving both participants: “This has led us to propose the introduction of several terms: ‘field’, ‘bastion’, ‘second look’. When the process stumbles or halts, the analyst can only question himself about the obstacle, by encircling himself and his analysand, Oedipus and the Sphinx, in a second look, in a total view: this is the field” (Baranger M, Baranger W and Mom, 1979, p. 1).

The work of 1961-62, in the meantime, was to provide a detailed observation and description of the essential aspects of the psychoanalytic situation, conceived as a dynamic field. This in turn opened up new issues, such as the importance of the analyst's participation and of countertransference as a technical instrument; the relevance of body language and

emotional communication as expressions of unconscious communication between patient and analyst; resistance phenomena that may express split off primary experiences; the process of verbal free association and factors of change or lack of change in the analytic process.

The Barangers (Baranger W, 1959, 1979; Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62; Baranger M, 1992) themselves also recognized broader influences that converged on their notion of the dynamic field. Among them, the theory of the Gestalt, particularly the work of Kurt Lewin, prioritized the individual's life space and its dynamics as determinants of his or her behavior. Lewin, the official founder of social psychology, refuted associationism and emphasized the importance of perception of structures that permit the discovery of new dimensions of reality. The Gestalt theory in turn influenced Merleau Ponty's concept of perception (as discussed in detail above).

According to **Beatriz de Leon de Bernardi** (2000), Hugo Vezzetti (1998) considered Enrique Pichon Riviere (1998) one of the psychoanalysts that introduced the ideas of the Gestalt theory into Argentina. In his study of human groups, this pioneer of social psychology and its greatest driving force on both sides of the River Plate incorporated both the Gestalt notion of field and Kleinian ideas on primitive object relations. However, his view of the internal world placed more importance on the internalized experience of early relationships than on instinctual factors. In his perspective, internal experience is organized as a group experience, an approach he developed in different social investigations, especially in the area of psychiatry. This model influenced Willy and Madeleine Baranger's concept of the phantasy of the session as a phantasy created by the couple. According to Vezzetti (1998), Pichon Riviere probably had access to Gestalt theory through his study of the French thinkers **Merleau Ponty** and **Daniel Lagache**. Papers by Lagache were published by the *Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanálisis* from its first issues in 1956 and were undoubtedly a part of the intellectual dialogue of the wider region. Lagache's work integrating behaviorism, phenomenology and psychoanalytic clinical work (in his conception of the different areas of the mind, the body and the world) in turn influenced **José Bleger** (1963). In the 1950s and 1960s, these ideas began to resonate in Uruguay, where the phenomenological current influenced other psychoanalysts, including **Gilberto Koolhaas** and **Rodolfo Agorio**.

Ideas of the 'Psychoanalytic situation as a dynamic field' were formulated gradually, as Willy and Madeleine Baranger and the founding group of the Psychoanalytic Association of Uruguay were in a continuous dialogue with leading Argentine analysts. Later, Willy Baranger (1979) referred to the creative atmosphere of Pichon Rivière's seminars in Montevideo referring especially to his ideas on the analytic 'spiral process', and the shared love of poetry of the 19th century French-Venezuelan poet Isidore Ducasse Count Lautréamont, whose "Ill Dawns" was held as a motto of increased freedom of psychoanalytic thinking over orthodoxy. While Freud's works formed the basis of the training, there was an added enthusiasm for the new theories of early object relations of Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, Wilfred Bion and others. While field theory allowed for a vision that explored the different manifest aspects of the analytic situation—spatial, temporal and functional—the Kleinian theory contributed pillars for understanding the underlying unconscious dynamics within a conception that

featured reciprocal co-determination of field phenomena: “Therefore, the analytic situation must be formulated...as a situation between two persons, who are unavoidably connected and complementary as long as the situation lasts and are involved in the same dynamic process... The analyst ‘intervenes in spite of his or her necessary neutrality and passivity—as a complete participant’...” (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 8).

The focus of the study of the bi-personal relationship is on *its unconscious aspects*, with the background of their deep elaboration of the analyst's countertransferential participation, as conceptualized by Racker, Heimann and Money Kyrle (de Leon de Bernardi 2008). The Barangers followed Heimann in part when they considered countertransference a global phenomenon and a valuable technical instrument, developments that had already been proposed in Buenos Aires by Racker. But whereas Klein and even Heimann thought of transference and countertransference from the intrapsychic viewpoint of patient and analyst, the Barangers placed the accent on the analyst's contribution from the very beginning. This is analogous to Racker (1948), considering not only the repetitive feature of the countertransference, but also its new aspects created by the analytic relationship. Their central hypothesis was that in the analytic encounter new structures (gestalts) and shared phantasies emerge that are products of the interplay of reciprocal identifications between patient and analyst. The transformation of these phantasies generates the dynamics of the analytic field. This view was a radical change from the uni-personal (one-person) approach at that time: “The basic phantasy of a session is not merely the analyst's understanding of the patient's phantasy, but something that is constructed in a couple relationship... This phantasy is gradually formed by the interplay of processes of projective and introjective identification and of the counteridentifications operating, with their limits, functions and different characteristics within patient and analyst” (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 19).

The concept of *basic fantasy* itself has different sources. The first is Susan Isaacs's ‘structural version’ of phantasy, as an expression of the different types of psychic life (impulses, sentiments and defenses). Others are Klein's notions of projective identification and Bion's conceptualizations of the basic assumptions of group functioning (Baranger M, 1992), applicable to psychoanalytic group psychotherapy, practice of which further developed in both Argentina and Uruguay.

The session is the scenario where *primitive object relations* are acted out, while the notion of phantasy provides the analytic field with an ‘as if’ dimension of its ‘essential ambiguity’ in the functional, spatial and temporal aspects. The manifest dimension of the analytic relationship is conceived as having a dialectic relation with the phantasied unconscious aspects. The focus of the analyst's *interpretation* then aims at aspects of transference and countertransference in connection to the current relationship with the analyst. This view developed from a perspective that critically discussed the positions of Freud and Klein, while also taking essential aspects of their contributions. The Barangers disagreed with Freud's ‘archaeological’ tendency, which might lead to exaggerate the historical–geological viewpoint of the evolution and fixation of the libido (Baranger M and Baranger

W, 1961-62, p. 9). While they agreed with Klein's view that the transference relationship actualizes archaic experiences that need to be interpreted in the present relationship with the analyst, they stressed the importance of the contribution of the analyst's countertransference, emphasizing his or her active participation. They highlight the "deep contact with a person and the profoundly different structure that is created between that person and us" (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 19). They draw on Susan Isaacs (1948), seeing the most primitive levels of this contact ('primary phantasies') as expressed by nonverbal types of communication: emotional experiences, diverse ways of reacting and acting and by the body language established between patient and analyst. Here, the 'logic of emotion' guides interpretive processes and inferences regarding counter-transference and transference. The analyst's emotional and life experience as well as his or her flexibility in processes of partial and concordant identification with the patient (Racker, 1957) make it possible to select the point of 'urgency' that appears as the most direct expression of the patient's unconscious aspects. At the same time, the feeling of greater or lesser urgency is regulated by the analyst's grasp of the patient's paranoid or depressive anxieties. Unconscious aspects are expressed in various manifestations of anxiety as well as in 'stereotyped patterns of experiencing and behavior'. As the Barangers note: "The patient's use of projective identification, promoted by the fundamental rule, allows re-actualization of reaction patterns stemming from past situations that have not been overcome" (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 31).

Phenomena such as the '*bastion*' reveal crystallized and dissociated aspects of the psyche and its most primitive defense mechanisms that escape the process of verbal free association, instead operating silently. Sometimes, the narration and recovery of memories of the patient's history, guided by the process of free association, take place in parallel with the existence of a crystallized defensive nucleus that remained split off from the apparent advance of the analysis. Its fall provokes deep catastrophic experiences in the patient. Initially, the authors considered the bastion fundamentally from the intrapsychic viewpoint. However, they soon began to mention its emergence in the analysis of stable, complex and reciprocal structures, which tend to, "crystallize a certain configuration in the field and condition the emergence of recurrent phantasies. This configuration is quite complex, since it includes reciprocal manifestations of all the patient's psychic agencies, the position of the Ego, the Id, the Super-ego and internal objects at different points in the field, which have certain functions" (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 36).

Influences of Racker's (1957) 'complementary countertransference', extended by 'Klein's 'projective identification' and Grinberg's (1957) 'counteridentification' are discernible, when Barangers wrote, "the transference-countertransference neurosis set tends to constitute a purely repetitive granite-like block that completely paralyses the analytic process" (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 37).

Such ideas of bastion may come close to Joseph Sandler's (1976) more recent idea of 'role responsiveness' and contemporary developments of the notion of enactment (de Leon de Bernardi and Bernardi, 2005; Cassorla, 2005). By 1979 and 1982 (Baranger M, Baranger W

and Mom, 1982), bastion was considered a *defensive formation of the field* involving both patient and analyst. With this advance, one of the most important factors for the advance of an analysis is the analyst's understanding of his or her complementary responses to the patient's unconscious ways of relating, which are acted out in silence through analytic interaction.

Faced with the regressive experiences of establishing and analyzing *the countertransference micro-neurosis*, interpretation offers the possibility of a double recovery in relation to the patient as well as the analyst. The authors return to the theme of observation of the field, in its two aspects: self-observation and hetero-observation of the patient and the types of interaction established. By regulating affective tensions, the analyst strives to have sufficient 'porosity' to be able to support the patient's disposition to self-observation and observation of the unity of the field. Following the session, the analyst needs to be able to take a 'second look' at the session and the evolution of the process. In the 1961-62 paper, *interpretation* is conceived as part of a dialectic process, based on the Freudian idea of an unconscious communication between the psychic systems. This is akin to the Pichon Rivière's idea of the 'spiral process' of a dialectical spiral between the 'here, now, with me' and the 'there and then'. The interpretative process is conceived as a sequential, progressive spiral that broadens out from the point of urgency, indicator of an unconscious aspect of the patient, into interpretation and insight, leading to re-structuring of the field. This illustrates the retrospective and prospective character of interpretation, the analyst is a "transactional" object between the real and the phantasied world, i.e., a "double projection screen" (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 44).

Additionally, the interpretation seeks to dialectically integrate different dimensions, especially sensorial and bodily emotions, of the partially dissociated primitive experience, thereby avoiding "the dangers of intellectualization" (ibid, p. 46). The theme of interpretation is framed here as a psychoanalytic communication, following **Luisa Alvarez de Toledo's** (1954) reflection on the language of interpretation and the characteristics of analytic communication. This view of interpretation continues throughout the subsequent decades in the psychoanalysis of the River Plate region. A comprehensive approach to the subject is found in the work by David Liberman (1970) that integrated developments in linguistics with understanding of the complementary styles of patient and analyst.

For Alvarez de Toledo, interpretation is 'a doing with the patient'. For the Barangers, too, the words of interpretation may be "bearers of gratification and aggression and in general of innumerable phantasies" (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 43). In this perspective, regressive processes allow words to recover "their original power to reach internal life" (ibid., p. 46), to reintegrate splitting and transform primitive, pathological object relations. The analyst's language may recover certain characteristics similar to those of the child's communication with the mother, allowing the patient to acquire new levels of symbolization of emotional and somatic experience. According to de Leon de Bernardi (1993), this view of symbolization that developed in the scenography of primitive phantasies of the Kleinian internal world, partly coincides with more contemporary views corroborated by investigations

of early development. Daniel Stern's (1985) findings of the unity of senses and non-modal transposition of information inherent to the child's communication with the mother appears to be taken for granted in the therapeutic relationship and in processes of artistic perception and creation where trans-sensorial analogies and metaphors have a prominent position. Interestingly, both Álvarez de Toledo (1954 [1996]) and **Daniel Stern** (1985) grounded their thinking in a quote from the same poem by Baudelaire, "Les correspondances" [Correspondences].

In 1979, in a paper published by the *Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanálisis*, Willy Baranger (1979), in dialogue with interim contributions of **Pichon Rivière**, **Michael Balint**, **Donald Meltzer**, **Melanie Klein** and **Jacques Lacan**, critically revised the initial conceptualization of the field from 1961-62. In this article, he questions the focus on transference and countertransference in the papers of the 1960s, which might lead to a reductionist, impoverishing vision of the phenomena occurring between patient and analyst. This in turn might induce a technique that would force the interpretation of transference or countertransference and ignore aspects of the patient's history. Similarly, he now questioned broadening the terms of projective identification and projective counteridentification, confusing them with those of transference and countertransference. In his view, this demonstrates how psychoanalytic discoveries and concepts may lose their specific boundaries. Processes of projective identification and counteridentification, though frequent, cannot explain the multiplicity of phenomena of the field. Additionally, Willy Baranger here works with *Lacan's notion of the divided subject* and takes a critical view of the mirroring and defensive character of bi-personal psychology. In a partial re-formulation of his previous view of the analytic field, he stated, "It is not a question of two bodies or two persons, but of two divided subjects, whose division results from an initial triangulation. The correct term would therefore be an 'intersubjective field'" (Baranger W, 1979, p. 30). Lacan's ideas on the symbolic place of the analyst, structurally different from the patient's, probably influenced the importance Willy Baranger assigned at this point to the function of analytic asymmetry of the analytic field. He also elaborated on the notion of the 'second look', which covers the unity of the field at moments when the analyst perceives stumbling blocks. Also, Lacan's proposal of the evasive and punctual character of the unconscious leads both Willy Baranger (1979) and Madeleine Baranger (1992) to review the issues related to the transformative potential of interpretation, viewed too optimistically in the papers of the 1960s. However, in his 1979 revision, Willy Baranger confirms essential points of his 1961-62 formulations. For example, he considered that the notion of the bastion may be the basis of a negative therapeutic reaction, impasse, non-analyzability, the limitations of the analytic process, the analyst's feelings that the patient is like a 'parasite' and 'perverse sado-masochistic complicities'. These notions would be developed further in 1982 by the Barangers and Mom, and in the 1992 paper by Madeleine Baranger.

Throughout, Willy Baranger holds closely to the notion of splitting. In dialogue with **Serge Leclaire** (Baranger W, 1972), he highlighted his differences in relation to the thinking of Lacan and Leclaire: "For us, analysis acts by modifying the patient's internal objects, reducing splitting in the person and gaining more integration... On the contrary, for Leclaire,

splitting constitutes the very condition of the subject's existence" (Baranger W, 1972, pp. 34, 35).

Both Willy and Madeleine Baranger maintained the situational-contextual and dialectic approach of their early papers. Their dialectic view of communication between the psychic systems and their integration being an objective of analysis was *in line with Freudian and Kleinian theorizing*, differing from Lacan's conception of the unconscious as radically ex-centric and heterogeneous to the Ego. Barangers' dialectic view of unconscious communication in the field formed the background of future important developments (Acevedo de Mendilaharsu, 1995; Ogden, 1994). The Barangers also disagreed with Lacan's conception of the unconscious being structured like a language, preserving their position that assigns importance to non-verbal forms, sometimes mute or acted out, of the emotional and physical aspects of analytic communication. In this sense, the Barangers remained loyal to their phenomenological approach of the 1960s, in stark contrast with the regionally influential structuralist (post-Lacanian) approaches that prioritize the verbal signifier in interpretation. They held firm to the perspective that emphasizes listening, the grasp of shared unconscious phenomena, and particularly the necessity that the analyst should detect the formation of bastions in the field. If understood, these important obstacles may also be a driving force in furthering the analytic process: "Thus, the main-spring of the analytic process appears to be the production of resistances and bastions and their respective interpretive dissolution, generator of 'insight' " (Baranger M, Baranger W and Mom, 1982). In 1992, Madeleine Baranger cautioned against the deceitful paths to which the construction of 'a common language with the patient' may lead and, referencing **Piera Aulagnier's** (1979) approach, she noted how interpretation needs to recover its figurability by evoking affects and concrete things for the patient. Simultaneously, she highlighted the phenomenon of emotional integration and insight as the most important indicator of dialectical transformations of the analytic field.

II. Cb. Further and Contemporary Developments of the Concept in Latin America

The Barangers' ideas have been used by most Spanish-speaking Latin American psychoanalysts. In Brazil, their influence was also promulgated through the translation of the books by Antonino Ferro. In 1999, Luis Kancyper edited the book "Volviendo a pensar con Willy and Madelaine Baranger", ("Back to thinking with Willy and Madelaine Baranger"), published in Buenos Aires. In 2005 Madeleine Baranger herself reviewed her ideas and connected them with those of André Green, Thomas Ogden, César and Sára Botella, Christopher Bollas, and others.

In 2012, *the Revista de Psicoanálisis* the journal of the Argentinian Psychoanalytic Association published a special issue (vol LXIX, number 1-2) entitled "El campo psicoanalítico de nosotros a los Barangers – 1962 <-> 2012" ("The analytic field from us to the Barangers 1962 <-> 2012"). In this issue, **Claudia Borensztein** presented Latin American authors who further developed the concept of the field in various contexts. Examples include: **Susana Ada**

Diringer's emphasis on the issue of the *energies* of the field and the view of the analytical situation as a *dream*; **Rafael Paz** proposed the need to delimit *sub-regions of the field* and pointed out that the basic fantasy of the field does not always exist; **Leticia Glocer Fiorini** addressed the issue of *complexity* and the presence of a symbolic third party; **Luis Kancyper** pointed out the importance of *affects* (see below); **Beatriz de Leon de Bernardi** highlighted the importance of the '*second look*' and the connection with Pichon Riviere's ideas; **Claudio Eizirik** addressed the *imagination* and the real person of the analyst; **Carlos Sopena** connected the Barangers' ideas with Green and Winnicott; **Volmer Filho** and **Antonio Carlos Pires** extended the idea of analytical field to the *field of supervision*. Further, **Juan Tubert-Oklander** related the field concept to *group therapies*; **Beatriz Pereira** highlighted the *passage from bi-personal to intersubjective*; **Hilda Maria Fehuerhake**, **Marta Lebrero**, and **Gustavo Mario Jarast** related the concept of the field to the concept of *enactment*; **Ricardo Velasco Rosas**, **Esther Romano** and **Leonardo Martin Solvey** linked the ideas of the field with the *vicissitudes of analytical formation*; **Ana Nélida Salazar** applied Green's and Michel de M'Uzan's ideas to the concept of the field. **Roberto Losso** and **Ana Packciarz de Losso** expanded the idea of field into *family and couple therapies*; **Leonardo Goijman** demonstrated its clinical utility in working with *children and adolescents*; **Benzi3n Winograd** connected the Barangers' ideas with David Liberman's *theory of communication*; and **Felipe Muller** emphasized the '*between*' that occurs between a patient and an analyst.

Additionally, **Paulo Henrique Favalli** (1999) demonstrated confluence of the ideas of the analytic field of Ferro and Ogden; **Serapio Marcano** (1999) explored analytical training through the lens of the concept of the field; **Ra3l I Tebaldi** (2004) used the field concept in the context of a relationship between *social trauma* and the society; **Ricardo Bernardi** and **Beatriz de Leon de Bernardi** (2012) related analytic 'field' to quintessentially Latin American psychoanalytic concepts of '*vinculo*' (link) and '*spiral process*', originating in the work of Enrique Pichon-Rivi3re; **Raquel Zac de Goldstein** (2012) explored the borderline dynamics within the field; **Roosevelt Cassorla**, (2012) discussed the manifestation of aspects *not represented* in the analytical field; **Ruggero Levy** (2016) studied *psychic pain* in the field perspective; **Ida Ioschpe Gus** (2016) introduced the ideas of *emptiness* and *mortification* in the field, and **Mauro Gus** (2016) studied the *perverse defenses* within the field; **Leticia Glocer Fiorini** (2016) connected the ideas of *intersubjectivity*, *otherness* and *thirdness* from the perspective of the complexity of the field; **Beatriz de Leon de Bernardi** (2015; 2017) worked with *metaphor and dialectical spiral* in the field perspective; **Elsa Rappoport de Aisemberg** (2017) emphasized the aspect of *unconscious communication* of the field; **Juan Tubert-Oklander** (2017) connected the concept with North American relational psychoanalysis; **Norberto Y. Marucco** (2017) referred to *mourning and body* in the analytical field; **Roosevelt Cassorla** (2017a) proposed the *field of dreams and not dreams* (below). Furthermore, **Roosevelt Cassorla** (2017b) studied the '*subfields*' of *interpretation*, in addition to the *Uncanny* in the analytic field (Cassorla 2019).

II. Cba. Luis Kancyper

According to **Luis Kancyper** (1998, 1999), clarification of the basic unconscious fantasy demands a complex and detailed working-through on the part of the analyst. That is, the concept of field implies a second dual look by the analyst in order to dismantle the ‘phantom assemblage’ of intersubjective dynamics and to infer, if possible, his/her own intrasubjective history. The aim is to highlight which ‘badly-bound pages’ of his/her own history are hooked onto the other’s ‘badly-bound pages’, and in what way that collusion between the unconscious fantasies, identifications, myths and pacts of both gave rise eventually to a shared phantom assemblage, where each keeps a stereotyped and repetitive role.

It follows that through the unconscious fantasy of the field, one can begin to unravel each participant’s psychic functioning and intrasubjective history [going from] intersubjectivity to intrasubjectivity, from the *hic et nun* to the past and the future, from this seemingly timeless precipitate to the temporality of the past and the future (Kancyper, 1998).

In Kancyper’s view, the Barangers’ field concept can be viewed as a macro-concept in complex thinking, a crucial place for questioning. From this vantage point, all references to the Gordian knot of the relations among the intrapsychic, the intersubjective and the trans-subjective are linked. This is in line with Edgar Morin’s (2007) advocating for macro-concepts, analogous to an atom as a constellation of particles, and the solar system a constellation around a star. In this way, he emphasized the need to think in terms of a solidarity of concepts, whereby complexity does not lead to the suppression of simplicity. Rather, it integrates in the greatest degree the simplifying ways of thinking while rejecting the reductionist, mutilating, one-dimensional and eventually blinding consequences of simplification as the living image of that which is real.

In Kancyper’s view, the Barangers’ concept of the analytic field opened new ways to regard selfhood concomitant with the consolidation of otherness, allowing for the review of one’s own history and the other’s while recognizing the linkages and their points of similarity, difference and complementarity.

Another aspect that Kancyper underlined is the relation between the analytic field and the affective climate. The field is characterized by its dynamic character and its moves are simultaneously registered in two levels: the thinking content and the circulation of affect, as well as in the inter-crossing of both. Kancyper has written that analysts must perceive the *Stimmung*, the climate or atmosphere of a session and minutely auscultate with their “countertransference stethoscope” the different feelings and affects that present themselves in the analytic situation. The *Stimmung* reveals that which is ineffable in the dynamic field. In accurately detecting the weight of feelings and affects prevailing in each moment of the session, as well as their nuances and fluctuations, the analyst is able to make an instrumental use of the field atmosphere, as if those feelings and affects were a compass and a lamp orienting and illuminating the darkness and labyrinths of the human soul.

In contemporary Kancyper’s view (1998, 1999), the basic unconscious fantasy should not be reduced to its most regressive aspects of bastion and ‘parasitizing’, because it is also

permanently present during the prospective processes of creativity, promoting a catalytic, productive field of new ideas and inventions in the intersubjective dynamics.

On the other hand, Kancyper acknowledged that the Barangerean concept of field and the *basic fantasy* commanding the unconscious aspects of the relationship may awaken in the analyst several impediments and resistances, because it may inflict a new wound on their narcissism and power; once again, they may lose the illusion of their omnipotence and their sovereign self-sufficiency. The fantasy born in and through the field “spreads its wings” in the bond with the other and the others. It is autonomous and exercises its own influence on the subjects, analogous to the Unconscious, having its own laws and psychodynamics independent of the conscious and rational rule.

To accept its presence in every (more or less) stable and lasting relationship inevitably implies the assumption of additional, complex work. Analysts cannot keep maintaining the position of passive observers of a situation that unjustly alienates and frustrates them. They must forcibly change their position. Through their own psychical functioning, conditioned by the complementary series, they asymmetrically participate in the outcome of nurturing or destructive bonds. This added psychical work demands to reallocate the automatic tendency to deposit in others the stream of projections and projective identifications or the massive return of these on the self, and to admit that eventually every member of the field is involved in the production of the intersubjective fantasy, which is original to and originates in the particular situation of that field.

Although the concept of the field emerged in the theory of technique for the treatment of adults, Kancyper (1998, 1999) views it also as highly relevant in the analysis of children and adolescents. However, here the matter is more complex, due to the effects of the tripod formed by parents, the analysand and the analyst. This demands the latter to make a more thorough ‘reading’ than that practiced in the analysis of adults, since it should include the effects of the parents’ unconscious fantasies in the establishment and creation of the basic unconscious fantasy of the field.

II. Cbb. Roosevelt Cassorla

In a series of publications, Cassorla ((2001, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2017, 2018) developed many aspects of the Psychoanalytic Field theory. Below are some of his major contributions.

(1) The Complexity of the Field Concept

Cassorla (2017) notes that reality can be “simple” or “complex” depending on how the observer views it. Ideas about the concept of field lead observers to pay less attention to facts than to the relationships and influences that exist among them. These relationships are in constant movement and it is this perception that makes a field dynamic. The field is the product of the observer’s capacity to observe and it must be remembered that any observer influences

the facts he or she observes. In other words, the observer is part of the field. Any concept of “objective observation” loses its meaning and, for this reason, observers, as participants in the field, must learn to objectify their own subjectivity.

Observing the complexity of the concept, one can identify that certain rules determine the functioning of fields. The principles of uncertainty and incompleteness show that observation is always provisional, uncertain, partial and transitory. As something is observed, it changes, not only because it is in constant movement but also because the very process of observation has affected it. But there is no way to determine the degree of influence of the observer over what is observed, or vice-versa. A supposed paralysis of the field can be nothing more than paralysis in the observer’s capacity to move from one vertex of observation to another.

Cassorla (2017) identifies the functions that a given analyst imagines for the field and the factors that led the particular psychoanalyst to choose the points of view that determine these functions. This approach lets each analyst use and identify the explicit and implicit theories that have led him or her to belong to a given field. In this vein, Cassorla (2017) proposes the capacity to transform and broaden the symbolic network of thought as for the vertex observing the functions of the field. The transformation of this network can be seen in the growing capacity of the analytic dyad to attribute meaning to their experiences, that is, to think about the conscious and unconscious facts that can be identified in the analytic field. In this way, mental resources develop that allow them to deal with reality and transform it to the benefit of the participants (and, hopefully, of mankind as a whole).

(2) The Dreaming Field

Among the factors of the field proposed, some phenomena can be identified that are articulated in very complex ways, such as the quality of the links between analysand and analyst, the quality of the emotional experiences resulting from these links, the analyst’s capacity for containing, and the reverie that allows him or her to transform emotional experiences into dreams (waking and nocturnal dreams). Also important is the ability of the analytic dyad to broaden the meanings of the dreams that are dreamed (‘here and now’), the analyst’s capacity to identify and deal with elements that cannot be dreamed, the ability of the dyad to deal with attacks on the processes described, and many other aspects. Cassorla combines the Barangers’ ideas with Bion’s theory of thought (Bion, 1962a, 1962b, 1992, Ferro, 2009), its outcomes and transformations.

In the model proposed, the field has been taken over by emotional turbulence and catastrophes (Bion, 1976). Analyst and analysand are linked together by emotions and the field is in constant transformation, thus indicating the quality of the links and the forms of attacks on the links. Everything that happens to one of the members of the dyad has emotional repercussions for the other. The adventure of the analysis is stimulated in both members of the analytic dyad by the connections among love, desire to know, and hatred of suffering. These initial emotions give rise to further complex sets of emotional links named by the letters L

(love), H (hatred) and K (knowledge), which influence one another and join together in many different ways. Inversely, their negativity (-L,-H,-K) attack the positive links (Bion, 1962b). Link K (instinct for knowledge) was hinted at by both Freud (1905) (Instinct for Knowledge) and Klein (1932) (Epistemological Instinct). Bion included this instinct among the emotions and this inclusion broadened the perception of the fields. As observation of the field develops, more complex, subtle and sophisticated combinations of the emotions are identified.

One of the characteristics of the analytic field is its capacity to connect L and H to K or transform them into K so that knowledge can develop. To know oneself through analysis is an emotional process and each K attained is an ephemeral step in the search for ultimate reality (O). But O is never really attained, meaning that, from this vertex of observation, the analytic field is infinite.

Dreaming goes on 24 hours a day just as other biological functions do, such as breathing and digestion. Dreaming is a “theater that generates meanings” (Meltzer, 1983), permanent unconscious dreaming, the content of which is manifest through daydreams and nocturnal dreams. These dreams, in turn, are constantly re-dreamed and the symbolic network and the capacity to think more abstract thoughts is expanded. Just as mothers do with their babies, analysts apply their capacity for reverie during sessions. When dreaming is possible, the analysand unconsciously dreams what is happening here and now in the analytic field. Through free association, the analysand then tells the analyst these dreams – which are deformed through defenses – by describing images, fantasies, feelings and ideas that come to mind as he or she freely associates. The narratives involve emotions and actions. Since the analysand is awake, secondary working through makes the narrative more or less organized, thus challenging the analyst’s skill, as the analyst himself is also transferentially included in these dreams. The analyst also dreams about what is happening in the analytic field. The asymmetry of the relationship turns the analyst into “the other” of the intersubjective relationship, and he or she re-dreams the analysand’s dreams, and dreams the emotional experiences that could not be dreamed. The careful observation shows that, at some moment, the analyst deals with “dreams-for-two”, that is, dreams that were created by the analytic dyad that includes facts beyond the individual dreams of each member of the dyad. Then, one can say that “the analytic dyad dreams both dreams and non-dreams that are part of the analytic field”. It can also be said that “the analytic field dreams the dreams and non-dreams that make it up”. It follows that the expansion of the ideas depends on the vertex used to observe the dreaming field.

When the patient (or part of him) has not enough capacity to symbolize, he cannot dream and think. Non-symbolized sensorial and emotional stimuli are expelled through projective identification. This expulsion may include split parts of the thinking apparatus (mental functions) and constitute bizarre objects. Here one is in an area of functioning of the psychotic and unrepresented parts of the personality.

The product of these projective identifications is expressed in the analytic field through discharges in the form of acts, physical symptoms, hallucinations, beliefs, fanaticism, delusions, voids and other transformations into hallucinosis (Bion, 1965), in other words, into *non-dreams* (Cassorla, 2005, 2008). In this psychotic area (with symbolic deficit) the analyst also listens but,

especially, *feels or suffers* in himself the action of the patient's projective identification, his non-dream, which tries to induce the analyst into avoiding psychic change. At the beginning the analyst should let himself be recruited by experiencing the aspects that the patient is trying to eliminate. But simultaneously, or soon after, he should disengage himself from this identification by dreaming, thinking about and interpreting what is happening. That is, the analyst dreams the patient's non-dream. The analyst's interpretation becomes part of the patient's symbolic network.

But the analyst may sometimes let himself be engulfed by the patient's massive projective identification and thus lose his analytic capacity. When this happens, the analyst becomes unable to let the patient's non-dream be transformed into a dream. In these situations, analyst and patient run the risk of remaining indiscriminate, or symbiotic, in an area of mutual sluggish psychic functioning. In this case we are in the presence of a *non-dream-for-two*, which is the raw material of chronic enactment (Cassorla, 2008, 2018). The chronic enactment is a form of manifestation of the bastions. The analyst seems to have become stupid (Cassorla, 2013)

In fact, the two extremes mentioned (dreams and non-dreams) are hypothetical abstractions (Cassorla, 2018). In practice we find intermediate and mixed situations because psychotic functioning oscillates and co-exists with non-psychotic functioning, such as PS< >D (Bion, 1963). For example, there may exist non-dreams that seek to become dreams, *quasi-dreams*, dreams with meanings that are difficult to expand, dreams being transformed into non-dreams, interrupted dreams (Ogden, 2005) and states of confusion that blend non-dreams with dreams. In this continuum, many different levels of symbolization can be seen, such as raw elements, precarious symbols with little capacity for connecting, symbolic equations (Segal, 1957), obstructed or sophisticated symbolic networks, etc. Behaviors that show up as acts resembling theatrical mimicry or a silent movie (Sapisochin, 2013) are a part of this continuum. In this case there is externalization in the analytic field of early mental inscriptions that were not symbolized verbally because they occurred when the symbolic mind had not yet been constituted. They are related to what Freud (1914) called *Agieren* and fall into the category of chronic enactments.

The field of dreaming includes facts of the dream<-> nondream gradient, with different degrees of symbolic representation and nonrepresentation. In this respect, the palimpsest model may help. Any dream covers over other dreams which, in turn, cover over areas of non-dreams that represent traumas, which cover up undreamed childhood traumas which cover over other traumas transmitted transgenerationally, which cover over other dreams and nondreams, and so forth. We should broaden the model to a multidimensional palimpsest model in constant movement. Communication between areas leads us to suppose that, when an analyst redreams a symbolic dream through a dream-for-two, he may also, implicitly, be dreaming areas of non-dreams, and vice-versa.

(3) Chronic and Acute Enactment

Cassorla (2001, 2005, 2012) considered two categories of enactment, the chronic and the acute, in relation to the Barangers' 'bastion'.

The military model, when associated with the concept of projective identification, is useful for the classic work of the Barangers (1961–2), in which they describe the “bastion”, an obstacle to the progress of the battle which occurs in the analytic setting. The origin of the word “bastion” suggests fortifications sticking out at an angle from protective walls, making it possible to guard them and fire at enemies.

The idea of a bastion, as a fortification from which analytical work is hindered, might suggest that the analyst is actively advancing while the patient remains withdrawn, defending himself. However, this impression would be inaccurate. To the contrary, the above model is to be understood within the concept of a “field”, containing the current ideas about intersubjectivity.

For the Barangers, the analytic situation involved two people who were taking part in the same dynamic process, one in which neither member of the dyad is intelligible without reference to the other. And in turn the two people hide multipersonal structures. The “field” is made up of the conjunction of spatial and temporal structures and what is called “unconscious fantasy of the dyad”. This fantasy does not have its origins in the sum of the elements of the patient and the analyst, rather “It is something that is created *between* the two of them, within the single unit they make up during the session, something radically different from what each of them is separately” (p.141). It is important to note that everything that happens in the bi-personal field will not simply be a repetition, insofar as it arises in a new context.

The encounter with bastions brings paralysis back to the field, a feeling that nothing is happening, and that narratives are stereotyped. Even though at times the Barangers refer to the bastion as belonging to the patient, it remains clear that they mean to consider it as a product of the field. This contradiction is clarified better later on (Baranger et al., 1983), when they consider the bastion as a “precipitate” from the field, which can only occur between this analyst and this analysand, and “arises, in unconsciousness and in silence, out of a complicity between the two protagonists to protect an attachment which must not be uncovered” (p. 2). It is a neo-formation of the field, “around a shared fantasy assembly which implicates important areas of the personal history of both participants and attributes a stereotyped imaginary role to each” (p. 2).

In this way parts of the patient and parts of the analyst become intertwined and engulfed in a defensive structure. The bastion may appear a static foreign body, while the analytic process seems to be continuing to run its course or it takes over the whole field, becoming pathological. The breaching of the bastion sets off the destruction of the status quo, making it possible for the split-off parts to be re-signified, allowing them once again to be part of the emotional world. It is interesting to note the similarity between the Barangers’ description and what is named chronic enactment.

Enactment refers to behaviors that take place in the analytic field as the result of mutual emotional induction. Consequently, it involves both members of the analytic dyad.

Chronic enactment is expressed through behavior whereby an obstructive collusion is formed with neither patient nor analyst being aware of what is happening. The analytic process becomes

paralyzed in certain areas. Such conduct and behavior refer back to situations where verbal symbolization was weakened. When words exist, they serve as instruments for discharging or forms for expressing affects that involve the listener emotionally. In consequence, *chronic enactment can be viewed as a kind of bastion*. But, by definition, chronic enactments are not perceived by the dyad. Chronic enactment is also a consequence of the need for initial linking mechanisms to be revived in the analytic field. Sometimes, in this revival, the patient receives the analyst's alpha-function, even if this happens unconsciously. It is gradually introjected, which also happens unconsciously. When it becomes sufficient, *the symbiotic chronic enactment can be suddenly undone as an acute enactment*, that involve discharges in the analytic field including the possibility to destroy the process. This rupture manifests itself as abrupt behaviours that impose upon the analyst's observation due to their intensity. Only *then does the analyst realize what had occurred during the previous chronic enactment*. This *retroactive re-signifying* corresponds to the Freudian idea of *Nachträglichkeit*, deferred action, or *après coup* (Freud, 1918). In sequence the analyst perceives that acute enactment includes not only non-dream discharges but also non-dreams being dreamed. This way, it is shown that, at least in borderline configurations, there may be a need for an initial more or less chronic enactment or collusion to take place, which may go unnoticed. In this phase, the analyst and the patient 'are preparing' themselves unconsciously to face up to the triangularity. When this is possible, a change in the nature of the enactment occurs, which tries to communicate vigorously, in an intense way, what was hidden from the analyst, who will now be able to free himself from the collusion. Perhaps this is a part of the 'natural history' of the analytical process with narcissistic and borderline patients: a symbiotic phase (in which unconscious changes also occur, masked by the collusion), which needs time to be worked through, gradually creating the possibility for it to be broken. This sudden break-up (acute enactment) is a sign that the process of working through has now arrived at a point at which it is possible to run the risk of realizing that the analyst is a third party, an independent being, no longer a narcissistic extension of the patient. Thus, in the analytical process, the earliest phases of an individual's development are relived, with the possibility that new experiences may substitute archaic negative parental and environmental experiences in order to reach an oedipal situation that can be worked through. In this context, *acute enactments* are conglomerates that include discharges, non-dreams being dreamed and dreams regressing to non-dreams. They indicate ruptures in former situations of earliest development. For the analytic work to fruitfully proceed, the analyst must identify and give meaning to the facts that had occurred long ago, to include them into the symbolic thinking.

(See also entry ENACTMENT)

(4) "Normal Enactments" and the Analytic Field

The analytic process as a whole can be described as a continuum of normal and pathological enactments. The analyst is trying to transform the contents of the patient's internal world "staged" through interaction with those of the analyst himself, also making use of those derived from his unconscious countertransference. In other words, he or she willingly engages—as a co-participant—in the enactments that are constantly occurring in the analytic

setting, necessarily, simply by virtue of being an analyst. His role is to identify continuous enactments in advance and dismantle them as he goes along. The majority of these enactments are derived from realistic projective identifications and occur in conjunction with symbolic verbal communication. They are called by Cassorla (2001) “normal enactments”. Normal enactments occur on a continuum and the analyst uses his/her interventions to dismantle them. These are contrasted with “pathological enactments”, which are derived from massive projective identifications and are harder to avoid or dismantle. These can be classified as: *acute*—when they appear with great intensity, mobilizing the analytical dyad in a violent way, and lasting only moments when they are understood; or *chronic*—which are prolonged in a collusion that takes some time to be identified or which leads to an impasse that cannot be resolved.

Comparing Cassorla’s ideas on normal enactments with Barangers’ et al. (1983) writing on psychoanalytic process (and non-process) in the field, “There is process as long as the bastions are being detected and destroyed.” (p.13), It then follows that when the bastions take control of the field, there ceases to be a psychoanalytic process altogether. This can be viewed as a confirmation that bastions and “chronic enactments” are parts of similar clinical facts.

(5) Setting and Analytic Field

Cassorla (2017) differentiates the setting and the analytic field. The setting encompasses some aspects of the analytic field but not its complexity. He considers the mental setting as being more important than the setting defined by spatial and temporal rules. The mental setting shows the analyst’s ability to maintain a state of mind whereby she or he becomes involved in the analysis. But the analyst’s mental state must also allow her or him to be aware of when the dyad is distancing itself from what the analyst considers to be psychoanalysis. With this awareness, the analyst will return to her or his task of psychoanalysing, anywhere and at any time, even outside the office. Strictly speaking, the field of dreaming includes not only the temporal and spatial setting, but the mental setting as well. But the field goes beyond these since it includes all situations where symbolization can occur as a reflection of the analytic process. The emotional involvement between analyst and analysand begins even before the first interview and continues after each session, outside the analyst’s office. The analyst has the advantage of being able to perceive how her or his mental universe broadens when she or he writes about a session, when she or he talks about the analysand with colleagues, supervisors and analysts, when a nighttime dream of hers or his throws light on one or another analytic process, or when she or he has insights about an analysis while reading a book, watching a film or participating in a scientific meeting. The same thing also happens with analysands, but analysts have access to these facts later, during the sessions.

The analytic field also implies taking into account situations when psychoanalysis is not happening. For example, interruptions in the spatial, temporal or mental setting are part of the analytic field and constitute a privileged aspect of analysis. When the setting is destroyed the analytic field continues to be present and this makes it possible to observe and understand

breaks in the setting. The configuration of transference and countertransference are part of the field but should not be confused with it. In the field all emotional links are transitory, even if, at first impression, certain patterns are followed. It should also be recalled that any changes in the vertex of observation can alter these patterns. The real person of the analyst, the real person of the analysand and aspects of external reality are also part of the analytic field. Gender, age, religion, ideology, beliefs and life experiences of both analyst and analysand are aspects of the field. Financial difficulties may be articulated in fantasies but they can also be real facts. Likewise, an act of terrorism can serve as material for a dyad's dreams, but its consequences are nonetheless real. The analyst is trained to deal with dreaming and difficulties in dreaming, but he must expand his perception of the field to encompass factual reality and be aware of the consequences of this reality in the dyad's work. The analyst works to discern the area in which the dyad is working at any particular moment, even though he knows that moments are transitory and that different areas overlap.

(6) The Theatre Model and the Analytic Field

Cassorla (2005, 2018) proposed the theatre model as a way to describe the functions of the analyst working as an observer-participant in the analytic field, where he is both the object of fantasies and a real person. When facing scenes placed in the analytic theatre, an analyst, with her or his analytic function intact, will carry out the following functions simultaneously:

1. *Character*, by interacting with the other characters that come into the field.
2. *Spectator*, by observing and trying to understand what is happening. (The power to participate and observe at the same time allows her or him to exercise the functions described below.)
3. *Co-author*, to the extent that, when interacting with the characters in the field, the analyst does not necessarily do so simply according to the pressure she or he feels. Much analytic activity will consist of pointing out this pressure in order to make it understandable for the analysand (for whom it is not conscious).
4. *Director*, by analytically acting together with the characters in the field as she or he seeks the best way for the original plot to be understood and changed.
5. *Theatre critic*, by taking a step back from the scene and using her or his knowledge to critically evaluate how the drama was carried out, how the characters behaved or whether the scene could have occurred in some other way; here, she or he will emphasise the analyst's critical function. The analyst may also evaluate what explicit and implicit psychoanalytic theories were used for both observing and understanding the phenomena. These can be understood on the basis of other theories or if new concepts or models are required. The role of critic becomes more powerful after the dramatisation has occurred. In short, the analyst's critical capacity is an important factor for defining her or his vertices of observation.

6. *Light and sound technician*, by aiding the director in seeing and hearing what is happening. Theatrical presentations are impossible without sound or lighting and, for this reason, technicians should seek to light up dark aspects, including aspects that are trying to disappear into the wings. A good lighting technician throws light on the characters with appropriate nuances of brightness and color. The analyst's lighting function depends on her capacity to enter into the context of the scenes and live them "at-one-ment" (Bion, 1970). Adequate lighting is equivalent to psychoanalytically trained intuition. Since the analyst is simultaneously co-author, character and/or director, these functions will complement her or his capacity for psychoanalytic observation. Focusing on direction and lighting by the director-analyst (who is also co-author and actor) is the spontaneous product of dreams that are being dreamed. The capacity to make the adequate splits becomes an important factor for these functions to be carried out as well. The analyst's critical capacity determines in which functions of the field she or he should become involved as participating observer. Cassorla has emphasized the capacity of the dyad to become involved in the analytic field of dreaming, which generates meanings and expands the symbolic network of thought. This capacity is determined by factors in the analyst's intuition that allow her to work 'without memory, without desire, without the intention to understand', thus allowing herself to be led by what happens and without blocking meanings. It should be remembered, in fact, that one of the objectives of analysis is exactly to broaden meaning capacity. In practice, the field of dreaming may include subfields, which can be interwoven. For example, the models of cinema, theatre, circus, storytelling and playground are different ways for the field to function, interwoven, swirling and mixing together. If necessary the analyst may change his vertices of observation and transform the field (of dreaming, for example) into other fields. Such transitions among different aspects of the field or among different fields depends on the cohesion of his analytic identity, allowing the analyst to be herself or himself regardless of the field in which she or he participates.

II. Cbc. Multiple Fields Theory of Fabio Herrmann: A Similar Terminology with Different Meaning

The Multiple Fields Theory of Fabio Herrmann can be considered an *interpretation of Psychoanalysis*. It takes from the Freudian interpretative method its simultaneous condition, an unusual conjunction, exploring the action of producing knowledge and cure through the psychoanalytic method. Following again the Freudian path, it amplifies and applies it to a psychoanalytic interpretation of the relation between the individual and his world.

Evolution, exposition and utility of the concept

Brazilian psychoanalyst Fabio Herrmann's Multiple Fields Theory developed in São Paulo from the end of the 1960s as a critique of a clinical psychoanalysis that had become widespread, which did not advance beyond repetitions and detailing of the same themes enshrined by the dominant psychoanalytic schools (Freudian and Kleinian-Bionian). In this

context, it can be viewed as an attempt to confront a crisis of a theoretical nature characterized by the incommensurability of psychoanalytic schools, especially those that began to dominate the psychoanalytic world in the second half of the 20th century. This crisis arose because each of the major figures spearheading the different schools held to certain aspects in the Freudian project that she or he understood to contain all of Psychoanalysis. To Herrmann, this meant that the history of psychoanalysis has been functioning as a resistance to Psychoanalysis (Herrmann, 2002). He states, for instance:

“In Freud, Psychoanalysis occupied itself with a much larger area than therapy in the consulting room; after, within the psychoanalytic movement, it did not expand, it shrank. Psychoanalytic theory, on the other hand, was adapted to individual practice, transformed into an individual psychology and training, dividing itself into doctrinaire, scholastic systems. (...) The same political agreements that determined the centers of psychoanalytic power conventionalized the permissible extent of clinical work and, by default, the level of its theorization, defining a standard clinic and standard theory. (...) Today, a crisis of clinical practice forces even the more recalcitrant groups to practice an extended clinic, which sustains itself—wrongly, however—in the standard theories of the existing schools or, with some frequency, in a version of them, even more simplified; whereas, on the contrary, the extended clinic requires a more elevated degree of theorization: “high theory”—the region of metapsychology that extends upwards towards the psychoanalytic method.” (Herrmann, 2003, p.168)

Without constituting itself as a new psychoanalytic school, this system of thought has proposed to rescue the heuristic value of clinical work towards the formulation of psychoanalytic knowledge. It is an attempt to recover what Herrmann called the *psychoanalytic idea*—the Freudian achievement of incorporating into the science of its time the exploration of human meaning.

The Multiple Fields Theory resulted from Herrmann's reflections upon *two themes* that are closely related: *the unconscious and the psychoanalytic method*. It is, therefore, an *interpretation of Psychoanalysis* based on a critical discussion of its foundations.

According to Herrmann, the essential property of psychoanalytic method is to create the unconscious wherever it is applied. All systems of human relations—*relations* meaning any human product, from a singular idea or emotion, to intersubjective relations, to human reality as such, the attempt at representing the real—when interpreted by the method of Psychoanalysis, *open themselves*, so to speak, revealing their unconscious. This unconscious consists of a set of rules that determine, limit and shape relations, although its operation is hidden to those who participate’ in it. The surface of human relations—that is, all we think of, recall, dream of or do—is formed by representations (*Vorstellungen*). Their determining rules are not hidden in the depths of the spirit, but rather, simply, in the reverse of the representations themselves. The equivalent occurs in a field of forces that organizes the distribution of particles—invisible as it is, this field does not hide out in a remote location, but is merely the form occupied by such particles. And, as the psychoanalytic method contains the seeds of *relative unconsciousness* (Herrmann’s neologism) — the *unconsciousnesses* of most diverse

relations—it seems preferable to say that it uncovers *fields* of the relations under study. In the case of Multiple Fields Theory, this thinking is applied to the generalization of the Freudian concept of the unconscious.

The reasoning behind this generalization (which proposes a new term *field*) is threefold. In the first place, it is of a critical nature. Although the interpretative method was Freud's fundamental invention, a doctrinaire layer has covered it ever since the founder's own time—as if psychoanalysts, notwithstanding the proliferation of unconsciouses generated by psychoanalytic method, decided at each moment that either a specific unconscious were sufficient or total. Of all doctrines, Freud's was undoubtedly the most encompassing, for in it was enshrined, in an almost pure state, the interpretive method. Recovering the creative power of the method, rescuing it from the doctrinaire prison, was the first aspiration of the Multiple Fields Theory as a system of thought. The second reason is of a practical nature. As analysts make their living off their consulting rooms (their practice), psychoanalytic therapy occupied all of their attention. Furthermore, with the multiplication of the schools, different technical recipes of how to analyze arose. In other words, the method became lost in the techniques and doctrines. Nonetheless, as the results obtained by these doctrines—with their diverse models of the psyche and different formulas of clinical procedure—seem fundamentally similar, it became very evident that the same agent, the *method*, undergirded them all. The third reason follows from this last one, and it has to do with the fact that Psychoanalysis was converted over time into a sort of a science of analytical therapy. This is not, however, its *vocational horizon*, which is to create a general science of the psyche, whether regarding phenomena said to be pathological or (as Freud never ceased to demonstrate) those considered normal.

The Multiple Fields Theory was born of this critique and undertook to recover the psychoanalytical method, a method that had become concealed among theoretical doctrines and embedded in the techniques of clinical practice. In its aspiration to contribute to the development of a possible ***general science of the psyche***, it is therefore not merely another school, but an interpretation of Psychoanalysis.

The word *method* has a long history. Etymologically, it combines the meanings of *way* (odós) and an *objective that reaches beyond* (metá)—metá/odós. Before and after positivism—in positivism it indicates system, clarity, repetition, proof—method has primarily meant movement and mode. When Freud invented Psychoanalysis, questions about the nature of its method did not arise. Method, in the accepted epistemological sense, was unproblematic, because it was embodied in any of the Freudian analyses and above all in his writing.

The notion of method, in any discipline, designates the form of the process of knowledge acquisition, the form of knowledge production, and the form of the knowledge produced—that is, the form of its *empiria* (source of research), of the particular universe that it proposes. Psychoanalytic *empiria* is, above all, the psychoanalytic clinical work and psychoanalytic form of production is psychoanalytic interpretation.

It remains necessary, however, to determine this protean operation, that of interpretation. In fact, if interpretation were the equivalent to translation, one would have to

compile a lexicon of diverse theories. Given that interpretation in analysis possesses an extreme power of suggestion over not only the patient, but also the analyst, all answers would be simultaneously justified and each process of translation imposes itself on those who practice it. The *Multiple Fields Theory* conceives of interpretation as a process that *produces the opening of the psyche to new meanings* that were formerly impeded. From this perspective, the unconscious is no more than the set of emotional rules that, at each moment of analysis, drastically limit the meanings of discourse to the very subject the patient is trying to develop—a field of psychic forces that seeks to exclude most of its emotional connotations. *Field* here refers the Freudian unconscious turned inside out, i.e., not quite resistance, but rather production of the conventional meaning. In the *rupture of a field* by the psychoanalytic method, the analyst allows other emotional meanings to arise, which, in turn, she or he takes into consideration.

Fabio Herrmann's theoretical contribution - the Multiple Fields Theory - offers itself as an original critical heuristic thought. particularly in Brazil. After Herrmann's death in 2006, it continued to inspire further developments in the thinking of Leda Herrmann (2007, 2017), Fernanda Sofio (2014, 2015), and Luciana Saddi (2017). Among examples of such further developments are investigations of the position of psychoanalytic method in relation to scientific methodology overall (Taffarel 2005). One of the themes developed most recently is the juxtaposition between the 'Compulsive Destiny' in Freud's opus and 'Dialogical Destiny' in Hermann's thought (Guimarães 2018).

(See also entries THE UNCONSCIOUS, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, TRANSFERENCE, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, CONTAINMENT, INTERSUBJECTIVITY and ENACTMENT)

II. D. PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORY AND CONCEPTS IN EUROPE

The field concept, developed by **Madeleine and Willy Baranger**, remained relatively unknown in Europe until the works of the Latin American colleagues were translated. However, thanks to two IPA congresses, Madrid in 1983 and Amsterdam in 1993, and the subsequent translations of their texts into French, Italian and English, their thoughts have gradually made way into the wider psychoanalytic community. The concept thus found a wide audience in Italy, to a lesser extent in France and Belgium. Of course, the fact that both Willy and Madeleine Baranger are of French origin facilitated the ties that continued after their departure to Argentina and Uruguay. Both had studied philosophy in Toulouse and Paris before leaving France in 1946.

II. Da. Developments in Italy

In her encyclopedic entry on Willy Baranger (in: de Mijolla, 2003/2005), Madeleine Baranger noted: "[Willy] Barangers' work is generally well known and recognized in Latin America, but much less so in Europe, with the exception of Italy, where a selection of his work

was published in 1990 as “La situazione psicoanalitica come campo bipersonale (The Psychoanalytic Situation as a Bipersonal Field)” (p. 150). Since then, the Baranger’s field theory has been further developed and expanded not only in Latin America but also in Europe, particularly in Italy.

Antonino Ferro

Ferro (1999, 2009) has greatly contributed to give the field concept its current standing in Italian and European psychoanalysis. In his many successive writings on the subject, Ferro identified at least *two roots of the field concepts as it has been developed first in Italian psychoanalysis and then in other parts of Europe*.

Its first root, and the dominant influence, may of course be traced back to Latin America to the work of **the Barangers** whose original field concept proposes that the analyst and the patient jointly form blind spots, which they refer to as “bastions”, constituted by the projective identifications of both members of the analytical couple, patient and analyst. These pockets of resistance or real blind spots are formed continuously and need to be dissolved by the analyst’s “second glance” as “interpreter of the bastion”. Thus, it is immediately apparent that there is a field, albeit one that involves a high degree of asymmetry in as much as it is the analyst who occupies a position of strength and privilege in breaking down these areas of resistance. Linked with this resistance, it is important to introduce another of the Barangers’ contributions, in co-authorship with Mom (1988), in which they elaborate the concept of “pure trauma”, a universe where “dangers” are “nameless”, “placeless”, without an object (p.124). It is precisely to these experiences that the psychoanalytic process would seek to attach an object and ensure they were represented and included in a narrative. In this article the authors state that “psychoanalysis establishes itself against pure trauma”, but in considering “pure trauma”, they point out moments and impasses when the difficulties “may seem impossible to overcome in order to go farther in the psychoanalytic process” in that “no man’s land” (p.124).

Ferro sees the other important root of European Field theorizing in the work of **Francesco Corrao**, an Italian psychoanalyst and physician who was interested in Greek thought and epistemology. He was trained in psychoanalysis by a disciple of Melanie Klein Alexandra Stomerse who moved to Sicily. Corrao took over from her to develop psychoanalysis in Sicily. He became aware of Melanie Klein’s work and also became interested in Wilfred Bion’s thought and his theory on groups.

Corrao (1985) defined the field as being generated by *the encounter between the internal dynamics of both patient and analyst*, or rather, by a ‘Big Bang’ of sorts which occurs whenever the analytic couple meets, creating a single unit where once there were two distinct internal worlds. This big bang creates what might be called *a function, which only comes to life in the field*. Its features no longer pertain to either the analyst or the patient but are jointly generated in the analytic encounter when the couple’s diverse internal worlds merge to form a single entity. The analyst’s interpretative approach thus changes to accommodate these units, focusing on the movement within the field as a whole and no longer on its individual aspects.

The attention that was previously devoted to interpretations turns instead to the process of transformation.

Ferro's concept of '*bi-personal field*' (Ferro, 1999), a structure resulting from a convergence of the analyst's and patient's subjective fields, represents a radical way to conceive *unconscious intersubjectivity*. The entity engendered by the interaction of the two subjectivities is something new, more than the sum of the two individual fields, which are taken over by this new structure. Insofar as the bi-personal field belongs to the present 'here-and-now' brought into being by the two subjects engaged in the psychoanalytic journey, the temporal dimension of individuals is overlooked, outlining a sort of "horizontal modellings of intersubjectivity" (Bohleber 2013, p. 812), a kind of a horizontal conception of the unconscious.

Ferro (2009) further *expanded* and clarified his field conceptualization at the Boston Bion Conference, where he blended *field theory with a Bionian conceptual framework*: "...after a long period of engagement, it was time to announce the marriage between Bion (or, better, many of his concepts) and the concept of Field" (Sabbadini and Ferro 2010, p. 424). The field now involves: "1. *The explicit move from a bi-personal to a multipersonal field*, where internal groupings of patient and analyst become engaged in complex interactions. 2. *The introduction of the concept of character of the field* as an ongoing hologram/manifestation of the pairing between internal groupings of analyst and patient; and, from a different perspective, understood as narrative derivatives of the waking dream thoughts. 3. *The identification within the field of structures and forms of functioning belonging to the field*, in terms of α function of the field, β turbulences in the field, and containing qualities of specific sites in the field (♀) and hypercontents (♂) in other sites. 4. *The field, by now clearly three-dimensional, becomes the site of all possible histories. Little by little, all the tools for thinking introduced by Bion will be considered as belonging to the field*, of which the current relationship is one of the loci, as is the History which continuously presses to be deconstructed, deconcretized, and dreamed. The same applies to the β elements waiting to be dreamed..." (Sabbadini and Ferro 2010, pp. 424-425; italics added).

The main point is that what comes to life in the field is dreamlike, referring to Bion's concept of alpha function - beta transformation into alpha and the development of tools for thinking - which thus becomes part of the field concept. *The field becomes an essentially dreamlike concept, a field capable of producing transformations*, and a field in which all that presents itself, and originates there, belongs only to the field. Nothing is outside the field and, in a way, nothing can exist outside of it, without necessarily being decoded and deconstructed. Deconstructing and interpreting are things that the analyst can do. Another possibility is to follow what the patient says, following the dreamlike thread and thus allow transformations.

In Ferro's work with **Roberto Basile** (Ferro and Basile, 2008), the field is understood as a meeting point of the *multiple characters* of patient and analyst with a life of their own, as if on stage. Transformations of the characters in the session's narratives are seen as representing *the transformations in the analytic field*. Ferro (2009) and **Giuseppe Civitarese** (Civitaresse 2008; Ferro and Civitarese 2013a,b) stress the use of the analyst's mind and body, held in *reverie*, as a guide to the unconscious processes in the patient and between analyst and

analysand. In the context of classical psychoanalysis, when the patient speaks about people, they are considered usually as historical characters. In a Kleinian model of analysis, the characters that enter the session are understood as internal objects, inhabitants of the patient's inner world. From the standpoint of the field concept, there is an added complexity: the concept of people is replaced by the concept of characters, so if a patient speaks about his uncle Francis, his dog, his grandfather or his brother, these characters are considered to be co-constructed by the analyst and the patient and to constitute ongoing signals of the field's life within the setting.

Therefore, whatever the discourse may be, regardless of its latitudinal or longitudinal coordinates, or of how the narrative theme unfolds in the session, the characters brought into the scene constitute functions of the field, serving to construct and communicate whatever is occurring in the depths of the field's psychic life.

Ferro (2009, 2017a) also described an operation he refers to as "Field Zero Time" or mourning for reality: "Operation 'Field Zero Time' is mourning for Reality, That Reality which corresponds to Time 'Zero', to 'O', to the Final (or First) Reality which will be worked out in the Black Hole of column two on Bion's Grid (as Grotstein reminds us in an extraordinary way), which funnels out, sucking in 'Reality', transforming it into narrative, or using the various ways through it, we could say alphabetising it and rendering it into material suitable for the construction of dream" (2017a, p. 73).

The analytic field, according to Ferro, has no limits apart from those of its *perennial expansiveness*. In the analytic field, there is '360 degrees listening'. In the 'space-time' of analysis – and this depends on the triad of a setting, an analyst and a patient – there are no extra-field phenomena or communications. Even the most real and realistic communication is to be considered relevant to the field even if it takes time for its relevance to be understood or expressed. Every communication will be eventually deconstructed, de-concretised, and re-dramatized with multiple possible scenarios. In this vein, Ferro lays emphasis on the development of the *narrative capacity*, which comes to life in the field through the operations of de-concretisation, de-saturation, de-construction leading to the possibility of co-constructing, co-narrating and co-playing. As he (Ferro 2019) noted later, reading, writing and play become the instruments and pillars of *creativity*. Starting with a saturated and concrete content, new emotional experiences are woven. Here, the analytic field is also the site of all the patient's and analyst's *potential identities*, which does not mean that all the potential identities must come to life or be integrated: sometimes it is appropriate for them to remain split off within the strata of the field itself for the whole of the time, when useful for the development of mental life and creativity.

From a *relational perspective*, the analyst's mental functioning in the session is an operation which is found and taken up in a certain way by the patient's associations. This is somewhat complicated by field theory, in as much as what comes to life in the session refers to and describes the very functioning of the field, without it being possible to determine what comes from the patient and what comes from the analyst. The field must be able to change from a beta field to an alpha field.

Overall, Antonino Ferro (2017b) enriched the concept of the field in multiple ways by incorporating some of Bion's later ideas about *Transformations in O* and his many ideas of the development of thinking. He introduced the “*extended field concept*” by associating the field concept with the ideas of “alpha function” in the metabolic and elaborative capacity and “narrative function” which makes it possible to transform emotions into narrations, and vice versa, narrations into emotions. To add further complexity, the Field concept is not only restricted to the dyad alone, considering Bion's binocular view of the individual-in-the-group-as-a whole.

II. Db. Developments in France

In **France**, in 1983, in preparation for the IPA congress in Madrid, Luisa de Urtubey translated one of the Barangers' most significant paper: “The analytic situation as a dynamic field” (1961-62). In de Urtubey's introduction (1985), she underlined the importance of this article as a reference for South American psychoanalysis.

Luisa de Urtubey and **Haydée Faimberg** (1987), both South American analysts and members of the Psychoanalytical Society of Paris, have greatly contributed to raising the awareness among the French Psychoanalytic community about Latin American thinking. Faimberg (1987) developed the concept of *listening to listening* based on the work of the Barangers and Jose Bleger. Faimberg's ‘Listening to listening’ is about listening to ‘how’ the patient hears and interprets or reinterprets the analyst's interpretation, intervention or even silence, in order to promote awareness of the intense psychic work going on in the process.

Based on the theories of Klein and Bion, the Barangers insist on the transfer-transfer relationship and on *the new transference object* that this relationship, which becomes a new formation in its own right, constitutes. Overall, in this and many other ways, the concept of the ‘field’ makes it possible to understand certain aspects and dimensions of the analytical situation more completely. At the same time, it *differs from* other concepts that are **similar**, but do not coincide, such as *atmosphere*, *framework*, *relationship*, or the *analytic third*. It was by emphasizing the understanding of *non-neurotic states*, as **André Green** (2002) calls them, that the Barangers found a receptive audience in French psychoanalysis, especially because they remained as close as possible to the unconscious without falling into a purely phenomenological intersubjective dimension that would cause the unconscious dimension of the analytical process to lose all its strength.

Another trend in French psychoanalysis, which also stems from the social dimension and socio-political interest, is represented by the work of **René Kaës** (2009), who developed the notion of an *unconscious alliance in groups* and *in the analytical relationship*. Kaës also developed the notion of *isomorphic polarity* which is a defensive organisation against archaic distress. Both notions that are *close to the “bastions”* described by Willy and Madeleine Baranger. According to Kaës, an *unconscious alliance exists in every treatment* and can have a structural, defensive but also alienating function, especially since it is unconscious and shared

by both members of the analytical dyad, even if the structure is asymmetrical. In this context, Kaës' three psychic spaces are instructive:

- 1) *the space of the singular subject*: the subject in relation to his internal space and that of others, but also putting into work unconscious processes and unconscious psychic formations which enable the subject to establish links with others and with the whole of which he is a part and constituent. This is how pacts, alliances and contracts are constituted which organize the psychic space of the subject and make him a subject of the unconscious by virtue of his status as a subject of the group.
- 2) *the psychic space of the group* and of the pluri-subjective sets of the specific whole formed by the group: the family or the couple. Here, the 'whole' corresponds to Freud's (1921) model of the "Group Psychology". This 'whole' of group psychology is, in contemporary Kaës' parlance, *a group psyche, the psychic space of the group*.
- 3) *the psychic space of the intersubjective link* that is established between a subject in the 'whole' that they constitute and that contains them. A link is that which binds several subjects together in a whole, it is, like the couple, the group or the family, irreducible to the sum of its constituent subjects.

II. Dc. Developments in Belgium

In **Belgium**, Willy Baranger's first article was published in 1985. This was his article on "The dead-alive: Object structure in mourning and depressive states", which he himself translated for the Belgian Review of Psychoanalysis, enabling members to appreciate the richness of the psychoanalytic thoughts in Argentina, just after the French translation of José Bleger's (1967) book *Symbiosis and Ambiguity*.

In their joint report presented at the 2002 French Speaking Congress in Brussels, **Jacqueline Godfrind, Maurice Haber, Marie-France Dispaux and Nicole Carels** chose to focus on the psychic transformations associated with the analytic process, taking into consideration transference-countertransference movements in the inter-psychic field. The psychic change they refer to as 'psychic transformation' is seen as the result of the analytical process built on the encounter between two psyches, creating inter-psychic functioning in an analytical space or analytical field. By exploring the impact of transfer-counter-transference movements on transformations and their intrapsychic effect, they identified as indicators of psychic transformation qualitative changes in at least stable psychic ways of functioning of increasing mental complexity.

The influence of the Baranger's writings was felt throughout the report, in particular in the "Shared Action Experience" of **J. and M. Haber-Godfrind** (2002), who started out with their interest in the events during analysis. They take into consideration the network of unconscious acts that is woven between analysand and analyst below the deployment of neurotic material; they deepen its participation in psychic transformations.

In "To the sources of Interpretation", Dispaux (2002) developed interpretation on the "analytic site", with reference to the expression used by **Jean-Luc Donnet** (1995). She envisions analytical work built on a type of interpretation that finds its purpose in linking. She advocates the idea of "co-aesthetic" work in which the psychic work of the analyst is a response to the patient's need for representation.

Nicole Carels (2002) leaned on Winnicott's transitional space, to show, especially in child psychoanalysis, the importance of the psychic work of the analyst to build this space. Transformations are considered from the angle of intra-psychic and inter-psychic limits and according to the hypothesis principle of convergence and divergence.

Fabio Hermann's (2003) work is not well known in Europe, but his theory of the *Multiple Fields* and his criticism of overly dogmatic psychoanalytical currents could be echoed by similar critics in Europe. In France, Hermann's wish to restore the strength of the unconscious and prioritize the analytic method evoked the work of **Donnet** (2005) on the method. Donnet highlights that it is *the gap between the rule and the game that animates the analytical setting* and supports the dynamics of the transference that constitute the 'analytical situation'.

In the European Federation, different working groups applied '*the group as psychic whole*' approach to listen to the psychoanalytic material in the session. The first one was the group of Haydée Faimberg's "Listening to listening". This method (Faimberg 2005) creates the conditions for understanding of the invisible, inaudible theoretical and clinical basic assumptions that make an analyst work as he works. The second one was introduced by B. Salomonsson (2012), using his "Weaving thoughts" i.e., a method for presenting and commenting on psychoanalytic case material in a peer group with a free association method. Finally, the third working group, led by Evelyne Sechaud and Serge Frisch, applied the "Specificity of psychoanalysis today" method. Here, the group of psychoanalysts were listening to a fragment of clinical material and were able to de-condense the many facets and issues of the session thanks to the sharing, by all participants, of the echoes that the presented analysis evoked in them (Lysebeth, Dirkx, Minazio, du Bled, Ducarme, Frisch et al. 2008). These three methods used the strength of the group as a sounding board to listen to the material based on the theories of Bion, Pichon Rivière, the Barangers, Donnet, and Kaës.

(See also entries THE UNCONSCIOUS, PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES and CONTAINMENT)

II. E. THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE FIELD CONCEPT IN NORTH AMERICA

The phenomenological project was brought to New York by Husserl's student, Aron Gurwitsch, and along with American Pragmatism, contributed to shaping the Interpersonal Psychoanalytic sensibility founded by Sullivan. Significant contributions were made by Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Clara Thompson, and Benjamin Wolstein, with a later generation of theorists who more directly elaborated a field sensibility, Edgar Levenson, Philip

Bromberg and Donnel Stern. This in turn can find influence among Relational thinkers, where the field concept is not emphasized as a discrete concept, but where a field sensibility is imbricated in their foundational orientation (Mitchell, Stern, Benjamin, Bass, Aron). The phenomenological focus on the field can be also later found in the Intersubjective work of North American Stolorow, Brandshaft, Atwood and Orange (Stolorow, Brandshaft and Atwood 1987; Atwood, Stolorow and Orange 2011).

A further influence is found through Bion's sojourn in Los Angeles, influencing his patient James Grotstein and then shaping his student Thomas Ogden's concept of the analytic third.

II. Ea. Points of Entry and Lines of Development

One point of entry of the concept of the analytic field into North American psychoanalytic thinking and practice was through writing on the subject of "the analytic situation," as comprehensively addressed in Leo Stone's 1961 monograph of that same title, in which he delineated a basic metapsychology of the clinical situation in psychoanalytic practice. In that work, along with later papers, in particular "The Psychoanalytic Situation and Transference: Postscript to an Earlier Communication", published in 1967, Stone described the analytic situation as consisting of a "central communicative field" consisting of free association that, along with the rule of abstinence, created a "dynamic effect" that promotes a regressive transference neurosis. Stone emphasized that the analytic situation features a "specific, dynamic effect" that lends a special quality and quantitative depth to the transference and the psychoanalytic process, one that is crucially shaped by both the analyst and the analysand. Still later, Stone (1975) defined psychoanalytic situation as a "gestalt ensemble" and a "synergistic organization" with a "dynamic power" (p. 334). A direct line of development can be drawn from the work on the part of Stone and others to contemporary ideas pertaining to the analytic field.

A second line of development expands outward from Klein's notion of the internal object, which Meltzer reported that she came to feel might be more properly conceived in terms of a "field" of forces and objects, the nature of which was expressed by Meltzer in his description of the analytic process as involving the internal objects of the analysand and analyst talking to one another and the implications for analytic listening such an image implies. Similar indications can be found in the evolution of Klein's (1935, 1940) internal world and technical focus on the here and now in the analytic session (Steiner, 2017), through Betty Joseph's (1985) elaboration of Klein's conceptualization of the transference as a "total situation," to the idea of the analytic field. These ideas were introduced in a more concentrated fashion with the arrival of Bion in Los Angeles in 1970, where he exerted a tremendous influence on certain American analytic writers and thinkers, most prominent among which was James Grotstein. Grotstein (2007) expanded on Bion's (1965, 1970) ideas regarding transformations and invariant elements in the analytic process, as well as his expansion of the idea of maternal reverie and

the conceptualization of the group as an “establishment” and, as such, a container, or ‘field’, that must be able to receive and metabolize new experience in order for growth to occur.

II. Eb. North American Field Conceptualizations and Related Field Concepts

II. Eba. Langs’ Bi-Personal Communicative Field(s)

The psychoanalytic writer and theorist **Robert Langs** (1976, 1979) made use of both of these lines of development, in the process of which he attempted to integrate the work of Stone, Klein and Bion in explicit fashion. In addition, although Langs’s work never achieved a mainstream acceptance in North American psychoanalytic circles of influence, he was notable in being the first North American analyst to import the idea of the analytic field as first described by the Barangers (1961-1962) into North American psychoanalytic discourse in his conceptualization of the ‘bipersonal field’, adding to it the description of subtypes of ‘communicative fields’ in psychoanalytic treatment along the dimension of the capacity of the analytic couple for containment and symbolic processing and the implications of the different subtypes for the depth of analytic process possible.

Drawing on contributions of Post-Kleinian Object Relations theories, especially Bion, Winnicott, Racker, Grinberg and Bleger, aided to by Freud, Stone, Greenson and Gill, Searles and Green, prominently inspired by Barangers (1961-62, 1966, 1969, 2008) conceptualization of Psychoanalytic Situation as a Dynamic Bi-Personal Field, Langs (1979, 1986) constructed an elaborate model of the *Communicative Bi-Personal Field*: Type A, where symbolic communication occurs and where the field itself becomes the realm of illusion; Type B, where projective identification and action predominate; and Type C, where all communication and meaning is destroyed. Modifying Freud’s Topographic Theory of the Unconscious, Preconscious and Conscious systems, in conjunction with Signal theory of anxiety, Langs stressed the unconscious perception rather than unconscious fantasies and conflicts. Triggering anxiety signals, emotionally laden perceptions are visually encoded and stored in the Deep Unconscious system, according to the laws of primary process. Elaborating specifically on transformative-communicative properties of the bi-personal fields, Langs (1986) posits “Transformation subsystems”, which operate between the Deep Unconscious and Conscious systems, effecting first the visual encoding of elements of emotionally intense and intolerable unconscious percepts and their storage (according to the laws of primary process mechanisms) in the Deep Unconscious. Their transformation and access to the conscious mind are facilitated by the analyst’s interpretative here-and-now interactively tuned affectively laden messages. Therapist’s transformative interpretive action is progressively introjected by the patient as a transformational function, through complicated working through process. Because the most emotionally intense unconsciously transmitted and encoded messages inevitably involve elements of primitive death anxiety and projections of death images, increased attention to the analytic frame is necessary to contain them.

Of note is Theo Dorpat’s (1999) addition of the ‘Type D’ inauthentic affective communication of the ‘false self’, a mode of relatedness as well as an interactional defense on

part of the patient, generating analyst's countertransferential conflict between inattention and 'a professional duty to listen'. The subsequent identification of the 'D communication' of both parties facilitates the analysis of the 'false self'.

(See also entry TRANSFORMATION)

II. Ebb. Concept of the Field in Interpersonal and Relational Theories

In the United States, the concept of the field in interpersonal theory began in the work of Harry **Stack Sullivan**, **Erich Fromm**, **Frieda Fromm-Reichmann**, and **Clara Thompson**. In Sullivan's "Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry", the 'interpersonal field of action' was considered the matrix of all psychiatry. Through his theory of development focused on mother-infant relatedness, and his work on dissociation, among others, Sullivan's was the most important conceptual influence.

Another early progenitor, **Sandor Ferenczi's** (1928, 1988) early portrayal of psychoanalysis as the interaction of two real personalities, his recognition of centrality of countertransference as a mutually shaping complement to transference, analyst's active participation, flexibility of psychoanalytic technique, his interests in unconscious communication alongside of trauma and re-traumatization, has continued to inspire later generations of interpersonal and relational field theorists (Wolstein, 1989; Aron & Harris, 1993; Fiscalini, 2004; Bass, 2001, 2003, 2015, 2019; Atlas & Aron, 2017).

Interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis are both centered on the concept of the field, as a *very broadly defined field theory*. Implicit in most interpersonal and relational writings, is that the analytic situation is defined in terms of its *relatedness*, referred to by **Stephen Mitchell** (1988) as *relational matrix*.

Throughout the evolution of this perspective, the transition from the analyst as participant observer to an *observing participant* is one of the themes. Here it is emphasized that the analyst cannot not interact in the therapeutic process (Hirsch 2015). The foundation of this shift came in the work of **Edgar Levenson** (1972, 1983, 1991, 2017; Levenson, Hirsch & Iannuzzi, 2005; Foehl, 2008), **Benjamin Wolstein** (Bonovitz, 2007; Wolstein, 1959, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 2000), and later, **Merton Gill** (1982, 1995).

Levenson described the analyst's unconscious '*transformation*' by the field, shaped by the unconscious interpersonal patterns of feeling, thought, and conduct originating in the patient's family, which then became unconscious and enduring structuring influences in the patient's mind. For Levenson, treatment became a struggle for the analyst to grasp this transformation and use this understanding to the patient's benefit. Here, the analyst began to be understood to be involved in the same way with the patient as the patient was with the analyst, both initially unaware of a substantial portion of this involvement.

Donnel Stern (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) eloquently posits the main tenets of the analytic field theory, describing how analyst and patient are continuously and inevitably, and

consciously and unconsciously, in interaction with one another. This interaction has to do with what they experience in one another's presence, especially in terms of the affective aspects of experience, and how they behave. Here, the field is the *sum total of all conscious and unconscious influences*, that each of the analytic participants exerts on the other, as well as the *outcome* of all those influences, the relatedness and experience that is created between the two people as a result of the way they deal with one another.

As soon as there is an outcome in the field—as soon as the field changes to accommodate the influences supplied by its participants—that outcome becomes part of the influence on the next moment of relatedness. Like the influences that pass back and forth, outcomes in the field are not necessarily conscious. In a continuous evolving sequence, each moment of influence in the field interacts with the personalities of those who are influenced to create the next moments of relatedness; and those moments of relatedness, in turn, are part of the conscious and unconscious influences on each participant's experience of the moment after that.

For most theorists of the interpersonal field, even when the process of formulating conscious experience unfolds without undue defensive inhibition, disruption, or detour, the course of that formulation is charted in the same moment that it takes place, and its final shape therefore comes into being only as it arrives in our minds. Prior to that moment, for many interpersonal and relational analysts, what will become formulated experience is only possibility. Conscious experience, that is, does not pre-exist its formulation; it is not predetermined, but emergent; it is not the revelation of something that is already “there” in the mind, but a process, an activity. Here, the interpersonal, relational, or intersubjective dimension of the experience can be reached: the experience that can be formulated within the analytic dyad is a function of the nature of the relatedness between the two people. The possibilities for the changing contents of consciousness are determined by the equally mercurial nature of the interpersonal field.

Here, the *field is a jointly created configuration of relatedness*, a social medium that is the result of the conscious and unconscious involvement and intersection of two subjectivities, including the interaction of what are referred to in other traditions as internal objects. The participants in the field may or may not be aware of the field's influences on them, depending at least partly on the consequences that would ensue from that awareness. Akin to the *analytic or intersubjective third* (Ogden, 1994; Benjamin, 2004), or to **Samuel Gerson** (2004)'s *relational unconscious*, field is a configuration of influences that continuously gives clinical process its particular, changing shape and nature.

The field links two subjectivities, however, it is not a simple additive combination of influences. Instead, it is a unique creation, a new and ceaselessly changing *gestalt* that expresses and represents the present, shifting states of relatedness between patient and analyst. *Broader than transference-countertransference*, the field includes the influences on each participant of the entire nexus of affects, motives and intentions, thoughts, proto-thoughts, meaningful behaviors, metaphors, and fantasies that come into being when two people are involved with one another.

How the field is composed in any particular moment encourages some unbidden articulations of experience and discourages others. The composition of the field is created by the interaction of the self-states of its participants, and is therefore in continuous flux. As self-states shift in the minds of each participant in responsive reciprocity with the self-states of the other participant (Bromberg, 1998, 2006, 2011), the field changes.

“The *interpersonal field remains a concept, not an experience*” (Stern 2013c, p.233). In more experience-near terms, changes in the field are changes in the possibilities for relatedness—i.e., changes in the kinds of relatedness that are facilitated and inhibited. We rarely “know” the field. For the most part, the field comes to our attention only through what we *sense* or *feel* of its influences. To explicitly reflect on the field usually requires a conscious effort, one that few people besides psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, with their professional interests, have a reason to expend; and there are many circumstances, or aspects of the field, that do not even allow the possibility of such reflection. On the phenomenological level, as the nature of the field shifts, as different kinds of relatedness feel most obvious or natural to the participants, patient and analyst ‘fall into, and out of’, certain relational patterns. As one kind of relatedness becomes natural (friendliness), other kinds of relatedness (irritability) fall into the background and feel less comfortable, easy, or natural to create in this environment, or are even actively avoided, sometimes with unconscious dynamic purpose (i.e., unconscious defensive purpose). Stern (2013c) summarily underscores two points: First, taking in consideration the facilitating and inhibiting influences of the field on the contents of individual minds, with the consequent importance of the allowance of the greatest possible range of unbidden experiences, which rests on the degree of flexibility and freedom of the field. Second, the degree of the field’s flexibility is defined by the range of relatedness available to the both participants.

Extreme examples of inhibiting influences in the field are *dissociative enactments*. Here, Stern’s (1989, 1990, 1997, 2003, 2004) theory of enactments is an extension and elaboration of his work on unformulated experience (1983, 1997), a dissociation-based perspective of the unconscious. Acknowledging imprints of **Philip Bromberg’s** (1998; 2000) thinking of enactments as the result of dissociation, when conflict does not exist, Stern (2004) writes: “1. Enacted experience, and thus dissociated states as well, cannot be symbolized and therefore do not exist in any other explicit form than enactment itself. Enacted experience is unformulated experience. 2. Dissociated states, because they are unsymbolized, do not and cannot bear a conflictual relationship to the states of mind safe enough for us to identify as “me” and inhabit in a consciously appreciable way. 3. Enactment is the interpersonalization of dissociation: the conflict that cannot be experienced within one mind is experienced between or across two minds. The state dissociated by the patient is explicitly experienced by the analyst, and the state explicitly experienced by the patient is dissociated in the analyst's mind. Each participant therefore has only a partial appreciation of what is transpiring. 4. Enactment, then, is not the expression of internal conflict. Enactment is the *absence* of internal conflict—though the external conflict, the conflict between the two people in the enactment, may be intense. 5. Enactment ends in the achievement of internal conflict, which occurs when the two dissociated states, one belonging to each participant in the enactment, can be formulated inside

the consciousness of one or the other of the two psychoanalytic participants.” (Stern 2004, p. 213)

Stern proposes further (2013c) that the goal in working with dissociative enactments and with milder constrictions of the field is to become aware of, and then loosen, constricted interaction. This unlocks the capacity of relatedness to serve as the crucible for the unbidden. But because as all events in the field embody an *emergent* quality of the relatedness itself, it is impossible to proscribe a technique to accomplish it and to describe exactly what needs to be done *to expand relational freedom*. Instead, Stern highlights openness to the unexpected, to *court surprise* by attending to ‘affective snags and chafing’, and allowance to feel deeply the clinical relatedness. The analysts’ affective involvement and thoughtful study of their own experience is all they can contribute.

Many other Relational and Interpersonal analytic thinkers made notable contributions to the field theory and conceptualizations. This diverse group includes, among many others, **Jody M. Davies** (1996, 2003, 2004) writing on multiple selves, dissociation, enactments, but also integration of internal objects and contemporary interpersonal field; **Lew Aron** (1995, 2005), writing on the relational view of the primal scene and interpersonal perspective on interaction; **Jill Gentile** (1998, 2008, 2010), approaching the subject of the field as the product of the dialectic between the a priori and the intersubjective-relational, the private and the public, and the desire (to know) versus the destruction of the desire. **Jessica Benjamin** (1988, 1995, 1999, 2017) theorizes the relational field in terms of movement between projective-identificatory complementarity and intersubjective mutuality, the inner and the outer, and most recently focusing on the experiential structure of the Third which facilitates mutual recognition, shifting the field out of ‘doer-done -to’ relations. The nature of the ongoing field processes is defined then by back-and-forth movement between the intersubjectivity and doer-done-to relations.

(See also entries THE UNCONSCIOUS, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, SELF, CONFLICT)

II. EBc. Intersubjective Field in Self Psychology

Kohut, Lichtenberg, Stolorow and Collaborators

Self Psychology began by carrying over the ego psychological emphasis on an intrapsychic focus. To this focus **Hans Kohut** (1971) added a conception of a special relationship between the self and the *selfobject*. In this field-related concept, a deficit in the self (such as the regulation of anxiety) are paired by the transmuting internalization of the function from the object into the self. This relationship between a self becoming cohesive through the activity of the selfobject has been referred to as a ‘one and a half person’ psychology.

Two major revisions were made to this original conception. One was a shift from the language and conceptions of the structure hypothesis to an experience-near theory (**Lichtenberg**, 1975, 1979, 1992). Addressing a sense of self, a sense of the object, and a *selfobject experience of enlivenment* and cohesion connected Self psychology to the subjectivity of intersubjectivity. The second far-reaching revision was the proposal by **Robert**

Stolorow (1997) of intersubjectivity, inherent in all human relatedness and of the intersubjective field. In Stolorow's broad conception (Stolorow 1997), the *intersubjective field*, which is located at the intersection of individual subjectivities, is at the center of the entire psychoanalytic framework as well as all human relatedness and all development. Individuals coalesce as precipitates of the field. The field functions in present, real time. Repetition strictly speaking does not occur. (Katz 2013, p. 291). Here, the intersubjective field itself, and not the individuals that make it up, are the basic, indivisible ground of experience. This field is the functioning whole and is the object of psychoanalytic process (Stolorow and Atwood, 1989). In the psychoanalytic process, "The psychological field formed by the interplay of the patient's transference and the analyst's transference is an example of what we call an *intersubjective system*" (Stolorow 2013, p. 383, original italics).

Grappling with the contextualism and phenomenology versus metaphysics and metapsychology, Stolorow (Stolorow and Atwood 2013) made a remarkable statement: "As our ideas have evolved over the decades (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, 1993; Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992; Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002; Stolorow, Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1987), however, it has become apparent to us that we, too, have not escaped the metaphysical impulse. The concept of the intersubjective field - central in our theorizing for many years—itself shows a tendency to become objectified and universalized. Accordingly, we have tried to think through the embeddedness of this idea in the personal and collaborative contexts of our work together (Atwood & Stolorow, 2012) and thereby to transcend its potentially limiting influence on efforts to understand still unexplored realms of human experience. Metaphysics, arising as a response to the tragic finitude of our existence, cannot be permanently transcended, and there will accordingly never be a psychoanalytic theory that is completely metapsychology-free. The answer to the dilemma this poses for our discipline, however, lies in a shared commitment to reflection on the constitutive contexts of all our theoretical ideas, including the idea of context itself..." (Stolorow and Atwood 2013, p. 418-419).

In analytic therapy, the intersubjective field of the interplay of subjectivities of analyst and analysand shifts the traditional emphasis on transference and countertransference to an expanded expression of the analyst's subjective experience. This redefinition of the analyst's role in the dyadic relationship creates a "more reciprocal (yet, still asymmetrical) subject-to-subject intimacy" (Lichtenberg, Lachmann, & Fosshage, 2016, p. 86-87). The subjectivity of intersubjectivity refers to the individual's awareness of affects, intentions, goals, perspectives, and reflections about him or herself. Additionally, as emphasized in self psychology and attachment theory, subject-to-subject intimacy is based on and necessary for each person to sense into the state of mind, perspective and strivings of the other (empathy [Kohut, 1971] and mentalization [Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target 2002]). Along with helping to account for empathic perception, intersubjectivity of the field helps to explain three other concepts central to Self Psychology: a focus on adaptive strivings, disruption-restoration sequences, and the ambiance that develops in the field. In its focal point of entry into developments in the intersubjective analytic field, Self Psychology tends to give precedence to inferences about a patient's positive strivings (as a leading edge) while many other relational theories give

precedence to interpreting maladaptive conflictual strivings (as following, i.e., a trailing edge). The *ambiance* - the general affective state, that is more than the individual subjectivities of the members of any intimate dyad – that forms in the intersubjective field of an ongoing analysis has a profound effect on both analyst and analysand and the outcome of the treatment. (See also entry SELF, THE UNCONSCIOUS, INTERSUBJECTIVITY)

Field in Infant Research: Beatrice Beebe, Frank Lachmann, Daniel Stern and others

Conceptualizations emerging out of developmental-psychoanalytic research (Beebe 2000; Beebe, Jaffe, Lachmann, Feldstein, Crown, & Jasnow, 2000; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985–1996; Harpaz-Rotem & Bergman, 2006; Steele, 2010; Stern, 1985; Stern et al., 1998; Tronick, 2002) drew, among others, on Spitz (1950), Bowlby (1958), Mahler, Pine and Bergmann (1975), Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978), Winnicott (1971), and various *early theories of mutual regulation* (Bateson, 1972).

After Main and Goldwyn's (1998) construction of the Adult Attachment Interview, the trend was toward longitudinal studies and the dynamic processes underlying behavior. Internalization, representation, and *mutual affective regulation* (Tronick, 2002; Field, 1995) were inferred from closely monitored infant and caregiver interactional matrixes of the partner's gaze, facial expression, touch, and vocal rhythm and cadence, together with verbal narratives (Beebe, Jaffe, Lachmann, Feldstein, Crown, & Jasnow, 2000; Cohen & Beebe, 2002).

Overall, research findings (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002) indicate that caregiver-infant affective-cognitive interactions set the pattern and tone of relatedness in mutual affective regulation. Tracking moment-to-moment interactions, Beebe, Lachmann and Jaffe (1997) propose *the systems model of inherent field theory underlying "a system defined by the constant interactive process which exists between its components ..."* (p. 215).

Such interactive system emerges as a function of the dyad; it is not "permanent," but rather is in a constant process of potential reorganization and non-linear transformational active restructuring (Sameroff 1983; Sameroff and Chandler, 1976). In addition, this non-linear developmental process model opens *the possibility for the transformation* of representations as the dyad continues to negotiate *patterns of relatedness*.

The Boston Change of Process Study Group, led by **Daniel N. Stern** (Stern, Sander, Nahum., Harrison et al. 1998) contributed another important model of psychoanalytic treatment based on observations from mother-infant studies, other developmental data and non-linear systems theory. Here, the findings indicate that nonverbal procedural elements of the *dyadic clinical process*. can play larger role in effecting therapeutic change than the verbal interpretation.

II. Ebd. Field dimension of Contemporary Freudian Thought, Modern Conflict Theory and 'Intersubjective Ego Psychology'

II. Ebd. Concept in Transition: From 'Psychoanalytic Situation' to 'Psychic Field' and Enactments

Hans Loewald's central thesis of revision of Freud's drive theory offered another field-related concept. He stated, "Instincts understood as psychic and motivational forces become organized as such through interactions within a psychic field, consisting originally of the mother-child (psychic) unit" (Loewald, 1971, p. 118). He was acknowledged by Stephen Mitchell (one of the founders of Relational Theory) for "shifting the locus of experience, the point of origination, from the individual to the field within which the individual comes into consciousness. ... In the beginning, Loewald says over and over again... in the beginning is the field in which all individuals are embedded" (2000 p. 35).

Previously, **Leo Stone** developed a rudimentary field-related metapsychology of psychoanalytic situation (1961, 1967, 1975) and his own field-related thinking on the beginning of psychic life, through "... the mutuality of organization, in the sense of organizing each other, which constitutes inextricable interrelatedness of 'inner and outer world'..." (1960, p. 23). Loewald extended Stone's thinking and wrote, "Psychoanalysis as an Art and the *Fantasy Character of the Psychoanalytic Situation*" (1975), where patient and analyst are engaged with each other, co-creating illusion within transference neurosis, both co-directors in dramatic re-enactments of the patient's life story (pp. 278-279).

There is a direct line from Loewald's dramatic re-enactments by both the patient and the analyst within the illusory transference neurosis of the psychoanalytic situation and the pioneering work of **Theodore Jacobs** (1986, 1991) who sees enactment as derived from countertransference. In his seminal paper, Jacobs (1986) introduces the term 'countertransference enactment' when referring to subtle acting-outs on the part of the analyst, whose origin may be found in the impact of the patient's transferences on the analyst's mind. The starting point is that enactment is defined from the analyst's experience, within the relational field she or he establishes with the patient.

James McLaughlin goes further in the direction of an interpersonal conception. For him, enactments are co-constituted as a consequence of shared regression in psychoanalytic situation. They are

"events occurring in the analytic dyad that both parties experience as being the consequence of behavior in the other ... Close scrutiny of the interpersonal behaviors shaped between the pair will provide clues and cues leading to latent intrapsychic conflicts and residues of prior object relations that one has helped to stir into resonance in the other, and between them actualized for both."

(McLaughlin, 1991, p. 80).

Subsequently, field-related terminology within the context of psychoanalytic situation started to appear in contemporary complex Freudian thought, like "transference-

countertransference field” (Blum 1998, p. 196); countertransferential enactments (Chused, Ellman, Renik, Rothstein 1999); “a human object-connected field” (Poland 1996, p. 33), and “trans-individual field...a container of multiple levels of reality” (Modell 1989, p. 9).

(See also entries ENACTMENT, THE UNCONSCIOUS)

II. Ebdb. Psychoanalytic Situation in Modern Conflict Theory

Further elaborating on Leo Stone’s (1961, 1967) ideas of psychoanalytic situation as central “*communicative field*” consisting of free association that, along with the rule of abstinence, created a “dynamic effect”, **Elliot Adler** and **Janet Bachant** (1996) define psychoanalytic situation in terms of basic elements of psychoanalytic relatedness. The psychoanalytic situation was (re)cast as an “extraordinary interpersonal arrangement, anchored by two clearly differentiated yet complementary ways of relating: free association and analytic neutrality” (Adler and Bachant, 1996, p. 1021). Described as one pole of ‘reciprocal role requirements’, free association is viewed as a prerequisite of expressive freedom to have an introspective encounter with their deepest emotional stirrings in *the context of an interaction with another person* (ibid, p. 1025; original italics). As an interpretive tool, free association is regarded as outweighing even the resources of theoretical knowledge. The analyst’s role is viewed as complementary to that of the patient. It serves a function of protecting the patient’s expressive freedom. In this way, the psychoanalytic situation and technique is cast as *a two-person process* of analytic exploration of one-person neurosis: “*one-neurosis*, not a one-person model of analytic treatment” (ibid., p. 1038, original italics).

Among areas of interest to contemporary Freudian psychoanalysts relevant to field conceptualizations are: unconscious sharing of ‘states of consciousness’ (Libbey, 2011), bi-directional unconscious influences within the inter-psychic realm (McLaughlin, 2005), enactment (Ellman and Moskowitz 1998, 2008) and ‘enaction’ (Reis, 2009), and reconstruction process as a co-construction in the two-person field (Gottlieb 2017), and others.

(See also entries CONFLICT, THE UNCONSCIOUS)

II. Ebdc. Intersubjective Ego Psychology

Nancy Chodorow’s (2004) Intersubjective Ego Psychology remains firmly committed to ego psychological theory and technique while also theorizing the centrality and pervasive impact of the object-relational, developmental, and analytic transference-countertransference fields. It is a North American fusion of Ego psychology and Relational psychoanalysis, rooted in both Sullivan Interpersonal Field Theory and Hartmann’s Ego Psychology, drawing on the work of Hans Loewald and Erik H. Erikson. Intersubjective Ego Psychology incorporates both - a focus on intrapsychic conflict, compromise formation, an internal world and intrapsychic fantasy, yet the psyche (of both the patient and the analyst) is also interpersonally and culturally created. Transference is a history-driven repetition, where

the analyst interprets to the patient, yet not everything that goes on between the patient and the analyst comes from the patient. The patient may also be the interpreter of the analyst's experience or affect the analyst's countertransference, and both participants can *co-create analytic field*, which is, in some sense, more than the sum of the two-person parts. Intersubjective ego psychologists hold both perspectives at the same time and thereby modify each.

The contemporary Intersubjective Ego psychologist **Warren Poland** (1996) expresses such hybrid integration in the following words: “No single person exists outside *a human, object-connected field*; the analytic space colors how such a single person comes to understanding by the other and to insight. At the same time, the mind of any individual can be engaged by another yet is always crucially apart, a private universe of inner experience” [Poland, 1996, p. 33].

(See also entry INTERSUBJECTIVITY, EGO PSYCHOLOGY)

II. Ebe. Field-Related Tertiary Formations in Post-Bionian Thought: ‘The Third’ of Thomas Ogden and James Grotstein

In its most general form, the concepts of ‘the third’ can be viewed as an extension of the field’s transitional creative constructive properties. Specific formation of ‘the analytic third’ is considered to be generated by the dialectic of the subjectivities of the analysand and the analyst (Katz 2013). This third is both created by and creates the subjective experience of the analysand and the analyst (Ogden, 2009). The necessarily unique matrix that evolves from the interplay and creation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity within the analytic process becomes an aspect of the object of psychoanalytic study.

British trained North American **Thomas Ogden** uses the Winnicottian notion of *potential space* as the precursor of his view of *intersubjective space*. “[T]he analyst attempts to recognize, understand and verbally symbolize for himself and the analysand the specific nature of the moment-to-moment interplay of the analyst’s subjective experience, the subjective experience of the analysand and the intersubjectively generated experience of the analytic pair (the experience of the analytic third)... it is fair to say that contemporary psychoanalytic thinking is approaching a point where one can no longer simply speak of the analyst and the analysand as separate subjects who take one another as objects” (Ogden, 1994, p 3).

According to Ogden (1994, 1995), the *intra-psychic* views of transference and countertransference should not only be complemented by the *inter-subjective* picture of a *transference-countertransference matrix*, but these perspectives are to be seen as constituting a *dialectic leading to an ‘(inter-subjective) analytic third’*, a *new evolving subjectivity*, comprising (analogically to the field), something more than the sum of its parts.

James Grotstein’s view (Grotstein and Franey 2008) of a field as a union of the two, giving rise to novel tertiary formation, is applicable to the analytic dyad as well as to the

dynamic processes within a group. Synthesizing and extending both Bion and the Barangers, and referencing Ogden (1994, 2005), Grotstein writes: "...the bi-personal field ...is more than intersubjectivity...Think of the analyst and analysand not only as intersubjective – back and forth – but see them as one. My model has always been the Siamese twins: where they are separate as one, and apart as two, a binary oppositional structure. The whole field controls the analyst and analysand...People have narcissistic and socialistic dimensions. When in a group something comes out of them that wouldn't come out otherwise...The influence is the point. I call it the *dramaturge* and Ogden calls it the intersubjective third" (ibid, p. 110).

For Grotstein (2011), 'The Third' emerges also in relation to the setting. Here, the setting, as distinguished from the frame, becomes a "sacred" agreement. In establishing the rules of the frame and in the analysand's acceptance of them, analyst and analysand are establishing "a *covenant* that binds each participant to the task of protecting the third – the analytic procedure itself" (Grotstein, 2011, p. 59). (See also separate entries INTERSUBJECTIVITY, SETTING, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES)

II. EBf. Field Conceptualizations Influential in French Canada

The French psychoanalytic tradition, influential in Francophone psychoanalytic communities in Canada, espouses the intersubjectively relevant 'Third Topography' (Brusset 2006). This is a retrospective assembly of post-Freudian thinkers who have subscribed to the notion that, in development, the two-person psychology predates the one-person psychology of the internally conflicted subject of Freud's Topographical or Structural models (First and Second Topographies in French nomenclature). The psychoanalytic situation and process is then variably theorized with this in mind.

Influential in French Canada, **Jean-Luc Donnet** (2001) differentiates the *analytic site* from the analyzing situation, "The analytic site contains the ensemble of what the offer of an analysis constitutes. It includes the work of the analyst... the analysing situation results haphazardly from the sufficiently adequate encounter between the patient and the site" (p.138). Here, it is possible to view the concept of the psychoanalytic field deriving from emphasis on the impact of the analytic setting itself on the process, as Donnet's conception of the analytic situation recognizes *the interaction of the analysand with the analytic site* that includes the analyst, the analytic process, and what it offers. This interaction includes the activity of the intersubjective third (Katz 2013).

In this context, **André Green's** work on the function of the frame as a "third" and as a support to the mental functioning of the patient in its capacity to form a shared "analytic object" (1975). **Jean Laplanche's** introduction of the notion of the "hollowed-out" transference ((1997, p. 662), mobilized by the relative non-reactivity of the analyst, which activates the possibility of solving anew the enigmas of childhood, are also relevant here.

Initially formulated by Green in 1975, 'the analytic third' is an elaboration of the Winnicottian transitional object and Green's own concept of 'the negative'. In its application

to the psychoanalytic situation, Green (1997) posits “the exchanges between patient and analyst or, in other terms, between transference and countertransference processes, as creating an ‘analytic third’, a specific outcome of analysis (ibid, p. 1072). Here, the analytic frame as a ‘third’ lends support to the mental functioning of the patient in its capacity to form a shared ‘analytic object’ (Green 1972, 1975).

Combining the intrapsychic and intersubjective within the French psychoanalytic framework, Green (1973/1999; 2002), in line with Winnicott’s works on potential space, defines another formation in the area of tertiary processes. His version is the ‘analytic object’ (object *of* analysis and *in* analysis) as the ‘*third object*’. Belonging neither to the analyst nor to the analysand, it has characteristics of transitionality, being *formed in the analytic encounter*. In Green’s thinking, the intersubjective relationship connects two intrapsychic subjects, and, “It is in the intertwining of the internal worlds of the two partners of the analytic couple that intersubjectivity takes on substance” (2000, p. 2).

Another important influence is French Canadian **Dominique Scarfone’s** (2011, 2014) work on memory, temporality and symbolization within *the multiple transference fields* in the psychoanalytic situation. Conceptualizing symbolization as closely connected with remembering, Scarfone holds that remembering is not a simple act of ‘recalling’ or ‘evoking’. It implies the transmutation of some material into a new form in order to be brought into *the psychic field* where the functions of remembering and integration can occur (Scarfone, 2011). The transmutation mentioned by Scarfone thus involves different levels of symbolization, i.e., enactment-unconscious symbolism of dreams and conscious communicative symbolism of language.

Scarfone (2010) has extended reflection upon the quality of the analyst’s listening in his notion of ‘*passibility*’, referencing **Jean Laplanche**’ (1993) concept of ‘*hollowed-out transference*,” a form of transference by which the analysand unknowingly deposits his actualized relationship to the enigma of his infancy. The transference form of this transference is itself deposited in another ‘hollow’ of the analyst’s ‘inviting (seductive) neutrality’ aimed at opening new mental spaces for the analysand.

(See also separate entries INTERSUBJECTIVITY, SETTING, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, THE UNCONSCIOUS, TRANSFERENCE, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE)

III. TRANSLATING FIELD THEORIES INTO CLINICAL PRACTICE

This section discusses what the analyst *actually does* when translating field theory into practice. To this end, **Andrea Celenza** (2019, 2022) proposed a description of two listening stances that are associated with different attentional sets. These sets reside at a relatively low level of abstraction and are experience-near. The two attentional sets are: 1) *a directed*

attentional set aimed at the identification of conscious or unconscious repetitious patterns, and 2) a *diffuse attentional set* receptive to emergent phenomena for the purpose of elaborating unconscious fantasy. While these attentional sets are combined in everyday practice, they can be prioritized differently among various theoretical models. *In the variety of field theory models (e.g., Italian Bionian Field Theory, various play therapies), a diffuse attentional set is prioritized.* In field theory models, particular modes of transference and their development are also facilitated, depending on the intention and goals in the analyst's mind. These attentional sets can be correlated with different types of transferences, evoking different types of clinical material that correspond to the analyst's goal and/or phases in treatment. The various steps in elaborating unconscious fantasy and how it is used will be provided that illustrates the utilization of this diffuse attentional mode of listening.

These two modes of listening are distinguishable for heuristic purposes, but in clinical practice, they are not so clearly separable. At any given moment, it may not be possible to differentiate the two modes of analytic listening as these modes tend to oscillate. When one mode is actively prioritized in a more sustained way, however, differences evoked in the clinical material can be discerned and thereby coordinated with different analytic goals.

Celenza purposely uses the language of *attentional sets* to underscore the purposive action and mode of readiness in the analyst's mental state, highlighting what the analyst's stance is at any particular clinical moment. Furthermore, this terminology aligns with contemporary neurophysiological studies which identify these sets as divergent and governed by different neurophysiological substrates. Below is her account of such attentional sets, expanded for the purposes of this entry.

III. A. DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS

This discussion of clinical application relies on the conception of the field (the awareness of which arrives specifically through a diffuse attentional set) in all ways discussed above. This includes specifically the ways of conceiving the field as explicated by the Barangers, Kancyer and other Latin American writers where the field is viewed largely as an intersubjective, 'bi-personal' fantasy jointly constructed by the analytic couple. Complementary to this is the European conception of the field largely explicated by the Italian Post-Bionian Field Theorists and well explicated by Ferro, Civitarese and others cited above. This perspective conceives of the field in a more expanded way, including a 'dream field' that may involve characters (multi-subjective), props and contexts, indeed everything that may enter the dream of the analytic couple and field. Latin American Cassorla combines both trends in depicting the complexity of the field in his 'acute and chronic enactments', 'dreaming field' and the 'Theatre model' of the field. In the North American conceptualizations, reliance is on the work originally set out by Langs and further expanded by Levine and Brown and other North American writers (such as Ogden, Foehl and Stern) contributing to this way of conceiving analytic process.

III. Aa. Directed Attentional Set

The first stance, a *directed attentional set*, involves the identification of relational patterns and/or defensive tendencies and personality organization that are the focus of clinical attention. These will usually emerge in the transference/countertransference experience and may also reflect repetitions linked to the analysand's historical narrative. In this attentional set, the analyst *searches, recognizes, and identifies* patterns of relating in the here-and-now. The analyst's mode of listening (and experiencing) is aimed at the identification of conscious or unconscious repetitious modes of relating that constrict the analysand's subjective experience and, consequently, the interactional field. These can also surface or develop through the experience of mutual enactments and are then scrutinized by the analyst in one of two ways: 1) through the recognition of constricting repetitions based on expectations from past experience (as in historical reconstruction); or, 2) as novel experience with the analyst, facilitating growth through the introduction of new understanding of old relational patterns and consequently, freeing the interpersonal field. Both of these analytic processes revolve around the *recognition* of unconscious relational patterns or defensive repetitions in the here-and-now that structure the unconscious transference/countertransference matrix. For example, Katz (2017) refers to a *detailed inquiry* into the emerging personal myths of the analysand and describes how analysands recapitulate relationships with primary caregivers based on these personal myths. Derived from Levenson, Katz states, "[T]he interpersonal field contracts the analysand's 'disease,' which consists of lived recursively generated patterns of experience." The aim of this mode of intervention is "to extricate the analytic couple out of the diseased field. ... One way that this is approached is by means of a detailed inquiry into the emerging personal myths and resulting patterns to open up new possibilities for the analysand" (Katz, 2017, p. 36-37). Here, the mode of readiness in the analyst foregrounds a *directed* attentional set for the purposes of identifying such patterns. Most importantly, the recognition and identification of these patterns is a *search for a fit* between experience in the here-and-now and past repetitive patterns that correspond with the analysand's historical narrative.

Similarly, a neo-Kleinian approach would be geared toward recognizing and interpreting an enacted internal object relation, including an appreciation of the ways in which unconscious fantasy interweaves with such a pattern. Forging links to the analysand's historical narrative is part of the interpretive strategy that guides this attentional set along with the analyst's ability to recognize the enacted internal object relation. Likewise, defenses are instantiated in unconscious fantasies that include wish/defense compromise formations (Erreich, 2003). The attention to defenses and the active parsing of the analysand's compromise formations, especially the ways in which these are entwined with veridical or constructed historical narratives, requires a more directed attentional set.

A significant way in which the analyst evolves a sense of the patient's early object relations is via understanding the here-and-now transference experience. Repetitious patterns in the here-and-now may correspond to internalized self- and object-configurations that structure the transference/countertransference relationship. Through this attentional mode of listening, the aim is to elaborate and re-transcribe the analysand's historical narrative or

personal myths about his/her history, i.e. Laplanche's (1994) ideas on the child as hermeneut. These will play a part in the evolving process of historical re-transcription and the creation of new meanings.

While this stance also includes an ongoing receptivity to emergent, (and perhaps novel) ways of being, there is an emphasis on *recognition and identification* of maladaptive defensive repetitions or old relational patterns that emerge in the here-and-now. This latter area of therapeutic action represents an aspect of the stance that is oriented toward the development of a deeper understanding of the past, but not in a manner that implies past memories exist in some static, preformed, or internally localizable way, nor are they constructed without the shaping of unconscious fantasy. Historical references are not assumed to be in a one-to-one relationship with what actually occurred nor do enacted scenarios replicate the past in some faithful way. Old patterns emerge and develop, becoming re-transcribed and reconstructed in the après-coup of analytic process. New experience is particularly oriented toward countering past maladaptive expectations and fixed scenarios. In this way, historical narratives change as the analytic process evolves.

In this attentional mode, the analyst has, in a preconscious way, the analysand's evolving historical narrative in the background of his/her mind. This readiness aids in the identification of modes of relating that may constitute repetitions of the past. Once such relational patterns are identified, various types of transference interpretations may be offered to further understand these patterns. Roth (2001) explicates four levels of transference interpretation aimed at linking the patient's history to current or external events, unconscious fantasies, and enactments in relation to the analyst/analysand relationship. Through the use of a clinical vignette (offered previously by Giovacchini [1982]), Roth delineates these four levels of transference interpretation among which the analyst chooses at any given moment:

The *recognition* of relational patterns, reflective of unconscious, fantasied expectations, dreads, and/or traumatic repetitions, is an interpretive strategy distinguishing this directed approach from that of the sustained and diffuse openness to emergent process for the purpose of *elaborating* unconscious fantasy. The theorists associated with this particular attentional mode include (but are not limited to) Freudian and Neo-Freudian theorists, Kleinian and neo-Kleinian theorists (e.g., LaFarge, 2000, 2017), interpersonal/relational theorists (Sullivan, 1940) and ego psychological theorists (Jacobs, 1986, 1991; Poland, 1996). Arnold Modell's view of affects and the complementarity of biologic and historical meaning (1978), Heinz Hartmann's and Ernst Kris' (Hartmann & Kris, 1945) genetic approach in psychoanalysis could be grouped here as well.

This approach may also lead to interventions that aim to correct, repair, and/or integrate traumatically dissociated parts of the self where split-off or dissociated self-states can emerge. However, the turn to the analysand's historical narrative (a narrative that continues to evolve through the analytic process) can subsequently guide the associational links. At the level of abstract theorizing, a polemic has arisen where traditions utilizing this approach can be viewed as *delimiting unconscious fantasy production, resulting in an impoverishment of unconscious fantasy in favor of identifying historical repetitions*. (Though erroneous, since historical

reconstruction is always inextricably shaped by unconscious fantasy [see Erreich, 2003], this is the argument put forth).

For articulation of this polemic, see Foehl (2013a,b); Stern (2013a,b); Ferro and Civitarese (2013a,b) among other discussants in a two-part panel. Foehl (2013a,b) emphasizes the common context in which interpersonal and field theories evolved, particularly in relation to the writings of Merleau-Ponty. He suggests an *epistemological pluralism that would invite working from diverse perspectives*. In contrast, Stern (2013 a,b) identifies essential distinctions between interpersonal and Bionian field theorists, asserting that Bionian field theorists do not take into account the analyst's symmetrical participation (i.e. 'relational engagement', 'mutuality') in the field. Interpersonal field theory (Stern 2013a,b) emphasizes the unconscious involvement not only on the level of a fantasy, but also on the level of the *analyst's conduct* in the course of treatment.

III. Ab. Diffuse Attentional Set

In contrast, the second stance revolves around a *diffuse attentional set* in relation to emergent process. This mode of listening engages an unfocused receptivity that is primarily aimed at expanding the play of unconscious process, encouraging its emergence in all its forms so as to facilitate the psychic growth of the mind. This attentional set is one of *patience, openness, waiting, and tolerance of uncertainty* in relation to what may emerge. Unconscious processes can take any form and are assumed to be ubiquitous in the here-and-now experience. This mode of listening corresponds to Freud's evenly hovering attention, Bion's listening without memory or desire (1988), and Ogden's (2005) immersion in reverie.

In a diffuse mode of listening, unconscious experience and data are not necessarily configured relationally, however there is great emphasis on the here-and-now experience within the analytic dyad. An *openness to nonrelational symbols* as potentially indicative of unconscious emanations is characteristic of this approach, with the emphasis on expanding the play and growth of the mind. The recognition of repetitive patterns in the analytic dyad is explicitly *not* part of this stance, *nor is the turn toward the analysand's historical narrative*. This process is held as "enriching and transforming in itself" (Ferro and Civitarese, 2013). The theorists typically associated with prioritizing this clinical stance are those associated with the variety of field theories, Winnicottian-inflected orientations, and child play therapies. Here, the analyst maintains an uncritical attitude toward emerging experience with the analysand, especially in relation to those *experiences that may not fit* with past repetitious patterns or the analysand's historical narrative.

As examples of this analytic stance, Bion (1965) writes of listening to a married patient and appreciating that this patient was "talking in a way which is quite appropriate to his not being married at all" (p. 15). In another example, Winnicott states to his analysand, "I am listening to a girl. I know perfectly well that you are a man but I am listening to a girl, and I am talking to a girl. I am telling this girl: "You are talking about penis envy"" (1971, p. 98). The North American writers associated with this type of sensibility include (but are not limited

to) Arnold Modell (1989, 1990, 2001, 2005), Lawrence Brown (2011), Thomas Ogden (1994, 2005), Howard Levine (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013), and Donnel Stern (1997, 2010, 2015).

One way in which this approach is put into practice is by viewing the session as a dream experience (Ferro, 2009, Cassorla, 2005, 2017a), comprising the lens through which every session is both understood and constructed. The session itself is held as a new experience created through unconscious mechanisms that use the entire setting as props or ‘characters in the field’ (Ferro, 2009; Cassorla (2005). Further exemplification of such an approach is Cassorla’s (2005, 2018) elaboration of his ‘theatre model’ of the analytic field: 1. Character; 2 Spectator; 3. Co-Author; 4. Director; 5. Critic; and 6. Light and Sound Technician.

A diffuse attentional set engages a form of thinking associated with analogic, synthetic modes of cognition, a ‘this is like that’ type of cognitive process, globally receptive to affective shifts and emergent experience. Analogic thinking is metaphoric, poetic, and momentarily disregards differences. This form of cognition corresponds to the form of thinking governed by the nondominant (right) hemisphere (Watt 1990, 2019; Schore 2011). This is a receptive mode of attention, especially for visuo-spatial (pictorial) images and affect-laden forms of processing that may emerge in the analyst’s reveries as well. Stern (1990) might refer to this mode as the analyst as conduit, an active receptivity to unconscious communication, in line with Bion’s (1967) ‘negative capability’ or Laplanche’s (1999) conception of the ‘tub’, that is, re-opening of the enclosure of the psychoanalytic situation and re-opening of (feared) transference repercussion.

This stance *privileges the elaboration of the field* so as to facilitate emergent growth processes. These may or may not involve the verbal expression of these processes. Projective identificatory processes may emerge and define functional roles for each member of the dyad, yet both are viewed as part of a single dynamic process that encompass the entire context (Baranger and Baranger, 2008). Attention to these processes are viewed as emergent properties of the joint internal fantasy of the couple or dream-field. This is an *expansive view* and privileges efforts toward growth and creative elements.

Sustained receptivity to emergent process is engaged in a more or less continuous manner to generate and elaborate unconscious fantasy as a primary and desired outcome of the analytic exchange. When engaging primarily with this listening stance, the analyst seeks to address the analysand’s concerns by more fully elaborating them, thereby containing and symbolizing heretofore unrepresented, ‘undreamt’ states. The pursuit of dream-like images is privileged, with the goal of transforming the analysand’s anxieties and the meanings derived from them. Because the privileging of this attentional set favors the generation of unconscious imagery in a dream-like context, the argument is sometimes made that analysts primarily utilizing this approach *neglect or even dismiss the analysand’s historical narrative* (and its concomitant myth-making, i.e., personal hermeneutic).

For example, a patient may report a dream. A field theorist would be interested in expanding the patient’s associations, elaborating the dream field in ‘waking dream thought’ during the here-and -now of the session. If there is a reference to the analyst’s office, there

would be responses by the analyst that would encourage further elaboration. Perhaps the analyst's office is on a lower floor of a building – this might represent deep structures, the unconscious, delving 'down' to archaic layers, or realizing buried affects. Rather than interpreting these images to find the 'right' meaning, the analyst might respond by adding to the associations with a response such as, "The unconscious is deep." This type of response is considered "unsaturated" in the sense that it remains ambiguous, does not specify particular contents (especially those related to the analysand's history), and allows the patient to take the prompt in any direction s/he may choose.

Another example might include a particular 'prop,' such as a wooden paddle. The analyst may simply repeat the name of the prop in an effort to wonder what might be added. The analysand could respond by adding an historical reference, such as, "My mother wholopped me once." Maintaining a diffuse attentional set, the analyst would attend to what the analysand adds but also notice any internal reveries that may be occurring within her/him. Perhaps the analyst thinks of the woodenness of the paddle, the hardness of the handle, leading the analyst think about the analysand's anger or potential to be unfeeling. Then another image may arise, perhaps a Flamenco dancer with straight, 'hard' arms placed above her head, and an angry expression on her face. This process would continue throughout the session, with the express intention to elaborate the unconscious associations and expand the analysand's ability to play with metaphoric, associational imagery.

Within the interpersonal-relational perspective, Stern's expansion of 'relational freedom' (Stern 2013c) with loosening and relaxing of the interpersonal field, that creates a possibility of emergence of new experiences, belongs to the diffuse attention set. However, in Stern's conceptualization, the key event often precedes new verbal understanding, including interpretation, even if the verbal interpretation is unbidden and may appear as though it is the source of the therapeutic action.

III. Ac. Attentional Sets and Forms of Transference

According to Celenza, differences among technical stances can also be viewed by identifying *which type of transference is being realized*. Prioritizing a directed attentional set is well-suited to evoke and explore a repetitious transference identified by Freud (1916-17). These are constituted by the projection of figures of the primary objects of love, hate, and identification and the effort at historical reconstruction.

Alternatively, transferences constituted by projective identificatory mechanisms in the moment, creating a pathology of the field (Baranger, Baranger and Mom, 1983), initially engage a diffuse attentional set. This allows unconscious emanations to become manifest. These may warrant interpretive clarification, and then, the so-called "second look" (Baranger, Baranger and Mom, 1983, p. 2) engages a more causal, directed attentional set as the analyst identifies a possible enactment through projective identificatory mechanisms (Baranger, Baranger and Mom, 1983; Cassorla 2001, 2005). These then can be identified and interpreted in line with other forms of defense analysis.

As noted throughout this discussion, these two attentional sets tend to oscillate in everyday clinical process. Yet sometimes a particular attentional set will be prioritized, depending on the nature of clinical process, clinical goals of the analyst, and phases in treatment. The immersed analyst primarily engages a diffuse attentional set, in order to be receptive to unconscious emanations as they occur in the dynamic field. Then, an observational, directed and causal attentional process can be engaged, depending on the way in which the analyst organizes the unconscious phenomena that have arisen. Historical re-transcription is one such use, but another would be a redistribution of projected splits, while another involves the re-integration of dissociated self-states. Still another may involve the naming (and thereby symbolizing) heretofore unrepresented states. Much of these differentiations occur in retrospect, ‘Nachträglich’ (Cassorla 2005, 2012), as the oscillation occurs naturally within clinical process.

A diffuse attentional set is primarily engaged in the effort to integrate dissociative phenomena, eloquently described by Stern (1997) as *unformulated experience*, the receptivity to which requires more diffuse attentional processes. Dissociated splits can be comprised of split-off affects, a sense of something as yet unstructured and non-symbolized, or as unrepresented self-states. Unformulated experience is not limited to the verbal register and it is experience that does not yet exist except as potential. It is what experience *can become* (Stern, 1997, 2015). These previously unformulated self-states then emerge in the transference/countertransference experience.

A similar distinction between the two sets, though not a one-to-one correspondence, can be made between Laplanche’s (1999) filled-in transferences (*transfert en plein*) and the hollowed-out transference (*transfert en creux*). The former involves the repetition of childhood images and scenarios whereas the hollowed-out transference represents the emergence of the analysand’s originary relation to the enigmatic (m)other. The former (filled-in transferences) are interpreted through directed associative links with the analysand’s historical images and memories in order to make room for the ‘hollowed out space’ of the analytic setting (see also Scarfone, 2015). This form of transference requires the analyst *not to know, not to fill in the space*, and instead to have a receptive, diffuse attentional set ready to receive unconscious emanations.

IV. CONCLUSION/SUMMARY

In Latin America, the ideas about the analytical field – a space-time where nothing happens to one of the members of the analytical dyad that does not resonate in the other – has been part of psychoanalytic culture long before the concept has been fully articulated and theorized by the Barangers.

Greatly influenced by theories and ideas on *complexity*, contemporary Latin American theorists enrich and expand the field conceptualizations in many directions. Through the lens of complexity, the field's emotional flow that manifests and hides together in words, actions and discharges, comes into prominence and reveals transient, unpredictable and constantly transforming configurations. In the context of the field's complexity, the participant is part of the field, modifies it, and is modified by it.

Latin American ideas influenced European and North American psychoanalysis, e.g., Antonino Ferro, Thomas Ogden and intersubjective authors. These same authors, in turn, enriched Latin American contributions. The concepts of field affective holography, and the analytical third, despite dissimilarities, have a common root with the 'dreams-for-two' and the unconscious fantasy of the dyad. Similarly, field paralysis, the bastions described by the Barangers come close to the concepts of a 'subjugated third', 'non-dream-for-two' and chronic enactment. All field concepts, theories and their derivations contribute to the deepening of the study of areas with deficit of symbolization, one of the challenges of contemporary psychoanalysis.

In Europe, variously envisioned field configurations highlight the *antidogmatic aspect* of analytic thought, openness and creative potentiality, applied to the analytic dyad as well as to groups. European analysts emphasize Freud's work as extensive and open. They also acknowledge that he never hesitated to question concepts based on his clinical discoveries throughout his life. There is always a risk of freezing psychoanalysis in a reductionist theory instead of keeping Freudian open-mindedness. The English Middle Group, French André Green, Jean-Luc Donnet and René Kaës, and Italians Francesco Corrao and Antonino Ferro represent this open current in Europe. In this respect, European field theorists draw on Latin American Willy and Madeleine Barangers and Fabio Herrmann who, in admittedly different ways, have contributed greatly to this contemporary, open and anti-dogmatic psychoanalytical current, while maintaining a Freudian but pluralistic anchor, particularly necessary for non-neurotic psychic structures.

In North America, the fundamental *interrelatedness, intersubjectivity and interdependency* of human development have led many analysts to attend to variously conceptualized jointly created configurations of the "dynamic bi-personal" field and/or meeting of multiple subjectivities, where new elaborations/extensions and not simple repetitions of the individual unconscious and/or preconscious fantasies, attitudes and behaviors for each partner of the dyad can emerge and to which the presence and mind of each significantly contribute. This thinking dovetails with the clinical experiences and conviction by many that there is a lifelong potential for inventive and creative expressions of previously excluded, dissociated or otherwise un-integrated psychic content.

The heterogeneous assembly of North American field conceptualizations includes two comprehensive theories: The Bi-Personal Communicative Field Theory of Robert Langs and the Theory of the Interpersonal Field by Donnell Stern. In addition, cross-fertilized field-related conceptualizations spread across Contemporary Freudian thought, Modern Conflict Theory, Intersubjective Ego Psychology, and Post-Kleinian, Post-Bionian, as well as the French

tradition. The emphasis on expansion, growth, expressive and/or relational freedom, (co)creativity and (mutual) transformation, transitional and tertiary formations and the immediacy, vitality and emergence of novel pre-psychic, intrapsychic, inter-psychic, intra-subjective and inter-subjective events, in development and in psychoanalytic situation, characterizes many of them.

Differences and similarities amidst the complex proliferation and cross-fertilization of psychoanalytic field theories and concepts within and among all three regions come to life when the theory is translated into clinical practice, in terms of ‘directed’ and ‘diffuse’ attentional sets, with pertaining relations to various forms of transference. Standing controversies (asymmetry vs. mutuality, the analyst’s involvement on a level of fantasy and/or conduct) can be recognized and sustained within the complexity paradigm, applicable here not only to the psychoanalytic field but the field theories and concepts themselves. In the same vein, Pichon Riviere’s ‘*dialectic spiral*’ linking *contradictory movements* of regression and progression, extended onto contradictory movements of any kind, can be also applicable to the wide context of the elaborations of the field conceptualizations in the different regions and among the diverse psychoanalytical orientations.

Previously undertheorized, increasingly resonating with all contemporary psychoanalytic cultures, the multidimensional and multi-perspectival spectrum of field theories and conceptualizations with implications for sensitive attunement to the (however variously conceptualized) field dimension of the psychoanalytic process, addresses challenges of today’s psychoanalytic practice with the broad range of clinical conditions, including those with deficits of symbolization and diminished capacity for reflection. In the context of Herrmann’s Multiple Fields theory, analytic field theories and field-related conceptualizations can be also thought of as a particular theoretical extension began by Freud of unconscious processes traversing individual subjects, with the field as a provision for new emotional meanings to arise, which in turn provides a ‘built-in guard’ against dogmatism, reductionism and unmovable orthodoxies of any kind.

See also:

CONFLICT

CONTAINMENT

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

EGO PSYCHOLOGY

ENACTMENT

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

SELF

SETTING

TRANSFERENCE

TRANSFORMATION(S)

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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SELF

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

According to the philosopher Charles Taylor, the ‘self’ is a modern phenomenon initiated by Western culture (Taylor, 1989. p. 304). He asserts that the usage of the self as person with both autonomous and relational strivings reflects a focus on one’s own subjectivity with its ‘interior’ as well as ‘communitarian’ dimensions. To the degree that psychoanalysis can be viewed as an in-depth study of human subjectivity, the self has been a central albeit elusive, ambiguous and controversial concept.

The conceptual heterodoxy is evident in the recent psychoanalytic dictionaries and definitions of the concept all across the three psychoanalytic continents.

In North America, Auchincloss and Samberg (2012) note psychoanalysts have used the term “self” to describe phenomena as varied as: 1) a whole person in the external world including one’s body and mind; 2) a subjective experience, organized around the “I”; 3) a representation or set of representations within the ego; 4) a fantasy of the self, featuring the imagining subject in a major role in its various emotional and interactive aspects; and 5) from the perspective of self-psychology, a personal psychic core that governs experience and action.

In Europe, Skelton (2006) highlights additionally the aspect of self as the bedrock of psychological wholeness that keeps the psyche from falling apart, encompassing the totality of the unconscious and conscious systems of Jungian perspective; and self as ‘subject’, ‘object’ and ‘project of being’ of existential metapsychology perspective.

In Latin America, where no entry ‘self’ is carried by contemporary regional dictionaries, various categorizations of existing models emerged, such as self as a subsystem of “I”, self as a structure, self-person, and the self model based on the subjective experience (Montero 2005). In addition, original conceptualizations of ‘self-link’ and ‘linked self’, which depict relational aspects of bridging and linking of self and object representations, and which in their expanded version also include the unconscious internal group formation, have been an important part of Latin American psychoanalytic identity (Pichon Rivière 1971; Arbiser 2013; Losso, Setton, Scharff 2017).

As a matter of style of this entry, ‘self’ sometimes appears as ‘Self, and sometimes as ‘self’, depending on the context, preserving a particular author’s or regional terminology

II. TERMINOLOGY, TRANSLATABILITY, SOCIO-CULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Often, divergences in conceptualizations of ‘self’ reflect different frames of reference, different levels of discourse, and divergent translations between languages, stemming from different socio-cultural heritage.

In colloquial usage, the reference to self, in many cases not directly translatable, is used while talking phenomenologically about self-reflection, self-awareness or self-criticism. In addition, many languages have, also specific ‘reflective’ or composite word forms concerning self care, self-assertion, self-expansion, stressing uniqueness of one’s own subjective voice, agency and intention.

German ‘Selbst’ and English ‘Self’ imply *illusory substantiveness*, which has no exact equivalent in Roman (French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese) languages. However, all Indo-European languages employ other means to express reflexivity, reflection, and sameness, the essential parts of the *vocabulary of selfhood*: a person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive and or reflective action. For instance, French ‘meme’, Italian ‘stesso’, Spanish ‘mismo’ form compounds of selfhood: moi-meme, toi-meme, soi-meme (myself, yourself, him/herself); me stesso, se stesso (myself, him/herself); yo mismo (myself), etc. In addition, all languages give voice to reflectivity in the grammatical structure of the sentence, which assigns agency/voice/intention to the speaking subject.

On the other end of the broad spectrum are abstract constructs from philosophy, various humanistic disciplines, literature, academic and developmental psychology, and neuroscience.

In the area of psychoanalysis the range covers wide spectrum from experience-near phenomenological conceptualizations all the way to the highly abstract metapsychological constructs of different psychoanalytic frameworks.

Perhaps more than any other psychoanalytic concept, ‘self’ reflects the ambiguities and dilemmas of the history of human thought, articulated in philosophical and scientific inquiries as much as in literature, popular culture and language.

Divergent philosophical and cultural patrimony, designating, in different, often contradictory ways, that a person-self exists in varying relationships within a total social, linguistic and cultural environment, includes Plato and Socrates, Aristotle, Sophocles, Augustine, Dante, Shakespeare, Montaigne, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hegel,

Husserl, Heidegger, Marx, James, Sartre, Dickinson, Saussure, Brentano, Bakhtin, Foucault, Adorno, and Taylor, just to name a few.

II. A. Philosophical Underpinnings

All major psychoanalytic orientations with their often contrasting positions on the concept of self reflect traditional philosophic questions, notably of a ‘homuncular self’ internal to consciousness, the isolation of the subject from other selves, and intersubjective origins of the self.

An example is a conceptual line of ‘self’, starting from Plato’s (and Socrates’) “Dialogues”, Aristotle’s *Treatises on Psychology, Politics and Poetics*, Augustine’s “Confessions” with his Neoplatonist thesis of humans’ childlike dependence on the transcendental omnipotent Being/God, Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage”, forming the basis of the Scottish-English empirist philosophy of Bacon, Hume, Locke, and others, of the person-self existing in varying relationships within the broad context of culture and nature, to Fairbairn’s primacy of object relations in development and pathology, and Winnicott’s self’s use of the object, and intersubjective roots of structure formation, with links to Lacan’s ‘silence in the encounter’, and, differently conceptualized Kohut’s ‘self-object’ and self-object transference, and a spectrum of intersubjective and relational psychoanalytic theories across all psychoanalytic continents (see the separate entry INTERSUBJECTIVITY), all variably compatible with modern philosophers Marcuse, Foucault, Heidegger and MacIntyre, who rely on theories of relativity and interpersonal relationships. Bakhtin’s (1929/1984) attempt to reconcile the autonomous ‘unfinalized’ and ‘unfinalizable’ self and ‘self in relation to other(s)’ through his ‘polyphony’ and ‘carnival’, resulting in a genuine internal and external dialogue, Ricoeur’s (1986/1990/1992) stages of selfhood in “Oneself as Another”, and Said’s (1978) projection of stereotypical otherness by one culture (our selves) onto another (them) in the “Orientalism” belong to this fruitful line of philosophical thought, applicable to literature, arts, and large societal-cultural contexts.

In another example, Plato’s Cave allegory of objectifying reason versus incompleteness of knowledge via senses, continues with Descartes’ Rationalism of self-reflective core of a unified self, “a substance ... an ‘I’ ... the soul by which I am what I am” (Cottingham, 1986, p. 115); Metaphysics of Berkley’s inner principle of unity, “imposed by the mind on the senses” (Kirshner, 1991, p. 162); Kant’s correspondence theory of truth and his subjectivist theory of knowledge, where the reality of things in themselves cannot be known directly, but only as they are constituted, correctly or less so, in our mind (circling back to Plato’s Theory of Forms), referred to by Freud in the context of the inability of the conscious mind to know its own reality, extended into the Ego Psychology’s theories of self and object representational world.

Acknowledgement of the crucial function of memory in constituting the identity of the ‘self’ starts with Aristotle, continues with Hume, anticipating, in different ways, both Freud as well as Kohut. Hume, unable to find a single conception of self, points instead to emotional, sensorial and perceptual “perpetual flux and movement” (Hume 1787, p. 252) and posits that

a self rests on an illusory unification applied to inner experience. Coming from different perspectives, Rationalist Descartes and Empirist Hume, as later Heinz Hartmann can appear mechanistic, and do not escape the homuncular self problem. While some heralded Freud's formulation of the unconscious (Freud 1915) with intricate divisions of the subject in topographical and structural models as resolving the philosophers' dispute about the identity of the self, others (Winnicott, Sartre, Lacan) looked for further solutions.

Hegel's "experience of having a self requires an engagement with another subject" (Kirshner 1991, p. 168) and his depiction of alienation of the subject in such an encounter has direct descendants in existentialism of Sartre and Heidegger, Lacan, and in a different way in Winnicott.

20th century French philosophy, in search of the contemporary human subject, in particular, has been engaged in a direct long-running conversation with psychoanalysis. Michel Foucault's writings on the 'care of the self', on 'hermeneutics of the subject' and on the 'government of the self and others' introduce a conception of ethics as a relation of self to itself in terms of its moral agency, which in itself is a product of self-forming activity called 'subjectivation', a term later picked up by French psychoanalysts. In this context, care of the self is understood as transformation of the self into a fruitful existence. Gaston Bachelard's (1938/64) "Psychoanalysis of Fire" presents a poetic exploration of various primary complexes revolving around fire mythology based on dream, reverie, daydream and poetic imagery, where the 'non-I' of the dreamer is in a playful reverie-like internal dialogue with the dreamer's 'I'. Here, reverie replaces inhibition and censorship. Jean-Paul Sartre's (1943/1992)'s "Being and Nothingness" proposes that what defines the subject is not a structure, but a fundamental project of existence: the project replaces the complex.

French philosophers in particular saw Freud's psychoanalytic formulation of the metapsychology of the unconscious as a new radical proposition about the subject:

With the idea of the dynamic unconscious comes the notion of the human subject that is far greater than consciousness (it contains consciousness, but is not restricted by it), which concentrates de-centered creative forces within it. Yet, the common aims are pursued by different means: the intense dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis is marked not only by complicity and admiration but also by rivalry and competition.

Such multi-faceted and multi-layered dialogue proliferates into many psychoanalytic orientations across all continents and psychoanalytic cultures. The shape it takes, is often shaped by the issues surrounding translatability of the term and meaning.

II. B. Original Freud Terminology and Translatability of 'Self': View From North America and Europe

It has been observed from variety of perspectives (Gammelgaard, 2003; Kelen, 1990; Kernberg, 1982; Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973; Kohut, 1971; Winnicott, 1960; Grinberg 1966) that the introduction and further development of the concept of self in psychoanalysis can be

traced to the conceptual development, and terminological complexity and ambiguity surrounding the 'I' / 'ego'.

While it has been a long-standing tradition in philosophy and psychiatry to translate German Ich as Ego (Meynert 1885; Solms 2019), some psychoanalytic authors have questioned the utility of this practice, followed by Standard Edition of Strachey and the Glossary Committee (James and Alix Strachey, Anna Freud, Ernest Jones and Joan Riviere), for psychoanalysis, and especially as it concerns complexity and ambiguity of Freudian Ich.

Freud used Ich – "I", which Strachey translated as "ego", for both a mental structure and psychic agency, as well as the more personal, subjective experiential "self".

Thus, he never separated the metapsychological "ego" from the experiential "self". Some contemporary authors who compared both German original and Strachey's translation (Kernberg, 1982; Laplanche and Pontalis 1973; Gammelgaard 2003) consider the ambiguity a strength rather than a weakness of Freud's concept of "Ich", conveying a richness of internal tension between the experiential-subjective, and self-reflective-objectifying properties of the concept of the Ich/I. In their view, Strachey's shift in the terms from 'Ich' to 'ego' strives for consistency, but it does so at the expense of Freud's terminology: the dual aspect of I gets lost.

In certain instances, Freud (1930a,b) equates self with I. In "Civilization and its Discontents" he uses the term "Selbst" for Self as well as "Ich" in one sentence, e.g. in German original: "Normalerweise ist uns nichts gesicherter als das Gefühl unseres Selbst, unseres eigenen Ichs." (Freud 1930b, p. 423). Corresponding Strachey's English translation reads: "Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego" (Freud, 1930a, p. 65).

In other instances, Freud equates self with the whole person. Writing about 'the sick Ich' (Freud 1940a,b), he writes: "Das kranke Ich verspricht uns vollste Aufrichtigkeit, ..., wir sichern ihm strengste Diskretion..." (Freud 1940a, p. 98). Strachey's English translation reads: "The sick ego promises us the most complete candor ... we assure the patient of the strictest discretion ..." (Freud 1940b, p. 173).

Another page in the "Outline" depicts self as an aspect of I, when Freud states: "... wenn das Ich einer Versuchung erfolgreich widerstanden hat, etwas zu tun, was dem Überich anstössig wäre, fühlt es sich in seinem Selbstgefühl gehoben..." (Freud 1940a, p. 137). In Strachey's translation, "...if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something which would be objectionable to the superego, it feels raised in its self-esteem ..." (Freud 1940b, p. 206).

In the same text (Freud 1940a,b), summarizing ideas from previous writings (Freud 1914), Freud contrast 'Ichliebe' and 'Objektliebe' (Freud 1940a, p.71), obviously self-love in contrast to object-love. Strachey's translation translates this as "the contrast between ego-love and object-love" (Freud 1940b, p.148).

Such translation, rendering the ambiguity confusing, may have contributed to Heinz Hartmann's (1950) need for correction via progressive conceptual separation of ego from self,

and self from self-representations, which, while instrumental in further conceptual developments, at the same time may have complicated conceptualizing the relations between the impersonal ego functions on one hand and subjectivity on another. In opinion of Otto Kernberg (1982, p. 898), such a strict delineation may have contributed to the removal of the self from metapsychology, therefore impoverishing it and making it almost a “common-sense concept” (Moore and Fine 1968, p. 88). In spite of this trend, some Post Freudian North American authors strove to elaborate the dual character of “Ich” (‘I’) “Ego” (Jacobson 1964, Mahler 1979, Kernberg 1982).

Similarly, Jean Laplanche (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, p. 131) laments the loss of ‘real Freudian contribution’ of ambiguity and complexity of Freud’s usage of Ich, which Freud uses to effect the inter-play on many levels of juxtaposing organism and environment, subject and object, internal and external, etc.

From somewhat related yet different angle, Bruno Bettelheim (1984) criticizes Strachey translation for abstract, exacting-scientific and Latinized terminology replacing soulful, humanistic and metaphoric connotation of Freud’s “psychische Behandlung (Seelenbehandlung)” or ‘treatment of the psyche (soul)’ by [“psychical (or mental) treatment” in Strachey’s English] (Freud, 1890a, p. 289; Freud, 1890b, p.283). Overall, Bettelheim decries how the word “soul” (*Seele*), with its attendant notions of a spiritual life and all-too-human struggle, seems to have been written out of Freud’s work in translation, often replaced with “mind” (*Geist*) (Bettelheim 1984, p. 70-71).

While the French translation of Freud’s opus “Oeuvres Complètes de Freud/Psychanalyse – OCF/P” (1989-2015) retains the ambiguity of Ich, translating it mostly as ‘le moi’ (tonic form of ‘I’), that is subjective, more a self than the defensive ego creature of Ego psychology to begin with, it has its own problems when it comes to translating ‘self’ into French; i.e. Without ‘Je’ (for ‘I’) being brought into play, Winnicott’s translator pronounced ‘self’ essentially untranslatable into French.

Overall, in differing ways, neither ‘ego’ nor ‘le moi’ are equivalent to German ‘Ich’. While in English-speaking psychoanalysis, there is an increased need for development of the concept of ‘self’, to account for, and theorize, the subjectivity lacking in the ‘ego’, in French psychoanalysis there is a diminished need for comparable development of the self, as ‘le moi’ is already ‘self-saturated’.

II. C. Etymological, Terminological and Translational Considerations: Latin American Perspective

As the English term “Self” (suggesting an illusory substantiveness) is essentially untranslatable into Spanish or Portuguese with a single word, frequently, the term Self is translated as “Sí mismo”. For instance, the references to Heinz Kohut’s Self Psychology are sometimes translated as “Psicología del Sí mismo”, or directly mentioned as Self Psychology.

According to the Collins dictionary (2018), self is translated to Spanish as “uno mismo” (male), or “una misma” (female), but also as “el yo” (equivalent to “I”).

Other translations of “self” as “mismo” (“same”) highlight the relationship of this concept with the concept of *identity*.

The related Spanish adjective “mismidad” designates “sameness”. According to *Diccionario de filosofía abreviado* [Abridged Dictionary of Philosophy] (Mora (2008),

“Mismidad” is: 1. Condition of being oneself; 2. That for which one is oneself. 3. Personal identity.

In addition, “Self” as “Yo”, is also “I”, and therefore the Freudian Ich (Ego). In fact, the term “Yo” has a distinctly Latin etymology being a variation of the old vulgar Latin “Eo” which in turn is a simplification of the classical Latin word “Ego”. The Portuguese term “Eu” (“I”), has the same etymological origin.

According to the Royal Spanish Academy Dictionary (2018), “Yo”, as a personal pronoun; 1. Designates the person who speaks or writes (The equivalent to “I”); 2. From a philosophical perspective, refers to the human subject as a person; 3. From a psychological perspective, it refers to a conscious part of the individual, through which each person takes charge of their own identity and their relationships with the environment.

In Spanish “Yo” means *selfhood*, *sameness/likeness* (opposite of otherness), and also, is used to refer to the *total person*.

According to Sensagent dictionary (2018), “Yo” from a psychological perspective, is the: Conscious part of the personality; seat of perception and subjective center of affective and intellectual experience. It constitutes, for the individual, the representation of his own identity: the distinction between the external world and the self.

According to Cambridge dictionary (2018) in Spanish, “Yo” could also be translated as “I” and “me”.

A similar situation is presented in Portuguese (*Dicionário Priberam* 2008-2013), since “Eu” (“I” in English and “Yo” in Spanish) as a personal pronoun corresponds to 1. “My person” (formal and informal); and 2. The conscious being, awareness.

It follows from the above, that the terms “Yo” and “Self” are intertwined in their meaning, as it happens in English between “I” and “Self”. In addition, the tight relationship between Spanish Yo or Portuguese Eu on one hand, and one’s own subjectivity on the other, could, at least in part, explain lesser necessity of usage of the term Self in the studies related with one’s *own subjectivity* in the Latin American region. Indeed, a broad bibliographical search recently carried out by the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association database of Argentine psychoanalytic publications, the use of the term “Yo” triplicates the references to the term “Self”. A thorough psychoanalytic perspective on the etymology and semantics of Self by Leon Grinberg et al. (1966) will be presented in the section about Latin American developments (below).

III. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

III. A. Pre-analytic Roots: William James

In his “Principles of Psychology”, William James (1890/92) undertook a thorough study of self within the young discipline of academic-experimental-phenomenological psychology. He postulates the existence of three ‘Empirical Selves’ (The material/body Self; The social Self; The spiritual Self) and the theoretical construct of ‘The Pure Ego’. Each of the empirical selves is capable of arousing feelings and emotions, which he calls ‘Self-feelings’; and each of them is capable of prompting an action of ‘Self-seeking’ and ‘Self-preservation’. James also acknowledges conflict between different Experiential Selves, reflecting conflicting needs. The Pure Ego is a theoretical construct, consisting of personal Identity and of Pure Self of personal unity.

III. B. Early Psychoanalytic Roots

Various precursors of the concept of Self are variably present already in Freud, Ferenczi and Klein.

III. Ba. Roots in Sigmund Freud

For Freud, “das Ich” (translated by Strachey as “the ego” rather than “the I”) refers to both a mental agency as well as a subjective experience. While in German original this dual aspect of ‘Ich’ seems to indicate an important ‘Ich’ characteristic, Strachey’s English translation and terminological shift from ‘I’ to ‘the ego’ prompted the need to distinguish more clearly the propensities of the ego as a mental structure and psychic agency from the phenomenological experiential self (see above). Throughout his opus, Freud maintained this duality of ‘Ich’, sometimes equating the self with the Ich, other times with the whole person, still other times with an aspect of Ich.

In a derivative form, the self (Selbst) first appears in Freud’s early theory, which sets up the anti-thesis between the self-preservative and sexual instincts: “... unterscheiden wir auch in der Psychoanalyse die Selbsterhaltungs- oder Ich-Triebe von den Sexualtrieben ...”, in English: “... in psycho-analysis too we make a distinction between the self-preservative or ego-instincts on the one hand and the sexual instincts on the other” (Freud, 1917a. p. 4; Freud 1917b, p.137).

While Freud emphasized a mind (originally ‘Seele’/‘soul’/psyche) that is divided and to a great extent influenced by unconscious drives, the view of a self as distinct from the ego was not his objective. One way that Freud strove to address what psychoanalysts today might regard as self-experience was through his theory of narcissism. In his paper “On Narcissism” (1914), Freud used this concept to explain phenomena such as omnipotence, grandiosity, idealization and narcissistic object choice. While Freud viewed object love as a developmental

goal, he tended to view narcissism as something the child needs to grow out of. However presaging some of the findings of self-psychology, Freud did come to view the ongoing power of infantile narcissism as related to the maintenance of self-esteem which is achieved by the fulfillment of one's ego ideals, loving an other who possesses qualities found in that ideal, or by being loved. In the paper "On Narcissism" Freud indicates, among the object choices "according to the narcissistic type ...someone who was once a part of himself" (1914, p.90), as being among the ways that bring the human being toward the choice of the object. The hope and expectation from analytic treatment on part of the patient then become the hope for "the cure by love" (ibid, p.101). In the 1930s the term Self is again introduced as an equivalent to the Ego, when Freud, as pointed above, states: "Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego" (1930a, p. 65).

By claiming that, in "setting up the object inside the ego ...", through introjection, incorporation and identification, "the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes", Freud (1923, p.29) seemed to indicate that what later theorists would term "the self", developed through the gradual replacement of the child's libidinal strivings for the parents, with identifications. This is in consonance with the earlier papers "On Narcissism" (Freud 1914), and "Mourning and Melancholia" (Freud 1917). Thus the concept of *identification* provides for a link between the intrapsychic and interpersonal world of the child. *Identification* also allowed for "reality" to play a more major role in self-development, paving the way for post-Freudian schools and conceptualizations of the Self and its development within Ego Psychology, British and North American Object Relations, Self-Psychology, and Interpersonal-Relational perspectives.

III. Bb. Roots in Sándor Ferenczi

A forefather of relational/interpersonal psychoanalysis, Sándor Ferenczi (1913; 1929; 1932/1949) split with Freud over their differences as to the role traumatizing reality plays in the creation of psychopathology. Ferenczi viewed traumatic experience as that which is generally perpetrated on a child by malevolent others and viewed the pathology that follows as caused by a split in the self (dissociation) which serves to protect the child from unbearable thoughts and feelings. This view of a trauma as generating dissociation psychopathology, viewed by some as an elaboration of the 'seduction hypothesis' proposed by Freud in 1896, is remarkably close to contemporary relational theories of Philip M. Bromberg and Donnell Stern. Ferenczi is also credited for perhaps presaging self-psychology, in his emphasis on the pivotal role of the empathic caretaker in the development of a healthy sense of self. Overall, Ferenczi viewed pathologies of the self as resulting from empathic failures the most extreme of which constituted trauma.

III. Bc. Roots in Melanie Klein

As Klein viewed primitive drives, constitutive of both pre-Oedipal and Oedipal strivings, as being of fundamental significance in the early, formative developmental process, she preferred the term ego to self and saw it evolving in relation to its largely unconscious function of the management of potentially annihilating aggression. As her “ego/self” is primarily unconscious and mainly involved with drive regulation, it bears little relation to the notion of a self organized around subjective experience. While in her earlier writings Klein tended to use the terms ego and self interchangeably, later she contended that self covers “the whole of the personality, which includes not only the ego but the instinctual life which Freud called the *id* ...” (Klein, 1959/1984, p. 249, original italics). This delimits the ego as the organized part of the self.

Referring to Freud’s paper on Masochism (Freud 1924), Klein described the underpinnings of the fear of annihilation as “The threat to the self from the death instinct working within ... bound up with the dangers apprehended from the internalized devouring mother and father ...” (Klein 1948), p. 117). Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions “describe the fundamental ways in which love and hate, along with self and object, are managed in the development of the internal world” (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012, p. 232). Klein (1940) considered the depressive position to be dominated by anxieties for the object, whereas the preceding paranoid-schizoid position was dominated by anxieties about the self. For Klein, the formation of a stable, resilient sense of self, is dependent on the ability to regulate affect through the achievement of the depressive position (Klein, 1946). The depressive position thus undergirds the ‘capacity to choose’ which would seem as essential characteristic of the maturing of ‘the self’.

Overall, Klein makes a broad use of the term using it interchangeably with the term Ego. However, a nuanced distinction between ego and the self that could be discerned concerns the fact that often the term ‘Ego’ designates an active role in the development of the child, as illustrated in “Our adult world”: “As I came to recognize in the light of my psycho-analytic work with children, introjection and projection function from the beginning of post-natal life as some of the earliest activities of the ego, which in my view operates from birth onwards” (Klein, 1959/1984, p 250). The term ‘Self’, on the other hand, is used more frequently in describing the object relationships, e.g. in the description of the paranoid and depressive schizoid positions and more generally when Klein addresses the role of early relationships in the development of infant’s psyche.

Moreover, the Self gains a place in her theory of projective identification during the schizo-paranoid position, dominated by anxieties about the self. In ‘Envy and Gratitude’ while exploring the processes of splitting that support the paranoid-schizoid (in English) position Klein distinguishes the strong ego capable of identifying itself with a single object and the weak ego subjected to an indiscriminate identification with many objects. She states, “... full identification with a good object goes with a feeling of the self possessing goodness of its own. When things go wrong, excessive projective identification, by which split-off parts of the self

are projected into the object, leads to a strong confusion between the self and the object, which also comes to stand for the self” (Klein, 1975, p 192.).

IV. FURTHER GLOBALLY INFLUENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONCEPT: BRITISH OBJECT RELATIONS MIDDLE SCHOOL AND POSTFREUDIAN STRUCTURAL THEORY

Overall, the concept of Self gains more explicit articulation mainly in post-Freudian psychoanalysis. In Europe, the concept of Self is seen as primarily originating in the conceptualization of British Middle School Object Relations Theories. In North America, where various conceptualizations of self and object relations are considered an aspect of all psychoanalytic conceptualizations, the next step in development of the concept of Self occurs within the Post-Freudian developments of the Structural theory/Ego Psychology.

In both continents, concomitant developments related to variously conceptualized child observation studies, infant research and the psychoanalysis of children and adolescents are considered relevant, as is the dynamic work with serious pathologies. These are followed in the chapters below, as they pertain to specific authors (Jacobson, Mahler and others), in a chapter on Child and Adolescent Psychoanalysis, where their influence comes into fruition within the context of further and contemporary developments in Europe.

IV. A. Self in British ‘Middle School’ Object Relations Perspectives

Subsequent object relations theorists, like **Fairbairn** (1952, 1954, 1963) and **Winnicott** (1960, 1965), deemphasized the centrality of drives, allowing for a more cohesive and totalistic concept of the self in its various forms to emerge from the multitude of interpersonal experiences that the infant participates in over time. Psychoanalysis was thus able to explicate the formation of various forms of the self that employ others to shape it and encourage its further development.

Ronald Fairbairn

Fairbairn (1952, 1963) does not use in his psychoanalytic theory directly the word *self* but he uses “ego”, as Freud employed “das Ich” in his pre-structural writings to designate the self. John Sutherland (1994) confirms that:” Fairbairn accepted that ‘self’ is a more appropriate term in most of his considerations since it refers to the whole from which sub-selves are split off. The ego is useful for the central self, that is, the dominant part of the self that incorporates the main purposes and goals of the individual in his relationships with the outer world and with which consciousness is usually associated” (p. 21).

Main features of the self in Fairbairn’s structural theory are as follows:

People are object-related, therefore the self is defined in terms of the relationship. The child/individual is object seeking rather than pleasure seeking. The self exists from the beginning and is not a result of the experience. It is precondition of it, and simultaneously precondition for further experiences and further development. The self provides continuity and colors further development.

“The self in Fairbairn’s theory is a living growing, self-defining center that he viewed as the point of origin of human psychic process; it follows directly from this most basic of principles that it is possible for such a self to have relationships with other human beings even though they have not yet representationally differentiated as objects separate from the self. Initially this self relates to the world with little basis in experience for self-object differentiation.” (Rubens, 1994, p. 432)

During the development, the subsystems within the self, which are part of Fairbairn’s endopsychic structure, form. Fairbairn (1963) defines it as follows: “... the original ego [self] is split into three egos -a central (conscious) ego attached to the ideal object (ego-ideal), a repressed libidinal ego [self] attached to the exciting (or libidinal) object, and a repressed antilibidinal ego [self] attached to the rejecting (or antilibidinal) object. [...] This internal situation represents a basic schizoid position, which is more fundamental than the depressive position described by Melanie Klein. [...] The antilibidinal ego [self], in virtue of its attachment to the rejecting (antilibidinal) object, adopts an uncompromisingly hostile attitude to the libidinal ego [self], and thus has the effect of powerfully reinforcing the repression of the libidinal ego by the central ego.” (p.35)

Along these lines, according to Robbins (1994), some Fairbairn’s Object relational theory ideas anticipate developments culminating in Kohut’s Self psychology. (Grotstein and Rinsley 1994). (See the separate entry OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES)

Donald Winnicott

The central figure of the British Object Relations ‘Middle School’, Donald Winnicott’s historical and contemporary influence in the evolution of the concept of the Self extend far beyond his native England. While much more influential in Europe, his influence proliferates into much of contemporary thought of North and Latin American conceptualizations as well.

Winnicott (1965) places the mother-child relationship at the center of self-development. In his model, the infant instinctively seeks the recognition and support of the mother. He views the infant’s nascent ‘self’ as capable of the ‘spontaneous gesture’ and ‘personal idea’ (Winnicott, 1960, p. 148). But the ‘self’ can only develop in the context of a series of interactions with a loving caretaker. Drawing on his years of experience in pediatrics, Winnicott emphasized the impact of the ‘real relationship’ between mother and child. In his view, the infant’s omnipotence is initially supported by the maternal ‘holding environment’; but inevitable parental failures, in the context of a ‘good enough mothering’ (Winnicott, 1953) allow the child to develop a resilient, healthy self (“the true self”). In the best-case scenario,

the infant is able to use the object (mother) ‘ruthlessly’ without regard to the subjectivity of the object (mother). Healthy self-development is contingent upon the object-mother being able to ‘survive’ i.e. meet her infant’s needs in a ‘good enough’ fashion while maintaining her own subjectivity. In this manner the child is able to become aware of an ‘other’ who survives his aggression and exists out of his omnipotent control – this allows for the development of a self capable of true object-relating and empathy. If the mother’s own subjectivity interferes with her capacity to deal with her child’s aggression and still meet his needs, the resulting sense of frustration and fragmentation gives rise to a defensively constructed ‘false self’. In this scenario, the infant learns prematurely to adapt to his mother’s needs in order to survive.

Thus, for Winnicott, the beginning is the mother-infant unity. “At first the individual is not the unit” (1952, p 221). From the infant’s perspective there is initially no differentiation between self and object. The infant is in a state of unintegration: “We postulate a primary unintegration” (1945, p 149) and completely dependent on the mother’s sensitive holding, a holding that is both physical and psychical. Through what Winnicott terms “primary maternal preoccupation” (1956) the “ordinary devoted mother” is in a state of heightened sensitivity towards her infant, which enables her to “adapt delicately and sensitively to the infant’s needs at the very beginning” (1956, p 302). This maternal holding creates for the infant the conditions for what Winnicott describes as ‘going-on-being’ (1960a), that is, the beginnings of a personal continuity which provides the foundations for the beginnings of a sense of self. This sense of self is primarily based on body experiences and body functions. If the mother’s holding is deficient – either through too long absences of holding or through intrusive impingements – the infant’s sense of continuity of being is broken and the infant is thrown into a state of *unthinkable anxiety* (falling forever, going to pieces, losing all orientation) which the child instinctively reacts against with a premature, rigid “self-holding” (1962, p 58). This is an aspect of the “false self” (see below), which “hides and protects the core of the self” (ibid).

The gradual move from unintegration to integration starts early through innate, natural processes in the infant, the mother’s holding and satisfactory drive experiences.

Winnicott makes a distinction between “ego-relatedness” and “id-relatedness”. The first is related to the mother’s holding function, the other to the mother as the object of the infant’s drive impulses. The primitive self is ruthless. “We have to postulate an early ruthless object relationship” (1945, p 154). The change over from ‘pre-ruth’ to ‘ruth’ comes later and belongs to the development of the capacity of concern in the depressive position. In “Primitive Emotional Development” (1945) Winnicott writes:

“I will try to describe in the simplest possible terms this phenomenon as I see it. In terms of baby and mother’s breast ... the baby has instinctual urges and predatory ideas. The mother has a breast and the power to produce milk, and the idea that she would like to be attacked by a hungry baby. These two phenomena do not come into relation with each other till the mother and the child *live an experience together* ... I think of the process as if two lines came from opposite directions, liable to come near each other. If they overlap there is a moment of *illusion* ...” (Winnicott, 1945, p 152)

Provided that the mother's adaptation is good enough, that she presents herself in a manner and at a moment that "corresponds to the infant's capacity to create" (Winnicott, 1953, p 12), the infant has the fantasy of creating the breast. The breast is a "subjective object", created omnipotently by the baby. Without this illusion, writes Winnicott, "no contact is possible between the psyche and the environment" (Winnicott, 1952, p 223). The experience of omnipotence, of illusion, is the foundation both for the rudimentary sense of self and for a personal, creative relation to the world. The alternative is a reactive relation to it, based on adaptation, where the personal impulse is absent and the vitality is absent. In this situation the child relates to the world from a false self position, which lead to a sense of futility and to a thwarted development of the capacity for symbol formation and the use of transitional objects.

The question of disillusionment, of loss of omnipotence and the entrance of the reality principle comes later. Without primary illusion the process of disillusionment loses its meaning. "The mother's eventual task," writes Winnicott, "is gradually to disillusion the infant, but she has no hope of success unless at first she has been able to give sufficient opportunity for illusion" (1953, p 11).

It can be observed that in Winnicott's theory of the very beginnings of mental life there is a sort of dual track model. For the infant states of non-separateness alternate with states of an incipient sense of separateness, a vague realisation of something that is not me, especially when needs are not met and when muscular activity (which Winnicott associates with aggression) meets a resistance. "In this respect," he writes, "the baby can meet the reality principle here and there, now and then, but not everywhere all at once; that is, the baby retains areas of subjective objects along with other areas in which there is some relating to objectively perceived objects, or 'not-me' ('non-I') objects" (1962, p 57). Thus the infant oscillates between these two states, but again, the important thing here is that the infant is given opportunities for the illusion of creating the object, which is the original basis for the development of a sense of personal self.

The function of the false self is to protect the true self from exploitation and to handle the relation to the environment. Winnicott describes degrees of false self organizations: "At one extreme: the False Self sets up as real and it is this that observers tend to think is the real person. In living relationships ... however the False Self begins to fail ... the True Self is hidden ... Less extreme: the False Self defends the True Self... [which] is acknowledged as a potential and is allowed a secret life ... More towards health: the False Self has as its main concern a search for conditions which will make it possible for the True Self to come into its own. If conditions cannot be found then there must be reorganized a new defence against exploitation of the True Self ... In health: The False Self is represented by the whole organization of the polite and mannered social attitude, a 'not wearing the heart on the sleeve'" (1960b, p 142-143).

An aspect of the false self and its premature holding function that Winnicott (1949) points out, is when "the thinking of the individual begins to take over and organise the caring for the psyche-soma, whereas in health it is the function of the environment to do this...[t]he psyche gets 'seduced' into the mind [the intellect] from the intimate relationship that the psyche

originally had with the soma.“ (p 246 – 47). There is then a dissociation between intellectual capacity and psycho-somatic existence where the “individual [attempts to] solve the personal problem by the use of a fine intellect. [A] clinical picture results which is peculiar in that it very easily deceives.” (1960b, p 144). There is, for the individual in this situation, a loss of a deep sense of self, for which a close link between psyche and soma is essential.

Winnicott is intentionally vague when he discusses the true self. “There is but little point in formulating a True Self idea except for the purpose of trying to understand the False Self, because it does no more than collect together the details of the experience of aliveness” (1960b, p 148). The true self is an inborn potential, unique for each individual and fundamentally dependent on a facilitating environment to be articulated and experienced. It is the source of creativity and feeling real and alive “[at] the earliest stage the True Self is the theoretical position from which comes the spontaneous gesture and the personal idea ... The True Self comes from the aliveness of the body tissues and the working of body functions ... It is closely linked with the idea of Primary Process” (ibid.), that is, it has a deep connection with the Unconscious and with dreaming. In one of the papers in “Playing and Reality”, Winnicott writes about “the deep dreaming that is at the core of the personality” (1971, p 109). That is, the true self is primary, and “the concept of an individual inner reality of objects applies to a stage later than does the concept of what is being termed the True Self” (1960b, p 149).

In the rich and complex paper “Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a Study of Certain Opposites” (1963) Winnicott deepens his thoughts about the true self and gives it a more enigmatic quality. He suggests, “that in health there is a core to the personality that corresponds to the true self of the split personality; I suggest that this core never communicates with the world of perceived objects, and that the individual knows that it must never be communicated with or be influenced by external reality ... At the centre of each person is an incommunicado element, and this is sacred and most worthy of preservation” (1963, p 187). This inner centre is “for ever immune from the reality principle, and for ever silent” (ibid, p 192). It is silent in the sense that there is no communication to the outer world, and also in the sense that there is a silent, inner, dreamlike communication with subjective objects and phenomena, that “carries all the sense of real” (ibid, p 184). Real, since it entails connection with the deep, personal central element of the individual.

Access to this inner non-communicating centre is inherent to the healthy individual’s capacity to be alone in that it is from here that the spontaneous reaching out towards others stems. Winnicott calls the silent, central communication “direct” and the communication with external objects “indirect”. It is indirect in the sense that it has only a derivative connection with the centre of the personality and at the same time it makes the communication with others alive.

Winnicott's thought was directly or indirectly influential in variety of ways on many successive developments of the Self theories across all three psychoanalytic continents, including those of Mahler, Bollas, Modell, Gaddini, Gammelgaard, Badaracco, Bleichmar and many others.

IV. B. Self in Ego Psychology and Post-Freudian Structural Theory

With their expanded interest in complexities of ego functioning, adaptation and early development, the ego psychologists (e.g. Hartmann 1939/1958, 1964; Freud A. 1936/1992; Spitz 1950) attempted to integrate their new clinical findings with Freud's metapsychology. Their ego psychological/structural theories emphasized the links between ego functioning and the development of object relations and the self.

Attempting to minimize the ambiguities inherent in Freud's Ich, and its controversial Strachey's translation as Ego, **Heinz Hartmann** (1939, 1950) differentiated the self as whole person, personality or organization, including psyche and soma, from the ego as a system or psychic structure:

“...in using the term narcissism, two different sets of opposites often seem to be fused into one. The one refers to the self (one's own person) in contradistinction to the object, the second to the ego (as a psychic system) in contradistinction to other substructures of personality. However, the opposite of object cathexis is not ego cathexis, but cathexis of one's own person, that is self-cathexis; in speaking of self-cathexis, we do not imply whether this cathexis is situated in the id, ego, or in the superego. ...we actually do find ‘narcissism’ in all three psychic systems; but in all of these cases there is opposition to (and reciprocity with) object cathexis. It will therefore be clarifying if we define narcissism as the libidinal cathexis not of the ego but of the self. (It might also be useful to apply the term self-representation as opposed to object representation.)” (Hartmann, 1950, p. 84f.).

Within the domain of the Self, Hartman tried to distinguish between the self, self-image, and self-representation, which he contrasted in opposition and reciprocity to object representations. Drawing mainly on Freud's paper “On Narcissism” (Freud 1914), which predated the dual drive theory of 1920, as well as the structural theory of 1923, Hartmann's economic definition of narcissism as a libidinal investment of the self did not address aggression and the problems in the inter-related concepts of narcissism, ego and self, and their relation to the psychic apparatus, structure and function (Blum 1982). All these issues are left for exploration of the next generations of Freudian thinkers (Jacobson 1964, Blum 1982, Rangell 1982, Kernberg 1982), as well as emergence of further theories of the self (below).

However, Hartmann's incipient distinction between the self as a person and the intrapsychic representation of the person or self-representation remains an enduring contribution, which, in further globally influential elaboration of Jacobson and Mahler (below), reclaims some of the dual aspects of Freudian ‘Ich’.

Erik H. Erikson (1950,1956,1959) expanded on Freud's conflict model and placed it in a social and cultural context, in which development takes place. In contrast to Freud's intrapsychic and psycho-sexual focus, Erikson emphasized the central role of social and environmental factors in development. He viewed development as a life-long process, which he broke down into eight stages, each organized around a pivotal psychosocial conflict (e.g. Stage One – Trust versus Mistrust). While he viewed all identifications, beginning in infancy

and continuing throughout childhood, as the primary mode of self-development, he saw adolescence, the pathway between childhood to adulthood, as the critical period for the solidification of identity. According to Erikson, identity is generally formed after some experience of role confusion and social experimentation. He coined the term “identity crisis” to describe the turbulence that often accompanies the development of a sense of self. For Erikson, this turning point in human development seems to involve the reconciliation between the person one has come to be and the person society expects one to become. This emerging sense of self involves the process of forging past experiences with anticipations of the future.

Edith Jacobson (1964), following both Freud and Hartmann and drawing on her clinical experience with psychotic patients, further clarified the differentiation between the self and object representations of early introjections and the development of these structures. She sought to reconcile Freud’s emphasis on the internal drive-bound processes with the importance of real experience by proposing a developmental model explicating their mutual ongoing interaction and influence. She stressed that the ego and superego developed in tandem with self and object representations, and emphasized the central role of affect in this process. She introduced the conceptualization of “images”, specifying the genesis of representations of self and other as the key determinants of mental functioning (Fonagy, 2001).

Jacobson (1954) noted that before the formation of self-other boundaries, the infant’s perception of the other directly shaped the experience of the self. Thus, the important interplay of actual experience and drive (libido and aggression) results in the feeling tone of one’s earlier experiences and lays the groundwork for self and object images which can determine how we may ultimately feel about ourselves and others. For example, upsetting experiences can lead to the internalization of images of a thwarting, withholding object and an angry, frustrated self while the preponderance of satisfying interactions can lead to the internalization of positive images of self and other.

In her conceptualization of separation-individuation, Jacobson drew upon Freud’s (1940) descriptions of libido and aggression as connection-forming and connection-breaking forces. She saw libido as the essential element allowing the child to integrate opposing images of the good and bad objects and good and bad self, and proportional aggression as developmentally promoting separateness and differentiation between the images of self and other. However, an excess of aggression might derail this process. Jacobson noted that the integration of good and bad images (i.e. both the ‘good’ and ‘frustrating,’ mother) facilitated the capacity to tolerate conflictual feeling states, which in turn, enables the capacity for complex emotional and interpersonal experience.

In her seminal work, “The Self and the Object World” (1964), Jacobson integrated classical metapsychological theory with the phenomenology of human experience, proposing that the instinctual drives are not ‘givens’ but ‘innate potentials’, shaped by inner maturational processes as well as by environmental factors. Thus, the child’s ‘representational world’ (Sandler and Rosenblatt 1962), is constructed out of her experience of herself in the environment on top of her innate psycho-biological substrate.

According to Jacobson, an infant acquires self and object representations with loving or aggressive valences, depending on her experiences of gratification or frustration with the mother. Her term “representation” refers to the experiential impact of both internal and external worlds. She viewed self representations as complex structures including “the unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious intrapsychic representation of the bodily and mental self in the system ego” (Jacobson 1964, p 19).

Jacobson formulations contribute a theoretical background for Margaret Mahler’s (1979) research on autistic and symbiotic childhood psychosis, and for the stages of normal and abnormal separation-individuation.

Margaret Mahler: Self in Separation-Individuation Theory

Mahler provides both direct observational and psychoanalytic data that make it possible to trace the stages Jacobson postulates. Mahler’s original interest in the child’s early development derived from her study of severe pathology in children – autism and symbiotic psychosis – where she noted an extreme inability to form a nurturing relationship with caregivers (Mahler, Ross and DeFries, 1949; Mahler, 1952; Mahler and Gosliner, 1955). This led to the development of a theory of normative child development in which object relations and the self were seen as outgrowths of instinctual vicissitudes (See also separate entry OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES). Although Mahler’s organizing principles were based on the relationships between self and objects, with an emphasis on the transactional aspects of growth and development, they were derived from classical drive theory. The establishment of a sense of “separation from”, and of “relationship with”, concerns above all the experience of one’s own body and the relationship with the object of primary love.

For Mahler, the benchmark of successful development was a movement from embeddedness within a symbiotic mother-child relationship to the achievement of a stable individual identity within a world of predictable and realistically perceived others. This process was termed “Separation-Individuation” or the “Psychological Birth” of the child. Complementary but distinct developmental processes, Separation is defined as the child’s emergence from a symbiotic fusion with the mother; while Individuation consists of those achievements leading to the child’s assumption of his own individual characteristics (Mahler et al, 1975, p.4).

At first, Mahler’s theory assumed that the child develops from “normal autism” through a period of symbiosis and the four sequentially unfolding subphases of the Separation-Individuation process – differentiation, practicing, rapprochement, and object constancy (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975). Subsequently realizing that from birth children show signs of increasing awareness of their environment and the objects in it, she later relinquished the concept of the first two months of neonate’s life, initially viewed as the Normal Autistic Phase based on primary narcissism and a stimulus barrier. In her later theorizing, the stimulus barrier becomes a ‘stimulus filter’, a term suggested to her by Blum (Blum, 2004b).

However, although Mahler herself later relinquished the Autistic Phase and modified her findings about the Symbiotic phase, many European analysts maintain her initial depiction of both phases, as archaic precursors ('prehistory') of the emergence of the Self, elements of which are potentially manifestly present in variously conceptualized serious pathologies of the Self in children and adults.

In Mahler's original depiction, in the normal Autistic phase, there is a relative absence of investment of external stimuli and the physiological rather than psychological processes prevail. In this state of absolute primary narcissism, the goal is to achieve a homeostatic balance of the organism in the new external environment. The autistic state is a state of undifferentiation or fusion with the mother in which the ego is not yet differentiated from the non-ego and the inner and the outer reality begin only gradually to be perceived as different.

From the second month – the Symbiotic Phase – the infant was supposedly only dimly aware of objects and is in a state of "delusional-somato-psychic" fusion (Mahler et al, 1975, p.45), a positive state of relatedness, which occurred in an intrapsychic context with an absence of boundaries between self and other (Fonagy, 2001). During this phase, the attuned mother establishes and maintains an appropriate affectomotor dialogue with the infant through eye-contact, facial expression, touch, holding, etc., contributing to the infant's integration of affect modulation and regulation (Blum, 2004).

In the original depiction, the Symbiotic phase begins at the moment in which the stimulus barrier or the autistic shell that keeps external stimuli away starts to be broken. The infant begins to have a vague awareness of the object that satisfies its needs, which however encompasses a dual unity, in which the Self still has no clear boundaries. Gradually the child starts to show a new attitude of tenacity and intentionality, which indicates that the child is "emerging", and at about 4-6 months the attempt to experiment separation-individuation, structuring the internalized representations of the Self, distinct from the internal representations of objects, begins.

The Separation-Individuation Phase, 4-6 months to 36 months, consists of several subphases:

The first is '*Differentiation/Hatching*', 4-6 to 9 months, when the child begins to differentiate the representation of the self from the mother/other (Mahler et al., 1975) by moving from the tendency to mold herself to her mother's body to a preference for more active, self-determined exploration.

During the second '*Practicing*' subphase, from 10 to 15-16 months, the child practices locomotion to increase physical separation from the mother and to continue the differentiation process. This is the period during which Mahler situates the actual "psychological birth" of the child. With upright locomotion, the child's horizons expand and the child becomes excited as the "world becomes his oyster". In Greenacre's (1957) phrase, it is the height of his 'love affair with the world'. It is, as Mahler conceptualizes it, the height of both (secondary) narcissism and object love (Mahler et al., 1975). At this time, as well, the child reaches "the peak of his 'magical omnipotence' derived from his sense of sharing his mother's magical powers"

(Fonagy, 2001, p.66). In the ‘Practicing’ subphase, through the acquisition of autonomous walking, the establishment of the autonomous ego apparatus in close proximity to the mother follows. This passage represents the line of development that allows the child's interest to move from the mother to inanimate objects, signifying the libidinal investment in the service of the autonomous Ego functioning.

The ‘*Rapprochement*’ subphase from 15-18 to 24 months brings with it an awareness of separateness, separation anxiety and an increased need to be with the mother (Mahler et al, 1975). The child who was becoming increasingly independent now begins to realize how very small she is in a very large world, which brings with it a loss of the ideal sense of self and the reappearance of a kind of separation anxiety. There is the dawning realization that the mother is actually a separate person who may not be always available, ushering the ‘Rapprochement Crisis’. During the ‘Rapprochement Crisis’, the attitude of the child is affectively ambivalent swinging between a need for clinging onto the mother and a powerful need for separateness. This is the period during which splitting is at its height (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). It is also the period during which there are rapidly evolving autonomous ego functions, marked by rapid gains in language and by the appearance of reality testing. Gender differences and gender identity are coming into awareness, interacting with the differentiation process.

The optimal emotional availability of the mother, including her acceptance of the child's ambivalence enable the child to invest the representation of the Self with libidinal energy. The fear of losing the object's love becomes more evident, instead of the fear of losing the object of love. During the ‘Rapprochement crisis’, as the child gradually gives up the illusion of his own greatness, often through dramatic struggles with his mother, he may characteristically use the mother as an extension of the Self, a process that allows the child to temporarily deny the painful awareness of being separated from her. Ultimately, the waning of infantile omnipotence is compensated for by selective identifications with the competent, tolerant, affectionate mother (Blum, 2004).

The attainment of ‘*Object Constancy*’ during 24 – 36 months and Self Constancy is the final subphase of Separation-Individuation process and a major developmental milestone. The two principal tasks of this period are the development of a stable concept of the self and a stable concept of the other, and are organized around the co-participants in all the child's object relationships (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Optimally, the child can now maintain a sense of her own individuality, as well as a sense of the other as an internal, positively cathected presence. She can function separately in the absence of the mother/other, attaining the capacity to more fully understand the separate experience of self and mother, her separate mind and the other's interests and intentions. Internalizing her mother's benevolence and regulatory functions, she can now more easily tolerate separations, frustrations, and disappointments. At 36th month, the maturation of the ego functions, and the libidinal constancy of the object will allow the consolidation of the identity of the Self and the possibility of separateness.

Mahler created an interface between classical drive theory and the developmental theory of object relations by using the concept of symbiosis to refer to both a relationship in reality and to a libidinally determined internal fantasy (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Mahler's use of Hartmann's concepts of an average expectable environment (Hartmann, 1927/1964) and of adaptation (Hartmann, 1939) "moved the drive model in a direction which implicitly granted relation with other a much more central explanatory role ..." (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, p.282). In order to specify the 'average expectable environment', Mahler also referred to Winnicott's (1960) concept of the "ordinary devoted/good enough mother" (Mahler 1961; Mahler & Furur, 1968). In this way she equated the child's early environment with the specific person of the mother.

Contemporary Separation-Individuation theory includes the real mother and infant, as well as the concepts of internalization, and internal representation. Mahler's theory correlates analytically informed observation with intrapsychic developmental transformations: "The intrapsychic changes can include a shift in ego boundaries, the differentiation of self and object representations, the cohesion or spitting of these representations and the achievement of self-object constancy. Both dyadic partners need to be considered" (Blum, 2004, p 551). In the proposed contemporary modification and reformulation, **Harold Blum** (2004) integrates findings of later developmental research (Stern 1985; Pine, 1986; Bergman, 1999; Gergely, 2000; Fonagy, 2000). His modification involves the symbiotic phase as well as separation-individuation, with particular attention to differentiation and rapprochement. He stresses that the neonatal "differentiation precedes the emergence of intra-psychic self and object representation" (Blum, 2004, p. 541).

From another perspective, structural theory, as developed by Jacobson and Mahler (1979), "contains a rich and sophisticated developmental concept of the self, a contemporary elaboration of the dual aspects of Freud's Ich" (Kernberg, 1982, p. 900).

In the context of the clinical work, Jacobson's and Mahler's focus on self and object representations contributed to future developments in the vast area of representational processes and 'representability' of the not-yet-represented enactments (see the separate entry ENACTMENT).

Hans Loewald was among the Freudian revisionists of 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, who forged a connection between Freudian Ego Psychology and Object Relations Theory in an attempt to create a psychoanalytic model that better reflected a person's actual experience in the world. In process he critically examined the most fundamental assumptions of psychoanalytic theory building, and addressed basic preconceptions about the nature of mind, reality and the analytic process.

Loewald (1960) believed that Freud had postulated two different understandings of the drives. Before 1920, Freud viewed the drives as discharge-seeking. With his introduction of the concept of Eros in 1920 in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," Freud introduced the idea of drives as connection-seeking, "not using objects for gratification but for building more complex mental experiences and for re-establishing the lost original unity between self and others"

(Mitchell and Black, 1995, p.190). Loewald's subsequent revision of Freud's drive theory (1971, 1972, 1976, 1978, 1988) required a radical reformulation of Freud's traditional psychoanalytic concepts. While for Freud the id is a biological force clashing with social reality, for Loewald the id is an interactional product of adaptation. Loewald views the mind as interactive by its very nature, not just secondarily in response to the need for others for gratification.

Loewald theorized that in the beginning there is no distinction between self and other, ego and external reality, or instincts and objects; rather there is an original unitary whole composed of both baby and caregiver. He proposed that "Instincts understood as psychic and motivational forces become organized as such through interactions within a psychic field, consisting originally of the mother-child (psychic) unit" (Loewald, 1971, p118). In viewing instincts/drives as the product of interaction, Loewald extends Jacobson's thesis that the instincts were a link between the infant's self and its objects. Going further, Loewald identifies interaction as the critical aspect in the internalization of the subjective representation of the self and other, highlighting the interaction as a basic building block of the mind.

Loewald's work transformed psychoanalytic metapsychology and allowed for novel approaches to conceptualizing clinical material. His influence, direct and indirect, may be seen in developments within a variety of psychoanalytic schools of thought (e.g. Object Relations, Relational/Intersubjective, Self Psychology) and thus can be viewed as a bridge between so called 'one-person' and 'two-persons' perspectives on the psychoanalytic clinical process. Most broadly, just as was the case for Winnicott in the UK, Loewald and Jacobson in the US can be seen as the forerunners of the intersubjective movement.

In the 1980's, increasingly complex and inclusive Freudian thought is exemplified by comprehensive reviews and extensions the conceptualizations of the self in works of **Leo Rangell** (1982) and **Harold Blum** (1982). Rangell amends Hartmann's definition of narcissism as the libidinal investment not of the self, but of the self-representations, stating that: "All that the ego knows about its self, the 'I' which surrounds it and of which it is a part, is the present state of the self-representations at each stage of development and at any moment of existence" (Rangell 1982, p. 879). Blum, focusing on the complexities of early development as depicted by Mahler (Mahler et al. 1975), maintains: "No self-concept is possible before a child emerges from the symbiotic orbit with the gradual onset of the process of separation-individuation" (Blum 1982, p. 971). His is inclusive developmental synthesis of Rene Spitz' 'reciprocal dialogue' (1965), Winnicott's 'transitional object' (1965) and Piaget's (1951) 'object permanence', weaved into the template of Mahler's 'separation-individuation', presenting a complex outline of progressive-regressive changes, within the matrix of object relations and underlying conflicts, leading to the emergence of cohesive self-representation and a relatively continuous sense of self, only after the advancement of self and object constancy in the third year of life.

V. FURTHER AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AMERICA

V. A. Integrative Models

Otto F. Kernberg

Since the 1970's, **Otto F. Kernberg** has been developing a version of Object Relations Theory within the Structural Theory/Ego Psychology. In his approach, 'self-object-affect units' (Kernberg, 1977) are the primary determinants of the overall structures of the mind (i.e. id, ego, superego). In Kernberg's model (1982, 2004, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015), a 'supraordinate' self is a sum total of the partial and gradually more complete self-representations. His Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory integrates the neuro-biological activation of affective systems, the differentiation of self from others, the development of a theory of mind and of empathy, the evolution of the self-structure, and the development of the processes of mentalization.

In his paper "Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives" (Kernberg 1982), Kernberg clarifies his views on development and structure formation, suggesting a modification of dual drive theory. It is already here that he proposes to reserve the term 'self' for the sum total of self-representations in intimate connection with the sum total of object representations. In defining the self as an intrapsychic structure that originates from the ego ('Ich'/I) and is embedded in it, Kernberg remains close to Freud's implicit insistence that self and ego ('Ich'/I) are indissolubly linked. This model conceives of the self as invested with both libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives integrated in the context of their component self representations. Re-examining Freud's use of 'Trieb' (drive) and 'Instinkt' (instinct), he concludes that "Freud preferred *Trieb*, best translated as "drive," precisely because he conceived of drives as relatively continuous psychic motivational systems at the border between the physical and the mental, in contrast to instincts, which he viewed as discontinuous, rigid, inborn behavioral dispositions" (Kernberg 1982, p.909, original italics). Strachey's Standard Edition, however, translates 'Trieb' (drive) consistently as instinct. Addressing the development of the earliest self and object representations, relevant to the development of the self, Kernberg integrates findings from contemporary neurobiology and studies of infant development with his revised formulation of the dual drive theory (in Freud's original German) in the light of relation between affects and drives. Here, numerous affects are the primary motivational system, linking gradually differentiated and integrated self and object representations, with affects consolidating gradually into libidinal or aggressive drives. In this model, affects are seen as the building blocks or constituents of drives. Kernberg would continue, update and refine his integrative work throughout the next 30 years.

Kernberg (2015) emphasizes the dynamic complexity of the earliest weeks and months of life. He asserts that already during the boundaryless 'symbiotic phase' (Mahler, Pine and

Bergman 1975), where baby and the mother are an ‘operative unit’, early strivings for differentiation of self and the rudiments of empathy are emerging as prerequisites for a “theory of mind”(Gergely and Unoka, 2011; Kernberg 2015).

Kernberg’s version of Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory (1982, 2004, 2015) relates the levels of development of psychic structure to the personality organization and psychopathology. He recognizes two basic levels of personality organization (borderline and neurotic), implying two basic levels of development, following the initial level of lack of differentiation and blurring of self and object boundaries (psychosis):

Extending Jacobson and Mahler, selectively integrating certain aspects of Kleinian thought, Kernberg views the preverbal infant building a dual psychic structure, under the dominance of peak affect states. Idealized self-representations relating to an idealized object, dominated by positive affects are opposed to negative representations of self and object where aggressive, frustrated affects dominate. Under these conditions, no integrated view of self or object exists. Rather self and object are split or dissociated into idealized and/or persecutory part-object representation. If mother-child interactions are dominated by aggressive affect, the integration required for ego identity is forestalled resulting in borderline personality disorder. Specifically, as it concerns narcissism, the investment is in a ‘pathological self structure’ (‘grandiose self’), containing ‘real self’, ideal self, and ideal object representations.

However, if in the first three years of life, developmental conditions allow for the tolerance of ambivalence, of combined positive and negative emotional relations with the same external objects, the child can develop an integrated sense of self (‘normal self’, realistic self concept) and the capacity for an integrated view of significant others. Here, the achievement of self and object constancy, allows for the formation of ego identity. The resulting internal structuralization delimits the id, and gives rise to an ego capable of sublimatory functions allowing for the adaptive expression of emotional needs regarding sexuality, dependency, autonomy and aggressive/assertive self affirmation. Internalized object relations that include ethically derived demands and prohibitions transmitted in the early interactions of the infant with his psychosocial environment are integrated into the Super-ego. This more integrated (neurotic, ‘normal’) level of personality organization allows for intrapsychic inter-systemic conflicts between all three agencies of Id, Ego, and Super-Ego (drive-defense conflicts). Here, the predominant mode of defense is repression.

Kernberg’s recent integrative elaboration of Object Relations Theory has many implications for grappling with the complexities of early development and consequent pathologies of the self, positing a homeostatic ‘proto-self’ that can develop into a ‘core self’ capable of placing oneself in space and time. This more mature, continuous, stable concept of self can include autobiographical memory, anticipation, ‘linguistic self’, ‘mental self’ and ‘social self’ (Kernberg, 2015). In his recent efforts to correlate psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory and affective neuroscience, Kernberg (2015) substantiates how current developmental affective neuroscientific research (Gergely and Unoka 2011) into various brain structures, circuits, and neurotransmitters supports the psychoanalytic hypotheses of gradual

internalization of separate ('good' and 'bad' self-object) representations, with full integration only being possible on the higher cortical levels.

In Kernberg's contemporary exposition (2013, 2015), two phases of mentalization processes are differentiated: an early phase of mentalization, in which understanding of a present affect state develops in terms of an immediate object relationship; and a later phase, related to the background of self experience and the background of experience of others, contextualizing the immediate present in light of the (self) reflected past.

Arnold Modell

Over the past 50 years, **Arnold Modell** (1968, 1984, 1990, 1993, 2003, 2007) strove to define the paradoxical nature of the self, as both an evolving contingent product and an enduring core. This quest has taken him from Freudian theory, through Winnicott and Object Relations, to intersubjectivity and neuroscience.

Modell was one of the first US analysts seeking to incorporate Winnicott's thinking and clinical focus on the birth of the self, through mirroring and object use. The emphasis of creation of meaning through establishment of a transitional space between infant and mother became central to Modell's initial theory of the self (Modell 1968).

While fundamentally an elaboration of Winnicottian concepts, "Object Love and Reality" (Modell 1968) introduced two themes: the intersubjective aspect of the transference and the imperative of the self to make meaning of its experience as fundamental to human motivation (Kirshner 2010). Furthering his intersubjective thought as complementary to Freudian drive theory, in "Psychoanalysis in a New Context" (Modell 1984), he argued that the self is built not only from bottom up from biological drives, but also from outside in, through a dyadic interchange. In this interplay of two psychologies, an inside out version – the one person psychology – addresses phenomena like dreaming, symptom formation, and the inviolability of the private or core self; and the outside in – the two person intersubjective model of entangled selves – addresses the relational quality of all psychic activity. Both are active in the psychoanalytic process. In this regard close to Loewald and Green, he maintained that psychoanalysis provides not so much a restorative new relationship, but a new relationship to already existing objects.

In the "Private Self" (Modell 1993), the emphasis on the hidden inner self, grounded in affective memory comes once again into the foreground, grounded this time in the neuroscientific research of Gerald Edelman. Edelman hypothesized that the brain's capacity to re-categorize and re-transcribe memory throughout new contexts of life experiences has evolutionary value, to maintain the continuity of the self. For Modell, this provided a neurobiological basis for the Freudian *Nachträglichkeit* (*après coup*, deferred action), as well as for resolving a paradox – the ephemeral yet enduring self – now understood as both being valid within specific contexts. Going beyond Edelman, in his recent writings (Modell 2003, 2007), he adds the creative and affective dimension to re-transcription, which is his main

contribution. In his “Imagination and the Meaningful Brain (Modell 2003), the process of re-transcription is further elaborated by linking it with metaphoric creativity. In “The Sense of Agency and the Illusion of the Self” (Modell 2007), the self needs to be continually re-contextualized through emotional experience.

In this paper, another example of inter-disciplinary thought, where he undertakes the phenomenon of phantom limb, he posits that the continuity of the self, a transitional creation “...may be an unconsciously generated illusion” (Modell 2007, p. 8), without which we cannot live (Kirshner 2010). Yet, true to his dialectical thought, in “The Unconscious as a Knowledge Processing Center” (Modell 2008), the self re-emerges as a process and dynamic re-transcription of experience, supplanting the illusion/fiction of a private continuous core self.

Thomas Ogden

Synthesizing Klein and Bion, and extending Bick, Meltzer and Tustin, Ogden (1989) recognizes a primitive, pre-symbolic, sensory dominated ‘autistic-contiguous’ mode, as decisive in generating rudimentary self-experiences in early development and autistic psychotic disturbances:

“This mode is a primitive psychological organization operative from birth ... It is sensory-dominated in which the most inchoate sense of self is built upon the rhythm of sensation, particularly at the skin surface ... Sequences, symmetries, periodicity, skin-to-skin ‘molding’ are examples of contiguities that are the ingredients out of which the beginnings of rudimentary self experience arises ...” (Ogden 1989, p. 30-31).

Writing on reverie and metaphor, as essential ingredients of psychoanalytic work (Ogden 1997), he poses a duality within the self – ‘the self as an object’ and ‘the self as a subject’:

“...what is occurring in the process of metaphor-making is the creation of the verbal symbols that give shape and emotional substance to the self as object (‘me’), thereby creating symbols that serve as mirrors in which the self as subject (‘I’) recognizes or creates itself.” (Ogden 1997, p. 729).

Saturated with primary process mentation, Ogden’s duality of the self in reverie and metaphor reminds of previous **James Grotstein’s** contribution on multiple selves of the dreamer (Grotstein 1979).

V.B. Self-Psychology Perspectives

Heinz Kohut

Self-Psychology was developed over time by Heinz Kohut (1971,1977,1984), who had become increasingly dissatisfied with the Freudian drive-defense model's capacity to understand his own clinical experiences with patients of wide spectrum of personality disturbances. While classical psychoanalysis focused on psychopathology as the result of the patient's defensive reactions to unconscious impulses and desires, Kohut observed that interpreting these unconscious conflicts was largely ineffective in reaching his patients 'where they really lived (and suffered)' (Kohut, 1971, 1977). His patients didn't seem to fit the model of being dominated by guilt generated by unconscious impulses but seemed to lack a sense of self that was resilient and vigorous. Instead of what he termed the Freudian "guilty man", Kohut was encountering 'tragic man' (1977) who suffered from a sense of emptiness and despair. Kohut began to look at what needs to happen developmentally between children and parents in order to develop an adequate sense of self. In Kohut's self-psychology the self is not present at birth but emerges beginning in infancy through relationship with a caregiver (Galatzer-Levy and Cohler, 1990). Kohut came to view the self as a functional unit, determined by experience rather than by internal drives.

Consonant with his ideas about self-development he presented a reevaluation of the concept of narcissism, viewing it as neither pathological nor undesirable, but as part of the human experience (Kohut, 1966). He thus came to view narcissism as a normal developmental phenomenon, which can provide a sense of identity, value, meaning and permanence. Transformations of narcissism according to Kohut "... are man's creativity, his ability to be empathic, his capacity to contemplate his own impermanence, his sense of humor and his wisdom" (Kohut, 1966, p. 257). The narcissistic line of development is active from the beginning of life and is a precondition for adequate personality functioning. The integration of narcissism into the healthy personality represented a radical departure from a psychoanalytic worldview that saw narcissism in pejorative terms (Siegel, 1999).

The heart of self-psychology is the self, the core of the personality, which is conceptualized as a mental system that organizes a person's subjective experience in relation to a set of developmental needs (Wolf, 1988). It includes the skills, talents, deficits, and temperament with which a person is endowed at birth. The self is the essence of a person's psychological being and consists of sensations, feelings, thoughts and attitudes toward oneself and the world (Banai, Mikulincer, and Shaver, 2005).

A person's sense of self develops and is sustained through his/her self-object experiences (Kohut, 1984). The concept of a self-object was introduced by Kohut to describe an aspect of a function in the relationship between self and others. From birth on, Kohut contends, we are intimately connected to others and need to feel that they are reliably available to provide the emotional nutrients necessary for optimal development (Wolf, 1988). What we

need from others, and how we need others to be responsive to us, changes over the life span (Kohut, 1984).

These functions consist of mirroring, idealization, and twinship (Kohut, 1977). Mirroring is part of the development of the grandiose self in which parental response to the child builds self-esteem and reinforces the child's sense of self (Kohut, 1971). Idealization is characterized by a yearning for an omnipotent object to which one can attach in an effort to feel whole, safe and firm (Siegel, 1999). Twinship is the need for an other who inspires a feeling of similarity (Kohut, 1971).

According to Kohut, self-object needs are fundamental to the human experience and are essential for self cohesion (1971); the development of a cohesive self takes place along three axes:

(a) The grandiosity axis, (b) the idealization axis, and (c) the alter ego-connectedness axis:

The grandiose self or mirroring self-object: The functions associated with the grandiose self include the experiences of being affirmed and acknowledged by another who mirrors one's internal state. The result is a sense of worth, positive self-regard, and experiences of being respected and feeling approved of by an "other" who praises and compliments us in an authentic way. Some of these experiences can lead the person to feel a sense of dignity and self-respect. Experiences of admiration and of feeling lovable can result in a sense of poise, self-confidence, and self-assurance. Experiences of being "cheered on" in the pursuit of novel experiences and encouraged in the mastery of challenges that stretch one's reach, lead to a sense of firmness in the sense of self, enhancing a vigorous sense of personal agency (Kohut, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1978).

The idealized parent imago or idealization: The functions associated with the idealized parent imago include the experiences of safety that results from the faith in the strength and omnipotence of someone who acts as a protector. Sharing in the strength of that person and the experience of being protected results in the function of feeling empowered and effective as a human being. The experience of having one's excitement or over-stimulating feelings modulated by another, results in the development of self-control, self-discipline, and self-regulation. The experiences of being soothed, comforted, and calmed by another, who provides solace and support as well as joyous vitality, result in the capacity for enthusiasm and equanimity. Finally, the experience of learning rules of conduct that represent the content of the culture's values and ideals, become consolidated into a value system, and a set of ideals that serve as guides in the person's life. These give a sense of purpose in the pursuit of life's goals (Kohut 1968, 1971, 1978).

The alter-ego or connectedness: The alter-ego self-object functions were initially associated with the mirror transferences, being considered an archaic form of those transferences, but were later given a separate status (Kohut, 1984). The functions associated with the alter-ego include the experience of a common bond with others that can lead to a feeling of kinship with others so that nothing human feels alien. The experience of the

intactness of oneself provides the sense of well-being and wholesomeness without which we feel dehumanized.

“In normal development, the parents’ capacity to serve as effective selfobjects provides the conditions which allow the infant to gradually internalize the functions they performed. These conditions, which include empathic responsiveness tempered by optimal frustration, permit the infant sufficient time and resources to forge a cohesive sense of self capable of mastering individuation” (Glassman, 1988, p. 26).

Selfobject functions are not innate psychological functions. The awareness of self creates the desire for others to function in ways that fulfill needs. Well-functioning selfobjects provide a set of experiences that lead to an experience of cohesion and stability. The conscious awareness of selfobjects is generally absent. However narcissistic wound, unmitigated by selfobject functions, is experienced as an injury to the self. When selfobjects fail to function in these need-fulfilling ways, it can lead to disruption and fragmentation.

In Kohut’s (1982) theory of the self, empathy is a mode of observation and the medium through which the mirroring, idealizing, and twinship selfobject functions are provided. With the experience of empathy, one develops a sense of self-cohesion. These ideas represent further elaboration and expansion of his earlier thought:

“Empathy, the recognition of the self in the other, is an indispensable tool of observation, without which vast areas of human life, including man’s behavior in the social field, remain unintelligible. Empathy, the expansion of the self to include the other, constitutes a powerful psychological bond between individuals. And, empathy is a psychosocial nutriment without which human life as we know and cherish it could not be sustained.” (Kohut, 1975, p.355).

The emotionally attuned and empathic caregiver provides selfobject functions that meet the child’s need for affirmation, admiration and connection to others.

Narcissistic pathology in Kohut’s view is due to empathic failures in mirroring and idealization, which deprive the self of reliable, cohesive sources of narcissism. This results in an inability to maintain and regulate self-esteem at normal levels and causes deficits, distortions, or weaknesses in the sense of self (Kohut, 1977; Goldberg, 1978).

Overall, the work of Kohut presents a major landmark in the theory of both narcissism and the concept of the self. After his death, Self Psychology has developed in several directions. Within the ‘traditional’ Kohutian Self Psychology, **Paul Ornstein** (1990, 1993) and **Anna Ornstein** (Ornstein and Ornstein 1980, 1985) further explicated the role of empathy, self-object transferences, narcissistic rage in the interpretive process with regard to the therapeutic action, and the patient’s dread to repeat traumatic self object disappointments and hope for a new beginning in treatment. **Arnold Goldberg** (1995, 1999) applied the concept of the vertical split, effected by disavowal, to the study of perversions, narcissistic disorders and to behaviors split off from avowed experience, such as binge eating, cross dressing and infidelity.

Joseph Lichtenberg

Building on Kohut's Self-Psychology and Stolorow's Intersubjectivity (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992), Joseph Lichtenberg developed a *Motivational Systems Theory* in which "self" is conceptualized as an experiential self or a sense of self. This sense of self exists in a complex context of sensations and information from the individual's body and from the individual's relatedness to other individuals, groups, and culture, from responsiveness and adaptation to inanimate objects and non-human animate others. In the matrix of attachment experience, the infant's sense of self originates from agency – that is, from being a doer, i.e., doing, acting and taking in, initiating and responding. According to Lichtenberg (Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 2011) central to the intentions and goals of the agentic sense of self are: seeking a safe base at times of danger and loss (Bowlby, 1988), being responded to by caregivers with mirroring affirmation, establishing a sense of commonality (twinship), and admiring (idealizing) others (Kohut, 1984) and being admired. Successful mutual regulation of these fundamental relationships of attachment to individuals and affiliation with groups (the family, peers, etc.) leads to corresponding changes in the sense of self, in the other, and builds a generalized positive ambiance that influences further expectations and adaptations. While one can speak of a core sense of self, of identity, of personhood, the experiencing of self differs with the multiplicity of intentions and goals. Overall, Lichtenberg (1989) has described five motivational systems in the development of self, including needs for: 1. psychic regulation of bodily requirements; 2. attachment and affiliation; 3. exploration and assertion; 4. aversive reactivity; 5. and sexual and sensual needs.

In normal adaptive situations, the sense of self shifts with fluctuating dominance, presence, or absence of intentions to regulate physiological requirements, form attachment to individuals, and affiliations with groups, give and receive caretaking, explore one's surround and assert one's preferences, express aversion through antagonism and withdrawal, and/or seek sensual enjoyment and sexual excitement (Lichtenberg, 2008). In response to chronic and/or traumatic stress, the sense of self can be fragmented in disassociated states, restricted through pathological accommodation, and diminished and debilitated in regressive and depressive states. Assaults on the sense of agency, self esteem and self worth, especially in an individual vulnerable to shame, guilt and loss of pride and confidence affects the sense of self leading often to rage, suspicion, and preoccupation with vengeance fantasies. Viewed broadly the sense of self as a doer doing is sustained by experiences of empathy or made vulnerable to loss of a sense of cohesion if empathic connection is disrupted or absent (Kohut, 1977).

Among much cross-fertilization between Self Psychology and Relational perspectives, **Howard Bacal** (1985, 1998a,b) identifies 'relational self psychology', where the focus is on the context of the subjective relationship rather than the relationship as such. Questioning the role of 'optimal frustration' in development and in therapy, he argues for 'optimal responsiveness' as a better description of what is needed for the self.

V. C. Interpersonal and Relational Perspectives

Indigenous to North America, **Harry Stack Sullivan** (1953, 1964) viewed psychiatry as fundamentally the study of interpersonal relations, he developed a very different conception of the self and its development, than his classical psychoanalytic colleagues. Sullivan, greatly influenced by George Herbert Mead (1934), believed we can only know ourselves in relation to an other and thus made the radical assertion that the self was actually just a collection of the reflected appraisals of those we were in contact with, consisting of a set of what he termed, “me-you” patterns (Sullivan, 1953). For Sullivan there was no way to understand an individual self outside the complex network of interpersonal relationships in which a person is inevitably enmeshed. One consequence of this “field theory” perspective was his firm belief that the feeling of an inner core of self was a narcissistically invested fiction. In fact, Sullivan viewed human beings as having “as many personalities as they have interpersonal relations” (1950, p 221). For him, our selves were divided into the “good-me”, that which I like about myself, the “bad-me”, that which I dislike, and the “not-me”, aspects of self so anxiety-provoking that they need to be disavowed by means of dissociation. Sullivan’s view of the self as multiple along with his invocation of self-preservative dissociative processes has forming the leading edge of contemporary relational views of the self best exemplified in the work of **Philip Bromberg** (1998, 2006, 2011) and **Donnell Stern** (1997, 2010). Sullivan developed the concept of the “self-system” to elucidate the configuration of personality traits and security operations designed to maintain an individual’s relative sense of safety and stability. This “self-system” is designed to protect a person from undo shame and anxiety by employing mechanisms such as *dissociation* and *selective inattention*. Sullivan’s emphasis on the “other” as a source of danger is consonant with contemporary interpersonal, two person psychology perspectives.

Following in the Sullivanian tradition of a field theory perspective, **Bromberg** (1998) views the mind as “a configuration of shifting, non-linear states of consciousness in an ongoing dialectic with the necessary illusion of unitary selfhood.” (p. 7). Following Sullivan, Bromberg (1998, 2006, 2011) sees “not-me” experiences as ubiquitous and inevitable and claims that dissociative processes can be a healthy, adaptive function of the human mind serving a primary self-protective function akin to Freud’s *repression*, or Sullivan’s *self-system*. Thus for Bromberg, “the self” is definitionally a collection of “me” and disavowed “not me” states. As some degree of dissociation is inevitable, Bromberg emphasizes that it is the degree of dissociation amongst the self-states that determines the level of psychopathology with the most extreme examples constituting psychotic experiences.

The contemporary relational field theory view of the self has implications for understanding interactions. For Bromberg and other contemporary relational thinkers (e.g. D.B. Stern, E. Levenson) an interaction between two selves involves a complex, ever shifting interweaving of both conscious and unconscious elements that affect and are affected by one another. For Bromberg, successful treatment involves the recognition of these dissociated self-states as they are enacted in the analytic relationship so that they can be re-organized by the patient. Bromberg (1998) views health as the capacity of our multiple self-states to access one another, unhampered by defensively determined dissociative processes. This capacity, which

represents an ideal, is the ability to “stand in the spaces” between self-states or as he puts it: “the ability to feel like one self while being many” (p. 274).

Stephen Mitchell (1991) also views the self as “multiple and discontinuous”, consisting of a collection of self-states akin to internalized object relationships. However he also emphasizes that people have a distinct sense of a private self with a clear boundary between ourselves and others. He explains this apparent contradiction by noting that each definition refers to a different aspect of self. For Mitchell the “multiple self” is the self as action, i.e. “multiple configurations of self patterned variability in different relational contexts” (p. 139), while the private, unitary self is: a “subjective experience of the pattern making itself, activity that is experienced over time and across the different organizational schemes [and] is recognized as ‘mine, my particular way of processing and shaping experience’” (p. 139). While more traditional views of the self (e.g. Freud, Klein, Winnicott) might be seen as vertically organized with the more defensively constructed, socially adapted parts on the surface covering the less acceptable, at times unconscious parts underneath, contemporary relational/interpersonal theorists favor a horizontal model. As **Donell Stern** (2010) puts it: “Mind here is not a vertical organization of conscious and unconscious, but horizontally organized collection of *self-states*, each in dynamic relation to the others” (p. 139).

Perhaps the most radical expression of a contemporary interpersonal approach to the self is seen in the work of **Edgar A. Levenson** (1972, 1991) who makes a strong case for the absolute inextricability of self and other and thus views analyst and patient as inevitably and unconsciously involved with one another in highly affectively charged ways. Levenson is relentlessly post-modern in his conviction that any attempt to define or explain anything about a person is only a perspective (e.g. of a person, an interaction, an experience) and as such may likely be defensively organized to exclude other perspectives that may contain other essential aspects of a person and their experience. Thus he views psychoanalytic concepts such as the “self” as reifications of something inescapably fluid that can only be seen in “process” or “context”. Levenson’s self, like Sullivan’s self-system, consists of the variety of strategies we employ to negotiate the dangers of our interpersonal world. Thus in an attempt to make sense of the world, people develop schemata which if they work, tend to be reused. For Levenson, the relative rigidity or flexibility of these schemata may be a way of describing psychopathology. He believes that the need to continuously adapt to an ever-changing set of circumstances has resulted in the development of a mind that functions as a self-organizing system (Levenson, Hirsch, and Iannuzzi, 2005, p. 612). Levenson acknowledges, “... there is something autonomous within the person organizing, experiencing, using it and taking it away, and reorganizing it.” (p. 613). Thus Levenson thinks of the *self as a process* rather than a structure.

VI. FURTHER AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF SPECIFIC TO EUROPE

VI. A. Contemporary British Object Relations Contribution

Christopher Bollas has written extensively on the concept of self, its origin, its articulation, the sense of self. He is influenced by Winnicott's concept the "true self" and has elaborated in a unique way. In his writing in this area he often refers to literature, poetry and arts.

In *Forces of Destiny* (1989) Bollas writes:

When Winnicott introduced the term 'true self' to stand for an inherited potential that found its expression in spontaneous action, I think he conceptualized a feature of the analytical relationship (and of life) that had heretofore been untheorized ... Winnicott's theory of the true self is, in my view, just such a concept through which we may describe something we know about analysis, but have until now been unable to think (p. 8).

Through his writings Bollas elaborates and refines his own thoughts on the true self, for which he gradually substitutes the term "idiom". He does this partly because he feels that "overusage of a term ... [leads to loss of] meaningfulness through incantatory solicitation, devaluing any word's unthought potential" (1992, p 64), but also because he wishes to find his own way in this elusive area.

In the chapter 'The psychoanalyst's multiple function' (*Forces of Destiny* 1989), he writes:

"The true self cannot be fully described. It is less like the articulation of meaning through words which allow one to isolate a unit of meaning as in the location of a signifier, and more akin to the movement of symphonic music... Each individual is unique, and the true self is an idiom of organization that seeks its personal world through the use of an object... the fashioning of life is something like an aesthetic: a form revealed through one's way of being." (1989, pp.109-10)

In "The transformational object" in "The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known" (1987) Bollas explores the beginnings of the infant's elaboration of this individual aesthetic, something that is fundamentally dependent on a facilitating early environment. If the mother does not respond sensitively to the infant's spontaneous gesture, his/her early idiomatic expressions will be blocked and replaced by false adaptations. But if she is attuned with the infant's emerging self she will have the capacity, through subtle conscious and unconscious interactions with her baby, to respond to the infant's true self communication.

In "The Shadow of the Object" he stays close to Winnicott's formulation describing the true self as "the historical kernel of the infant's instinctual and ego dispositions" (Bollas,

1987, p. 51), “the core of the self” (p. 208) and – linking true self to Freud’s concept of primary repression – as “that inherited disposition that constitutes the core of personality, which has been genetically transmitted, and exists as a potential in psychic space,” and he places the true self at “the very core of the concept of the unthought known” (p. 278).

In “Forces of Destiny” Bollas (1989) formulates a crucial difference between “fate” and “destiny”. He links fate to the concept of the false self and reactive living and destiny to the fulfilling of one’s own inner potential. In “The destiny drive”, chapter 4, he articulates his belief that the this sense of destiny is the natural course of the true self through the many types of object relations, and that the destiny drive emerges, if it does, out of the infants experience of the mother’s facilitation of true self movement.

As we go through life, our idiom continues to be articulated through our choice and use of objects. In “Being a Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience” (1992) Bollas elaborates his image of idiom as an “intelligence of form” and his ideas of idiomatic object-usage, which he began in “Forces of Destiny”. “The idiom,” he writes, “that gives form to any human character is not a latent content of meaning but an aesthetic in personality” (pp. 64-65). Our idiom is “our mystery” (1992, p 51). It cannot be known or reached through introspection. We will never encounter the true self as such, we will never *know* what it is, neither our own or the other’s, but we can sense its derivatives intuitively, in a similar way that we can only sense the Unconscious through it derivatives.

Bollas views one's idiom as being articulated through one's choice and use of objects, both in the transitional sense (where inner and outer reality meet and where the question of what comes from inside and from outside is kept suspended) and in the “objective” sense, where one encounters the object's quality of being fundamentally itself, outside the sphere of projective mechanisms, what Bollas calls the *integrity* of the object.

Bollas writes:

“If idiom is, then, the it with which we are born, and if its pleasure is to elaborate itself through the choice of objects, one that is an intelligence of form rather than an expression of inner content, its work collides with the structure of the objects that transform it, through which it gains its precise inner contents. This collisional dialectic between the human’s form and the object’s structure is, in the best of times, a joy of living, as one is nourished by the encounter” (Bollas 1992, pp. 59-60).

In several instances Bollas discusses the deep “sense of self”. In the chapter “What is this thing called self?” in “Cracking up – the Work of Unconscious Experience” (Bollas 1995) he calls it “a separate sense. A sense that is only a potential in each person, who is born with this sense capacity, and who will, to a greater or lesser extent, develop it.” (ibid, p 154). This sense of self can be blocked and thwarted when, in the individual’s life, there has been too little of sensitive responses to his idiomatic expressions, leaving him with a feeling of emptiness and lack of contact inwards. In the sense of self, Bollas writes, “There is a feeling there of one’s being, of something there, but not a something we can either touch or know; only sense, and it is the most important sensed phenomenon in our life.” (ibid, p 172).

VI. B. Italian Contributors

Where in British psychoanalysis, theories of the Self have been developed within the object relations tradition, in Italian psychoanalysis the concept of Self was developed by authors who have theorized its genesis from the primitive mind in the relationship with the mother (Eugenio Gaddini); from the “group matrix” (Giovanni Hautmann); from the trans-generational dimension (Diego Napolitani); or as a device to analyze the dynamics in the analyst-patient relationship (Stefano Bolognini) .

Eugenio Gaddini (in: Mascadini, Gaddini, De Benedetti, 1989), through his deep knowledge and collaboration with Winnicott was one of the psychoanalysts who imported and developed theories of the Self in Italian psychoanalysis. In referring to the Self, he uses the term “organizer”, with respect to the term “structure”, to indicate its catalytic function in the development of the psychic organization. In the initial phases in the structure of the Self, its anchoring to sensory stimuli and bodily sensations that lack a sense of time and defined space prevails. These first sensations cause in the baby a first form of “self-experience”, which is experienced as coming from the self, devoid of boundaries and not differentiated from the non-self. The psyche then emerges from the sensations and gradually organizes them through a very primitive mechanism that Gaddini defines “primitive imitation”, or “imitating to be”. This primitive imitation/impersonation continues to be used also in adult life – usually in dreams and in the pathology of the sense of self – and in the age of adolescence in the face of anguish caused by the relationship with the object (Mascadini, Gaddini, De Benedetti, 1989/1989, p. 563).

Starting from the third month the child’s psyche through perception begins to meet with something that Gaddini defines as an “obscure sense of non-self” that will lead him to a first recognition of the object as separate from himself. The author strongly underlines the psychic vulnerability of the child in this phase, more extreme than the biological one that generates a form of primitive anguish which is the anxiety of loss of self (p. 566). Later Gaddini will define 1-the anguish of non-integration, when the separated Self fails to maintain cohesion and is fragmented , 2- anguish of integration, when the Self, through biological maturation and adaptation of the environment to its emotional needs, acquires a feeling of sufficient stability, but it is constantly afraid of losing it. It is interesting to note that Winnicott talks about the anguish of integration as connected with a kind of paranoid anxiety. The separation of the Self from the non-Self object coincides with the psychological birth (Mahler et al. 1975) and occurs through an oscillation between anguish of non-integration and anguish of integration. The libidinal charges do not primarily seek the object, but are turned inside to hold the fragments of the Self together and this stage can be defined as consolidation of the constituted, unitary Self. This stage can last for a considerable time and is a precious time because the Self is able to have autonomous experiences and the anxieties of loss of the self gradually disappear. The last stage is that of the formation of the object and coincides with the renunciation of the Self of the previous defenses in order to invest in an authentic relationship of love. Gaddini argues that all these stages are also recognizable in the individual analytic process.

Giovanni Hautmann (1990, 2002) developed the links between the early formation of the Self – its birth – the beginnings of symbolic capacities and the birth of the ability of thinking. Hautmann emphasizes that the primitive mind is governed by an asymbolic matrix, in which sensory stimulations, perceptions, sensations, primitive emotions prevail. The development of the Self occurs through the progressive emergence from this original matrix, with an oscillation between an asymbolic, dispersed and disaggregated condition, and an initial impulse towards integration, towards progressive degrees of possible emergence of identification and symbolic expression. Taking a cue from Bion's theories on the protomental apparatus, Hautmann defines the asymbolic matrix 'protomental magma' or 'primitive group self'. In this protosymbolic matrix the elements, whether dispersed or aggregated, may belong both to the psychic and to the physical status and therefore are amenable to analytical approach, as, perhaps also, to biological approach. The oscillations of the primitive mind can also be intercepted in the analytic session, contained and understood by the analyst's reverie and re-signified through his interpretative activity.

Diego Napolitani (1987, 1991, 2005) proposes a model of formation of the individual Self, understood as a strong identity nucleus/central core, starting from the *matrice gruppale* (group/collective matrix), stratified in its cultural, social and family dimensions. Napolitani modeled his Self construct with the help of a graphic representation that he defined as the "map of the bipolar mind", in which he indicates the "masculine" and the "feminine" components as two different ways of approaching knowledge and vision of the world. In the map of the 'Bipolar Mind' the author identifies three dimensions: 1. The IDEM (Latin for 'sameness and identity') is closely related to the original environment (individual's past, from the most distant origins to the most recent relational experiences), the core of the roots of the identity; it is the complex of experiences in the history of each human being, from birth to the present moment, the world of traditions, the set of relational, affective, intellectual accumulated experiences in the history of each individual. The Idem is "my tradition and my culture", and as such also "a prejudicial way of knowledge". The formation of the Self coincides in the bipolar map with the IPSE (Latin for himself/herself, in person) and indicates the reflective dimension, the self-awareness through the emergence from the Idem. The Ipse coincides with the conscious Self, and it develops from linguistic, gestural, ethical codes, internalized as identification from the original environment. Finally, the author identifies a third place of the bipolar map that is AUTOS (Greek for He), the self-reorganizing device that reveals itself in the production of symbols, the symbol-poetic ability which represents the source of all these complex proceedings that connect the individual with his own original matrices on one side and his own becoming on the other; Autos maintains the Self in a condition of a permanently unstable equilibrium between the conservative dimension and the transformative dimension, thus passing from heteronomy (obedience to the law of the other) to autonomy (the construction of the symbol around which to articulate its own law).

Stefano Bolognini (1991) has developed a theory of the Self focusing on the dyad patient-analyst at work. Bolognini underlines the differences between the terms "Ego and Self". The Ego is defined according to Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) as: (1) nucleus of consciousness and bundle of active mental functions; (2) organizer of the defenses; (3) agency, mediating

between external reality, id and super-ego. The “Self” is the set of representations concerning the person himself when he is an object (potential or actual) of his own subjective experience. Unlike ego, id and superego, which are dynamic components of the psychic apparatus, self is a content of the apparatus, in the same way as the representations of objects. Being a unit with continuity over time, self is configured as one internal structure of the psyche, in which, however, it has a complex location: various and often conflicting representations of the self are distributed in the ego, in the id and in the super-ego (Kohut 1971). Accordingly, the self appears to be partly conscious, partly unconscious.

Bolognini proposes a model of interplay of Ego and Self in the dyad patient/analyst, where 4 combinations are explored: 1. The contact between the Ego of the Analyst/the Ego of the Patient, whereby portions of the patient’s psychic life are communicated at a conscious level. The aim of the relationship is to provide the equivalent of a geographical map to allow the patient insights and new points of view on himself. The couple does not enter the inner world, and surface space is explored and this could be an informative and explanatory way to work in analysis. 2 The contact between the Ego of the Analyst/ the Self of the Patient: Here, the analyst is able to organize himself in a fairly stabilized condition of preconscious receptivity, while maintaining his own experiential center of gravity in the conscious ego, in situations in which the patient is instead available to a more profound and complete exchange. The analyst is also able to notice projective intrusions of the patient, which he recognizes as elements of non-self and to give back, formulating dynamic hypotheses, to the patient's internal processes including extensive scenarios of his patient's dreamlike life. 3 The contact between the Ego-Self of the Analyst /Ego of the Patient. Here, the analyst uses the resonance of his own self to identify, comparatively, the underdeveloped or inaccessible areas of the patient's self; but he also experiences, with his own self, the ways, the levels and the strength with which the unconscious defensive Ego of the patient suspends, chokes or usually cancels the subjective contact of the patient with his own self (Bollas 1987). The wide and deep contact with the his own self allows the analyst to receive, experience and discern the parts of the patient's mental life (object and functions) that have been split and projected into him. 4. The contact between the Ego-Self of the Analyst /the Ego-Self of the Patient. In this configuration, the contact with the patient is deeper: the preconscious channels widen and the exploratory functions of the observing ego of the analyst can illuminate, deepen, and gain contact with parts of the patient and of himself. Here, the analyst does not deduce, but sees more; the introjective processes prevail over the projective ones; the projective processes of the patient, experienced by the analyst, are not only objects of verbal communication, but they are more often treated through the identification and a creative play.

Overall, Bolognini (1991) advocates for a widened definition of the concept of the self. According to such a broad definition, the self would correspond to the internal reality (including object representations) which turns out to be a lasting, characterological and constituent part of a person's mental world, and which may be the object of his subjective experience. Seen in this way, the nuclear part of the self is the part in which the elements that have most profoundly and authentically been the object of projective identification form an organic nucleus with the person's hereditary somato-psychic constitution; at this level any

psychoanalytic work involving de-identification will inevitably be inappropriate and destructive. This nuclear self relates to a deep identity (the equivalent of Winnicott's 'true self'). The overall picture formed by the internal objects, the nuclear self and their relations can transmit a basic emotional atmosphere of the self, whose occasional fluctuations can be perceived in the patient's state of mind, in the contents of his dreams and the atmosphere of the session. The analyst can choose to observe this dream theatre or take an active part in it. In the first case he works mainly by the ego; in the second case he brings his own self into play too. Various combinations and permutations of analytic work, encompassing contacts between analyst's and patient's ego's and selves, lead to processes involving ego's growth and emancipations (from id and superego) on one hand, and expansion and enrichment of self on the other hand go hand in hand: "Experience teaches us that in a good analysis these two processes of development are destined to meet and combine harmoniously, in spite of whatever the various prominent theorists of technique might say: the result is a person with a valid ego and a rich self ..." (Bolognini 1991, pp. 348-349).

VI. C. Self in French and French-Related Tradition

Jean-Bertrand Pontalis

Pontalis (1977/1983) described intermediary areas between the dream and psychic pain, where, in his view, the birth and recognition of the self occurs. According to this view, it is not so much the pleasure, but the suffering, an intensely subjective aspect of pain, which contributes to psychic structuring and 'subjectivization', as it reveals and influences the condition of the subject/self.

Pontalis' seminal paper "Naissance et reconnaissance du soi" [Birth and recognition of the self' in English transl.] presents a fundamental chapter in his book "*Entre le rêve et la douleur*" [In between dreams and pain] (Pontalis 1977/1983), where such notions are introduced, is considered also one of the first French texts on the 'as if personalities' of Helene Deutsch (1942) and 'true' and 'false Self' of Winnicott, putting in perspective the Psychology of the Ego and that of the Self.

Pontalis (1977/1983) thoroughly examines the genesis of the concept of the Self and its implications with respect to the Freudian theory. He criticizes the illusory unity of the concept of Self, in which he sees the risk of escaping the irreducibility of conflict, the alterity of the unconscious, the irreconcilability of representations, the multiple transformations of drives, and the multiplicity of identifications. Accordingly, he stresses that the unity of the Self could contradict the complex articulation of psychic reality, on the basis of the Freud's Structural Theory/Second Topography, the formation and differentiation of the various psychic agencies and their irreducible conflict, for the benefit of a model of unitary growth, very close to the organic model. Despite this, Pontalis brings some examples related to clinical investigation that make the introduction of the concept of Self useful. The first one concerns a comparison between two types of patients introduced by Helene Deutsch and Edith Jacobson, for whose description both authors have used the notion of the Self. Helene Deutsch's (1942) description

of "as if" personality refers to patients whose internal reality is characterized by the absence of the Self, and it may be represented by an empty envelope, whose external boundaries are invested to keep out objects, representations and affects. Edith Jacobson describes the personality of the psychotic who, on the contrary, suffers a fragmentation of his own Self, within a "too full" interior psychic reality whose boundaries are constantly threatened by the irruption of external reality. Additionally, while disagreeing with Hartmann's distinction between Ego and Self, which would challenge the intrinsic contradiction of the Freudian 'Ich', Pontalis recognizes the merit of Hartmann and also of Kohut for having extended the field of psychoanalytic research to the disorders of the narcissistic spectrum through the development of their respective Self theories. From this apparent contradiction between theoretical framework and experiences that emerges in the depth of clinical work, Pontalis suggests that notion of Self can help to highlight the subjective component of the patient and analyst in the analytic work. Finally, Pontalis proposes a careful re-examination of some central points of Winnicott's ideas (transitional space, the creation of the transitional object, the distinction between true and false self), from which he takes inspiration to propose his own conceptualization of Self:

"For a conscience and an experience of self to be possible, there is the need for an ego to be constituted, even if rudimentary it may be. The ego is the representative of the organism as a form, fragile in its vulnerability and reassuring in its fixity, like the image in the mirror: the ego is in an enclosed space and as embedded between the space of the id, always ready to invade it, and the outer space, always marked by the superego, which the ego must face: the Self is not the life impulse, but in the psychic space it is the representative of the living: the Self is in a space open, if I can say, to the two sides, to the environment that feeds it first and that in turn it creates". (Pontalis, 1977/1980, p. 178).

Taking up the idea of Winnicott that the Self is the custodian of the feeling of existing, Pontalis concludes: "Being someone who lives, it is a task already carried out, programmed for the animal organism, but always invented for man" (Pontalis 1977/1980, p. 178), highlighting the point of self-inventing property of Self.

Judith Gammelgaard

In her seminal paper on the subject "Ego, Self and Otherness" (Gammelgaard 2003), Gammelgaard synthesizes French philosophy of Ricouer (1992), with French psychoanalytic tradition of Laplanche (1992), Green (2000) and Piera Aulagnier (1975) together with Winnicott's (1971) notion of the transitional space, to articulate in contemporary terms the Freudian contradictory and ambiguous conceptualization of de-centered 'I', including the ego, the self as well as the otherness. She situates the self in the intermediary area of experience, following Winnicott's emphasis on the difference between relating to the object and using the object. Winnicott (1971) exemplifies that going from relating to the object to the use of the object implies that: (a) the subject phantasically destroys the object, and (b) the object

survives the phantasmatic destruction in order to acquire its own autonomy. Having thus survived, in Gammelgaard thinking, the object can be now perceived and conceived as the other, leading to the emergence of the rudimentary perception of 'I', 'Me', which is in turn the first representation of the idea of "I", with 'Me' in it.

Such first representations correspond to Aulagnier's (1975) pictogram, which may precede primary phantasy formation, but which is not outside the sphere of representation. The pictogram is the first representation that is given by the very first psychic activity, reflecting both the activity and the activation, and most importantly, it encompasses the other. Here Gammelgaard is back firmly in the territory of French psychoanalysis: the pictogram as illusion belongs to the I or Me existing in the psyche as a never understood 'enigmatic message' from the other (Laplanche 1997, Gammelgaard 2003, p.107).

VI. D. The Self in Psychoanalysis of Children and Adolescents

While many contributions of the North American and European authors are explicitly or implicitly developmental, in Europe in particular, psychoanalyses of children and adolescents, directly building on some aspects of research and theories of Margaret Mahler and Daniel Stern, are frequently thought of as a special category providing further elaboration of the theories of the Self. Reciprocally, the clinical theory and clinical work of child and adolescent analysts provide further impetus for the overall evolution of the concept, inspiring further empirical studies and interdisciplinary research, which may be relevant to clinical conceptualizations applicable to all age categories.

VI. Da. Background in Infant Studies of North America and Europe

René Spitz's studies (1945, 1965, 1972) of long-term maternal separation on institutionalized infants was greatly influential on Mahler's theory of separation-individuation. Importantly, he was also the first one to stress the vital importance of affectionate 'holding' of the infant by caregivers, which promotes rich tactile affective nonverbal communication between the infants and their caregivers.

This tradition continued with Mahler (Mahler, Pine, Bergman, 1975), within the Ego Psychology/Structural theory framework, and, with the infant research on self- and interactive regulation of Beebe (Beebe and Lachmann 2002; Beebe 2004a,b), and with the Boston Change Process Study Group (Stern, Sander, Nahum et al., 1998), within the Self and Relational theories framework.

Following Bowlby (1969) in England, Ainsworth (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall, 1978) in the USA developed contemporary attachment theory, where the attachment is defined as an affective bond between the infant and a caregiver (Blum 2004) and as the behavioral correspondence of internalized object relations under the influence of the early mother-infant relationship (Diamond and Blatt, 2007).

The above and comparable studies in the field of infant research and attachment in Europe (D. N. Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 2001; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002; Ammaniti & Trentini, 2009; Cortina & Liotti, 2010) consistently support the view of personality organized in terms of ‘self-with-other’, where the interaction between two subjects is the necessary condition for psychic development as well as for psychological cure (See also separate entries OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES and INTERSUBJECTIVITY).

Developmental neuroscientists have suggested that there may be a ‘virtual other’ in the brain whose outlines get filled in with experience (Bråten, 2011). Mirror Neuron Systems (Gallese, Eagle and Migone, 2007) are thought to be a possible element in such innately given ‘interpersonality’. Neuro-analytic studies of right brain structures and activities implicated in the unconscious processes of the ‘implicit self’ of Allan Schore (2011) are also relevant in this regard.

VI. Db. Mahler and Stern: Integration of Research and Theory

Margaret Mahler

An émigré from her native Vienna to New York, where she lived and worked most of her adult life, Margaret Mahler’s influence is felt acutely across both continents, North America as much as Europe. Her theory of Separation and Individuation developed out of her extensive work and studies of children with severe pathologies of autism and ‘symbiotic psychosis’.

Directly relevant to child analytic work her is her notion of symbiotic origins of human existence, with the Self emerging through complementary processes of separation and individuation, which structure the internalized representations of the Self, distinct from the internal representations of objects.

The phases and sub-phases of Separation-Individuation process include pre-separational Autism and Symbiosis, and Separation-Individuation proper with sub-phases of Differentiation/’Hatching’; Practicing, Rapprochement, and ‘On the way to Object Constancy’. (For specification, see chapter IV.B. of this entry above)

Daniel N. Stern

A North American trained analyst, active in both North America and Europe, Stern (1985) has elaborated a model of the development of the Self by integrating the insights of the infant research with psychoanalytic theory.

At birth, the infant experiences the world as a barrage of seemingly unrelated sensory stimuli, which s/he gradually learns to “yoke” together using cues such as the “hedonic tone” (emotional quality), and temporal and intensity patterns shared between stimuli. This process of integrating and organizing experience, called the emergent sense of Self, continues until about two months. It serves as the basis for the child's ability to learn and create.

Around two months, the infant's organization of sensory experience reaches a point where s/he is able to sufficiently organize experience to have integrated episodic memories. This enables a higher level of sophistication organizing future experiences, as the infant is able to discern discrete invariant objects from cross-modal sensory stimuli and to use these to arrive at generalizations about what he/she can expect in the future from his/her environment. In this process, the infant also becomes aware of its own features ("self-invariants"), which give the child its sense of core Self as an entity distinct from objects in its environment. The infant also develops generalized representations of its interactions with its primary caregiver during this time, a concept related to and informed by attachment theory. An important role of the caregiver during this time is to assist the infant in regulating his affects. Eventually, if all goes well, the infant will internalize these experiences with the primary attachment figure, making it possible for him to help himself in the self regulation of affects.

Around seven months, the infant begins to be aware that his thoughts and experiences are distinct from those of other people, that there is a gap between his subjective reality and that of other people. However, with proper attunement by the primary attachment figure, the infant also becomes aware that this gap can be bridged through intersubjective experiences, such as sharing affect and focus of attention, while developing the sense of the subjective Self. A lack of such attunement, as could happen, for example, if the mother suffers from depression, can deprive the infant of sufficient intersubjective experiences, leaving the infant unable to connect to other people in any meaningful way, which Stern believes may underlie narcissistic personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder. Around 15 months, the infant develops the capacity for symbolic representation and language, and becomes capable of creating complex abstract mental representations of experiences, facilitating intersubjectivity but shifting the child's focus towards those things that can be represented and communicated in language. This process allows the development of the verbal Self. Each sense of self corresponds to a different domain of interpersonal experience: the domain of emergent relatedness, the domain of core relatedness, and so on. The senses of self and domains of relatedness are not successive phases or stages, which replace or subsume one another. They continue to grow and to coexist throughout life.

Mahler's and Stern's findings were contemporaneously integrated with later developmental research (Stern 1985; Pine, 1986; Bergman, 1999; Gergely, 2000; Fonagy, 2000) in the synthetic inclusive contemporary Freudian perspective in the work of Harold Blum, who highlighted mainly the multidimensional differentiation processes as a precondition for emergence of intrapsychic self and object representation. Further clinical and theoretical integration followed in the following conceptualizations of self in the psychoanalysis of children and adolescents.

VI. Dc. The Self in the Psychoanalysis of Children

Frances Tustin (1981), in her study of the primitive stages of development, takes up the concept of a normal autistic phase in early childhood that defines a body-focused state,

dominated by sensations, which constitutes the core of the Self, associated with a relatively undifferentiated auto-sensuality. She describes that at this stage, the child's body and its sensations lay the foundations for the constitution of a bodily self, the basis for the subsequent development of identity. In this phase the objects of external reality, including the mother, are incorporated in the form of sensation-objects belonging to the body, precursors of the next relationship of the newborn with not-me objects, experienced as separate from the body to which the child must adapt.

Tustin also stresses that the child must have first developed a sense of self that is distinct and separate from others in order to be able to develop social awareness of others. The way in which the newborn develops this type of awareness is essential for the acquisition of the sense of individual identity. The sensuality of the newborn in the state of normal primary autism is combined with the adaptability of the mother coming from her maternal preoccupation and protecting her child from the experiences of the "non-self", in a sort of "post-natal womb". Tustin theorizes an auto-sensual construct to describe the way the child experiences the mother as part of his body. The capacities that the newborn acquires at this stage, through the "sensation-objects", come into play in the subsequent use of objects recognized as non-self. The acquisition of these capacities supports the child in the adaptations necessary to confront the external reality separate from the Self. Tustin then proposed a clinical classification of pathological autism based on the defense mechanisms that the child puts in place to protect himself from failures in the elaboration of separation of the Self from the non-Self.

In 'encapsulated' children psychological development is blocked, the "bodily Self" maintains a split from sensations and the non-self is encapsulated in the self.

Such children maintain a fusional condition through the splitting-off of their own sensations and through including the "non self" (sensations deriving from the other's body, or the other's gestures, actions, emotions etc) in their own Self. These children cling to hard objects that are a source of cold and metallic sensations; these sensations help the child to build a somato-psychic representation of the shell in which they are encapsulated.

In 'confused' children, on the contrary, the Self is fragmented and confused with non-self and the psychological development is grossly disorganized. The non-Self is engulfed into the self and enclosed in it by means of exciting bodily sensations. In both encapsulated and confused children the central core consists in the attempt to maintain a fusional condition between the Self and the non Self.

Overall, the encapsulated child effects a kind of splitting-off/ alienation from the sensations of his own body; the confusing/confused child is as if swallowed by his bodily sensations.

According to **Renata Gaddini** (1977, 2004), the word 'self' is used within a maturational context based on a developmental theory. In this context, the 'self' is the outcome of the infant's total bodily experience in the first months of life. These are sensations which, in the course of growing, are gradually elaborated in a process of mentalization. The longitudinal studies on the development of children have shown that in the process of growing the child

goes from sensations to perceptions and feelings and symbols, and finally, to thoughts. The transitional object is the first observable step in early symbolization, a base for the development of secondary process thinking. On the basis of these longitudinal studies Gaddini has been able to show how the quality of the mother-infant interaction allows the development of the bodily self. The self, in fact, is the first organization of the individual just born, while he tries to adapt to the new homeostasis. The infant works at its formation in the very first months. In the organization of the self there is the contribution from the mother touching her baby, and, in so doing, delimiting the infant's physical boundaries and from the innate contribution of the baby. The baby's self originates through the converging of these two contributions. The wholeness of these peripheral sensations of skin-to-skin contact and of his body's impact in space are what matters for the infant to build his sense of Self. The functioning of the body (the various organs' function) is the language of the body; this body language, on its way to becoming mental (somehow), is the language of the self. Gaddini states that "Every time we refer to the self we find ourselves immediately dealing with a mental activity which in some way is related to (has to do with) the body ... We see among the functions of the self, the control of organic reactions of the body". (Gaddini 1977, p.264) Mental activity arises from body experience and helps the child to master disintegration anxieties and fears and his fantasy helps him to save him from disintegration.

Anne Alvarez

Trained in Canada, USA, and Great Britain, Alvarez is a member of numerous Child Psychoanalytic Societies and academia in both North America and Europe.

A child and adolescent analyst in a post-Kleinian tradition, whose views have been informed by her extensive study and clinical work with autistic and otherwise developmentally impacted children, Alvarez theorizes "it is almost impossible to think of the self except in relation to objects" (Bach, Mayes, Alvarez, Fonagy, 2000, p. 11). She names three factors that compel her to attend to the issue of selfhood.

"The first is work with autistic and deprived children, where a self may be barely visible or almost nonexistent. Sometimes this is because the object is all too dominant, and at other times it occurs where the object hardly exists either, in which case the child can seem barely human. The second is the study of the neonate, and the third is the study of extremely early levels of infantile functioning in children with severe developmental delays" (ibid, p. 12).

Studying the self and its earliest origins, she broadens the Kleinian notion of anxieties about self, dominating the schizoid-paranoid position, and argues (Alvarez 1992, 1999) that the needs, in addition to anxieties of people functioning at the level of the paranoid-schizoid position deserve more attention than they have received.

With the self and objects and their respective parts intermingled, the issue of where the self ends and the internal objects begin has important clinical and technical implications.

Assuming the general agreement that internal objects are not exact replicas or representations of external objects, but rather an amalgam of outer figures and of projections of parts of the self; equally, that the self is made up of an amalgam of an inner core blended with layer after layer of identification and of internalized responses, still, the theoretical and technical distinction among the ingredients is nevertheless necessary. Under certain circumstances, the clinical decision to go for the object-ness of the figure or the self-ness may matter greatly to the patient. The author exemplifies (Bach, Mayes, Alvarez, Fonagy, 2000) such clinical decisions via working with series of dreams, where at first, critical and rejecting authority figures seem filled with obvious otherness, and although one might find later that the figures contained some aspects of the patient's self, she would wonder first about the nature of the internal maternal object. Alvarez explains that her preference for seeing the authority figure first as an internal object (rather than an aspect of self) would depend on the degree of otherness the figure contained. Later on, when the authority figure evolves and gains more benign characteristics, it could be also seen and explored as a part of the self, but if it at first seemed full of otherness (criticism, rejection), the author would start from exploration of the figure's motivations.

Alvarez follows the Kleinian picture of the mind as containing an inner world of (more or less integrated) aspects of the self and of various internal objects (Alvarez 1999). Pertinent are examples of children with apparent learning difficulties due to omnipotence or shame or despair is motivated by an internal object which they see as stupid, or otherwise impeded, so the children play stupid to 'keep the object company', as it were. As the internal object begins to become more robust, viable and more intelligent, the children may begin to reveal and to use their intelligence.

In this author's view (Alvarez, 2010; Alvarez and Lee, 2004), no feeling or function can ever be seen in purely one-person psychology terms. It is toward what kind of object various feelings are directed, and this depends on – and in turn affects – various processes of introjection, internalization and identification. As the patient gets older, such figures may get to be accepted as ego-syntonic, and more a part of the patient's self. However, the author holds firm to the criterion of otherness, which may apply even in the most integrated of personalities.

VI. Dd. The Self in the Psychoanalysis of the Adolescent

Explorations related to the function of the Self, as a distinct entity with respect to the ego, derive from the influence of **Peter Blos'** (1967) model on some of the authors who have dealt with adolescent psychoanalysis.

According to Blos, adolescence can be modeled as a "second process of individuation" with reference to the first process of separation and individuation, described by Margaret Mahler; as the child detaches from the mother through a process of internalization of the image of her, similarly the adolescent must detach himself from his own internalized objects of his infancy to be able to turn to objects outside the family. Blos considers adolescent change as a transformation that leads to the definition of the structure of the character. This process is based

on the establishment of realistic representations of Self and object, on a decrease in the rigidity of the Oedipal super-ego, on an increase of influence from the ego ideal and on the achievement of an adequate sexual identity. Blos describes adolescence through different sub-phases:

- preadolescence: in which we witness the moment of greatest quantitative increase of the instinctual pressure and the reactivation of pregenital drives;
- early adolescence: characterized by genital primacy and rejection of internal parenting objects;
- late adolescence, phase of consolidation of the functions and interests of the ego and of the structuring of the representation of the self;
- post-adolescence, during which the task of the reshaping of the personality must end and be completed.

Although Blos does not study in depth the distinction between Self and Ego, his model has been used as a cue for some authors who, starting from the issue of individuation, have deepened the distinction between Ego and Self in the development of the adolescent.

Arnaldo Novelletto (2009) explored the concept of the Self with particular reference to its implications for the understanding of adolescent development. Within the “Ego-Self system” Novelletto distinguishes two distinct functional areas, the Ego proper and the Self. The Ego remains the instance for the function of perception, of the judgment of reality, of thought and of access to the function /psychic dimension of the will, of the defensive mechanisms and of the control of the anguish. The Self, on the other hand, provides for the storage and updating of physical and psychical representations of self, the awareness of the processes of change, the elaboration of mourning linked to separations, internal and external, the formation of character, self-preservation, the rebalancing of narcissistic charges towards object realities and mood homeostasis. In adolescence the Ego-Self system is grappling with the other two constituent instances of the psychic apparatus, the id and the super-ego within a complex transformative process that will lead to a profound reworking of the representation that the subject has of his own identity, of internal object relations, of the integration of his instincts and of the orientation of his drives. Novelletto attributes to the Self an observer function towards other psychic instances, which will allow the individual to develop self-reflection. This is important for the investment in some objects that perform a function similar to transitional objects of early childhood, e.g. personal diaries, overlapping private space and common space; these personal diaries confirm the nascent intimacy of the Self, but at the same time evidence the adolescent’s need to prolong the symbiotic community with parents. Another central theme is the integration of physical puberty changes in the body image and the reshaping of the image of the Self. A splitting is particularly evident between the part of the Self that tends to evolve and grow, mainly through action, and the one that tends to regress mainly through fantasy. This splitting within the system is inevitable. Another theme is the reworking and the reconstitution of the ego-ideal and the use of the peer group as a source of narcissistic and identity recharging.

According to **Tommaso Senise** (1980, 1985, 1986), the Self represents an object of the Ego – “The self is the I experienced as an object by the subject Ego” (Senise 1980, p 1) – and the personal identity derives from the acquisition of a feeling of the global and unitary image of the Self. Senise defines processes of individuation, those endopsychic processes that allow the subjective constitution of one's own identity, as an image of the person in its totality. The individuation processes allow the constitution, the permanence and the continuity of the Self as an interior entity, even in its continuous change in its space-time representation, as a function of the dialectical developments of the relations of the ego, both intrasystemic (ego, superego, id) and ‘intersystemic’ (in the relationships with external objects; unlike Hartmann’s use of the term ‘intersystemic’ for the conflict within the ego: see the separate entry CONFLICT). The notion of the self is both a given of our concrete experience (the feeling of self), and one of the functions of the ego. As a function of the ego, the self is constituted and develops as a continuous scheme, a permanent reference, as a mirror image of emotions and thinking, corporeal ego agent and in relation to reality. The structural modifications of the psychic organization that lead to a remodeling of the ego and the super-ego follow uneven, tortuous and contradictory roads, inducing episodes of anxiety, tension, confusion and disorganization, to which concomitants and consequent changes in the experiences of the image of Self and therefore of personal identity correspond. In the mature and normal adult a permanent and continuous oscillation and reciprocal modification between ego and self allows the subject to live as an object in relationships: within himself, in intra-psychic reality and with external reality. The experience of self-image does not reflect the actual situation of the ego. Hence identity disturbances, errors of assessment of one's own abilities, difficulty in projecting oneself correctly into the future and formulating programs and defining realistic perspectives. Senise also distinguishes the self from the self-image and affirms that a greater or lesser coincidence between self and self-image is the index of the good or bad functioning of the described processes. In the analysis with the adolescent it is important to pursue an understanding of the image of him/herself to allow the adolescent to remain sufficiently attentive to the state of the Self in order, possibly, to act on the ego for a more and more correct and adequate use of this awareness.

VII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT IN LATIN AMERICA

VIII.

Latin American psychoanalysis overall developed from the intertwining of strong Freudian and Object Relations tradition and their various elaborations in the work of post-Freudian and post-Kleinian theorists in North America and Europe, prominently including French psychoanalytic authors, with the original ideas of the authors of the Latin American region. Many original and synthetic conceptualizations (below) emerged out of such panoramic variety of “Schools of Psychoanalysis” (Belchior Melicias 2015; also separate entries INTERSUBJECTIVITY, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE). Notable is the bipolarity between the French and Anglo-

Saxon influences in the development of psychoanalysis in Latin America in general (Roudinesco 2000), which subsequently influenced the reception and evolution of self concept in the region.

Despite the difficulties derived from terminological differences and theoretical opposition (Lacan, 1969; Hamburg, 1991; Roudinesco, 2000; Vegh 2010), it is possible to observe a significant development and application of the Self concept in Latin America.

VII. A. First References of the Use and Application

The first Latin American references regarding the Self can be found in the 60's and 70's. Simultaneously with the developments regarding the Ego and the Self in North America and Europe, psychoanalysts from the Latin American region were not only aware of those developments, but had already started their own research and studies on those concepts.

Leon and Rebeca Grinberg

In his pioneering, today considered classical, publication “Yo y Self: Su delimitación conceptual” (“The Ego and the Self: its conceptual delimitation”), **Leon Grinberg** et al. (1966) addresses both conceptual and semantic difficulties of the usual use of Ego and the Self, and follows up with his own attempt to resolve them.

In the etymological part of the paper, Grinberg traces the origins of the term ‘self’ (‘ipse’ on Latin) used as a prefix part of a composite word, pronoun and adjective into its roots in Classical Latin and Old English languages: Out of thirteen original composite words in Old English, containing ‘self’ (Latin ‘ipse’) as a prefix with reflexive meaning, the ‘self will’ is the only one that is currently used. Used as a pronoun and adjective pronoun, it indicates that the reference is made to the named person or thing and nothing else. Furthermore, while the non-declined forms have been in common usage since the 12th century, literary use predates the common usage: non-declined forms can be found already in the poem “Christus” by Cynewulf, from around 900 C.E. With the meaning of ‘same’ (‘mismo’ in Spanish) the term Self had already appeared in Bede, in the “Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum” (Church History of the British People) between 673 and 735 C.E.

Addressing himself to the conceptual problems, Grinberg states, “Addressing the problem surrounding the psychoanalytic conceptualization of the Self begins explicitly with Hartmann, when he makes the distinction between ‘Ego’ as a psychic system and ‘Self’ as a concept referring to ‘oneself’” (Grinberg et al. 1966, p. 239), although he also mentions an important antecedent in a previous contribution by Federn (1928), who studied the Ego as a subject of ego functions and also as an object of internal experiences. According to Grinberg, Hartmann’s contribution lies in opening the door for Jacobson’s articulation of self-representation. After reviewing Freud’s ideas on the subject and the models of Self proposed by Klein-Segal, Hartmann-Jacobson and Wisdom, building on Wisdom’s model of nuclear and

orbital introjections and projections, in conjunction with Jacobson's self and object representations, and introjective and internalizing processes, Grinberg and collaborators proposed their own 'attempt of systematization' (ibid, p. 239):

Ego is the psychic structure described by Freud, which includes the unconscious fantasy of the Self into the Ego. It corresponds to the nucleus of Wisdom's model and contains the self-representation of Jacobson.

Non-Ego is within the Self and it includes the orbital of Wisdom (internal objects, the Superego, and the object representations of Jacobson).

Self includes the Ego and the Non-Ego. It is the totality of the person himself. It also includes the body with all its parts, the psychic structure with all its parts, the link with external and internal objects and the subject as opposed to the world of objects.

In the concluding remarks on the semantic aspect of the subject, Grinberg et al. review the multitude of terms for Self in Spanish psychoanalytic literature, especially as it regards translations: Self is called "Yo", "personalidad", "persona", "sí mismo", "uno mismo", "ser" ("I", "personality", "person", "him/herself", "being"). The consequence is that originally clear concepts become confusing and ambiguous. Therefore, Grinberg recommends the definitive incorporation into Spanish of the word "Self", in the same way that it has been done with other psychoanalytic terms such as "insight", "acting out", etc. Additionally, the Grinberg recommends proper usage of "Yo" (Ego), when referring to the psychoanalytic structure classically described by Freud; and "Self", when referring to the total person. (Grinberg et al, 1966, pp. 242-243).

In the subsequent publication "Idendidad y Cambio" (Identity and Change), (Grinberg L. and Grinberg R. 1971), drawing on Hartmann, Wisdom and Erikson, the **Grinbergs** propose the concept of 'feeling of identity' as the result of interrelation of three types of 'integration links': 'Spatial' (integration of different parts of the self), 'temporal' (continuity between different representations of the self in time), and 'social' (relation of different aspects of the self with objects). Emotional experience of identity is here defined as the subject's ability to feel him/herself despite the succession of internal and external changes.

Salomón Resnik

In his "El yo, el self y la relación de objeto narcisista" (The Ego, the Self and the narcissistic object relationship) **Resnik** (1971-1972) reviews the different meanings of the notion of self, as it translates the German Selbst, including its theoretical uses, in English, in other disciplines, as exemplified by William James' use of the term Self in his "Principles of Psychology" (1890). Resnik reviews Freud's description of the Ego as a structure with functions (thinking, coordination, synthetic and integrative functioning, defense mechanisms), but "the Selbst remained as an ambiguous idea, to which Anglo-Saxon psychoanalysts have given specific meaning in clinical experience" (Resnik, 1971-1972, p 267). Considering the cultural burden the notion of self carries, Resnik highlights the importance of discussing the

different use of self by different authors, especially as it regards the specific clinical discourse of a particular person in analysis. However, as a *lived experience*, “*Selbst's notion of self* surpasses the limits of a particular culture, since there is no exact equivalent in other languages ... This problem certainly opens possibilities for exploration in the domain of relations between philology, linguistics and psychoanalysis” (Resnik, 1971-1972, p. 267, emphasis added). Resnik illustrates how various aspects of self experience in the clinical process relate to each other and how they emerge, e.g. the relation of the Self with dependence and the discovery of one's own identity or a global image of oneself observed through the elaboration of a relationship with a narcissistic object. The author maintains that, in the clinical discourse, the ‘Self discovers his true self’ through otherness or presence of the other; and the dyadic relation opens synchronously to the triangular relation, and therefore to the multiplicity.

Enrique Pichon Rivière

Not known as a classical author of the Self, **Enrique Pichon Rivière’s** (1971) “*Del Psicoanálisis a la Psicología Social*” (“From Psychoanalysis to Social Psychology”) inspired an important strand of continental psychoanalytic identity, linking psychoanalysis and social psychology, with important implications for theoretical and clinical conceptualizations of interconnectedness (‘link’) between the psychic interior and societal exterior domains. In the edited volume “The Linked Self in Psychoanalysis: The Pioneering Work of Enrique Pichon Rivière” (Losso, Setton and Scharff, 2017) about Pichon Rivière’s life’s contribution, Leticia Fiorini’s book endorsement states: “Pichon Rivière proposed a social psychology for psychoanalysis, emphasizing the necessary links between internal and external worlds”. Additionally, Kernberg’s endorsement of the same edited volume reads: “Pichon Rivière’s original concept of ‘link’ explains the relational linkages between self and object representations, and expands the concept of the link to the description of unconscious intrapsychic group formations”.

According to Pichon Rivière (1971), the therapeutic process starts with ‘an existent’ (what is explicitly manifested) that gives rise to therapists’ interpretations. Existent interpretation-emergent movement is the work unit that constitutes the dialectic spiral. The latter shows the development of the analytic process, with its alternating progressions and regressions.

Pichon Rivière ideas about ‘the internal group’, were further developed by Samuel Arbiser (2013), who describes how these internal linking structures, incorporated during evolutionary development reproduce the socio-cultural world in the internal world, and how they are in constant exchange with the linking structures of the present surrounding external world. These bridges between the internal and external worlds allow psychoanalysis to nourish with the myths that are part of the Latin American identity, a theme that has been addressed both from Psychoanalysis (Santamaría Fernandez 2000) and from Sociology (Tünnermann Bernheim, 2007).

Alberto Cabral (2017) establishes a difference between those authors with whom one simply shares a temporal proximity, and those who, both for their ability to perceive the subjectivity of their time, as well as the shadows of it, deserve to be considered contemporary. Accordingly, the capacity of Pichon Rivière to glimpse the conceptual utility of the ‘linked Self’ and develop the bridge between Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology locates him as a true contemporary.

VII. B. The 80’s, The 90’s, and the Beginning of the XXI Century

Roberto Doria Medina Eguía, one of the first to study Ego and Self Psychology in Argentina, studied the relationship between the psychopathology of perversions, borderline disorder, acting out and false self in female homosexuality (Doria Medina Eguía und Raggi de Leonetti 1980).

Jorge García Badaracco (1986) presented “Identification and its vicissitudes in psychoses: the importance of the concept of ‘maddening object’” at the 1985 IPA Congress, part of which is an articulation of the relationship between his own original contribution of ‘Maddening object’ (See entry OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES) and the conceptualizations of the Self of Winnicott and Kohut.

Following his 1979 “La psicología psicoanalítica del self” (“Psychoanalytical Self Psychology”), which reviewed Kohut’s ideas regarding Self development, pathology and clinical manifestations in narcissistic personality disorders, **Juan Miguel Hoffmann’s** (1989) “La teoría del self como posible nexo entre investigación empírica y clínica psicoanalítica” (The theory of the self as a possible link between empirical research and psychoanalytic clinic) initiated psychoanalytic empirical research into the concept of Self.

In the early 1990’s, a group of Argentine psychoanalysts, coordinated by **Ethel Cayssials de Casarino and Marcelo Casarino**, scholars of the work of Kohut, developed seminars on research and study of the Self, and published four yearbooks starting in 1995. Among them were “Why a Psychology of the Self?” by Marcelo Casarino (1995), and “The Self and the Person in the thought of Heinz Kohut”, by Ethel Cayssials de Casarino (1996). In 1997 Paul and Anna Ornstein visited Buenos Aires and offered conferences whose transcriptions are also included in one of the mentioned yearbooks (Ornstein, P., 1998; Ornstein, A. 1998). This development closely followed already published clinical application of Kohut’s self psychology to the treatment of severe pathologies (Raggio 1992).

In 1999, **Guillermo Lancelle** edited the book, “El self en la teoría y en la práctica” (“Self in theory and practice”), dealing with, among other topics, countertransference, empathy, narcissism, interpretation and anxiety, adolescence and negative therapeutic reaction. The publication included Argentine (Arendar, R; Cayssials de Casarino, E; Hoffman, J; Ortiz Frágola, A; Paz, M A) and North American (Brandchaft, B; Goldberg, A; Tolpin, P; Wallerstein, R and Wolf, E) authors, and Lancelle’s own article “Self, clinical finding and conceptual need” (Lancelle, 1999).

Guillermo Montero (2005) described in detail fifteen models of Self. According to this author, most detailed self models involve a psychic functioning in which the evolutionary processes are intimately connected. In this sense, several models of self are 'psycho-evolutionary' models. Montero proposes classifying these models into four groups:

1) *A model of self as sub-system of "I"*. The line of theoretical development that starts with Hartmann, continues with Erikson, Lichtenstein, Mahler and Jacobson, until it becomes consolidated in Kernberg's thought.

2) *A model of self-person*. A line of theoretical development involving a subdivision into two lines: The first is the line that starts from Fairbairn, and reaches Winnicott and Guntrip. The second is the synthesis of Kernberg, Kohut and Winnicott carried out by Masterson / Rinsley. These models rank the achievement of a personal integration that surpasses the structural organization as a model of health.

3) *A model of self as a structure*. This theoretical development includes Sullivan's self-system model and Kohut's self-model, including their later elaborations. These models stress the role of the regulation function of self-esteem and the control of anguish as a health model.

4) *A self model centered on the subjective experience*. The examples here are models of Stern and Tyson and all those that account for the development of the acquisition of a subjective feeling of self. These models would seem to hierarchize the maintenance of a continuous subjective experience and in constant development as a model of health.

Since the mid 1990's, perhaps as a reaction to the classical Kleinian setting and technique, experienced as rigid, growing interest in Donald Winnicott initiated the Encuentro Latinoamericano sobre el Pensamiento de Donald Winnicott (Latin American Meetings on Donald Winnicott's thinking). **Sonia Abadi** (1994, 1996) wrote about transitional phenomena, emotional development and Self integration, **Casas de Pereda** (1999) studied the possible equivalent to the False Self in Freud and Klein writings.

Brazilian authors **Megaço Leal Silva** (1999), **Salésio da Silva** (1994), **A. Naffah Neto** (2007) and others worked on different aspects of the False self. Some of the topics were: false self in politicians, psychosomatics, metapsychology, perverse organizations, the self and the image in the mirror, self and sexuality, violence and false self from an intersubjective perspective, the relationship with the environment, early development, and Self formation disturbances in borderline and schizoid patients. **Ricardo Rodolfo** (2009), studied the relationship between destructive and creative aspects in Winnicott's thinking.

VII. C. Contemporary Latin American Developments, Uses and Applications of the Self Concept

The huge influence of Winnicott's writings, some criticism of Lacan's devaluation of the role of the Ego, and some interesting developments in the research area, accompanied by

the advances in neuroscience, led to new perspectives and applications of the Self concept in theory and practice.

Hugo Bleichmar (2000) highlighted the importance of recognizing arousal levels of the patient to choose the best moment to intervene in the session and applied Lichtenberg's motivational systems within a new perspective on depressions (Bleichmar 2001).

Adolfo Canovi (2001) studied the Self needs within the context of the couple therapy practice.

The *dialogical perspective* was highlighted by **Felipe Muller** (2005), according to whom psychoanalysis branched out into many directions of theoretical developments and this has led to some central debates about the way in which it is possible to organize the set of theories that comprise it. He maintains that one of these forms of organization is one that distinguishes psychoanalytic theories based on the psychology of one person from those based on the psychology of two people (Balint, 1950, Spezzano, 1996), or, according to more contemporary distinctions that distinguish monadic systems from dyadic systems (Lieberman, 1976), the intrapsychic from the intersubjective (Dunn, 1995), or the drive structuring model from the relational structuring model (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Muller attempts to account for the presence of the dialogical conception of the self in contemporary psychoanalysis, going from a monological conception of the self to a dialogical one. The 'monological self' is defined as highlighting the representational domain, and the border between the external mind-body-world, which emphasizes the descriptive-referential function of language. The dialogic conception emphasizes the permeability of the relationship between subjects and the constitutive function of language. The author describes four movements that, according to him, enabled psychoanalysis to include the conception of the dialogical self: The first of them starts from the consideration of internal and external spaces towards an emphasis on the spaces 'between'. The second prioritizes the subject-subject relationship over the subject-object relationship. The third emphasizes action and relational practices over insight. The fourth goes from foundational, realistic or positivist perspectives to hermeneutic and constructivist perspectives.

Overall, the authors who take into account the concept of the Self, emphasize the importance of relationship, emotions, and empathy, which results in a much broader and more comprehensive approach than the approach exclusively focused on the discursive production and the exchange between analyst and analysand through verbal discourse.

In the clinical field, a contemporary perspective on the different types of suffering found in the concept of self a useful theoretical-clinical tool (Lerner 2013),

In the field of research, **Ricardo Bernardi's** (2015) "Model of the Three Levels of the Observation of Patient Transformations (3-LM)", includes, on the Level 2, the perception of oneself and others, and assessment, in relation to the identity, how capable the patient is to properly perceive their own internal states and those of others, including the skills to empathize, tolerate and understand different points of view. Following the Operationalized Psychodynamic Diagnosis (OPD 2), the model considers four areas: a) Perception of oneself

and others; Mentalization; Identity; b) Regulation of affects, impulses and self-esteem. c) Internal and external communication; Elaboration; Symbolization, and d) Links with internal and external objects.

The concept of Self has also facilitated development of reflections regarding analytical training, as presented by **Cecilia Rodríguez** (2016) in Mexico, who addressed the risk of developing an “Analytical False Self”. The concept of Self was also utilized in conceptualizing the interdisciplinary meanings of mental health, in a publication “Psicoanálisis relacional. Espacios intersubjetivos e interdisciplinarios de creación de significados para la salud mental” (“Relational psychoanalysis. Intersubjective and interdisciplinary spaces for the creation of meanings for mental health”), edited by Elena Toranzo and Alejandra Taborda (2017) in Argentina.

Overall, these approaches are in line with **Nemirovsky’s** (2007, 2018) emphasis on the importance of developing adequate theoretical instruments to approach the clinical problems of the present times. He stresses the importance of psychoanalysts reinventing themselves at the present time, in a context, which may be ephemeral and difficult to encompass.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The tension, ambiguity and duality inherent in Freud’s ‘Ich’, which encompasses both the ‘ego’ as the mental structure and psychic agency, as well as the more personal experiential ‘self’, as the generator of subjective experience, has led to numerous psychoanalytic approaches to the age-old problem of what constitutes ‘the self’, in relation to ‘the ego’, in relation to the development of psychic structure, and in relation to the formulations of narcissism. Widening of scope of intense psychoanalytic interest in clinical conditions, which include serious nonorganic psychopathology of all age groups has brought the various developmental and clinical conceptualizations of the ‘self’ into prominence.

While all contemporary psychoanalytic theories of early development and structure formation view the self as forming in relation to others, they also differ along numerous criteria, some of which are: relationship to drive theory in its various contemporary formulations; the relative centrality of the ‘other’; the weight given to real interaction versus unconscious fantasy/phantasy; whether the self is conceptualized as unitary or multiple or both, having predominantly structural or process characteristics; its relative permanence, continuity and/or fluidity and changeability.

Often, divergences in conceptualizations of self reflect different frames of reference, different levels of discourse, and divergent translations between languages, stemming from different socio-cultural heritage.

In North America, where object relations consideration has always been part of all post Freudian psychoanalytic theories, the Ego Psychologists Edith Jacobson and Margaret Mahler, following Hartmann's reformulation of narcissism as libidinal investment of the self rather than of ego, constructed a view of self-development that could account for the formation of a complex set of self and object representations while retaining a view of the sexual and aggressive drives as the underpinnings of human experience. In a contemporary Freudian frame of reference, accordingly, Rangell reformulated Hartmann's prior reformulation of narcissism as an investment of the self-representations rather than of the self. Blum has further integrated Mahler's Separation-Individuation theory with contemporary developmental research, highlighting the self-object differentiation as the crucial prerequisite for the formation of the self. Along these lines, Otto Kernberg has developed a comprehensive American model of Object Relations that integrates Freudian structural theory, object relations and neuroscience, describing "self-object-affect units" as the building blocks of a superordinate self, as the sum total of self representations.

Another approach to the development of the self follows the work of Winnicott in Arnold Modell's synthesis of Freudian drive theory, Winnicott, intersubjectivity and neuroscience. In this context, self is both an evolving contingent product and an enduring core, a process and a re-contextualized re-transcription of an experience.

A major landmark in the theory of narcissism and the concept of 'self', Kohut's school of Self Psychology places the development of the self and self-esteem at the center of psychoanalytic inquiry, articulating how the self forms through the internalization of experiences with caregivers. Kohut described how early empathic experiences give rise to internal 'self-objects' which help maintain a stable, robust sense of self that can tolerate life's disappointments, and how a caregiver's empathic failures and could give rise to narcissistic psychopathology. In his radical revision of psychoanalytic clinical practice, he suggested that the analyst needed to provide the self-object experiences the patient had not received in childhood.

According to Harry Stack Sullivan, the author of the Interpersonal theory in psychiatry and the founder of Interpersonal Psychoanalysis, the 'self' is a collection of various reflected appraisals of others. His concept of self is essentially multiple as there is a somewhat different self for each distinct relationship. For Sullivan, shame, not guilt, is at the center of the human experience, as danger comes from an encounter with the other. Following Sullivan, contemporary interpersonalists and relational theorists like Bromberg, Stern, Mitchell and Levenson view the self as emerging in the interpersonal field. As the self is responding to the ever-shifting set of relational experiences, it is necessarily multiple. Bromberg views the mind as a collection of 'self-states' and the 'unitary self' as a necessary illusion. In his view, the particularly threatening self-states are deemed 'not me' experiences, which are subjected to dissociation. Psychopathology is determined by the degree of dissociation with the more extreme examples constituting psychotic experiences. Mitchell describes multiple self-states as akin to internalized self-object relationships. However, Mitchell postulates a distinct and valid sense of a 'private self' that serves to constitute a boundary between oneself and others.

Levenson deems self and other as essentially inextricable. For him, 'self' is a process of the ongoing unfolding of a person's adaptations to the challenges that the interpersonal world presents, and psychopathology is seen in the failures to confront such challenges. In clinical practice, any narrative about the self or the other is likely to be a somewhat defensively organized construction designed to exclude other more disturbing perspectives.

In Europe, the psychoanalytic exploration of concept of Self originates mainly in post-Freudian psychoanalysis, in particular in the conceptualization of object relations, with developments related also to the psychoanalysis of children and adolescence. Some precursors of this concept may be identified both in Freud and in Melanie Klein, although not through the formulation of an explicit theory. Winnicott is the first author who has developed a complete and constantly updated theory of the Self, importantly including his conceptualizations of true self and false self. The traces of his thought have influenced the expansion of Self theories in different currents of European psychoanalysis: The English authors have favored the exploration of the Self within the object relations theories. Bollas developed in his own way Winnicott's ideas of the true self. He gradually preferred the term "idiom", describing idiom not as a latent content of meaning but an aesthetic in personality. For Fairbairn the Self exists from the beginning and is the result of experience. It is a living growing center that he viewed as the point of origin of human psychic process. In Italian psychoanalysis, the concept of Self was developed by authors, who have theorized its genesis from the primitive mind in the relationship with the mother (Eugenio Gaddini), or from the "group matrix" (Giovanni Hautmann), or from the trans-generational dimension (Diego Napolitani), or as a device to analyze the dynamics in the analyst-patient relationship (Stefano Bolognini). In the French tradition Pontalis has explored the limits of the concept of the Self, recognizing its usefulness in understanding more deeply its relationships with the agencies of Ego, Id and Super-Ego. A further contribution to the elaboration of the theories on the Self comes both from the psychoanalysis of children through some aspects of the thoughts of Frances Tustin, Renata Gaddini, Margaret Mahler and Daniel Stern, and from the psychoanalysis of adolescents through the influence of Peter Blos's theory on the thinking of such authors as Novelletto, Senise and others.

In Latin America, either to get out from a conceptual quagmire (Freud, Hartmann), or to describe a theoretical or clinical entity, previously under-theorized and unrecognized, the concept of Self has most often been associated with a possible alternative to a dogmatic technique, allowing current pathologies to be addressed in the clinical practice. Echoing Nemirovsky's emphasis on the importance of developing adequate theoretical instruments to approach the clinical problems of the current psychoanalytic practice, the concept of Self allows psychoanalysts to move forward in the direction of a better assistance to the contemporary patient population suffering from serious personality disturbances.

Overall, the study and application of the Self concept in Latin America took place in three stages. In the first stage, which includes the decades of the 60s 'and 70s', the efforts were exerted to define the Self and differentiate it from the Ego. In the second stage, the greater dissemination of the ideas of Winnicott and Kohut, and their consequent clinical application in

the clinical practice, is accompanied by theoretical elaboration, tending to discern the novelty of these conceptualizations with respect to the classic Freudian and Kleinian referential frames. In this stage, through André Green's reinterpretation of the ideas of Winnicott, the study of the Self receives a new stimulus. In the 21st century, renewed criticisms related to dogmatism in technique, and the need to tackle disorders in which isolation and apathy predominate, lead to an emphasis on relational aspects, which, in turn, accompanies the interest and development of interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis in the region. This provides yet a new stimulus for the further theoretical developments that prominently include the concept of Self.

Strongly resonating with Latin American cultural identity, but applicable worldwide, Pichon Rivière's psychoanalytic conceptualization of *links and bridges* between the internal and external worlds, in addition to his '*dialectic spiral*' linking contradictory movements of regression and progression, extended onto contradictory movements of any kind, is envisioned as also applicable to the wide context of the elaborations of the self-concepts in the different regions and among the diverse psychoanalytical schools.

Across all psychoanalytic orientations and cultures, the multidimensional spectrum of theoretical conceptualizations of the self with implications for sensitively attuned contemporary clinical psychoanalytic practice with wide range of serious clinical conditions, provide for a '*built-in*' guard against dogmatism and rigidity of old and new orthodoxies.

See also:

CONFLICT

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

ENACTMENT

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

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SETTING, (THE PSYCHOANALYTIC)

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. DEFINITION

The stable conditions necessary to carry out the investigation and transformation of psychic phenomena, particularly those concerned with the unconscious, in a specific therapeutic environment.

The concept of the psychoanalytic setting has been implicit from the beginning of Freud's development of psychoanalysis as a method of research and treatment, as outlined in his papers on Technique (1912, 1913). Whilst there have been, for various reasons, modifications to the external setting proposed by Freud (6 sessions per week at the same hour every day), development and elaboration of the concept has predominantly occurred in relation to the unconscious meanings of the setting for the analyst and patient; particularly in work with borderline and difficult to reach patients and in relation to the analyst's internal setting, also referred to as the analyst's analytic attitude (Schafer 1993).

When discussing the "analytic setting", this should mean the specific, exclusive work conditions necessary to carry out an analytic process. Other treatments, including psychoanalytic psychotherapy, have their own setting, although they may use some elements from the analytic setting. The setting will include both external and internal conditions. The former are established within a framework of time and space, while the latter concern the state of mind needed to carry out the analytic work, which basically consists of keeping an open mind: in the patient, through the rule of free association, and in the analyst, through evenly-suspended attention and the maintenance of an attitude of neutrality and abstinence. Although the internal setting is usually associated with the analyst, it could also be applied to the patient. This "internal setting" of the patient may not be initially apparent and may need to be developed during the consultation process. As for the external setting, some analysts talk of a "pact" or rather "contract", between analyst and patient (Etchegoyen, 1991).

Patient and analyst have corresponding but asymmetric roles, attitudes and tasks both in the external and in the internal setting. It is important to point out that the two aspects of the setting will influence each other. The patient will have to accept the conditions of the setting and be willing to collaborate as best he can to fulfil them. The analyst will also have to agree to comply with these conditions. Any failure by the patient to comply will be subject to

analysis, and therefore become part of the analytic process. However, the patient also lends the setting his own point of view, influenced by his unconscious fantasies, which will need to be interpreted by the analyst. The analyst should also take into account any observations from the patient on his mistakes. (Rosenfeld 1987; Limentani 1966)

Ferenczi promoted greater technical elasticity; he believed that maintaining a traditional setting in the treatment of more seriously ill patients might jeopardize the evolution and survival of the therapy. Ferenczi (1928, 1955) introduced the idea of "tact," whereby analysts may change their technique with each patient in order to facilitate the progress of the analysis. However, this did not mean that analysts could do whatever they wanted in the consulting room. Ferenczi distinguished the notion of analytic tact from kindness. He talked about the *second fundamental rule of psychoanalysis*, whereby if one wants to analyze others, one must undergo analysis first. In this way, Ferenczi thought that technical differences among analysts might disappear.

José Bleger (1967), probably the first analyst who made a systematic study about the setting, described the analytic situation, following Gitelson (1952), as the totality of phenomena taking place in the analyst-patient relationship. He breaks down this situation as follows: *process*: phenomena that can be studied, analyzed, and interpreted, and *frame* [encuadre]: a non-process, in the sense that it is made up of constants within whose bounds the process can evolve. According to Bleger, when the patient meets the analyst's proposed setting—the *ideally normal frame*—it is not easy to detect the underlying unconscious fantasies which remain mute; they will not become apparent until there is a disruption in the setting. For Bleger, the patient's predominant unconscious fantasy is that the setting is the place where his/her body is in fusion with the primitive maternal body. So, there is the *analyst's setting* functioning as the container of the "mute" *patient's setting*, which implies the "psychotic part of the personality". Bleger means by the latter the primitive ego which is undifferentiated because of the symbiotic relationship with the mother's body.

Meltzer (1967), in discussing what he calls the "natural history of the analytic process," (1967, p. 10) differentiates between two technical issues. One involves what he calls "the gathering of the transference;" the other the "creation of the setting." He distinguishes these two points, stressing that however important interpretation may be to the "cure" and the development of "insight", it is not the main work of the analyst as regards the establishment and maintenance of the analytical process. This is done, according to Meltzer, through the "creation of the setting", a constant work in which the transference processes of the patient's mind may find expression.

Bion's conception of the setting agrees with Freud that, "an analysis must be conducted in an atmosphere of deprivation," so that "at no time must either analyst or analysand lose the sense of isolation within the intimate relationship of analysis" (Bion, 1963, p. 15). Bion's concept of the analytic space conjoins intimacy and isolation. This creation of an intimate and yet abstinent setting is necessary so that an atmosphere is evoked where the reality beyond phenomena, that which is formless, "O," can be experienced and "become," not just intellectually known (1965, p. 153). The setting is organized around Bion's concept of

“transformations,” where the sense of an absolute emotional truth can be facilitated to emerge—a change in form—often understood as unborn parts of the self coming into life.

Some recent papers concerning the setting, link the temporal and spatial aspects of the external setting with the internal setting of the analyst in order to discuss the ways in which the setting represents the earliest level of maternal holding and presence. Many of these papers on the setting/frame take up Bleger’s focus on the unconscious meanings of the frame for the analyst and the patient, using Bion’s concept of the container/contained model of object relationships and the Barangers’ concept of the analytic field. (Barangers, 2008, Civitarese, 2008, Churcher, 2005, Green, 2006).

II. EXTERNAL SETTING

Space: the couch. Freud made the following recommendations: “he invites them [patients] to lie down in a comfortable attitude on a sofa, while he himself sits on a chair behind them outside their field of vision.” (Freud 1904, p. 250). There are several reasons for Freud to make this suggestion. Historic reasons: In the clinical cases in “Studies of Hysteria”, Freud notes that patients he visited were frequently lying on a sofa or couch, and that they preferred to remain in that position, especially if they closed their eyes to talk about their ailments. Later, he adds a subjective motive for avoiding the face-to-face position: the feeling of discomfort and lack of freedom when being observed by the patient. But he gives other reasons: “[...] [the patient] is spared every muscular exertion and every distracting sensory impression which might divert his attention from his own mental activity” (Freud, 1904, p. 250). And for the analyst: “Since, while I am listening to the patient, I, too, give myself over to the current of my unconscious thoughts, I do not wish my expressions of face to give the patient material for interpretations or to influence him in what he tells me.” (Freud, 1913, p. 134). After a hundred years, accumulated experience allows us to consider those recommendations as valid. The use of the couch to facilitate the patient’s focus on his mental activity implicitly allows for psychic regression, which enables the expression of unconscious phantasies and conflicts to emerge within the network of associations. Winnicott (1955) understood the analytic setting as providing the conditions in which developmental disturbances arising from developmental failures and traumas could be expressed, met and interpreted so as to allow for developmental progression. (See below, *Setting and regression*).

Time. This consists of sessions lasting 45 or 50 minutes; a high frequency of sessions between three and five per week; and although the duration of the whole treatment is difficult to determine, as each patient will require a particular period, it is known that this usually involves many years. As greater understanding of psychic life, particularly concerning primitive and psychotic levels in all patients, has been achieved, the duration of psychoanalysis has become longer.

Nowadays the frequency of the sessions is a polemic issue. For some analysts, the number of sessions is irrelevant, for others, it is important. The former consider that what matters are the attitude and the analytical function of the analyst or the “internal setting”. Other analysts think that, in order to develop the analytic function and an adequate internal setting with respect to a specific patient, an intense relationship is necessary, and the high frequency of sessions is an essential factor. They also consider this as essential for the patient, in order to be able to explore his mind through free associations on the deepest levels and, above all, to work through the analyst's interpretations. With regard to the frequency of sessions, Freud said: “I work with my patients every day except on Sundays and public holidays—that is, as a rule, six days a week. For slight cases or the continuation of a treatment, which is already well advanced, three days a week will be enough. Any restrictions of time beyond this bring no advantage either to the doctor or the patient [...]. When the hours of work are less frequent, there is a risk of not being able to keep pace with the patient's real life and of the treatment losing contact with the present and being forced into by-paths”. (Freud 1913 SE: 12, p. 127). Although the high frequency of sessions is not a sufficient condition, for many analysts it is a necessary factor. However, this must be accompanied by other elements of the psychoanalytic method: *attention* to transference and countertransference, including the primitive and psychotic levels in both patient and analyst, along with the analyst's *interpretation*.

Other external conditions. The analyst's office has specific characteristics (furniture, decoration, room climate etc.) showing something of the personality of the analyst. The analyst's body is also part of the setting. Enid Balint (1973) writing about the analysis of women by a woman analyst, suggested that for the patient, at an unconscious level, the analyst's room takes on the meaning of the mother's body. Lemma (2014), following Bleger's idea, has developed the conceptualization of the “embodied setting”, particularly in patients with a symbiotic transference. She pointed out how the analyst's physical appearance acts as a powerful stimulus in the patient's internal world and any change in the analyst's body is felt as profoundly destabilizing.

Other components of the “contract”, such as fees and holiday periods should also be included as parts of the external setting. As regards fees, and especially nowadays, the patient may need financial support from some organizations, which inevitably implies the presence of a third party, an element that must be considered in the initial contract. This third party varies according to different countries: it may be the National Health Service, a Health insurance, or the Psychoanalytic Clinic of an Institute, in the case of candidates.

III. INTERNAL SETTING

Regarding the *analyst's internal setting*, the main ideas are found in Freud. The internal setting consists of a state of mind of “not directing one's notice to anything in particular” and

of maintaining the same “evenly-suspended attention [...] in the face of all that one hears” [...] “the rule of giving equal notice to everything is the necessary counterpart to the demand made on the patient that [he] should communicate everything that occurs to him”. Moreover: the analyst “should withhold all conscious influences from his capacity to attend, and give himself over completely to his “unconscious memory” [...] He should simply listen, and not bother about whether he is keeping anything in mind” (Freud, 1912, pp. 111-112). These ideas are still valid, but there has been greater deepening of them, especially with Bion’s ideas of *reverie*. Bion defines reverie as “that state of mind which is open to the reception of any “objects” from the loved object and is therefore capable of reception of the infant’s [patient’s] projective identifications whether they are felt by the infant [the patient] to be good or bad” (Bion, 1962, p. 36).

Other important components of the internal setting are neutrality and abstinence. Laplanche and Pontalis define *neutrality*, as an attitude in the analyst of trying to be “neutral in respect of religious, ethical and social values [...] neutral too as regards manifestations of transference” and neutral because “he must not, a priori, lend a special ear to particular parts of a patient’s discourse, or read particular meanings into it, according to his theoretical preconceptions” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973 p. 271). Anna Freud defined neutrality in terms of the need for the analyst to remain equidistant from the ego, superego and id of the patient (1936). Laplanche and Pontalis define *abstinence* as follows: the analyst “should refuse on principle to satisfy the patient’s demands and to fulfil the roles which the patient tends to impose upon him.” (1973, p. 2).

Freud discussed the dangers of therapeutic zeal in his papers on technique written between 1911 and 1915 and famously described the analyst as acting like the surgeon. The latter comparison has been open to misinterpretation and criticism if it is taken literally (as in the idea of the silent analyst). Rycroft (1985) underlined the fact that the analyst needs not only to give “correct” interpretations but also importantly he needs to provide a relationship with his patients within which an analytic process can develop. Aron (2001) underlines that the interaction in analysis is asymmetrical. One asymmetry is that while both participants will fail in the attempt to maintain the setting/frame, it is the analyst’s responsibility to restore the frame through analysis. This seems both an ethical and a metapsychological matter, pertaining to the duty and function of the analyst. Neutrality and abstinence are also the basis of the ethical dimension of the analyst’s attitude towards his/her patients and work. Without a genuine internalisation of these capacities the analyst’s narcissistic needs may lead to exploitation of the patient’s vulnerability. The study of ethical breaches (Gabbard and Celenza, 2003) has drawn attention to the importance and meaning of analytic abstinence and the continuing need for the analyst to monitor his/her countertransference.

Although the *internal setting* usually refers to the analyst, however, there is no reason for it not to be considered regarding the *patient* as well. The specificity of the analytic situation lies in the willingness of the patient to allow the free expression of unconscious affects, conflicts and fantasies and the responsiveness of the analyst to grasp it. For the patient to be able to express his unconscious fantasies he will need a particular mental state, not easy to

achieve, in order to accept the commitment of trying to comply with free association. According to Freud, this fundamental rule consists of the patients having “to refrain from any conscious reflection and to abandon themselves, in a state of quiet concentration, to following the ideas that occurred to them spontaneously (involuntarily) [...] even if they are disagreeable, too senseless, too unimportant or irrelevant” (Freud, 1924, p. 195).

Many other analysts have explored and developed their thinking about the “analytic attitude”, following Winnicott’s concept of holding and the facilitating environment, (Winnicott, 1965, Klauber, 1981, Bollas, 1987, Parsons, 2014), in which the analyst offers him/herself as an object to be used by the patient. This has expanded the field of understanding of the analytic process, including the transference and countertransference and the analyst’s affective response (King, 1978). J. Sandler (1976) described the concept of the analyst’s role responsiveness, which concerns the analyst’s capacity to unconsciously identify with an internal object belonging to the patient and to engage in an enactment in the session. The analyst only subsequently becomes conscious of what has taken place and is then able to formulate an interpretation concerning the fantasy meaning of what has occurred. This type of enactment may involve the analyst’s body, in terms of behaviour or a particular bodily response.

Within Italian psychoanalysis, (e.g. Bolognini, Bonaminio, Chianese, Civitarese, Ferro) following the work of Winnicott and Bion, there has been a development of thinking concerning various elements of the analyst’s analytic attitude, expanding the understanding of the concepts of countertransference and construction, and focusing on the “person of the analyst”, including the analyst’s body. Bolognini has explored the subject of psychoanalytic empathy (2004) which he locates in moments of deep emotional contact and insight between analyst and patient in the session: “a felicitous combination of emotion, imagination and reflection, which had enabled both the patient and myself to fully comprehend what was happening.” (2004, p. 13). Antonino Ferro’s description of the quadrants of the setting has contributed to expanding the concept of the setting (1998). These are four main definitions of the setting that, while emphasizing different prevailing meanings, combine to constitute the setting as a whole. The first quadrant is the set of formal rules (couch, frequency, fees, and so on). The second includes the analyst’s mental condition, which, according to Ferro, varies depending on the patient’s projective identifications and is a key condition for the evolution of the analysis. The third quadrant refers to the setting as a goal and views the analysand’s breaking of the setting as an attempt at communication, especially in the case of more seriously ill patients. Here Ferro is stressing a different perspective from the traditional one; he considers that transgressing the rules may constitute a mode of communication rather than a manifestation of acting out. (Limentani, 1966, has also stressed this point of understanding acting-out as a communication) Finally, the last quadrant includes the disruption of the setting by the analyst, based on José Bleger’s ideas.

IV. SETTING AND REGRESSION

The concept of regression is a controversial matter. For some analysts who follow the ego psychology tradition the setting is a condition in which “The immutability of a constant, passive environment forces him [the patient] to adapt, i.e., to regress to infantile levels” (Macalpine, 1950, p. 525) in order to allow analysis of the transference neurosis. By contrast, Winnicott put forward the view that the positive aspects of the analytical setting provide a facilitating and holding environment which allows for regression. The emphasis is on an active, responsive environment in which the setting represents aspects of the analyst’s attitude. Winnicott emphasised the vital importance of the setting as a therapeutic agent in itself for those patients whose developmental disturbance has led to the formation of a false self (1955). Such patients require a deep regression within the analytic treatment, in which the physical setting and the analyst’s alive presence provide the facilitating environment necessary for healthy development of the (true) self to emerge; the withholding of premature interpretations is part of the adaptation the analyst needs to make.

Melanie Klein (1952, p. 55) defined the therapeutic space as one that is dominated by the transference, seen as the “total situation” of the interaction between the analysand and the analyst, where interpretation is viewed as the analyst’s primary tool for interacting with the patient. Klein sought to create, in alliance with Freud, an objective space where projections of both good and bad internal objects—as well as parts of the ego—are free to emerge in the analytic space. Winnicott described a different kind of setting from the one established by Klein. Where Klein seeks *objectivity* in the therapeutic space, Winnicott pursues an entirely different space, one that through “reliability” creates an atmosphere which facilitates the analysand’s *subjectivity*-- subjectivity in that the space conforms to the patient’s individual sense of being and seeks not to impinge on it. “The setting of analysis reproduces the early and earliest mothering techniques. It invites regression by reason of its reliability” (Winnicott 1955, p. 286). Winnicott’s thesis is that in some patients there exists a primitive state of “un-integration” that requires regression to the earliest stages of development. Through this regression, the analysand can confront his or her developmental distortions and fixations in order to find other solutions, with the analyst creating a safe and sensitive environment. Thus, there is “the provision of a setting that gives confidence” (Winnicott, 1954, p. 287) to the analysand allowing “regression of the patient to dependence” (ibid), a healthy dependence that can then reinitiate early developmental processes. An interesting parallel could be made with Laplanche’s concept of the “hollowed-out” transference, which also regresses to origins, that of the enigmatic desires of early caretakers (Laplanche, 1997, 2010).

Other analysts, such as Etchegoyen (1986), think that the setting was not designed to create the regression, but to discover it and contain it. Within Kleinian metapsychology regression is seen rather as a form of “psychic retreat” (Steiner, 1993); regression is not the product of the setting, but the patient’s pathology evidenced in the specific working conditions offered by the analytic setting.

V. SETTING AND PARAMETER

In this entry, the standard setting necessary to achieve a psychoanalytic process is described. However, there is some controversy that also involves other elements of the setting. In general, such parameters are regarded as justified when it comes to patients with severe psychopathology, who may not tolerate the standard conditions.

Eissler (1953, p.110) first defined the term parameter in psychoanalysis as follows: “the deviation, both quantitative and qualitative, from the basic model technique, which requires interpretation as the exclusive tool.” This modification should be temporal and will disappear, returning to standard technique as soon as possible. Although Eissler refers mainly to making use of other interventions instead of interpretation, the term parameter can be considered in a broader sense (other terms have been used, such as *variation of technique*, Loewenstein, 1982). This means any modification of elements of the psychoanalytic method, which in the standard setting involves frequency of sessions, the use of the couch and therapy duration (of the session and the whole process).

Some analysts consider that it is necessary to introduce some kind of variations in the setting when treating patients with severe pathology, such as borderline and psychotic patients. This is the case of Kernberg, who states that “borderline personalities do not tolerate the regression within a psychoanalytic treatment” (Kernberg 1968, p. 601); however, he does not claim that his technique should be considered as psychoanalysis, but as psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Other analysts, on the contrary, do not modify the standard conditions for similar patients; for them the standard method is both necessary and possible (H. Rosenfeld, 1978). This difference of approach reflects different theoretical views about the psychopathology and in some instances refers to different kinds of this psychopathology. Other psychoanalysts such as Krejci (2009) and in their theory of mentalization, Bateman & Fonagy, (2013) also propose that severe borderline patients who act out in extreme ways require modifications to the setting in order for treatment to be established.

VI. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SETTING

Some writers have differentiated the “frame” from the “setting”; the former being the setting provided by the analyst within which an analytic process can unfold, rather like the frame of a painting (Milner 1952a) whilst the setting refers to the process itself. Milner regarded the frame as essential in marking off what is inside from what is outside; the frame shows “that what is inside has to be perceived, interpreted in a different way from what is outside”. The frame “marks off an area within which what is perceived has to be taken as

symbol, as metaphor, not literally.” (1952b, p 80-81). Rycroft (1958) and Heimann (1957) referred to “figure and ground” rather than the frame. Other authors use the terms “frame” and “setting” as synonymous. In this entry the two words are used as synonyms, except when otherwise indicated.

Lacan's experiments with the temporal aspects of the frame prompted serious reflection on the clinical and theoretical implications of the classical setting (1958-1997). Another innovation of Lacan's was his postulation of the analyst as the subject-who-is-supposed-to-know. This notion was at once deeply respectful of a necessary inter-subjective asymmetry in the analytic relationship, and meant to be ironic regarding the normative pretensions of those analysts who saw themselves as incarnating healthy egos for their patients. In this viewpoint, the classical frame is inherently paradoxical. Not "authoritarian" *per se*, but rather allowing this imaginary projection on the part of the patient to be tolerated and gradually disabused in interpretive work (1947-1997, 1945-1966). Aulagnier, in a series of as yet un-translated texts (1968, 1969, 1970, 1977) scrutinized the ineluctable imbrication of the subject in the projections of the other. She pointed out that the injunction “to say everything that comes to mind “can have the effect of placing the patient in a state of absolute slavery, of transforming him into a talking robot“. In this and other ways, she analysed the potential alienation perpetrated by an unthinking application of the framework. In her concept of the inevitable “violence of interpretation“, she situated early caretaker and analyst in the same paradoxical position of risking “excessive“ interpretation, a cautionary note that has led French speaking analysts on both sides of the Atlantic to express reservations about an uncritical use of countertransference to understand patients. French writers have been particularly sensitive to the inherent “seductive” potential – both necessary and abusive – which is part of the analytic setting.

Donnet (2001) differentiates the *analytic site* from the analysing situation: “the analytic site contains the ensemble of what the offer of an analysis constitutes. It includes the work of the analyst” and “the analysing situation results haphazardly from the sufficiently adequate encounter between the patient and the site” (p.138).

The two principal sources for current theorizing specifically concerning the setting are Winnicott (1955) and Bleger (1967). Some authors also refer to the Barangers (1983) use of field theory, which views the analytic situation as a co-creation; the two members of the analytic pair are inextricably linked, neither can be understood without the other. The analytic field is configured as an unconscious fantasy of the analytic couple that will be addressed as such over the course of the entire analysis.

André Green's seminal paper “The Analyst, Symbolisation, and Absence in the Analytic Setting” (1975) was dedicated to the memory of Winnicott, an author whose work Green introduced into France. In Green's reading of Winnicott, the frame and the quality of analytic presence accompanying it is the present day “environment” in its role of facilitation or impingement of the patient's capacity for experiences in a transitional space and creative thinking. Thinking is meant here in the sense of non-hallucinatory, non-projective thoughts subjectified as part of oneself. In an extension of this theoretical opening, René Roussillon's

work has stressed the quality of “squiggle”: “the setting can become an invitation to the patient to participate in a shared area/field of play or co-thinking, where the patient can ‘respond’ in his or her own fashion” (Roussillon, 1995) and which will have a consequence of being either “held” by the analyst or interpreted. The analyst and his setting become a “médium malleable” in the use-of-the-object sense (1988, 1997, 2013).

VI. A. Specific North American Contributions and Developments

A strand of influential expansion of the Freudian tradition with an emphasis on the psychoanalytic situation/setting/frame as actively and dynamically participating in the ongoing psychoanalytic process can be found in the writings of Stone, Modell and Spruiell. In his classical, yet during his time, revolutionary monograph “The Psychoanalytic Situation” (Stone, 1961), and its sequel “The Psychoanalytic Situation and Transference” (Stone, 1967), Stone presented the concept of Psychoanalytic Setting as organically connected with the dynamic “field of force(s)” it generates (1967, p. 3). In this perspective, the setting unleashes a set of illusions in the form of archaic as well as relatively mature transferences, and an interplay of different temporalities.

Robert Langs (1984) wrote about the ideal classical frame as a structural provision, which defines the bi-personal field within which patient’s unconscious communications can safely emerge (and intersect with those of the analyst). Within his ‘communicative’ approach, “Establishing, managing, rectifying, and analyzing infringements on the frame constitute a major group of relatively unrecognized and consistently crucial interventions” (Langs, 1979, p. 12). His rich exposé of the multiple facets of the projective-introjective unconscious communication in the bi-personal multi-vectorial field, which the ‘securely established and maintained frame’ allows to emerge - a link with the capacity for experiences in a transitional space with its emergent dynamic properties and the analyst’s contribution to the patient’s transference - contains many foundational elements of rich contemporary developments, acknowledged or not.

Arnold Modell (1988, 1989) broadens the tradition of mining the intra-psychic and relational dynamic forces, which emanate from the centrality of the psychoanalytic setting as a “container of multiple levels of realities” (Modell 1989, p. 9), in view of changing aims of treatment (Modell 1988). In this view, the setting itself includes the quality of bond between analysand and analyst, and presents the dynamic foundation of the psychoanalytic treatment. Following and expanding on Spruiell’s (1983) emphasis on the significance of the “rules of the game”, the “ground rules” and the “frame” of Langs (1979, 1984), and Milner’s analogy to the frame of painting (1952), Modell (1988) considers the “frame” not only as a constraint (Bleger, 1967), but also as “enclosing a separate reality” (Modell, 1988, p.585), and the institution of a unique “contractual as well as communicative arrangement between the two participants” (ibid), generating the illusion of transference, in a way analogous to the creation of illusion in theater. (see also J. McDougall, 1986)

Attunement to the setting itself, broadly conceived dynamically, evolves further in contemporary North American theory, in the Bionian and field theory approaches (Goldberg, 2009; Peltz and Goldberg, 2013), the interpersonal (Levenson, 1987; Stern, 2009) or the relational schools (Aron, 2001; Bass, 2007 and others). Hoffman (2001) for example, following Gill and joining Mitchell and the relational group, wrote about interplay between ritual and spontaneity. He was attentive to the necessity of rules and rule suspensions.

José Bleger was read only relatively recently in North American psychoanalysis but Racker (1968) was translated early on, and he was an influence on the intersubjective, interpersonal work developed in the William Alanson White Institute under Sullivan, Thompson, and further in the modern period by Levenson, Mitchell, Daniel Stern and others. Contemporary relational theorists like Bass (2007) see analytic work framed as a space in which there are two persons in a bipersonal field. But Bass, in difference from Langs, stresses uniqueness: “one size never fits all” (ibid, p.12). The here and now is infused with the relational past, a way of thinking with strong affinities with the Barangers and Bleger. Setting, in Bleger’s sense, is more in tune with two-person models of analytic process, including the thought that social, institutional as well as meta-theoretical concerns are played out and operate within the setting.

In a way similar to Bleger, Peter Goldberg (2009) has developed a perspective in that he sees the frame/setting in Bionian terms as the structure in which psychotic anxieties are projected and held. In Goldberg’s view, the frame becomes a site into which either analyst or analysand evacuate damaged or psychotic aspects of the self. To understand all the split aspects of the transference/countertransference dynamics in certain cases, one looks to the frame, to the supposedly simple straightforward elements in the frame, or setting, which have been distorted and made toxic via processes of evacuation and projection. The dangerous fragments of self or other may be hidden in the frame, remaining unremarkable and extra-analytic until the analyst can observe and repatriate these split-off fragments back to the living persons in the analytic situation.

Grotstein, one of Bion’s earliest and leading proponents in the U.S., developed a concept of the setting where the two participants eventually agree to protect the analytic “solitude”. Here the concept of the setting, as distinguished from the frame, becomes a “sacred” agreement: in establishing the rules of the frame and in the analysand’s acceptance of them, analyst and analysand are establishing a *covenant* that binds each participant to the task of protecting the third – the analytic procedure itself (Grotstein, 2011, p. 59).

Tabakin (2016) has recently made a distinction between the terms “frame” and “setting”. He suggests that the “frame” conceptualization connotes structure, while the “setting” implicates relationship. The idea of the frame-as-structure serves as a guide to gauging and interpreting acting-out against that structure. The setting, as distinguished from the frame, implies the atmosphere that defines the potential transformative effect of the treatment. The setting narrates the shared space between the analyst and the analysand, which becomes a dynamic process of development between the two participants.

The evolution of the concept of the setting/frame is an independent story in the case of French Quebec analysts, situated in the confluence of three psychoanalytic cultures: their natural affinity for Continental French analysis is predominant, but nevertheless influenced by all three schools of thinking in Great Britain, and aware of some of the major developments changing the American psychoanalytic landscape. With respect to the setting, the identificatory choice for the Quebec French analytic community was clear: by deliberately distancing itself from both the medical model and the Eitingon version of the frame, it has explicitly defined itself in opposition to the "canonical" pressures which became such a divisive issue for many American (US) analysts.

In contrast to the need for iconoclastic assertiveness that has tended to characterize important segments of American theorization, Lacan's legacy promoted a mental freedom, expressed in a spirit of deep debate with and extension of the Freudian oeuvre. Both André Green's work on the function of the frame as a "third" and as a support to the mental functioning of the patient in its capacity to form a shared "analytic object" (1975) and Jean Laplanche's introduction of the notion of the "hollowed-out" transference ((1997, p. 662), mobilized by the relative non-reactivity of the analyst, which re-activates the possibility of solving anew the enigmas of childhood, are subsequent examples. Scarfone (2010) has extended reflection upon the quality of the analyst's listening in his notion of "passibility".

Another strong current in the evolution of French psychoanalysis which has had influence in Quebec, has been the exploration of non-classical elements of the setting as support for psychic representation and subjectification, especially in infra-neurotic registers: Françoise Dolto's (1982, 1985) use of symbolic payments in child analysis; Cahn (2002), Roussillon (2013), Donnet (1995) and others regarding the metapsychological function of visual perception of the analyst in face-to-face analytic work. Practice within psychoanalytic clinics in France and in Quebec also has been a source of "framework" innovation, especially from the triple points of view of the evaluation process (Kestemberg, 2012; Donnet & de M'Uzan, 2012; Lasvergnas, 2012; Reid, 2014), of third party payment (Kestemberg, 1985, 1986), and of alternative psychoanalytically-inspired interventions, such as a specific expansion of the frame in 'psychoanalytic psychodrama' by Lebovici and Diatkine (Lebovici, Diatkine and Kestemberg, 1952) and by Gibeault (2005). Another valuable though paradoxical outcome of Lacan's theory and practice was the critical investigation among Aulagnier (1969) and others of the potential for insidious abuse in the "setting" of teaching and training in psychoanalytic institutes. Lastly, among French-speaking North American analysts, there is the added conception that the setting intensifies the "laying out" of speech (Imbeault, 1997) in such a way as to render the unconscious logic within it accessible to observation.

VI. B. Specific Latin American Contributions and Developments

In Latin American psychoanalysis, Horacio Etchegoyen (1986) and José Bleger (1967) are the most internationally cited authors on setting-related issues. Due to cultural diversity and to the plurality of schools that have influenced Latin American psychoanalytic institutions,

there is not one single way of approaching this topic in the region. There is an ongoing debate on the need to adapt psychoanalytic technique to contemporary society.

Etchegoyen (1986) advocates a firm yet flexible setting that comprises a set of variables that are established in order to provide a stable framework that will enable the unfolding of the analytic process. Etchegoyen claims that the setting represents the reality that is present in the analytic situation, and understands this reality as the social environment around us. He believes that the process inspires the setting but should not determine it.

Among Brazilian contributors to the notion of setting, Fabio Hermann (1991) is an important thinker who also views it as a *frame*. Analysts establish it in their clinical practice to avoid losing their method over the course of the analytic process. This frame acts as a fence facing outwards. It does not shelter the analysis from the invasion of the external world; this is an impossible task, for the outside world is already present in the consulting room with the analyst and the patient. Yet it does protect the analytic couple from a routinized way of thinking. The crux of Hermann's theory is the notion of the breakdown of the field, which may be understood as a moment in an analysis when the analysand is able to perceive a self-representation that had been prevented from emerging. The rupture of the existing field of communication, according to this author, constitutes the hallmark of the analytic process. It is inside the fence of the setting that analysands will become aware of a different perception of themselves.

Eizirik, Correa, Nogueira et al. (2000), advanced the idea that the current social context bears specific features and that its repercussions on the analytic setting must be respected. They claim that analytic training plays a key role in the constitution of the analytic identity, which must include the analyst's attitude of preserving the setting – of being its custodian, in a way. They share Green's view on its function; the setting plays the role of the third that must be explicitly or implicitly present in any human relationship so as to prevent it from becoming psychotic. Furthermore, they emphasize the significance of the notion of *internal setting*. The latter will enable analysts to manage the preservation of the setting in the current social context.

Marcio de Freitas Giovannetti (2006), following Derrida, refers to present-day analysts' hospitality. This approach represents a fairly topical perspective within the psychoanalytic debate in Latin America. Freitas Giovannetti upholds the idea that in contemporary clinical practice what is needed is a feasible rather than a traditional setting. In today's world, where the idea of speed and of the acceleration of time has replaced the notion of permanence, if the classical setting is introduced to patients, there is the risk of preventing any form of analysis from developing. For this author, one of primary roles for the analyst is the gradual establishment of a feasible setting so that the analysis can progress. Analysts must strive to transform virtual, borderless space into a place – a place of real rather than virtual existence.

VII. THE SETTING IN PSYCHOANALYTIC DICTIONARIES

It is significant that there is no entry for “setting” in many frequently consulted psychoanalytic dictionaries. Nevertheless, some of the elements of the concept “setting” can be found in these dictionaries: free association, evenly suspended attention, abstinence, neutrality and technique. The only exceptions that have “Setting” or a corresponding term as an entry are: *Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts*, Eds: Auchincloss, E. and Samberg, E. (2012) under “Analytic Process”, *Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse*, Ed: De Mijolla, A. (2013) and *Diccionario de Psicoanálisis Argentino*, Ed: Borenszstejn, C. (2014) under “Bleger/Encuadre [Frame]” and “Campo Psicoanalítico [Field]”.

VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The analytic setting as established by Freud has clearly remained valid in current clinical practice in all three regions. Developments have predominantly occurred in conceptualising and understanding the unconscious meanings of the setting for patient and analyst, particularly following the work of Bleger and Winnicott. Bion’s concept of “reverie” has led to further elaborations of the work of the analyst (internal setting) and of the analytic process itself. The focus on the analytic attitude and the work of the analyst is also linked to the expanding concept of countertransference.

The terms “setting” and “frame” are used by some interchangeably, whilst others differentiate the two terms in relation to the “rules” and boundaries of the setting and the process which occurs within the frame.

In Latin America there is explicit concern about the need to adapt the classical psychoanalytic setting in relation to current social and cultural realities, which are seen to mitigate against the acceptance of the traditional setting.

Maybe more importance to the term “setting” is now being given, because there is a concern that changes in the conditions for conducting psychoanalysis (i.e. via new technologies involving virtual presence) might result in the risk of losing the meaning and importance of this fundamental concept.

In the text above pages 1 – 10 have been written mainly – but not exclusively – from European psychoanalytic sources, pages 10 – 13 from North American sources and pages 13 – 14 from Latin American sources.

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THEORY OF COMMUNICATION of David Liberman

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

In the widest sense, David Liberman's Theory of Communication presents a complex objectifying empirically based systematic reformulation of psychopathology, according to the multidimensional evaluation of the communicative interactive aspects of clinical psychoanalytic practice. In this complex system, psychopathology is recast in terms of disruption of the communication process, producing a deficit in adaptation. Specifically, exchange-dialogue between the patient and the clinician provides the empirical basis for the psychoanalytic research as well as the diagnostic tool.

The author of the Theory of Communication, David Liberman was one of the most original contributors of the fruitful 'psychosocial current' in Argentinian Psychoanalysis, led by Enrique Pichon Rivière (Arbiser, 2017). This current of thinkers embraced a multidisciplinary and pluralistic position as a cardinal characteristic. In this context he proposed an innovative methodological decision: taking the analytic dialogue as a departing point in order to study and evaluate the evolution of the psychoanalytic session and process, and the performance of both members of such dialogue as an 'empirical base'. His contributions could be considered as a systematic study of clinical practice itself. Liberman's purpose was to give psychoanalysis a more fully scientific character, as he himself wrote explicitly in the first chapter - entitled "Science, research and theories in psychoanalysis" - of his early seminal work *Communication in psychoanalytic therapy* (1962). It implied the decision to develop systems of descriptive and explanatory formulations as a result of the systematic research of the highly complex field of human behavior. As can be seen in the tables below, he used for this purpose Jurgen Ruesch's formulations (Ruesch and Bateson, 1951) which had recently appeared at that time, but in order to apply psychoanalytic ideas current in Latin America in the 1960's, he believed those formulations can be put in correlation with such basic psychoanalytic presuppositions as 'unconscious phantasies', 'fundamental anxieties' and the 'defenses' (Klein, 1952) manifest in the analytic situation under the influence of the transference-countertransference relationship.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

It should not be forgotten that, previous to this, the author had already given a hint in this direction relating his theoretical concerns in his doctoral thesis, which went on to become his first book, entitled *Psychosomatic Semiology*, published in 1947.

Liberman's use of the Theory of Communication was but one more step in a long effort to systematize psychoanalytic clinical work so as to account for the reality of consulting patients in a more possibly objective way while taking into account the singularity of each member of the therapeutic couple. The Theory of Communication was followed in his explorations by one of its extensions, semiotics. Semiotics is the science, which studies the general principles governing the functioning of systems of signs and codes and establishes their typology (Prieto, 1973). This discipline (also informed by Morris, 1946) provided him with the conceptual tools to conclude that human communication is not transmitted only through the verbal channel (the 'syntactic area') but that we must also remain aware of possible 'misunderstandings' in communication, pertaining to the 'semantic area' and, finally, to the 'pragmatic area' to decode the messages which travel predominantly along the behavioral channel. Therefore, 'syntactic area' refers to the syntagmatic relationship between signs, 'semantic area' to the relationship between signifier and signified, and 'pragmatic area' to the relationship between the user and the code (Watzlawick et al, 1967). In other terms, information travels in "packages" which contain various amalgamations of the three semiotic areas. According to the prevailing elements and the distortions that can be observed in each of them, Liberman classified the patients into three categories: 1) "patients with predominantly syntactic distortions", approximately corresponding to "neurotic" patients of classic psychopathology; 2) "patients with predominantly semantic distortions", covering a vast array of those called "narcissistic" by classic psychopathology; and 3) "patients with predominantly pragmatic distortions", including psychopathic disorders, perversions and addictions of classic classifications. *Predominantly* is the key word in this systematization. the clue word

Finally, Liberman finished his sequence of clinical systematizations with a study of Roman Jakobson's "factors and functions of communication" (Jakobson, 1960). In correlating them with his own personal adaptation of Freud's first topographical model, he created his theory of "styles," of "stylistic complementarity", and of the "ideally plastic ego". In the last years of his life, which was prematurely cut short, Liberman returned to his early subject of the psychosomatic effects with his description of the "over-adapted patient" which means a passive adaptation to reality in terms of E. Pichon Rivi re's teachings about 'adaptation to reality' (Arbiser, 2017)

II. A. Styles

With respect to a definition of styles, David Maldavsky (1986), a close collaborator of Liberman's, described difficulties to find in Liberman's texts a precise definition, and consequently proposed ways of selecting and combining words and specific sequences in stories, to understand time, space, object and causality.

Taking as his basis the fact that the language code, according to the double articulation system of signifier/signified and sign/sign by Luis J. Prieto (1973), allows for infinite possibilities of combination in constructing the signal, which carries the message, Liberman defined distinct *stylistic* typologies in accordance with the spontaneous choices made by each and every user. This is to say that the three dimensional graphic representations of the *ego and the id* (Freud, 1923) are crossed by a 'ribbon' which departs from the perceptual pole with its respective cathexis of attention to finally flow into the motor pole where it regulates action by the anticipated perception of the reply. Between these poles he proposes six partial *ego functions*, which correlate with six ways of receiving (decoding), evaluating (discerning different meanings and significance) and issuing (encoding) signals carrying messages. These six modes of functioning are in turn arranged in a succession of boxes which, following the same order, become increasingly included. For illustrative purposes, a numerical synthesis of styles is presented below.

Box 1: *Reflexive style*. This concerns Roman Jakobson's *source factor and metalingual or reflexive function*. This discourse is centred on the speaker, e.g. "I think". The ego function involved implies the capacity to dissociate oneself and to observe without participation by splitting oneself from affects, which in turn enables overall perception and perception of detail. The connection to objects is exclusively perceptual at the price of one's own affects and those of others. These patients approximately correspond to the schizoids mentioned in classical terminology. In nomenclature used in his 1962 book *La Comunicación en la Terapéutica Psicoanalítica* (Communication in Psychoanalytic Therapy), Liberman defines them as "observing, but not participating personae".

Box 2: *Lyrical style*. As in the previous case, the source factor is also involved in that this style is similarly centred in the speaker, but here it is a question of the expressive function, e.g. "I feel"; the splitting in these patients is at the cost of perception while the participation of the affects increases. Perception thus becomes constricted and biased due to the threat of being overwhelmed by affects. The distance between the Ego and the object is reduced in such a way that the subject becomes both included and committed, leaving object relations with the context outside the field of perception. This concerns predominantly *Depressive personae* in previous systematisations (1962) and individuals suffering from neurotic or psychotic depression, according to classical classification.

Box 3: *Epic style*. This refers to the *addressee factor* and the *conative function* is involved. The ego develops the capacity to register personal desires and to detect the vulnerabilities of the human environment in order to put the said desires into action. This involves taking a decision after finding the balance between necessity and possibility. With regard to the previous terminology

(1962), *personae who acts*, or classically speaking psychopaths, acting out, addictions and perversions are included here

Box 4: *Narrative style*. Here we refer to the *contextual factor* and *referential function*. For the ego this implies the capacity to adapt to circumstances, to the type of bond, be it horizontal (with peers, degrees of intimacy) or vertical (father-son, authority-subordinates). In contrast to the previous case (Box 3), thinking as rehearsal replaces action or defers it indefinitely. In discourse, given the pre-eminence of context, it is very difficult to distinguish the principal idea from secondary ones - *logical personae* (1962) and obsessional neurosis and anal character in the classical set.

Box 5: *Dramatic style - searches for the unknown and creates suspense*. The factor at play is the *channel* and the *phatic function*. This function alludes to the capacity of the ego to obtain contact with the object with a minimum of information transmission and maximum security in the connection. For example, in everyday modern life, we might take as a model interminable telephone calls in which the interlocutors do not exchange information but only keep open the channels of communication. What is implied here is the capacity to maintain a useful level of anxiety, anticipating completing an action once the bond is established, the decision taken, and circumstances observed (Boxes 1, 2, 3, 4). This is linked to a developmental moment in the Ego at which it learns to use *signal anxiety* (Freud, 1926) and in this way freedom is attained from the tyranny of traumatic anxiety or the necessity for the unconditional possession of the accompanying object - *fearful/intimidated personae*, or those given to flight (1962), and anxiety hysteria and phobic characteristics classically.

Box 6: *Dramatic style with aesthetic impact*. The factor at play is the message and Jakobson's poetic function. Involved is the Ego's capacity to unite in one single message the greatest degree of combinations between action, affect and thinking in the use of verbal language and communicative symbolism. This can be observed in successful advertising slogans of *demonstrative personae* (1962) and classically hysterical character and conversion hysteria neurosis.

This classification may then be used to define the *ideally plastic Ego*, which consists in a combination of ego functions adjusting themselves at each moment to the circumstances afforded by the social field involving the subject's interaction, and which corresponds to relative absence of psychopathology, i.e. *normality* (in other words *plasticity* or '*astereotypy*').

From this perspective of the analytic process as therapeutic interaction, the idea of *complementary styles* can be accepted insofar as the analyst as a user of diverse communication codes when he interprets must also opt for the infinite possibilities of constructing the carrier signals of his interpretative message in order to give his interpretative responses. The desideratum of stylistic complementarity is that the form and content of any intervention result is the most well adjusted interpretative response in terms of the point of urgency, prevailing anxiety and defences involved at each moment.

II. B. The “Over-Adapted Patient”

This concept represents an extension and later elaboration of Liberman’s early interest in psychosomatic incidence, as originally exemplified in his doctoral thesis on Psychosomatic Semiology (1947). In his return to this subject (Liberman, 1982), organic traits are not the core of psychosomatic characterisation, but rather *overadaptation* to the environment and to unquestioned dominant cultural values. The ‘overadapted’ person adapts to reality in a passive, noncritical way. The substantial consequence of this environmental ‘overadaptation’ is the deferral/suspension and underestimation of the corporeal and emotional self, hence the Liberman’s formula of “*overadapted environmental self*” versus “*repudiated and subjugated body self*”. Signals coming from the emotional world and the world of the body are ignored due to faulty symbol construction by a deficient *symbolic apparatus*. When the body’s stimuli are not integrated in the psychical process, the mind suffers from a deficit the result of which is the pre-eminence of exteriority over interiority. Conceptual connections with Sándor Ferenczi’s (1931, 1949) traumatized ‘wise baby’ and Donald Winnicott’s (1955) ‘false self’, developing under the conditions of ‘not good enough mothering’ are discernible.

As mentioned at the start, the necessity to resort to those so-called auxiliary disciplines was the result of a *methodological decision* in line with his project to provide psychoanalysis with a greater scientific basis; as a result, it was necessary for Liberman to establish a specific empirical base for psychoanalysis.

To view the analytic session as a dialogue framed within human interaction demanded that the study of the unconscious in the session itself was differentiated from the study of the session from the outside, in which case the performance of both members of the dyad, as well as the responsibility of each of them in the therapeutic or iatrogenic outcome of the process, should be evaluated with the least possible subjectivity. Within the session it is impossible, besides being inadvisable, to detach from one’s own subjectivity, since both members are necessarily immersed in the emotional atmosphere of the transference-countertransference. The case is different when the session is examined from the outside. In order to obtain such objectivity, he insisted upon the need to count for this examination on the so-called “auxiliary disciplines”.

It is noteworthy that Liberman did not substitute a new psychopathology for the classical one: his contribution promoted an original “systematization of psychoanalytic clinical work” starting from the specificity of his method. That was the result of the above-mentioned methodological decision.

Liberman’s viewing psychoanalytic therapy as a dialogue implies taking for granted from the very start a “linking” perspective framed in the repeatedly mentioned human interaction, as exemplified by his statement “... the psychoanalytic session is understood as an interactive process in which the behavior of one of the members of the [analytic] couple determines the response of the other, and vice versa...” (Liberman, 1976, p. 21). Liberman’s analytic dialogue, based on the postulates of the Theory of Communication, can be seen as an

interplay between three superimposed communicative circuits: two intrapsychic ones (the patient's and the analyst's) and the interpersonal circuit created between them.

In his book *Communication in psychoanalytic therapy* (1962) Liberman makes use of Jurgen Ruesch's contributions in order to classify the different types of 'personae' according to the way they communicate with their interlocutors. He enumerates and correlates them firstly with O. Fenichel's (1945) classical nomenclature, and then with his own future systematizations, as in the following tables:

Ruesch's nomenclature	O. Fenichel's nomenclature
An outgoing person	Conversion hysteria (hysterical character)
A fearful, a 'flight' person	Anxiety hysteria (phobic character)
A logical person	Obsessive neurosis (obsessive character)
A person of action	Psychopathic personality (perversions and compulsions)
A depressive person	Cyclothymic disorder, neurotic depression and cyclical psychosis
An observing, non-participant person	Schizoid disorder, schizophrenia
An infantile person	Organ neurosis (psychosomatic illnesses)

Liberman proceeds further to combine Ruesch and Fenichel with the phases of development of the libido (Freud, 1905, 1933; Abraham, 1924) with paranoid and depressive anxieties (M. Klein, 1952), thereby drawing the following outline in order to describe the prevailing affects in each clinical picture (Liberman, D. 1962, p. 130):

Qualities of the superego object projected onto the therapist according to the erogenous zone from which stimulus derives.	Emotion or feeling corresponding to the depressive position.	Emotion or feeling corresponding to the paranoid-schizoid position
Depriving breast (receptive oral modality. O1)	Sadness. Nostalgia. Affliction	Greed. Envy
Devouring breast. (Cannibal oral modality. O2)	Resignation	Impatience
‘Dispossessing’ (expelling) breast (Expulsive anal modality. A1)	Humiliation	Shame
Stifling breast (Retentive anal modality. A2)	Despair	Worthlessness. Contempt.
Poisoning breast (Phallico-urethral modality. FU)	Pessimism	Mistrust
Mutilating breast (Genital modality. G)	Depersonalisation	Estrangement. Derealisation.

III. CONTEMPORARY EXTENSIONS AND CLINICAL USES OF THE CONCEPT

David Liberman’s Theory of Communication as a whole presents a contribution to contemporary psychoanalysis, which can be synthesized in two ways, along which the concept further developed:

Firstly, the theory presents a modern empirically based system of evaluation and investigation; a system widely developed and detailed in his publications, especially in Liberman (1970), and then expanded and perfected in the vast and laborious *oeuvre* of David Maldavsky (2004, 2007 and 2013) on what this author has named the DLA (David Liberman Algorithm).

Secondly, the other innovative direction that Liberman’s work has taken, lies its direct relevance to contemporary practice, evaluation as well as clinical implications for psychoanalytic work, as it provides innovative tools to address actual psychopathology in all

its complexity and heterogeneity. Specific example of further developments in this area is Samuel Arbiser's (1994) reformulation of the free associative process, interpretative interventions, and the whole of clinical setting, with favorable ensuing clinical consequences with patients with phobic-obsessive and perverse structure: "...[The fact that] the formulation did not retain the classical form of interpretation and inclined very clearly in the direction of warning was consistent with *the language of action*, which was the only language the patient used and understood (pragmatic distortion—Lieberman, 1971-2)..." (Arbiser 1994, p. 741; original emphasis).

IV. CONCLUSION: METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY

Successive stages of the conceptual development of Lieberman's Theory of Communication, marked by correlation of traditional psychoanalytic concepts, assumed to underlie the clinically observable communicative dialogue, with terminology from communication theory, semiotics and linguistics, and the resultant highly individualized multidimensional diagnostic systematization, with implications for clinical process and technique, pose a set of methodological questions and controversies. Some of these controversies are relevant to many other areas of psychoanalytic research, whenever empirical precision, categorization and cross-fertilization with auxiliary fields are employed.

Lieberman has described his effort as a firm striving to demystify psychoanalysis and to extricate it from the tendency to become a cliché, a form of indoctrination, risks to which psychoanalysis may be disposed to by its peculiar nature and practice, the theoretical diversity it encompasses, and its relative isolation from the scientific-academic community. In order to avoid these pitfalls, David Lieberman's work seeks to reach for the singularity of each individual in unrestrictive respect for the diversity of the human condition.

To this end, he directs his work towards fashioning answers to the following epistemological and methodological questions:

- How to reconcile the counter objectives of a method that seeks to emphasize the singularity of each patient while at the same time having to systematize and construe abstract concepts, a necessity of each and every science?
- How to establish a practice of psychoanalysis which is so finely tuned to subjectivities and singularities with the pressures of being tested by objective standards of evaluation that are more trustworthy than the subjective impressions of those that individually practice it?
- How to bring together the wide-reaching diversity of psychoanalytic theories – a veritable Tower of Babel – under a common language, intelligible to all, without taking away from each individual psychoanalytic culture's peculiar efficiency and richness? (Arbiser, 2014).

Such epistemological and methodological issues and controversies have a wide applicability, across psychoanalytic regions, theoretical orientations and research areas. In various ways, they are applicable to Infant ‘Strange Situation’ research studies of Attachment by Mary Ainsworth et al. (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall, 1978); Beatrice Beebe’s Theory of Interaction (Beebe 2000), drawing on Bateson’s (1972) Ecological models, constructing a method of close video-monitoring of mother-infant and therapist dyads/triads; Neuropsychanalytic studies (Balbernie, 2001; Shevrin et al. 2013); Otto Kernberg’s (2015) study on Neurological Correlates of Object Relations Theory; Leo Rangell’s (1971) Unconscious Decision Making Function, synthesizing Information Processing theories and psychoanalytic studies of the Unconscious Ego functioning; Matte Blanco’s (1959) conceptualizations of ‘Unconscious Logic’ and ‘Bi-Logic’, combining mathematical logic theorems to enrich Freud’s formulations of the Unconscious and Primary process, and many others. In another broad sense, the Liberman’s Theory of Communication and its current evolution also inspires and reflects the contemporary trend within psychoanalysis towards the inter-subjective and inter-psychic ‘unconsciously communicative’ perspective, in addition to the intrapsychic one.

It was already the ambition and intension of the founder of psychoanalysis to demystify the human psyche and put the in-depth understanding of its unconscious workings on a scientific basis. The Theory of Communication of David Lieberman is an original, vital and widely applicable contribution in such continuous quest.

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TRANSFERENCE

Tri-Regional Entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION(S)

Today, Transference is a shibboleth concept for all the analysts all around the world. The German term *Übertragung* (*transfert* in French) means conveyance (transfer, delegation) of experiences from one context into another. Not to be confused with various psychological uses of ‘transfer’ (e.g. in experimental learning theories), the word used in psychoanalysis is transference. In its widest sense, as a universal feature of mental life, transference is a widespread phenomenon involved in any human relation. But the specificity of psychoanalysis is that it strives to understand the latter, especially since, from the outset, it appears as “the worst obstacle that we can come across” in the psychoanalytic treatment (Freud, 1895, p. 301), and because it subsequently becomes one of the tools of the cure.

Since its introduction in the “Studies on Hysteria” (particularly in connection with the idea of “a false connection”, i.e. with the transference of the affective charge of the pathogenic representations – unacceptable to consciousness – onto the person of the physician), the notion of transference has gradually broadened, referring to a constitutive process in the psychoanalytic treatment, a process in which unconscious wishes, infantile conflicts and traumatic wounds become re-actualised in the here-and-now of the relationship with the analyst – the locus of staunch resistance to remembering. Such a modality of psychic functioning, which implies the insertion, in the psychic life of a person, of another person operating as an object mobilising fantasies of desire and conflicts, can be sufficiently generalised so that the analyst’s transference onto the patient may also be envisioned, leading the notion of counter-transference to develop in its turn (See the separate entry COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).

Variety of definitions of Transference appearing in contemporary dictionaries and writings from across North America (Auchincloss & Samberg 2012) Europe (Laplanche and Pontalis 1967/1988, Skelton, 2006) and Latin America (Borensztein, 2014) concur on variously conceptualized and variously formulated baseline thesis: Transference is the patient’s mostly unconscious response to the analyst, as it is shaped by the patient’s early life experiences, which may include internalized self and object representations affected by adjacent traumas, passions, fantasies and conflicts; it may also be conceptualized as an expression of a wish to revivify or actualize intrapsychic, multidetermined object relations fantasies. The variety of formulations reflect a plurality of theoretical conceptualizations of both *repetitive* and *interactive* aspects of

Transference, in regard to the *content(s)*, *mechanisms*, and *methodology* of *clinical engagement* within the context of psychoanalytic setting. This entry first follows the multiply dimensional evolution of the concept and concludes with outlining some convergences in the current theoretical and clinical plurality across the continents.

II. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF TRANSFERENCE IN FREUD

Historically, the notion of transference developed at the time when psychoanalysis was expanding and distancing itself from hypnosis, suggestion and the cathartic method, even though the issue of psychic transmission remained and would later return, envisioned then from the perspective of telepathy. In his translation of Bernheim's "De la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique" (1886) into German, Freud opts for the term *Übertragung* to translate the French word "*transfert*" used in the field of hypnosis. When it is featured in the *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), in the context of the work of disguise in dreams, transference refers to the displacement of a repressed wish, under the guise of a trivial representation borrowed from "indifferent" day's residues (1900:563). Therefore, transference firstly consists in the displacement of a sum of libidinal energy from one pole of cathexis to another, confusing matters in the process, imposing, for example, a distinction between manifest content and latent content but, by the same token, signalling how, in all the spheres of psychic life, desire is mobile in all its various forms and how it is ready to recombine.

This initial hypothesis returns, not anymore in terms of disguise but with a focus on the fulfilment of an unconscious wish: whether it is a love wish (as illustrated most blatantly and for the first time by the case of Anna O. treated by Breuer (Freud & Breuer, 1895)) or the transference of a desire for revenge, as in the Dora case in which Freud becomes the target of the return of disappointment and hate (Freud, 1905).

Confronted with the interruption of the treatment, which Dora inflicts on him, Freud is led to change his understanding of the transferential phenomenon (M. Neyraut, 1974). Whereas, until then, he sees it as embedding the reproduction of former psychic states in the form of "copies", of "re-impressions" – "the transferences" would stem from some kind of "sublimation" which would allow them to become conscious – *the* transference (with a shift to the singular form) from then on refers to the side of the analytic relationship infused with reminiscences that escape speech and subjectivity, but are translated into act. Hence the pivotal place, which, as early as the Dora case, Freud assigns to the interpretation of the transference, insofar as the elucidation of this mode of hallucinatory fulfilment may grant access to the most opaque area of the libidinal apparatus (Freud, 1905). In his *Postscript* to that case Freud blames his not having recognized and interpreted Dora's paternal transference to him as the cause of her unexpected flight from the treatment. He might later have said that her transference served

as a resistance to the analysis. He also underlined the role of the homoerotic transference, i.e. the crucial place of the “other” woman.

II. A. Freud’s Further Development of the Concept

In keeping with the development of analytic practice, the definition carries on increasing complexity. The first shift from the plural to the singular in Freud’s writings points to the ubiquity of the phenomenon, and it is closely followed (Freud, 1909, 1912 1914, 1915, 1917a) and combined with another breakthrough: if the transferences are no longer “copies”, they become the “prototypes” of the relations to infantile figures, the patient thus reliving with the analyst the conflictual impulses that have inherited the ties to parental imagos. Such imagos are loved or hated, the object of displays of tenderness and/or hostility, in positive or negative transference, and they present themselves in a “newly created and transformed neurosis” (Freud, 1917a, p. 444) at the heart of which the patient places the analyst and which becomes the very space of interpretation (Freud, 1912).

While in the ‘Ratman case’, Freud (1909) had already mentioned that both positive and negative feelings can be part of transference, it is in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (Freud, 1912) that he presents the first composite and clearly formulated account of the theoretical side of the phenomenon, within the (First) Topographic theory. In it, Freud made the following points: 1. Transference emanates from the portion of libidinal impulse that has remained unexpressed and/or unconscious; 2. Transference is ubiquitous and it occurs not only in the course of psychoanalysis, but also outside it. The difference is that in psychoanalysis it is made the subject of study; 3. Transference is “the strongest weapon of resistance” (ibid, p. 104); 4. Transference can be positive or negative; 5. The ‘Positive Transference’ can be divided into an affectionate type, which is an ‘unobjectionable ally’ of the treatment, and an erotic type, which needs interpretive resolution; 6. Predominance of negative transference presents a challenge to the successful outcome of analysis; 7. The patient getting insight into how the Transference-based wishes/desires fit into “the nexus of the treatment and of his life history” (ibid, p. 108) frees him from the tendency to re-create such situations. This is necessary to dissolve early fixations since “it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigy” (ibid, p. 108). The move from transference-resistance to transference interpretation as a central element of technique is implicit here. It became explicit with the concept of ‘transference neurosis’, a technical elaboration of which appeared in “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” (Freud, 1914). This paper is significant also, because it not only mentions ‘repeating instead of remembering’ as a potential resource of accessing the infantile history, but also because it mentions prominently for the first time transferential ‘compulsion to repeat’, which would be theoretically further developed in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (Freud, 1920), a transitional text between the First and Second Topography / Topographic and Structural Theory.

“Observations on Transference-Love” (Freud, 1915) presents further study of the technical difficulties raised by the positive transference. Only towards the end of his life Freud approached the subject once more in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (Freud, 1937a).

While psychoanalysis discovers and names the transference very early on, it does not create it, it uses it in order to interpret the configuration of the libidinal apparatus which is repeated ‘in the flesh’ in the context of the analytic relationship. By 1917, Freud was clear that transference – together with its manifestation in the analytic situation as “resistance” – was the “most important” aspect of psychoanalytic therapy (Freud, 1917b, p. 316). In fact, echoing his previous paper on Narcissism (Freud, 1914b), the capacity to develop transference became a condition of the potential success of analytic therapy (Freud, 1917a, p. 447), as he concluded in his Lecture on Transference (ibid, pp.431-447) of the “Lectures on Psychoanalysis” which eloquently summarized all the developments within the area of transference until 1917.

Throughout this period, Freud highlights the paradox that the transference is at once the cross to bear and the best tool because the transference is a carrier of the dimension most removed from consciousness. Once a facilitator, the transference can become a major obstacle in the process of remembering the repressed material: the unconscious drive-related impulse seeks to achieve satisfaction while barring access to any awareness or any remembering in the treatment, transference having formed an alliance with resistance. Hence, in Freud’s view, lies the paradox of transference love: without it, you do not get anywhere in the treatment even though transference love is also the source of the most persistent form of resistance. “Thus the transference becomes the battlefield on which all the mutually struggling forces should meet one another” (Freud, 1917a, p. 454).

Freud does not hesitate to rely on war-related vocabulary to name a conflict that takes place on territories where forces fight one another for every inch. The conceptual evolution of Transference is inter-related to the evolution of formulations of psychic conflict and both are inter-related with the overall evolution of increasingly complex psychoanalytic theory. First, in the transitional text of “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud (1920) adds the aggressive drive of destruction and death (Thanatos) to the sexual drive (Eros), which reformulates conflict of the (First) Topographic theory from previous sexual drive/instinct vs. defence/repression/self-preservative instincts (Ego instincts), to drives vs. defence(s). *Repetition compulsion* is a clinical manifestation of the aggressive/destructive Thanatos. Then, in “The Ego and the Id” (Freud, 1923) and in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (1926), Freud posits the conflict to be among the three agencies id, ego and superego, and the demands of the outside world: The conflict is between the drives in the (fully unconscious) id, defences/repression in the unconscious portion of the ego, which responds to anxiety signalling danger, and the superego as the heir of the Oedipus complex, with its largely unconscious self-punitive and ego-ideal components. As the id’s aggression feeds the self-punitive component of superego, id and superego pressure ego from both sides. This can manifest itself in the transference-resistance, which is thus linked to the sway of the id but also to the internal assault carried out by the superego. This assault underlies what Freud (1923) refers to as “negative therapeutic reaction”, i.e. a worsening in the treatment in which transference is the bearer of both excess and destructiveness, as explored later by such authors as André Green in “The Work of the Negative” (Green, 1993) and J.-B. Pontalis in “On the Basis of Countertransference: the Dead and the Living Intertwined” (Pontalis, 1975) and in “No, Twice No” (Pontalis, 1979).

Thus, the central role, played by the *repetition* of the repressed in the transference cannot not be limited to lived experiences for it pertains to psychic reality which comprises unconscious desires and the fantasies that are attached to them – the latter are “indestructible” while repetition in the transference justifies the prominence given to the compulsion to repeat as defined already in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (Freud, 1920).

II. B. Oedipus and Hamlet, two faces of the human experience in transference.

Freud considers that the Oedipus Complex is deeply rooted in tragedy, an inevitable and deadly fate which lurks in human experience. ‘Oedipus Rex is what is known as a tragedy of destiny. Its tragic effect is said to lie in the contrast between the supreme will of the gods and the vain attempts of mankind to escape the evil that threatens them’ (Freud, 1900, p. 262). The gods represent the all-powerful parents, to whom the infant acknowledges his own helplessness.

Tragedy refers to the feelings of human beings as they experience this complex, and describes the essence of its constitution. According to Freud, the Oedipus complex refers to the inclination towards incestuous and parricidal actions to which all individuals are prone as a result of their archaic heritage.

Freud claims that there must be a voice within us, which is prepared to acknowledge the compelling power of fate in the Oedipus. ‘His destiny moves us only because it might have been ours—because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him.’ (ibid.).

The Oedipus’ fable is fantasy’s response to those typical dreams (murdering the father, wedding the mother) and in the same way as adults experience them with disgust, the saga must also include horror and self-punishment.

In Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex* the basic wish-fantasy of the child is brought to light and realised as it is in dreams, whereas in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* it remains repressed, and ‘—just as in the case of a neurosis—we only learn of its existence from its inhibiting consequences’ (Freud, 1900, p. 264).

We know that *Hamlet* was written immediately after the death of Shakespeare’s father (in 1601) and therefore – we have a right to suppose – in the midst of grief, while Shakespeare was re-experiencing his own infantile feelings towards his father. It is also known that one of Shakespeare’s sons, who died prematurely, was called Hammet (which is identical to Hamlet). (See Freud, Dreams of the death of beloved persons, in *The Interpretation of dreams*, V, 1900).

Oedipus and *Hamlet* provide an example of two aspects present in transference: *Hamlet*, of the criminal parricidal impulse which, as a result of repression, turns into self-reproach, and *Oedipus*, of the inevitability of a deadly fate which attempts to consummate incest and parricide.

Hamlet's tragedy allows Freud to refer to the repressed aspect of the Oedipus complex, whereas Sophocles' tragedy alludes to yet another element, to what has been dissolved, buried, (*Untergang*) but is displayed in the way events develop for the tragic Oedipus.

Both aspects are experienced in transference with the person of the analyst through symptoms, dreams, and 'actual' manifestations within the scene of transference.

Typical dreams of the death of beloved persons and anxiety dreams, where censure is overpowered, constitute paradigmatic examples of the presence of tragedy. Nightmares in particular indicate that the dream mechanisms have failed in their function of preserving sleep and that the tragic contents have burst into consciousness and interrupted sleep. In the scene of transference resistance takes advantage of the presence of tragic contents to interrupt the analytic task.

Freud considers that actual feelings are a consequence of tragic contents bursting into consciousness and, therefore, when we encounter the incestuous killer we all carry deep within, feelings of horror and self-punishing behavior tend to appear.

In consequence, throughout an analytic treatment, within the transference, we will face contents stemming from the conflict between desire and prohibition, and also actual manifestations that come from what has been dissolved.

By the time the phase of the Oedipus complex is over, part of it is repressed and part becomes buried. However, in neurotic patients none of these processes have been entirely successful: symptoms and other occurrences where the buried aspects (that is, incestuous and parricidal instinctual impulses) become manifest, tend to appear. The more serious the condition, the greater presence dissolved elements usually have.

These are the two aspects of transference: that of the repressed, with symptoms typical of transference neurosis, and that of tragedy, in turn brought about by the compulsion to repeat. At the core of the complex that each individual has experienced with his quota of love and hate, but limited by the establishment of prohibitions, tragedy can be found, the matrix of which is part of the human essence and is revived by each and every child in his period of omnipotence.

Freud establishes the relationship between the Oedipal tragedy and the Hamlet character drama, and settles the basis of a theory, which would center around the repetition compulsion, which he would soon denominate the resistance of the id, reigned by the death drive, a concept whose inclusion implicates an important turn in the theory. This compulsion to discharge --destruction drive-- remains latent during the treatment and will then occupy the transference scene with the maximum resistance. The analyst perceives an active resistance from the unconscious ego against dealing with the repressed, resistance, which the conscious ego disowns. The repressed is segregated from the ego by the resistances of repression, but can be communicated to the ego through the id.

"The Ego and the Id" (1923), read alongside "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920) contextualizes the ego as the representative (*Repräsentanten*) of reason and prudence, while the passions (drives) prevail in the id, and are capable of breaking through its borders.

Freud's description of the resistance to the analytical work, enunciated in metapsychological writings previous to 1920, culminates in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", where the clinical phenomenon of the repetition compulsion assumes drive-like characteristics and demands to undertake the fight against the ego's need for punishment, which is a consequence of the tragic fault coming from the forbidden oedipal actions to which the subject is driven, martyred at the same time by the super-ego's demands.

If the ego submits itself to an unmerciful super-ego, creating thus an intense masochistic joy, the analysis may be in danger. Even when the analyst sees some progress, a negative therapeutic reaction will arise, resulting in interpretable transference manifestations of neurotic level. Tragic transference manifestations (oedipal tragedy, personal prehistory) such as anxiety, lethargy, refer to buried material, 'actual', and require a construction of the act, which occurs 'now'. Also, the buried tragic material may activate itself through a recent trauma and produce a discharge in the somatic, as the ego is above all a body ego (Freud, 1923).

Viewed through the lens of such theory developments in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" and "The Ego and the Id", murderous superego punishment of the ego, fueled by the id's death drive, reveals itself in different ways both in Oedipus' 'fateful' tragedy and in Hamlet's agony.

Freud's introduction of the Second Topography/Structural theory marks an important change in the dynamics of transference. Seen until then as driven by the force of desire, it appears as inexorably tied to the repetition compulsion and to the sphere of action, of discharge. One must note that Freud's papers on technique come to an end in 1918, before the second topography. Only in 1937, with "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (Freud, 1937a) and "Constructions in Analysis" (Freud, 1937b) does Freud return to the technical problems raised by the introduction of the repetition compulsion and the death drive, especially in relation to Ferenczi's (1909) notion of negative transference.

With the developments put forward in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920) and, in particular, with the introduction of the concept of death drive, Freud suggests that, urged by the compulsion to repeat, something beyond the repressed is displayed within the scene of transference: something that now presents itself by means of feelings and perceptions. These, however, have not been repressed because they have not been articulated; they have not been put into words.

Taking these considerations as a starting point, in "Moses and Monotheism" (1939 [1934-38]), Freud acknowledges a historical truth, that of parricide, which underlies religious history. Establishing an analogy with the analytic experience, the historical truth would be the one constructed by the analyst (actual construction) based on feelings and experiences, indications of yet other scenes that accompany the scene provided by transference.

This construction refers to a tragedy, present albeit silent until now, which, spurred on by the compulsion to repeat, becomes manifest in the analysis with its deadly fate. This unstoppable force can lead to the interruption of the analytic task. The masochistic component

reveals the tragic guilt or the need for punishment while transference provides a stage where tragedy unfolds.

This construction becomes connected to an historical construction (which the analyst arrives at by means of symptoms, screen memories and the transference) in the same way as Freud describes in *Constructions in Analysis* (1937b): “Up to your nth year you regarded yourself as the sole and unlimited possessor of your mother; then came another baby (...) your feelings towards your mother became ambivalent (...)” (p.261).

If *remembering* is presented as the ultimate goal of the analysis, as it leads to establishing coherence, continuity and full range of choices, then, when it is not achievable, constructions can compensate for its failure and provide attempts at representing the repressed, traumatically dissociated, lost, ‘expelled’ or buried. The transference indeed works towards the possibility of bringing a lost object back to life from under the sway of repression, by representing it on the basis of clues: such work is carried out by the treatment. The transference in neurosis is therefore only sought as a form leading to remembering and not as an end in itself: there lies the border against a possible manipulative hijacking of transference. On this point Freud always remains curious and mindful of the links between transference and suggestion as well as between transference and occultism: how does a memory that belongs to the patient’s past become tied to the therapeutic situation via the person of the analyst and is thus shifted to the forefront of the psychic stage? Is there a misalliance in which the concurrent affect is of equal force and intensity as the affect that once begot the symptom? These early observations made by Freud initiated an ongoing debate about the recognition of the importance of psychic reality and its impact on all mental processes, including perception and memory.

III. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS AFTER FREUD

Defining transference is a difficult task, not only because of its rapid development within Freud’s views, but also because of the complexification yielded by various author’s perspectives, including the addition of qualifiers such as “lateral”, “positive”, “negative”, “adhesive”, “maternal”, “paternal”, etc. However, Freud’s account of the transference neurosis that develops preferentially in neurotics, even though it is also featured in other structures, remains an important landmark when identifying the other forms of transference. Other authors have gradually contributed different input or viewpoints following the development of theory and technique.

Abraham was the first one who took an interest in transference in the area of psychosis. Ferenczi, for his part, develops the notion of narcissistic transference. He insists on introjection as the pivotal phenomenon in the constitution of transference: the subject seizes in the world and annexes external objects; therefore, for Ferenczi, every object-love or every transference

is an extension of the ego or introjection (“Introjection and Transference”, 1909). His view is centred on the child’s individual history and elaborated on the basis of the child’s auto-erotic investment of his organs: there lies the matrix of what is being repeated in the transference. “The first ‘object-love’ and the first ‘object-hate’ are, so to speak, the primordial transferences, the root of every future introjection” so that transference is not a characteristic of neurosis but the exaggeration of a normal mental process (p. 41). In his “Clinical Diary” and later writings, Ferenczi pleads in favour of deepening the theorisation of technique and for metapsychological reflection on the analyst’s psychic processes, thus paving the way for the forthcoming developments of many analysts.

III. A. James Strachey

How important, then, was the identification and “interpretation” to the qualities and outcomes of psychoanalytic treatments? Leaving aside what might be meant by the activity of “interpreting,” the degree of attention an analyst paid to indications of his patient’s transference became a matter of controversy. In 1934 Strachey famously argued that in his view the “ultimate instrument of psychoanalytic therapy” (1934, p. 142), the only class of “mutative” interpretations is the one comprised solely of transference interpretations. (p. 154) By transference interpretations he meant those comments made by an analyst that helped to make unconscious aspects of his patient’s transference conscious. No other kind (extra-transference) could have a mutative effect. Notably, according to Strachey, the mutative effect derived from its creating an opportunity for the analysand to correct his error when confronted by the contrasts between his unconscious transference image of the analyst and the “real nature of the analyst”. (p. 143) Of course Strachey’s simple and straightforward assertion of the “real” nature of the analyst will later collapse (to some extent) in the face of more contemporary views of contingency, reality, and the power of the analytic field to induce “real” feelings of, say, hostility toward the patient that in fact may match the analysand’s transference image.

III. B. Ida Macalpine

Ida Macalpine can be credited with having underlined, for the first time, the fact that psychoanalysis does not merely “reap” the transference (“The development of transference”, 1950). Through the frustrating and infantile environment that it creates, the analytic situation “produces” the transference and reaps what it sows. Accordingly, some of Freud’s major successors, such as Melanie Klein, Bion and Winnicott, each develop perspectives on transference that contribute meaningfully to the current understanding of the transference phenomena in the treatment.

IV. THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

IV. A. Kleinian perspective

The work of Melanie Klein contributes to the development of the concept of ‘transference’ in three ways: Klein senses that the transference onto the analyst originates in the same processes as the ones which determine object relations at their earliest stages; secondly, she stresses the importance of unconscious phantasy; and lastly, she theorises a technique in which the unconscious elements of the transference are being inferred on the basis of the whole of the presented material, which she refers to as the ‘total situation’.

Klein posits object relations as the origin of the transference. Freud understands the transference as a direct reference to the analyst in the analytic session and as a re-enactment of the past. For Klein, the primitive internal object relations are at the origin of the transference and she views psychic life as a constant changing and reshaping of internal imagos. Through her work with very young children, she comes to understand that the material displayed in play therapies is not a re-enactment of a distant past, but of an immediate present, for the traumatizing events appear to be living on. Klein takes children’s play seriously: it is their way of relating to themselves, to their own fears and anxieties as well as to their deepest desires. The child expresses his effort to encompass experiences and phantasies through the relations enacted in the play session with the analyst. In the same way, the transference in adult analysis becomes a re-enactment of current phantasy experiences, made out of unconscious and conscious phantasies, internal objects and the interplay of emotions directed at them as well as the defences protecting them.

The object is always at the heart of emotional life from the very start, as it is in the transference situation, and defence mechanisms are from the beginning indelibly linked with object relations. Object-seeking is considered by Melanie Klein to be fundamental, constituting a prerequisite for psychic life whereas, for Freud, the satisfaction of drives is independent of object-seeking. These differences produce a profound divergence in their respective theories of transference: whereas, in Freud’s view, transference is mainly based on drives seeking discharge and on the reconstruction of the past, for Klein, the evolution of the transference becomes the centre of attention. “[...] fundamental changes (in analysis) come about through the consistent analysis of the transference; they are bound up with a deep-reaching revision of the earliest object relations and are reflected in the patient’s current life and altered attitudes towards the analyst.” (Klein, 1952, p. 438). Klein does not favour ‘here-and-now’ interpretations that would be disconnected with the patient’s past but she recognizes that the patient projects an internal world determined by past experiences onto the analyst and the structure of this internal world evolves throughout the process of transferential reliving.

The discovery of splitting mechanisms in the 1920’s enables psychoanalysts to conceptualize transference as experienced by psychotic patients: the splitting into good and bad objects which dominates very early childhood bears directly on the understanding of transference as the interconnection of positive and negative feelings of love and hate. The

interplay of the various aspects of the objects towards which these emotions are directed instigates a vicious circle of aggression, anxiety and guilt which has to be worked through over and over again in the transference: "There are in fact very few people in the young infant's life, but he feels them to be a multitude of objects because they appear to him in different aspects." (Klein, 1952, p. 436). Klein asserts that analysing the negative transference is a precondition for gaining access to the deeper layers of the mind, although positive and negative transferences are always combined.

Klein emphasizes the notion of *unconscious phantasy* in the here-and-now of the session. 'Real' events must always be considered, according to Klein, in their interaction with the patient's unconscious phantasy life. Klein's (and Susan Isaacs's) definition of unconscious phantasy was at the heart of the Controversial Discussions in the early 1940's and, according to Elizabeth Bott-Spillius and Ron Britton, the use of the same words for different concepts has contributed to the intensity of the debate. According to the Kleinian view, unconscious phantasy includes every early form of infantile thought - it is the mainspring of the unconscious mind and the psychic representative of drives, but it also includes other forms of thought that emerge later on, through development of the original phantasies. Transference in this view is the unconscious experience in the here-and-now, yet mapped onto the infantile mechanisms with which the patient managed his conflicts long ago. Unconscious phantasy influences and colours the experience of reality, and vice versa. Melanie Klein advocates interpreting in terms of unconscious phantasy, rather than in terms of impulse versus defence. As a result, she would consistently interpret *within the transference* instead of interpreting the transference itself. "One can show the patient how he experiences a relationship which gives rise to anxiety or guilt, and how he alters it in phantasy, to avoid pain." (Segal, 1979).

Klein focuses in this way on the patient's anxieties and his relations to objects in the past and in the present, as well as on the experiences that have occurred in between. She calls this the '*total situation*' and this includes all aspects of the patient's experiences and phantasies, past and present, reported in the analytic session: "For instance, reports of patients about their everyday life, relations, and activities not only give an insight into the functioning of the ego, but also reveal—if we explore their unconscious content—the defences against the anxieties stirred up in the transference situation" (Klein 1952, p. 437). She deems that all material, generated through free association, is an account of the (unconsciously) split set of the relationship with the analyst. According to Donald Meltzer (1986), the analyst's task is to 'gather the transference' from the myriad ways in which the relationship with the analyst can be represented. "The infantile transference gradually begins to appear in the material in the form of bits of 'acting in' or 'acting out', of memories or dreams, their recognition and investigation sets in motion the analytic process." Betty Joseph (1985) emphasizes the importance of the 'total situation' as a way for patients to express their conscious and unconscious thoughts and feelings in the transference relationship. She also demonstrates how patients use the transference not only to achieve the satisfaction of impulses but also to support their defensive positions.

IV. B. Kleinian influences in North America

The classical concept of transference analysis in North America has been expanded significantly by the concept of the analysis of the “total transference situation” proposed by the Kleinian approach (Joseph, 1985). It involves a systematic analysis of the transference implications of the patient’s total verbal and nonverbal manifestations in the hours, the patient’s direct and implicit communicative efforts to influence the analyst in a certain direction, and the consistent exploration of the transference implications of material from the patient’s external life that, at any point, he brings into the session. The inclusion of a systematic consideration of the patient’s total functioning at the point of the activation of a predominant transference is an important reinforcement of the centrality of transference interpretation, and also points to an important implicit consequence of transference interpretation, namely, the analysis of character.

IV. C. Donald W. Winnicott

The term ‘*transference*’ is practically absent from the titles of D.W. Winnicott’s writings, with the exception of his 1955-1956 article entitled “Clinical Varieties of Transference.” The term is not featured either in the chapter headings of Jan Abram’s “The Language of Winnicott: A Dictionary of Winnicott’s Use of Words” (1996). Yet, Winnicott’s treatment of transference deserves significant attention; it is closely tied to the notions of frame and counter-transference.

Originally a paediatrician, Winnicott directs his analytic reflection to the mother-infant relationship. Distancing himself from the Kleinian perspective on the new-born baby’s nascent intrapsychic life, he privileges the infant’s earliest environment and studies the interactions between the good enough mother and the baby, along with the transitional phenomena that refer to them. In the treatment, the analytic frame endows the analysand with this kind of containing (holding) environment, an environment within which the transference and the counter-transference unfold.

Focusing on deficiencies in these earliest environments (i.e., especially cases in which the mother could not be attuned to the little child’s needs), Winnicott develops his notion of the false self, which is at once a protective organisation sheltering the true self but which also hinders the establishment of an authentic ego. He introduces a breach in the continuous feeling of being. Such patients who were not the recipients of the kind of care appropriate to early childhood and whose ego cannot be envisioned as an established entity – i.e. those experiencing borderline states and psychotic episodes as adults – can no longer be discussed in terms of transference neurosis or the lifting of repression. The concept of transference needs to be broadened for “*the analyst finds himself... confronted with the patient’s primary process*”, with the original breach (1955-1956, p. 298).

In such cases where the earliest environment featured a deficiency, the ordeal that aims at overcoming the deficiency must take place in the transference relation. Good attunement

on the part of the analyst may elicit the implementation of intense dependence in the patient, from which sufficient trust and safety can emerge so that the experience of the original trauma – the primal agony of falling forever – may be re-played in the transference, yielding a shift from false self to authentic self. As Winnicott writes (1963), it is impossible for such patients to remember something that has not happened yet since the infant's ego was too immature to experience it. In this case, the only way for the patient to 'remember' is to go through the experience of that past thing for the first time, in the present, i.e. in the transference.

Another specific contribution made by Winnicott in the theorisation of the transference pertains to destructiveness. In "The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications" (1968), Winnicott describes the indispensable vital and destructive thrust that allows the subject, whether a child or a borderline patient, to allow for the existence of the object or the analyst outside the sphere of control of his omnipotence, outside the sphere of his subjective phenomena provided the object survives the transference attacks. Thanks to this fundamental ordeal, "fantasy begins for the individual. The subject can now *use* the object that has survived" (p. 90). If such an experience fails to take place, then, for the patient, the analyst forever remains a mere projection of a part of his *self*.

In "Hate in the Counter-Transference" (1947), Winnicott stresses the ambivalence experienced by the analyst when facing challenging patients. The patient evokes a kind of hate which is not particular in itself but whose intensity is specific to the situation in question. "In the ordinary analysis the analyst has no difficulty with the management of his own hate. [...]. In the analysis of psychotics, however, quite a different type and degree of strain is taken by the analyst, and it is precisely this different strain that I am trying to describe" (p. 197). According to Winnicott, this difference in intensity between neurosis and psychosis stems from the considerable gap between the respective experiences of early relations and interactions.

In a theorisation that relies, in part, on Winnicottian notions, Roussillon (2011) discusses patients suffering from narcissistic identity disorders who develop a paradoxical form of transference, "a kind of transference in which something is 'turned back': the analysand, split off from any possibility of integrating a particular past experience, puts the analyst through that experience" (p. 6)...."Thus it is that the world of the transference is dominated more by issues involving negativity than by integration and linking. At the same time, destructiveness, or certain forms of the death drives, take over from the libido; the relationship to the object appears to be subordinated to the idea of the use of the object rather than to the more 'classic' idea of object relations" (*Id.*, p.7).

IV. D. Wilfred R. Bion

Bion, for his part, develops Melanie Klein's theory while also relying heavily on the Freudian corpus. Examining the formation of thoughts within psychic life, Bion introduces the concept of the alpha function (Learning from Experience, 1962) which allows the sensory experiences and the emotions – the beta elements – to become alpha elements and thus to be able to be memorised, symbolised and used in thoughts and in dreams. Such transformation

posited at the root of the psyche yields a view of the conscious and the unconscious as reversible mental states within the mental experience.

In some of his work focusing on psychotic functioning, Bion differentiates between the psychotic and the non-psychotic part of the personality. He thus develops the concept of projective identification described by Melanie Klein, with reference to the transference of the split destructive components projected onto the analyst, and he endows it with another meaning: that of the deep affective communication that normally operates between mother and baby. Maternal reverie welcomes and transforms the projected raw sensory and emotional elements and thus makes them tolerable and thinkable for the baby. Thanks to Bion, projective identification and the container-contained relation take on a key significance in the understanding of the transference (*cf.* entry CONTAINMENT).

Bion considers that the kind of transference at work with schizophrenic patients reflects the conflict between the life drive and the death drive, making the relationship to the analyst “premature” and “precipitate” insofar as the violent destructive drives and the hate of internal and external reality are in the forefront (Bion 1967 [1956]). What the analyst-archaeologist therefore uncovers does not consist in the traces of an ancient civilisation but in a primal catastrophe rooted in the deficiencies inherent in the early bond with the mother, along with the nameless dread that comes with it, reactivated in the transference by the attacks on the capacity for thought and for the toleration of psychic pain.

The persistence of the psychotic transference (*ibid*) contrasts with its lack of depth, its lability and its extreme variability: any change is reflected in the transference in an undifferentiated fashion, access to meaning being jeopardised, if not annihilated, by the attacks on linking which prevent any awareness and any link with the object. The sensory aspects of the interpretation, the intonation of the voice and other material features of the frame, are thus used by the patient at the cost of the interpretation itself.

Bion underscores that “elements of the transference are to be found in that aspect of the patient’s behaviour that betrays his awareness of the presence of an object that is not himself. No aspect of his behaviour can be disregarded” (Elements of Psycho-Analysis, 1963: p. 69). With the “Grid”, Bion envisions a system of “notation and record” of the analytic experience, defined as an emotional experience. The transference can then be represented by one of the categories of the Grid, it sheds light on the link K (knowledge) between analyst and patient, a link featured among the basic links of psychic life, along with the links L (love) and H (hate).

In the Freudian sense, the transference includes, in Bion’s view, the “rigid” transformations pertaining to “a model of movement of feelings and ideas from one sphere of applicability to another” (Transformations, 1965: p. 19). “The feelings and ideas appropriate to infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex and its off-shoots are transferred, with a wholeness and coherence that is characteristic, to the relationship with the analyst. This transformation involves little deformation” (*Ibid.*). Such transformations are specific to the non-psychotic part of the personality and refer to a “linearity” that elicits the distinction of what is transferred onto the analyst by the patient.

When psychotic mechanisms tied to a primal psychic catastrophe and to the most archaic part of the psyche are involved in the analysis, the projection planes are multiplied and the attacks against the alpha function – if not against the whole of the psychic apparatus warranting the contact with internal and external reality – generate such confusions and distortions that this linear model is revealed as irrelevant to the clinical material.

Bion introduces the notion of “projective transformations” to account for these forms of transference marked by states of confusion, undifferentiation, and even derealisation. In such forms splitting and destructiveness directed at psychic contents and containers prevail; arrogance replaces the search for truth; and bizarre objects, reduced to their concrete dimension, including fragments of the Ego, Superego and non-transformed beta elements, refer to the pathological projective identification and the attacks on linking.

In his later writings, Bion reminds us that any theorisation, including the theorisation of the transference, is a response to the fear of the unknown and involves the risk of crippling creativity and psychic growth. Bion returns to the etymology of the term transference which suggests a passage, a transitory element in the history of the analytic encounter (Bion 2005a, p. 5). The analyst’s interpretations “hide [his] nakedness” (Bion 2005b, p. 42); the transference relationship as well as the analyst’s position should be elucidated so that we may be released from it.

IV. E. Late Bionian development in USA

An example of a late Bionian tradition in North America, particularly applicable to analysis with children and primitive mental states, is Mitrani’s concept ‘taking’ the transference. (1999, 2000, 2001, 2014). She conceives this as a function of the analyst essential to what Bion called the maternal function of reverie: that attentive, actively receptive, introjective and experiencing aspect of the containing object. This function does not merely entail a cognitive understanding of or an ‘empathic attunement’ with what the patient is feeling toward and experiencing with the analyst in any given moment. It also refers to the unconscious introjection, by the analyst, of certain aspects of the patient's inner world, and a resonance with those elements of the analyst's own inner world, such that she is able to *feel herself to actually be* that unwanted part of the patient's self or that unbearable object that she has previously been introjectively identified with.

Taking the transference may be the most difficult aspect of the work, as it is not a matter of good will or good training, but an unconscious act governed by unconscious factors.

V. THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION

V. A. Jacques Lacan

Lacan posits the transference as one of the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, along with the drive, the unconscious and repetition. His approach to the transference is predicated on the Freudian idea that the link with the analyst hosts the repetition of an experience that comes from the past, the reactualisation of signifiers in which the childhood demands for love may have taken form. But even before involving these particular forms, the transference shows itself in the very process of the demand for analysis, insofar as the subject addresses someone in whom some knowledge is supposed. The figure of the analyst as the *subject supposed to know* is pivotal when accounting for the course of the treatment according to Lacan: during his analysis, the analysand must specifically experience the illusion in which he finds himself when supposing that the analyst has the answer he expects, as a patient, with regard to his demand and his becoming, more generally. In Lacan's view, any demand is fundamentally aimed at what was irretrievably lost in speech.

This dimension of the experience of the transference is, to Lacan, the most decisive one; it keeps the analyst, thus a representative of the figure of the Other, from being concerned with counter-transference: the most orthodox Lacanians hold the attention given to the patient's linguistic discourse as exclusively worthwhile, whereas the attention paid to the analyst's mental processes is regarded as a distraction in the listening process. The end of the treatment, envisioned as the eradication of the transference, coincides with the moment when the analysand may depart from this illusion and relieve the analyst of the subject-supposed-to-know position.

In his 1951 paper (1966/2007), "Interventions on Transference", Lacan details his theory of transference in terms of its imaginary and symbolic aspects, looking in particular at Freud's case study of Dora (1905). The imaginary transference for Lacan includes the extreme feelings of love and hate that emerge in treatment and that can act as a resistance, in particular as a narcissistic obstacle between patient and analyst. Specifically, the imaginary transference crystallizes as a resistance when it becomes the analyst's resistance. 'Caught in the patient's imaginary drama', Lacan claimed, the analyst often becomes deaf to the more symbolic aspects of transference that keep the analysis unfolding, bringing to the surface unconscious material, deepening the treatment. In the Dora case, Lacan points to the stagnation of treatment with Freud's insistence on Dora's love for Herr K, a resistance that often arose for Freud with women patients during his early period. Because of this, Freud fails to hear in Dora's dreams and in the unfolding of her story, her complicity with and erotic feelings for Frau K. that would have brought the analysis to its next turn, what Lacan calls Dora's central question concerning the enigma of femininity and her own desire (as opposed to her previous obsessive concern with the desire of others—her father, Herr K). Lacan takes Freud's conception of transference as resistance and make the analyst responsible for it: "There is only one resistance, the resistance of the analyst". (1978/1988, p. 228) Lacan's emphasis on the "intersubjective

dialectic” of the symbolic realm of the third, The Other, ‘in’ the transference is close to the interpersonal and relational emendations to classical psychoanalysis.

Another important aspect of Lacan’s thoughts on transference concerns technique. For Lacan, there is no ‘meta’ position the analyst can assume in relation to the transference. When the analysand hears what the analyst says, he hears it ‘in’ the transference to the analyst, namely, through whatever particular subjective position he or she may be occupying in the unfolding of the analysis. This challenges many ideas concerning the interpretation of the transference, especially when done from an external vantage point. It also raises a question about the ‘dissolution’ of the transference via interpretation.

For Lacan, transference takes place whenever “the subject supposed to know” arises, meaning the love, hate, and ignorance that develop in the face of those to whom we attribute knowledge. This is why it happens most readily with teachers, religious figures, doctors and psychoanalysts; namely with parental figures in positions of power. What distinguishes analysts, and differentiates interpretation from suggestion, is that the analyst does not abuse this transfer to him/her by the patient. The very frame of analysis allows this supposed knowledge to be seen not as a particular property of an individual, but rather a knowledge ‘in’ the unconscious, in the Other, that can be unpacked, becoming part of the evolution of an analysis. Lacan describes this movement in terms of the feeling the analysand has that the all-powerful analyst knows something about their symptoms, allowing a treatment to begin and gain traction. We might think of this as the imaginary and projective aspects of the ‘benign positive transference’ - the therapeutic alliance. The analyst’s neutrality helps contain the patient’s developing anxious preoccupation with the analyst’s desire, e.g., What does the analyst want from me? Does the analyst love me? And so on. Finally, the analysis transforms this focus on the analyst’s desire into questions that concern the analysand’s own desires and fantasies; work that will make up a series of important encounters with the conditions of desiring that are unique and singular to each patient.

When the patient can let the analyst fall from the special place he/she occupied in the transference, the analysis can end. In essence, the analyst becomes the loved and lost object (cause of desire), allowing the patient to separate and individuate. Lacan’s position on the ending of the analysis thus comes close to classical notions of ‘identification’ with the ‘analytic function’ or the ‘analyzing instrument’, mourning, working-through, and the capacity for self-analysis after termination.

V. B. Lacan in the USA

Although there is no coherent group of USA Lacanians, his influence is especially present in academe where some have observed that a “psychoanalytic approach” is synonymous with the application of Lacanian thinking. But there is also a small and increasingly influential group of practicing and theorizing Lacanian psychoanalysts. Some among these represent a more “pure” Lacanian position (e.g., Lichtenstein, Fink) while others who have had both “classical” and Lacanian training (e.g., Webster) engage in dialogue with

the other North American “schools”. As translations of Lacan's work have been made available to Anglophone analysts, it has become more apparent that the divide may not be as wide as is often depicted, in particular by Lacan himself. Lacan pays special attention to affects in the transference, especially anxiety. Some of his dialectical and inter-subjective notions of treatment comes close to the classical lines of transference analysis and, differently, to its intersubjective and relational modifications.

V. C. Jean Laplanche

With the theory of enigmatic signifier, Jean Laplanche introduces a new point of view about the transference. The intrusive impact of the Other and the impossible translation by the infant of the adult's messages “compromised” by interference of sexual fantasies is, for Laplanche, the frame of the fundamental anthropological situation and the basis of the “general theory of seduction” (Laplanche, 1987). It is this situation, which is repeated in the transferential situation. Therefore, the transference is not limited to a simple repetition of the relationship to the infantile objects. This aspect only corresponds to what Laplanche names “filled-in transference” – i.e the “positive” content which the analyst and the analysand can refer to as infantile imagos. The other aspect, named “hollowed-out transference” by Laplanche, is the reiteration of the relationship to the other as bearer of enigmatic messages (Laplanche, 1992). It is “provoked” by the analyst insofar he/she confronts the analysand with his/her enigma and “refusal to know” – this position actualizing the relationship to enigmas of the patient's infancy. In this very heart of the transferential situation, a progressive process of “de-translation” and “re-translation” allows the analysand to “re-appropriate” excluded messages (Laplanche, 1999).

From this perspective “mourning is the paradigm of symbolization.” Transference as a process – along with dreaming – works in the opposite direction to mourning. To repeat in the transference, means to try and retrieve the lost object (or relationship) rather than mourning and symbolizing it; therefore, the transference works in the same direction as the dream: both tend to deny absence; they tend to re-present (present anew) what could not be symbolized; hence, they both work in the opposite direction of mourning. This means that transference and dreaming share a “hallucinatory” quality in that they tend to shape the experience according to unconscious schemas rather than acknowledging the reality of absence or loss.

V. D. Laplanche and Freud: a reading in French Canada

An influential strand of thought in French Canada maintains transference as indeed the most important and most distinctive feature of psychoanalytic treatment. From this perspective partially inspired by Jean Laplanche's writings, taking transference into account is what makes their treatment “psychoanalytic”. Moreover, no “genetic” reconstruction of the patient's story will have as much weight as what is brought to life within the transference. Transference is

viewed as one of the strongest forms of resistance to — and the most effective instrument of the work of analysis.

While transference is a form of resistance in that it tends toward repetition within the relationship to the analyst instead of “remembering”, the term “remembering” must be understood not as a process of recovering memories but rather as one of reconstructing one’s own psyche. (Scarfone, 2011)

Scarfone recognizes two kinds of transference. The first is a basic, positive transference towards the analyst as a trustworthy professional who is believed to be in the service of the patient’s longterm interests. This was called by Freud a “paternal” transference, but this is not what matters most. The important thing is that without this baseline transference, analysis is not possible. (It is the basis of the therapeutic and working alliance, in the American vocabulary). This positive transference is not a resistance and should not be interpreted. Uninterpreted, it is left to work in favour of the on-going process of analysis.

The second kind is termed “transference proper”: this is the transference that stands as a resistance, no matter if it is negative (hostile) or “positive” (e.g. strongly erotic or passionate) transference. This transference proper itself subdivides into two sub-classes which can be found in Freud: on the one hand, the “prototypes” described by Freud in the 1912 paper (Freud, 1912); on the other hand, the “cry of fire [...] raised during a theatrical performance” kind he described in the 1915 paper (Freud, 1915). Whereas in the first, it is a matter of reproducing something that was already formed and ready to be projected on the analyst, in the second, it is truly an unprecedented event: the patient would not wish for analysis any more nor wants to “know” anything regarding “meaning”. The difference between the two is more clearly stated if we say, following Laplanche, that we have:

In the first kind of transference – a “filled-in” transference – the patient tends to repeat what was already noticeable in her own previous relationships to significant figures. This form lends itself all too easily to interpretation (e.g. “you reject my interpretations just like you rejected your father’s advice...”), but does not bring us very far into the heart of the matter.

In the second and most important kind of transference – a “hollow” (or “hollowed-out”) transference, where neither the patient nor the analyst has any notion of what is being repeated: the analysand is experiencing the fact of being confronted with the enigmas that puzzled her in the past. What is “repeated” here has never actually been experienced in a subjectively comprehensible way before. This is very close, if not identical, with what Winnicott reports in his famous paper “Fear of breakdown” (Winnicott, 1974; see also Clare Winnicott, 1980) wherein something happened in the past but there was no “I” to register it. As a result, it must be experienced for the first time in the analysis in order to become something of the past. This is therefore the most important sort of transference, one where what lurks in a badly unrepresented form has to be lived through and worked through for the first time in the patient’s life.

VI. SPECIFIC NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Freud's early idea of the "transference neurosis," its establishment and cure by the therapeutic work, became one of the hallmark ideas of North American psychoanalysis during the much later period of hegemony of "classical psychoanalysis" (a term denoting American Ego psychology of the 1940s, '50s, and '60s). Although this idea has since lost much of its influence, during the "classical" era the establishment and resolution of a transference neurosis was virtually defining of psychoanalytic treatment. Treatments lacking in a clear transference neurosis and its "cure" were commonly questioned as to whether or not they were "truly" psychoanalytic.

At this time Strachey's view still had many adherents and North American (the American Psychoanalytic Association – "APsA") analysts of the "classical" period found themselves largely limiting their comments to analysands to the transference or needing special reasons for doing otherwise. Analytic technique based on Strachey's principle was widely taught to students at APsA institutes. Nonetheless, acceptance of Strachey was not universal, and analytic work in the extra-transference was widely if more quietly practiced.

It is important in discussing the evolution of the transference concept that one keep track of the evolution of its ever-present partner, countertransference. It has been widely accepted (although recently disputed, see Holmes, 2014) that beginning with Freud's early writing and correspondence on the subject, countertransference was viewed – initially and through the 1950's and '60s – as a largely unconscious, highly personal if not idiosyncratic reaction in the analyst that impeded or interfered with an analyst's capacity to function as the analyst of the particular patient evoking the countertransference. In short, countertransference was a problem in the analyst that often if not regularly was deemed to require further analytic (or at least self-analytic) work by – or upon – the treating analyst. Despite its parallel to transference, countertransference was viewed as discontinuous, cropping up at particular moments or phases in an analysis. It was also viewed, like transference, not so much as an interpersonal event taking life from the interaction of two particular individuals but rather as the activation of a pre-existing template or schema of the analyst's in response to – but not in its essence shaped by – the analysand. The deliberate intensive study of countertransference as a phenomenon in and of itself as well as a unique product of a specific dyad in a particular and unique analytic situation was to wait for future elaboration.

VI. A. Edith Jacobson and Hans Loewald: Transitional Thinkers of Classical Psychoanalysis

Within the "classical" tradition were transitional thinkers beginning to bridge the divide between one-person drive theorists and two-person relational perspectives. The two contributors who were perhaps most prominent and influential were Edith Jacobson and Hans Loewald. Both emerged from the ego psychological tradition but felt that perspective to be

insufficiently attentive to the importance of the relational or object-relational environment in the formation of psychic structure and in the nature of the instinctual drives themselves. Jacobson's monumental volume, "The Self and the Object World" (1964), represented an integration of object relations theory with "classical" drive theory. Her views, like Loewald's, had powerful implications for the understanding of transference, for both its formative early developmental experiences and relationships and its implications for psychoanalytic technique.

Loewald, an ego psychologist writing in the 1970s and 1980s, bridged this divide (a relationship versus the transference of the patient versus the transferences of patient and analyst) by proposing a somewhat different amalgamation drive theory with object relational theory.

For Loewald instinctual theory was insistently "psychological" rather than "biological". Loewald, whose philosophical background included Heidegger as a teacher, saw "...the inextricable interrelationship between what we call subject and object" (1970, p. 55). In this he was in tune with the philosophical postmodern deconstruction of objectivity in science, an intellectual trend that ultimately influenced the whole field of psychoanalysis, especially the relational school (see below). Developmentally, Loewald's vision was that "object relations ... [are] not merely regulative but essential constitutive factors in psychic structure formation ... The psychoanalytic process and ... early developmental processes reveal the interactional origin and nature of psychic reality..." (1970, p. 67) Writing about "the transference neurosis", holding to the importance of the centrality of the Oedipal situation, he enlarged a sense of an analytic process as a co-created scene of "transference and countertransference" (Loewald, 1971). He thus took "the transference" -- often referred to as a singular figure -- to mean also the many transferentially influential figures that were encoded in the child's upbringing and thus in his/her growing mind, including the child's sense of the caretakers' emotional relationships to one another -- all of whom became internalized, to be re-externalized in verbal and non-verbal ways once more in the analysis. He analogized the analytic situation and the emergent transferences and countertransferences to a dramatic play that is set up by the patient, where the analyst is co-creating the script that is being written by the patient, and where gradually in growing autonomy, the analysand takes over his/her own interpretation of that script. (Loewald, 1975).

VI. B. Heinrich Racker's Influence to further broadening of the concept in North America

While North American Ego psychology dominated much of the region's psychoanalysis, the Argentinian Heinrich Racker's seminal studies on countertransference found a friendly reception within the North American Interpersonal school of Harry Stack Sullivan. Racker's earliest published studies (1953, 1957, 1958b) emphasized not only the ubiquity of countertransference and its continuous nature, but perhaps most importantly its interpersonal or relational aspects. He also added essential developmental and genetic (that is, individual-historical) dimensions. For Racker, transferences and countertransferences in the analytic

situation were of necessity dyadic, involving interpenetrating feelings, fantasies, impulses, and memories of both patient and analyst and their mutual impact upon and interactions with each other. He framed transference-countertransference in terms of object relations, especially in the repetition of early ones, and introduced the terms “complementary” and “concordant” to describe their typical patterns of reciprocity.

Racker’s work and his view of transference/countertransference and their inseparability has slowly worked its way into the North American “mainstream,” so much so that it is difficult to have a clinical article accepted for the “Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association” that does not have some description of the transference/countertransference dimension of the manuscript’s clinical illustration. Integration of the two-person implications of transference/countertransference has contributed to a degree of convergence of the points of view of the relational/interpersonal school and the “modern conflict” school – although fundamental differences remain as will be discussed below. Nevertheless, the decades of the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s have appropriately been called “the countertransference years”. (Jacobs, 1999, p. 575) Jacobs correctly identified countertransference a concept “long in the shadows, that has emerged as one of the issues most actively discussed and debated in psychoanalysis today.” Today it is difficult – although by no means impossible – to speak of transference without reference to its partner. This has been a radical evolution, perhaps a paradigm shift.

The view of transference as repetition of past relationships into the present and most importantly into the analytic relationship, although modified in a variety of ways – perhaps unrecognizably so by the relational/interpersonal school (see below) – remains acknowledged at its core by North American analysts today. Kernberg (this entry, see below) probably speaks for the great majority of North American analysts today when he says “the analysis of transference is the main source of specific change brought about by psychoanalytic treatment”. Transference analysis may well be *the* defining feature distinguishing psychoanalysis from other psychotherapies.

Representing a further evolution of the “Ego psychology” (Hartmann, 1939) that dominated the field in North America between approximately 1940 and 1980, “modern conflict theory” (MCT) (also sometimes referred to as “conflict theory” or “classical analysis”) held fast to the view that the capacity for transference resided solely and uniquely in the mind of the analysand. This view contrasts strongly with the views of the “two person” theories that hold, variously, that the transference – perhaps a misnomer in this view – or better said, the relationship is a unique *de novo* product of the interactions within a particular analytic dyad. A variant of this idea is that transference is co-constructed and that therefore an analysand’s apparent transference will differ depending upon who is his analytic partner. Even the use of the term “transference” can be confusing since some two-person analysts may speak of transference but exclude or minimize the importance of the repetition of the past. Whereas the two-person psychology view is that the analytic relationship is created solely or primarily from present day elements, the MCT view retains Freud’s idea that the analytic relationship will be highly influenced by transference in the sense of the patient’s repetition of his past

relationships. Hence for two-person analysts nothing of importance is transferred. It would be better to speak of the analytic relationship rather than the transference.

VI. C. Modern Conflict Theory

The contemporary descendants of the North American Ego Psychology (see separate entry CONFLICT) view transference activity, with its repetitive and interactive character, in the transference-countertransference dyad as a manifestation of persistent ubiquitous unconscious fantasy, which can be understood to consist of compromise formations that may be adaptive or maladaptive, underlying neurotic symptoms and creative achievements alike. Contemporary clinical notions of ‘hidden transferences’ and ‘transference cycles’ (below) are examples of this school’s current complexity: Abend (1993), expanding the view of ubiquity of the unconscious fantasy into its layered manifestations, identified the subtle idiosyncratic ‘hidden’ transferences onto the psychoanalytic situation as a whole. “My own clinical experience”, he wrote, “has led me to become increasingly attentive to the idiosyncratic, at times quite subtle ways in which patients construe the analytic situation in conformity with their own emotional needs. These often constitute ongoing experiences of transference gratification which may be very difficult for the analyst to detect, and even more difficult for the patient to surrender. There are some varieties of transference wish that are not as much subject to disappointment and frustration by the limits of the analytic situation as are others, i.e., the wish to be taken seriously by an attentive listener. This poses a technical problem that deserves further study. I believe that it is advantageous to search for such hidden transferences on a case-by-case, individual basis, without employing any potentially restrictive formula derived from the analyst’s preferred developmental schema...” (Abend, 1993, p. 644). Ellman and Moskowitz (2008) link the repetitive character of transference to seeing treatment in terms of transference cycles in relation to analytic trust, true self, conflicts and object relationships: “... each new cycle involves at least a partial renewal of analytic trust. The trust is bidirectional and the analyst’s trust of the patient involves helping or standing aside while the patient finds her or his own voice and constructs reality in his or her idiosyncratic fashion. Thus, reality is experienced as constructed ... Nevertheless, the patient’s conflicts and true self are seen as mainly contained within the patient. How the interaction is constructed depends on the particular analytic pair, but we believe there is a true self that is not a construction.... Each transference cycle begins a new aspect of an object relationship in which trust is reinforced from two different directions. Initially the analyst enters the patient’s world and when a natural separation is found and tolerated, each member of the pair begins to voice their views of the relationship. Being able to utilize the other is in our mind a crucial aspect of the benefits of insight in the analytic situation” (p. 825).

VI. D. Interpretive Focus: Transference versus Extratransference

As noted in the introduction, the question has been raised concerning to what extent is transference analysis the exclusively effective form of interpretation and its corollary, should

the analyst's interpretive activity be limited exclusively to interventions concerning transference. While there are a minority of North American analysts today who believe that transference interpretations are the therapeutically effective ones, most feel that there are many problems in the patient's life that may draw the analyst's attention because they are affectively dominant in the communications of the hour and are linked with the transference. Consequently, these analysts hold that the interpretation of the corresponding unconscious conflict focused on that extratransference relationship can be helpful because the affective dominance is located there. Eventually, however, major pathogenic unconscious conflicts tend to be anchored in characterological defensive structures that will become transference resistances. Thus, systematic analysis of the transference is widely viewed as the essential, but not exclusive focus of the analyst's interpretive activity.

The Kleinian approach always has tended to maximize systematic transference analysis, but the trend has today also evolved in both ego psychological and relational approaches. French analysis, too, has increased this aspect of the work.

VI. E. Object Relations Approaches – Advanced and Archaic Transferential Configurations

Comprehension of the nature of transference regression also has shifted to the conceptualization of primitive, early, archaic object relations-determined transferences, in contrast to later, advanced oedipal transferences. Oedipal and pre-oedipal conflicts tend to be condensed in regressive transferences with dominance of aggressive developments, in contrast to clearer differentiation of stage of development in less regressive transferences with dominance of infantile sexual conflicts.

In the light of contemporary object relations theory, the understanding of identificatory and projective aspects of transference developments, as in those seen in the treatment of severe personality disorders, has been clarified and enriched. In the case of neurotic personality organization, the predominant enactments in the transference/countertransference binds that develop during treatment involve the patient's identification with an aspect of his infantile self, while projecting the corresponding object representation onto the analyst. Reversals of this enactment, where the patient identifies with the object representation while projecting the corresponding self representation onto the analyst, are less frequent. In contrast, in the case of severe psychopathology, such reversals are frequent, and the consistent alternating reversals of self and object representations the rule, which gives an apparently chaotic character to the transference developments (Kernberg, Yeomans, Clarkin et al., 2008).

In addition, other complications emerge in these cases: the reciprocal activation of the patient's grandiose self and his depreciated self representation as dominant object relations pathology in the transference manifestations of narcissistic pathology; and the regression to symbiotic relations in which the patient cannot tolerate any differences of views and relatedness in the therapist, experiencing all triangulations as intolerable traumatic situations. The

interpretation and working through of these primitive transference regressions may represent the dominant therapeutic feature of these cases.

VI. F. Relational Perspectives

The relational/interpersonal view of transference is firmly rooted in a two-person psychology and thus views the transference as inextricable from the countertransference. That is, for relationalists, transference cannot be simply the “transfer” of internalized templates in the patient onto the analyst but rather is a part of a clinical situation which in Racker’s view (1988), is an interaction between two personalities... “each personality has its internal and external dependencies, anxieties, and pathological defenses; each is also a child with his internal parents, and each of these whole personalities – that of the analysand and that of the analyst – responds to every event in the analytic situation” (p. 132). Steven Mitchell (2000) states that psychoanalytic knowledge is generated in the intersubjective mix between patient and analyst through the study of transactional patterns and with an internal structure derived from an interactive, interpersonal field. As the pattern is the object of analytic study, transference does not exist without participation from its object (countertransference).

For relational analysts, transference is grounded in a social constructivist model. Irwin Z. Hoffman (1983) points out that the transference is not a distortion of reality but a selective attention to certain aspects of the analyst’s participation, both conscious and unconscious. One major implication of this view is that the analyst inevitably influences the nature of the patient’s transference. As Ogden (1994) observes out, a given patient will have a different analysis depending on the particularities of his analyst, both conscious and unconscious, as they co-create an “analytic third”. Sullivan’s “Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry” (1953) states that a person can only be known in the context of a social interaction that constitutes an ever-shifting “interpersonal field”. As he sees the “self system” as designed to reduce anxiety which comes with having to interact with a significant “other”, a patient’s “transference” to his analyst may likely be a form of adaptation designed to reduce the danger in the interaction, perhaps protecting the analyst. Irwin Hoffman critiques the classical view of transference by pointing to the impossibility of the analyst not influencing the patient’s reaction to him.

As some contemporary relational analysts, notably Bromberg (1998, 2006, 2011) and D. B. Stern (2011), view the self as a collection of self-states (i.e. internalized object relationships) which may or may not be aware of one another, they view the transference as a particular self-state of the patient interacting with a self-state of the analyst. Bromberg (1998, p. 13) writes, “By being attuned to shifts in his own self-states as well as those of the patient, and using this awareness relationally, an analyst furthers the capacity of a patient to hear in a single interpersonal context the echo of his other selves voicing alternative realities that have been previously incompatible.”

VI. G. Self-Psychology Perspectives: Kohut and Contemporary

The self-psychological consideration of transference differs from that of other theoretical points of view inasmuch as it is based upon a developmental line of narcissism separate from that of object relations. It also considers an extended theory of the mind (Sheldrake, 2012) and thus the “other” or the analyst is not seen as distinct from the patient as in a “two-person” psychology but rather as a necessary constituent of the patient or as a “selfobject.” From this perspective, the analyst as a transference figure does not have mental components transferred or “projected” onto him but rather participates in the ongoing analysis and growth of the self (Kohut, 1971).

From the earliest moment of self development beginning with the attainment and recognition of a cohesive self (Kohut, 1971) and onto the continuing changing characteristics of the self, one can note the dual aspects of the self according to the modifications in ambition and idealization (see separate entry SELF). Therefore, the transferences or selfobject realizations are directed towards the analyst aiding in self integration, serving as a mirroring selfobject, a twinning selfobject, or an idealizing selfobject. The transferences will retrace the developmental line of narcissism with both its normal as well as its pathological aspects. Transference interpretations will allow for pathology in mirroring to mutate into pride, while those of idealization will become integrated as enthusiasm. It is important to recognize that the extended theory of the mind never results in an isolated person but rather in a lifelong employment of others as selfobjects to aid in mirroring and idealization. One is never free of selfobjects. This is in line with the fact that transferences, both selfobject transferences as well as others, are ubiquitous and universal.

VII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT IN LATIN AMERICA

VII. A. Ángel Garma

Ángel Garma set up an important psychoanalytic movement in Argentina, which, in turn, extended throughout Latin America. Born in Bilbao, Spain, he migrated to Argentina in 1938 during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). In 1942, along with others, he founded the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association, of which he was president throughout different periods.

In one of his earliest papers, “La Transferencia afectiva en el Psicoanálisis” [Affective Transference in Psychoanalysis], from 1931, he stressed the importance of making conscious within the psychoanalytic treatment the patient’s unconscious masochistic submission to the superego that he has transferred to the analyst.

In the same year Garma had presented a paper in order to become member of the German Psychoanalytic Society, “Die Realität und das Es in der Schizophrenie” [Reality and

the Id in Schizophrenia], which was published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Volume XVIII (1932), 2.

Traces of Garma's thought can be found in the following authors:

VII. Aa. Heinrich Racker

Native of Poland, H. Racker was forced by the Nazi persecution to emigrate to Buenos Aires in 1939. He began his training analysis with Angel Garma, and became very influential in development of psychoanalytic thought and practice in Latin America (Garma, 1931).

Racker focused on what happened to the analyst in connection to the analysand during the analysis. Therefore, parallel to the dynamics of transference, he developed what he termed the dynamics of counter-transference, the consideration of which allows the analyst a fuller understanding of transference. He takes into account not only the repetitive aspects, but also all that is new within the exchange between the analyst and the analysand.

Racker developed certain concepts at a time when, in his opinion, not enough attention was being paid to resistance to transference and to the interpretation of dreams. There was a tendency to interpret conflicts but the profound motivations, such as wish-fulfilment in dreams, which are in fact their essence, seemed to be ignored.

He attributed these technical differences to oscillations in the Freudian thought itself. In *Estudios sobre técnica psicoanalítica* [Studies on Psychoanalytic Technique], Racker (1958) remarked that Freud wanted to spare patients from the intensity and the violence of repetition and therefore he sometimes seemed to want to limit his tendency to give transference neurosis a central role in the treatment.

Racker's contribution to transference has mainly been to emphasise certain unconscious processes that take place in the analyst, that inhibit him and prevent him from offering the appropriate interpretations throughout the treatment: he termed them counter-resistances to the task of interpretation. Counter-transference is the actual response to transference. In consequence, he applied the Freudian methodology of transforming what has become an obstacle (that is, counter-transference) into an instrument that broadens the understanding of 'making conscious the unconscious' (see separate entry COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).

Racker's suggestions could be differentiated from what at the time came to be termed 'classical psychoanalysis' – which emphasised the notions of 'analyst as mirror' and 'analyst as surgeon' in order to achieve an ideal asepsis – because he adhered to a more active technique on facing the analysand's clinical production, something that can be attributed to the influence of Klein and, in particular, of Paula Heimann.

He took up an active aspect of the Freudian statements by becoming aware of the processes of identification with the patient that entail empathy and the careful attention to the patient's associations. He tended both to a microscopic and macroscopic approach to the patient's activity, in the *Siedehitze* (intense heat) of transference.

Such heat is attained, according to Racker, only if the analyst contributes enough heat (enough positive countertransference while carrying on with his task) to the analytic situation. Certain asepsis, he remarked, should not prevent us from showing interest and affection towards the analysand, because only Eros can create Eros.

Certain defences of the analyst against aspects of his own unconscious hinder his task when he faces the analysand's unconscious. These defences manifest themselves as excessive aloofness, inflexibility, coldness, and inhibited behaviour in the presence of the analysand.

Following Freud, Racker considered that transference needed to be interpreted when it was being used by the force of resistance. However, he differentiated himself from Freud when he pointed out that 'transference resistances', such as transference anxieties, appeared from the very beginning in the analyses and must therefore be addressed early on.

Racker claimed that transference is resistance but it is also the resisted. He made his position clearer based on a Freudian idea from *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) with regard to the position of the analyst, who teams up with the id and its tendency to repetition and fights against the Ego resistances that oppose repetition. He emphasised that the resisted is present in repetition.

In Racker's opinion, analytic therapy is focused on the analysis of transference neurosis. Transference is resistance as well as the resisted; that is to say that the analysand repeats infantile defences (which constitute the transference resistances) in order not to make conscious certain infantile anxiety situations that he is about to re-experience within transference.

He further explained that certain resistances to making something conscious are not connected to actual occurrences, but rather to something that has never become past and is therefore re-experienced in the present. Here Racker appeared to be referring to that which has not achieved inscription and, as a result, lives on in a constant present.

He claims that "every recollection at the same time represents a certain transference relationship and every refusal to remember represents a rejection of a certain transference relationship" (Racker, 1958, p. 63; translated here from Spanish original). In order to state the existence of resistance originated in the counter-transference, Racker takes as a starting point the Freudian statement that the analyst wishes that the patient would remember things as belonging to the past, instead of repeating the repressed as something present and in transference.

In Racker's theory, transference and countertransference represent two components of a unity that mutually feed each other. In counter-transference Racker establishes a distinction between the response of the analyst to manifest transference, and another response to potential, latent transference but which has been repressed and blocked. Countertransference is an expression of the relationship of the analysand with his internal and external objects and, in addition, constitutes an actual experience; for this reason, taking it into account will be important (see separate entry COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).

The response to negative and sexual transference with negative and sexual counter-transference on the part of the analyst prevents the analysand from introjecting the analyst as a 'good object', free from anxiety and anger. On the other hand, positive countertransference allows the analyst to identify with the ego and the id of the analysand. It is for this reason that Racker suggests that negative countertransference should always be analysed and dissolved.

Anxiety in counter-transference always constitutes a guide for the analyst and it may be expressed in a range that can go from states of tension to irruptions of anxiety of either paranoid or depressive content. The anxiety produced in the analyst by the analysand's disagreement and the consequent frustration can cause the advance, within his mind of his own masochism or of another kind of resistance, such as intense sexual feelings, induced, in turn, by the unconscious material of the analysand.

Although Racker insists on the fact that countertransference should not be confessed, he nevertheless admits that it could be included in the interpretation offered. For instance, by temporarily enacting the role induced by the analysand only to analyse later what has taken place. The analyst must avoid acting out but in certain cases of patients that use the fundamental rule (which favours the use of words) as a resistance to paralyse the influence of interpretation, the analyst's acting out functions as an interpretation. However, Racker warns that this technique should only be used by widely experienced analysts.

Above all, he emphasises the importance of interpretation, focusing on counter-transference neurosis, the core of which is the Oedipus complex (in its positive and negative aspects). He points out that the analyst is an object of impulses, which could distort his perception, but when his neurotic reaction is added to this the capacity to interpret becomes hindered. In addition, neurotic counter-transference in turn has an influence on the analysand's transference. From the Oedipus complex that becomes involved in counter-transference the analyst transfers his paternal objects onto the analysand and tends to repeat the negative as well as the positive aspects. For instance, rivalries with the analysand's spouse, jealousy and fantasies of possession might emerge.

Racker puts forward these concepts taking into account the training of the analysts. He bases his ideas on the Freud's (1937) statement in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable": '[The analysis of the analyst] alone would not suffice for his instruction; but we reckon on the stimuli that he has received in his own analysis not ceasing when it ends and on the processes of remodelling the ego continuing spontaneously in the analysed subject and making use of all subsequent experiences in this newly-acquired sense. This does in fact happen, and in so far as it happens it makes the analysed subject qualified to be an analyst himself' (Freud, 1937, pp.248-249; clarifying brackets are specific to this publication).

He also points out that being unable to 'let go' of the patient as well as the unwillingness to cure him, or the sexual envy that could push the analyst into acting out, all constitute dangers that risk the evolution of the analysand. He stresses that only by knowing his 'personal equation' will the analyst succeed in lessening the danger of inducing, or 'grafting' (as he puts it) his own neurosis into the patient.

A myth of the analytic situation is the analyst without anxiety and without anger which, according to Racker, corresponds to the ideals typical of the obsessional neurosis which could lead to mental block and repression. In contrast, true objectivity means that the analyst includes his own subjectivity or counter-transference as constant objects of observation and analysis.

Racker describes the concordant identifications of the analyst with the analysand: his Id with the analysand's Id, his Ego with that of the analysand, and the same case with the superego. However, he distinguishes these from complementary identifications that are connected to the analysand's objects. For instance, the analyst's disposition towards empathy, which in turn is originated in sublimated counter-transference, allows concordant identifications. When these are rejected the complementary identifications are the ones that prevail.

In order to detect these identifications, Racker stresses the importance of counter-transference experiences involved in the counter-transference ideas and position. Counter-transference ideas emerge from the particular resonance that takes place in the analyst due to the correspondence with the psychological constellation of the analysand.

Counter-transference ideas appear thanks to the evenly suspended attention suggested by Freud and pose no danger to objectivity unless they are disregarded. In contrast, it is the unacknowledged counter-transference positions (for example, the analyst's anger at the analysand's frustrating behaviour) the ones that do have consequences.

He also describes para-countertransference phenomena, which are connected to the transferences generated by the analysand during treatment with people close to him or her. In the same way, in the analysand transferences about people, places, institutions connected with his analyst also emerge (para-transference).

Racker also establishes a distinction between counter-transference anxiety of a depressive nature, which in general corresponds to a masochistic defence in the patient which induces in the analyst a tendency to repair and to experience his patient as if he were damaged, from the paranoid anxiety (the analyst is frightened of being attacked or damaged by the patient). There is correspondence between the analyst's paranoid anxiety and the patient's identification with persecuting objects, from which the patient tries to protect himself by harassing the analyst. It is in these cases that the analyst experiences paranoid anxiety.

Racker says that little is written or said about this subject and claims that speaking about this appears to embarrass the analysts. The cause of this is to be found in what constitutes the basis of counter-transference: the infantile experiences that have been awakened by the analytic task.

Racker's ideas, in particular the concepts of counter-transference and that of the analyst trained in self-observation have had influence in the training of several analysts, not only in Argentina, but also throughout Latin America.

VII. Ab. Fidias Cesio

Taking his adhesion to the Freudian thought, to which he contributes with his own developments, as a starting point, Fidias Cesio examines two definitions of transference: the one given in “The interpretation of dreams” (1900) refers to the transference stemming from the unconscious ideas being transferred to preconscious representations; the other, put forward in the case of Dora (1905), refers to the transference to the person of the analyst, which according to Freud: “(...) are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and fantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment” (Freud 1905, p. 116).

The first version of transference is the one found in the discourse of the analysand, the rule of free association, which, thanks to the particular analytic way of listening, says a lot more than would appear at the manifest level: in our capacity as analysts we hear the latent discourse in the words that the analysand chooses, in the same way as in the dream the repressed idea is transformed and represented by images; thoughts of a more primitive nature.

Cesio gives particular emphasis to countertransference, which reveals the full contribution made by the analyst, who forms with the analysand an indissoluble pair in the process developed within the session. Both members are included in an abstinent setting, without which the analytic session could not take place.

Both the transference and the countertransference threaten to become resistances to the cure – as they themselves are indeed resistances – unless they are made conscious and, therefore, become essential tools in the analysis.

Cesio emphasised the concept of the ‘actual’ and made his own contributions to it (Cesio, 2010).

Cesio considers the session from the perspective of the theory of dreams and, therefore, the analyst acts as a day’s residue: on sharing the traits of the recent and the insignificant, he can adequately receive the patients’ transference of his internal objects. The way he hears gives the patient’s words the significance of ‘free association’. By means of intrapsychic transference, those words show the emotional experience that is taking place in the session.

The abstinence in which the analysis develops tacitly includes a prohibition against any direct sexual activity, which thus becomes taboo, that is, incestuous. As the analysis progresses, a series of mental experiences appear, which are characterised by their ‘actuality’, their timelessness, they constitute an eternal present, a ‘now’ that peremptorily demands impossible satisfaction. The analyst takes the place of the superego – the parental couple – and the incestuous currents that were repressed now find expression in the patient’s unconscious relationship with the analyst, shaping the fundamental transferences.

Keeping up this parallel to dream-work, Cesio states that without the intervention of the analyst, the session would become an anxiety dream that could turn into a nightmare, thus interrupting the process.

The oedipal tragedy ends in the interruption of the analytic process, therefore, understanding the narcissistic, incestuous, and tragic structures buried in the id will help us establish a distinction between the concepts of oedipal tragedy and Oedipus complex.

In *The Ego and the Id* (1923) Freud claims that there is a primary oedipal structure in the foundations of the psyche, the oedipal protophantasies, which lead to the “first and most important identification.... This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis”. These primary identifications are the basis for the identifications that later on will form the Oedipus complex; they shape the ideal ego, the forerunner of the ego ideal. These protophantasies contain the origins of the Oedipus complex: incest involving filicide and parricide impulses in the struggle for the possession of the mother-wife, as Freud describes in his account of an original mythical time. In the psychoanalytic process, current evidence of that mythical time can be seen, for instance, in the cases of incest. Its clinical manifestation is the negative therapeutic reaction, whereas transference love is one of the forms it might take.

Thus, Cesio (1993, p.137) maintains that there are two oedipal structures: one is that of incest with its narcissistic, passionate, tragic nature, the oedipal tragedy, while the other results from working through the former with the parents of personal history: the Oedipus complex, described by Freud as characterized by tenderness and ambivalence. As for its manifestations, the latter seeks the inhibited sexual aim and its symptoms are those of the psychoneuroses. This ‘actual’ material is a consequence more of a process of burial than of repression. The return of the repressed gives place to psycho-neurotic symptoms that can be interpreted, whereas the ‘actual’ material, which has been buried (*Untergang*), gains access to consciousness in terms of tragedy, of actual neurosis, lethargy, and acting-out, and therefore, will require the use of construction.

When Freud faces Dora’s acting-out, he concludes that “this [the interpretation of the transference to the person of the analyst] happens to be by far the hardest part of the whole task. It is easy to learn how to interpret dreams, to extract from the patient’s associations his unconscious thoughts and memories, and to practice similar explanatory arts: for these the patient will always provide the text. Transference [to the person of the analyst] is the one thing the presence of which has to be detected almost without assistance and with only the slightest clues to go upon, while at the same time the risk of making arbitrary inferences has to be avoided. Nevertheless, transference cannot be evaded (...)” (Cesio, 1905, p. 116; the clarification in brackets specific to this publication).

Therefore, Freud emphasises the ease with which he could analyse the dreams brought by Dora – the imaginary – while it was harder for him to analyse transference to his person – the actual, the real – which led Dora to act out, to the interruption of analysis.

It is important to remember that the analyst's drama is that the technique, the setting, elicits incestuous sexual transferences and, at the same time, frustrates them. These transferences are neither a mere imaginary play of representations nor 'reality', but what we call 'virtual' or 'real'. By imaginary Cesio means the play of representations; by reality, dramatic acting out with things of the world; by real, that which implies the expression of the foundations, the affects, all that gives rise to 'actual' manifestations: those that have not been 're-signified' (provided with a new meaning).

By 'real' Cesio means the drama that takes place within the setting of the session, reaching consciousness in terms of affects that might range from anxiety to tender feelings. This is an original experience, a more or less direct presentation of the unconscious. As such it is also 'actual' in the sense that we apply this term to anxiety neuroses. The word 'act' denotes the verbal construction that describes the 'actual' drama based on the analysis of free associations; it leads to the reconstructions that place the act into history and time.

Cesio describes the analytic space as 'real', inasmuch as it is not reality but includes, along with the verbal images, the affective manifestations to which we attribute a somatic, neuro-vegetative, cellulo-humoral, involuntary-muscular figuration. These are perceived by the analyst and attributed to the patient as shared 'actual' experiences.

The analyst perceives these alterations and infers those that belong to the patient. When these actual experiences overflow the limits of the setting and massively invade the coherent ego, they finally reveal their incestuous sexual nature.

Transference is always present, but in the analytic situation it is revealed and employed to interpret the experience: it is unavoidable. On the other hand, transference to the person of the analyst emerges from profound levels, it has 'to be detected almost without assistance', which requires the analyst to be on the alert for these 'slightest clues to go on' in order to be able to interpret and/or construct what is happening *hic et nunc* and avoiding the risk of making arbitrary inferences. With this idea Freud warns against inadequacies, against a kind of 'delusion of self-reference' on the part of the analyst, which could hamper the effects of interpretations and/or constructions.

The concept of 'the person of the analyst' involves naming him based on his function, that is, on the role played along with the patient, who displays his fantasies that, as the analysis develops, cannot fail to re-awaken and become conscious as something 'actual'. That which was buried, lethargic, actual, that which never constituted a personal experience, with the progress of the analysis arouses affects and words in the analyst in terms of experience (Erlebnis), and the analyst then infers that this exists in the analysand. He, then, makes a construction of a 'theatrical performance' as it were, which is part of a tragedy in which both are leading figures.

It should be pointed out that when reference is made to construction, what is meant is the construction of the act -'akt-' that was inferred from the affect, the anxiety, the silence or the lethargy that appear with the experience -Erlebnis- and from the ideas that come to the mind of the analyst, who is then able to describe the tragic scene which is displayed in the 'real' of

the session. This is different from the historical re-construction that can take place later, a posteriori.

Countertransference neurosis constitutes an obstacle for the analyst, whereas countertransference, considered as a part of the pair transference-countertransference, is a worthy element for the clinical work.

Freud underlines the resistance accompanying the emergence of the fundamental transferences of parental imagos, which inevitably develop in the analysis and which, unless adequately resolved and interpreted, result in ‘transference love’, a tragedy that can destroy the treatment. Such was the emblematic case of Anna O, a patient of Breuer’s who, led by his resistance to acknowledge the sexual aetiology of neurosis, ended his collaboration with Freud. This resistance, generated by the counter-transference neurosis, postponed the development of the analytic therapy in its first decade.

The consideration of the ‘fundamental sexual transferences’ requires a definition of the theoretical position with regard to the Oedipus complex, which includes two different structures (as remarked above): one takes place with the grandiose, original parents, which Cesio calls ‘Oedipal tragedy’, that of incest with its narcissistic, passionate, tragic nature: a sealed unit formed by parricide, incest and castration, which as a rule remains buried and returns by means of a tragic representation. The other, the Oedipus complex proper, is characterized by an ambivalent relationship with the father, tenderness towards the mother, and the castration complex, and results from working through the former structure with the parents of personal history. Its fate is repression and may return as psychoneurotic symptoms.

In the chapter III of “The Ego and the Id”, Freud (1923) refers to a primary oedipal structure in the foundations of the psyche, the oedipal fantasies that create the first identifications, the effects of which will be universal and lasting, and which lead us back to the genesis of the Ego ideal through a first and most important identification in the individual which takes place with the great, undifferentiated parents of personal pre-history.

Therefore, the oedipal tragedy and the variations in the positive and the negative complex with its singular resolution will be revealed during the analysis of transference.

The tragic oedipal nature of the negative therapeutic reaction and of the emergence, from its foundations, of the affect known as ‘transference love’, overflows the limits of the psychoanalytic setting (Cesio, 1993).

This love only seeks absolute possession of the object, thus showing its drive-like nature, to the point of destroying it, and at the same time bringing about self-destruction.

Cesio claims that it seeks to realize the ‘wonderful baby’-phallus, which finds in death its highest expression. What is now manifested in transference love is ‘the dead’, what was buried in the unconscious and appears in the form of this narcissistic expression: The ‘wonderful baby-phallus’ reappears, in transference, as the constitution of the wonderful patient-analyst couple. The analytic setting, based on abstinence, repeats the original frustration for both members of the tragic scene that is being displayed: ‘need and longing’ must be turned

into “forces impelling (the patient) to do work and to make changes ” (Freud, 1915, pp. 164-165).

Psychoanalytic theory considers the existence of an unconscious, a buried formation, the ‘dead’, the ideal ego. It is an unconscious structure that can be deduced from lethargy and certain ‘actual’ manifestations, as a result of the original trauma: the phallic castration. In its constitution we find the tragic, buried primary Oedipus complex. It is ‘ideal’ because it contains a part of the Id that did not get to be postnatal ego. It is what never was conscious and thus never repressed, it is the buried unconscious, timeless and spaceless, ‘actual’. It manifests itself in the actual neurosis, wordless, silent and with bodily manifestations such as anguish, lethargy and other somatic diseases. It is based on the Oedipal proto-fantasy, which constitutes the primary ego. About the concept of the ‘dead’, it is a construction that we make from the buried contents that we discover in lethargy, and it becomes conscious through death representations, among which the abortion representations are paradigmatic, besides the night-fiend, Mare, god, vampires, ghost, shadow- and actual neurosis.

Previously, in 1956, Racker presented a clinical case about negative therapeutic reaction, the essential aspect of which was the presence of ‘dead’ objects and the stillness of the patient’s internal world. The following year he presented another case where he dealt with the analyst’s boredom and somnolence (Racker, 1957).

Cesio concurs with both Freud and Racker that, when it comes to transference and countertransference, there is no room for moralizing or ethical dilemmas, only the considerations of a good technique.

The analyst, in his neurotic transference response, takes the patient’s sexual demand to be his/her aim and sometimes unconsciously seeks to meet this aim by seducing the patient in his/her helplessness. Analysts will always find their patients grateful when the analyst sustains his desire to analyse.

The analyst’s drama is that the technique, the abstinent setting, elicits incestuous sexual transferences and at the same time frustrates them. These are ‘real’ transferences, that is, neither imaginary play, nor reality.

The analysis progresses in an unstable balance. If it remains in the imaginary, then the real unconsciously grows until it finally overflows into acting out: reality.

Freud uses the concept of ‘actual’ when he enquires into actual neuroses, which he considers the foundation of all psychoneuroses, as every mental production is founded on an actual one. In the opinion of Cesio, that is the ‘real’ beyond time and space. What presents itself as ‘actual’ corresponds to what has been buried, *Untergang*.

The experience of the transference that takes place in the session between analyst and analysand is ‘actual’, its sexual nature is as genuine as the infantile experience that is being repeated instead of being remembered. The inclusion of the analyst as protagonist introduces the analysis of the actual neuroses and the disorders with a somatic presentation in the psychoanalytic session.

‘Actual’ transference manifestations such as anxiety, hypochondria, lethargy, physical disorders, allow the analysts to give meaning to, and define, certain sensations such as drowsiness, boredom, tiredness, discomfort, among others, that emerge during the session. These are minor manifestations, which Cesio termed ‘the occupational disease of the analyst’. He devoted particular attention to the lethargy phenomenon – apparent death – that can sometimes creep over either the analyst or the patient, rarely both, and which has euphemistically been described as ‘sleepiness’. Due to its tragic, incestuous, and sexual aetiology, and because of the neuro-vegetative, cellulo-humoral manifestations that involve somatic or physical disorders both in the analyst and the patient, it certainly constitutes an actual neurosis.

Actual neurosis is discovered in the clinical practice that analyses the repressed unconscious and, in particular, the buried primal narcissism and incest. It gains access to consciousness through representations of death and, according to Cesio, through the presentation of the corpse, in the silence, the anxiety, and the lethargy as an end to the parricidal tragedy that is fatally repeated in transference. This is what Cesio calls ‘actual transference’; it has a somatic quality and bears the uncanny hallmark of nightmares and/or destiny realizations. These ‘actual transferences’ can be analysed by means of the construction and the interpretation of the buried contents. Indeed, the concept of burial is essential to the understanding of Cesio’s theoretical position.

The hypothesis is that, when the interpretation-construction is made at the right moment, transference love finds its way into consciousness, and a careful analysis of it resolves the transferences by binding its unconscious emotional components. Thus, the actual drama is endowed with the nature of a repetition of infantile experiences with which it is then introduced into time and history. The realization that these memories are a re-living, only now with the analyst, makes it possible to free the libido from these primary, incestuous, tragic fixations, and to channel it, through the meanings it gains, towards a secondary oedipal structure, that can be worked through.

The concept of ‘actual transference’ is a contribution to analytic technique because it broadens the therapeutic scope of psychoanalysis on providing the means to treat the so-called ‘actual disorders’ – the new term for actual neuroses – lethargy and the negative therapeutic reaction.

The analysis of these ‘actual’ manifestations presents major difficulties because, in order to investigate them, it is necessary to delve into concepts such as death drives, repetition, trauma and transference to the person of the analyst, which arouse strong resistances among analysts but which afford the possibility of broadening the field of psychoanalysis to include actual and somatic manifestations. The latter are frequently only treated with medication, as many analysts are of the opinion that they belong to the field of clinical or psychiatric practice, not of psychoanalysis.

VII. Ac. R. Horacio Etchegoyen

Based on Freud, Etchegoyen (2005) defines transference as opposed to experience. The prototypes are formed by two kinds of impulses: those conscious, which allow the Ego to understand present-time circumstances with the models of the past and within the Reality principle (experience), and the unconscious impulses which, subjected to the pleasure principle, take the present for the past in search of satisfaction, of discharge (transference). He emphasises the repetitive aspect of transference led by the death drives, and the resistance to transference mobilised by the pleasure principle, by libido.

With regard to counter-transference, Etchegoyen points out that it was H Racker in Argentina (and also, at the same time, P. Heimann in London) the one who drew attention to the role played by counter-transference as a sensitive instrument.

Etchegoyen suggests that countertransference feelings and drives appear in the analyst's Unconscious as a result of the patient's transference (p. 297)

The starting point is the patient's transference, while countertransference is its counterpoint, and both are generated within a setting. The setting operates as a contextual reference that creates a non-conventional, asymmetric relationship. "The analyst could respond to the patient's transference in an absolutely rational way, maintaining himself always at the level of the working alliance. But the clinical facts prove that the analyst responds at first with irrational phenomena in which infantile conflicts are mobilized. In this sense, this is clearly a transference phenomenon on the part of the analyst. But if we are to preserve the analytic situation, it has to be a *response* to the patient. If it is not, then we would have to say that we are not within the analytic process but are, instead, reproducing what happens in everyday life between two persons in conflict". ("The Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique". Revised. English edition, 1999, pp. 268-269)

Transference is, at the same time, past and present. The Unconscious is timeless, claims Etchegoyen, and the cure consists in giving temporality to it. For this reason memory, transference, and history are inseparable. The analyst must help past and present blend in the mind of the patient, leaving behind the mechanisms of repression and splitting that try to separate them. Etchegoyen considers that referring transference to the past is not enough; rather, the situation can only be solved if we acknowledge the *hic et nunc* of transference; that is, what is happening in the present should also be taken into account. With regard to the interpretation of counter-transference, it should be carried out in such a way so as to prevent it from becoming a mere act of 'levelling with' the other.

Therefore, in order for transference to become a technical instrument, it is with interpretation that it should be blended. In this way, the analyst's confidence in his own thinking is recovered.

Based on the concept of transference put forward in two Freudian texts: "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900) and the postscript of the case of Dora (1905), Etchegoyen says that Freud discusses two different ideas about transference that are, nevertheless,

connected: one takes into account the person of the analyst (rudimentarily already in “Studies on Hysteria” of 1895, but mainly in “Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria” [Dora] of 1905) while the other (in chapter seven from the “Interpretation of Dreams”) describes the same phenomenon from the perspective of dream-work. As we stated above, they are two different, but somehow connected, psychological processes rooted in childhood, and in which the present and the past become confused.

“Transference is a peculiar object relation with an infantile root, of an unconscious nature (primary process) and therefore irrational, which confuses the past with the present, which gives it its character of inadequate, maladjusted, inappropriate response”.(*The Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique*. English edition.1999, page 83)

Etchegoyen describes a particular phenomenon where the analytic process insidiously reaches an impasse that tends to perpetuate itself while at the same time the setting is preserved. The existence of this phenomenon is not evident, but, rather, is rooted in the psychopathology of the patient and involves the counter-transference of the analyst. Etchegoyen coins the term ‘impasse’ for this phenomenon, which consists in a group of strategies adopted by the patient in order to attack and hinder the development of the cure.

The patient’s strategies may include: acting out, negative therapeutic reaction and reversible perspective. The latter consists in a particular way of thinking aimed at avoiding mental pain at any cost: the subject skilfully ‘rearranges things’, as it were, in order to accommodate them to what he thinks. This is how interaction becomes stagnant. Here Etchegoyen draws on Bion’s concept of static splitting.

Although at a manifest level the patient may appear to agree with the analyst, he in fact holds fixedly to his own premises, which, however, he does not communicate, or is indeed even aware of, because they are unconscious. In this way, the patient reinterprets the analyst’s interpretations so that they can blend with his own premises. It should be stressed that the analyst usually becomes aware of this only when the process has reached a complete deadlock. According to Etchegoyen, reversible perspective, which calls the analytic contract into question, in general appears from the very beginning. As Bion points out, in the most serious cases it constitutes a phenomenon akin to hallucinosis. Perception and mnemonic phenomena such as delusional interpretations usually appear when the analytic task threatens to shake down the patient’s very structure. However, what should never be forgotten is that these patients come to analysis because they wish to be cured.

VII. Ad. Mauricio Abadi

In his publication “The Transference”, Abadi (1982) stated: “If before Freud psychology was a science that developed within the dimension of time, like music, with Freud psychology became a discipline that unfolds as in painting; in the dimensions of virtual space” (p.4)

Every human being is an active agent of transport (a notion connected to the term transference) towards an object, an agent of substitutions. Transference (Übertragung), according to Abadi, is the substitution and displacement (Verschiebung) of affects from an object to another, substitute, object.

Not only transference is responsible for the analysand's love, but any kind of love is transference love. Within transference a 'process of presentification' is produced, an evanescent presence that actualises the past, dissolves absence and makes things happen in a magical, illusory way. These are phantoms from childhood that hold the subject captive.

Abadi, by using the model of staging, expresses the view that transference hardly involves the mere recovery of experiences, but rather constitutes a kind of collage where the infantile aspects are combined, connected, with aspects that belong to the subsequent development of the individual, which offer new meaning and significance to the former ones (*Nachträglichkeit*).

During the process of transference two people become changed by it: the patient that 'transfers' to himself the image of the child he once was, and the relationship he had with the object, and the 'other', the relational object onto whom the patient transfers the image. Thus, Abadi suggests that there is transference of images and transference of relationships.

This 'other' that appears in transference will be invested with affects, imagos, and parts of the Ego, which will transform the relationship into a narcissistic one. That is to say that transference constitutes a narcissistic relationship with a supporting object (an anaclitic relationship) without which transference would be impossible. This narcissistic relationship will try to take possession of an object that initially presents itself as an other; in other words: there is a relationship with someone who, by virtue of not being me, can therefore protect me. However, narcissism encourages one to transform this other into a part of oneself, thus refusing to acknowledge the painful, distressing dependence (disavowal). The 'other' is therefore invaded, penetrated, colonized, and infiltrated by parts of one's own Ego.

Abadi traces the origins of transference back to the early times of the child's experience of abandonment, with which he/she deals by introducing this 'other' while at the same time disavowing his own dependence. Therefore, the analytic process consists in helping the patient acknowledge, at some point, that the other is another and not a part of himself. According to Abadi, it is this that marks the difference between psychoanalysis and other kinds of therapies. When transference is dissolved, reality can be appreciated as 'otherness'.

Although there is a tendency to get to know the other, and transference is a kind of bridge that encourages this, in the same movement the other goes unacknowledged, it is 'covered' by transference in order to preserve the narcissistic illusion. An illusion: this is what transference is about. As a result of compromise formation, transference is both a symptom and a daydream, one among other artificial structures created by the Ego with which it attempts to work through an underlying conflict.

In order to define transference, Abadi suggests that the notion of projection should be replaced by that of attribution, a mechanism by which someone becomes the object to whom something is attributed.

Transference occurs in two stages, the first corresponds to the destructuring of something that may be the symptom, and the second, the restructuring (or the structuring of something new) that replaces the destructured symptom which we call transference.

Abadi (1980) focuses on the first stage, which sometimes can be of short duration, and which involves not only the destructuring of a relationship, but also reality loss. What is transferred, in fact, is not real: we might call it phallus, omnipotence, wholeness, immortality; in short, the inkling that “all that exists in the other is a guarantee that some day it will be given to me, it will be part of me” (Abadi 1980, p. 698).

A comparison is established between transference and the psychotic process: there is certain reality loss and the real object is un-known. The fact that transference is unconscious not only allows the setting in motion of the primary process (substitution or displacement), but also becomes the condition for the maintenance of the relationship that has been transferred. On the other hand, the patient has certain inkling, introspective in nature that something strange is happening to him but he cannot quite understand what it is. The delusional conviction, usually induced by transference, that that person is someone who in fact he is not, has been repressed but the cracks in the process of repression generate a compromise formation with what tends to repress the conviction.

Therefore, Abadi establishes a distinction between the transference typical of the psychotic – for whom the other is only a distorting mirror in which he sees a part of his own Ego reflected, or a precipitate of a libidinal relationship with an object – and another kind of transference, typical of the neurotic patient, in which we infer the repressed transference and from which we can only see a product, a ‘hybrid’, typical of all structures characterised by compromise formation.

Abadi considers that transference proper is unconscious and that the so-called neurotic’s transference is a compromise formation similar to a symptom. The psychoanalytic task in the cases of neuroses will be to dissolve the false connections, while in the cases of psychotic patients that observation will prove pointless and dispensable and “the only thing to do is to directly offer the interpretation that crushes transference proper” (Abadi, 1980, p. 700).

VII. Ae. Willy Baranger and Madeleine Baranger

In 1946, Willy and Madeleine Baranger came from France to Argentina, where they joined the psychoanalytic movement that was developing. Later, when they moved to Montevideo, they also helped constitute the Uruguayan Psychoanalytical Movement, but went back to Argentina in 1966, where they settled for good.

The Barangers believe the analytic process to be a dialectical movement where process and non-process coexist. When the analytic process stops it is the analyst who should find out what the obstacle to it might be. Therefore, they suggest that a 'second glance' including both the analyst and the patient should be used, thus constituting a dynamic field. This obstacle not only involves the analysand's transference, but also the analyst's countertransference. Each analyst turns his attention to the 'second glance' as soon as he has given up the 'evenly suspended attention' and this moment of the process is marked by the appearance of bodily experiences, imagined movements or certain images turning up, among other things. All this constitutes an indication that new structures – unconscious fantasies that are shared by both and which, in addition, are the result of interplay of reciprocal identifications – have emerged within the analytic setting. The dynamics of the field are thought to be given by the transformations of these fantasies, which, in turn, are the ones that give the analytic field the hallmarks of time and space ambiguity and its 'as if' quality.

The Barangers were influenced by the ideas of Merleau Ponty and K Lewin when developing their field theory. The subject and the object behave as a field and define each other. That is to say, we are not dealing with two different bodies, or with two different people, but with two divided subjects, whose division is the result of an initial triangulation. The analytic couple constitutes a triad, where one of its members is absent in body but present as an experience. Hence the Barangers substitute the notion of dynamic field with that of intersubjective field. They privilege the bodily and emotional aspects of the analytic communication and, in addition, establish a distinction between the concepts of setting and of process.

As a product of these dynamics, a neo-formation, a stagnant, crystallised structure that hinders the process and which they call 'bastion' is created. This structure is formed around a 'fantasmatic' organisation, involves important aspects of the personal history of both participants, and assigns to each a stereotyped, imaginary role. The patient has a tendency to avoid referring to this role, which could be connected to his ideology, his idealized love object, aristocratic fantasies, or the state of his finances.

To the analysand the bastion is an unconscious refuge for omnipotent fantasies. He is not willing to give it up because that would mean getting into a state of vulnerability, helplessness and hopelessness.

The rupture of the bastion means re-distributing aspects of the participants involved (analyst and analysand). It therefore constitutes a de-symbiotization. The most extreme form of this symbiosis indicates a state of parasitism (the analyst feels as if he were 'inhabited' by the analysand, as it were, and grows concerned about him beyond the sessions), which might end up in a violent rupture of the analytic situation or, in contrast, in the continuance of the process only if the patient's projective identifications are returned to him.

Therefore, the analytic process seems to be constituted by the production of resistances and bastions. The dissolution of these by means of interpretation creates insight and the indications of insight open up, in turn, a vision for the future, marked by the appearance of new projects and feelings of hope.

These authors also point out that sometimes certain positive signs presented by the patient are in fact only covering up a non-process, with which it is intended to ‘make the analyst happy’, as it were, but avoiding greater dangers. Stereotyping is an intrinsic danger in every treatment.

The Barangers number among the resistances that pose great difficulty to the analyst the negative therapeutic reaction, the incoercible resistance, and impasse; all of them put treatment at risk. In contrast to other kinds of resistances, these are obstacles characterized by being stable and long lasting. The analyst has become even more involved and proves unable to put a stop to them. In fact, these obstacles can only be understood in terms of the field underlying the bastion. The dynamics of the process become crystallized as a result of the resistances of both the analysand and the analyst and the Barangers suggest that the bastion should be approached and analysed thoroughly.

With regard to the impasse, an end could be put to it without further ado; unfortunately, however, this is not the case with the negative therapeutic reaction which, in general, leads to tragic endings.

The bastion usually reappears in some form or other and constitutes the expression of the compulsion to repeat (the death drive).

Changes in the discourse of the patient and in the dynamics of affects are an indication of the existence of an analytic process. The Barangers consider that the Kleinian perspective on the different forms of anxiety (persecutory, depressive and confusional anxiety) can prove useful to check the direction the process is taking.

On the other hand, they remain opposed to a definition of transference-countertransference only focused on what is being experienced *hic et hunc*. Rather, they take into account the nuances of transference and, in consequence, establish a distinction between those kinds of transference that are not the result of the mechanism of projective identification – and which are characterized by the simultaneous appearance of highly specific counter-transference expressions which give the analytic field important pathological traits – and the structured, repetitive transference that Freud called ‘artificial neurosis’ (the vicissitudes of the Oedipus complex). These transferences need to be interpreted, while other kinds of transferences, momentary and changing, emerge from the successive ways in which the field is being structured and do not demand urgent interpretation.

With regard to counter-transference, the authors also distinguish between the non-stereotyped transferences of the analyst on to the patient, which are part of the process, and those provoked by the analyst’s projective identification and which can even cause ‘counter-transference micro-delusions’.

W. and M. Baranger consider the analysis as a privileged moment when a subject’s history is re-written and its meaning changed. It is when insight happens that this can be appreciated; that instant when an aspect of the individual’s life history is reworked and new prospects are considered. The whole process develops with no sense of time, within a present

where there is no rush, the nature of which is sometimes circular, but which at other times can bring about all that is new.

VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Starting from humble beginnings in Freud's having assigned a name to an error made by the human mind, the multifaceted exploration of transference ever since, in Freud's own creative thought and those who followed, has designated transference as one of the most defining aspects of psychoanalytic thought and clinical work.

Throughout the evolution of psychoanalytic theory, different conceptualization of the forces behind the repetitive aspect of transference and its activation in the interactive context vis-à-vis the analyst developed. While traditionally, displacement and or projection were understood to be the primary mechanisms of how the infantile passions and conflicts surrounding early self-object world were 'replayed' in transference, the picture became progressively much more complex. Some of the contemporary views hold that besides re-creation of old object relations, transference involves a search for developmentally new objects, and that transference phenomena may be co-created, within the variously conceptualized dynamic field or various other 'triadic' and/or transitional conceptualizations, or dialectics of analyst-analysand interaction.

As the understanding of multiple connections between the intrapsychic and interpsychic processes, communications, 'roles' and temporalities within the context of psychoanalytic setting deepened, many authors of different schools of thoughts have made powerful cases for the clinical and theoretical importance of the bidirectional influences that flow between analyst and analysand. The analytic "pair", "dyad", or "couple" became a pre-eminently important unit for clinical and theoretical consideration, and Transference and its counterpart of Countertransference became dynamically linked partners. The mechanism of "projective identification" is one of many attempts to name and explain those mutual and bidirectional influences. Similarly, such concepts as "self-object" and 'self-object transference', speak of the importance of inseparable entwinement of self and object from a different theoretical perspective.

Within the widened arch of transference-countertransference matrix, there is growing emphasis on the issues of "representation" or "representability" of psychic or bio-psychic experience and the view of the analytic process as one in which the analyst's participation helps the analysand to represent symbolically experiences that had previously been inchoate and incapable of representation.

In Latin America, where the tendency has historically been specially focused on the definition of Transference centered on the analyst's person, the countertransference

theorization agglutinated diverse developments. The concept of experience *displayed* in an intersubjective field has enlarged and deepened the study of the diversity of obstacles and ‘bastions’, which appear in the analytical work. The appearance of sensations, perceptions, experiences (*Erlebnis*) and occurrences in the analyst, analyzed during the session, which accounted for what had not reached any inscription and survived in a constant present ('actual' experience), was considered under different approaches. Such situations prompted special consideration of the possibility of negative therapeutic reaction, as an exponent of the repetition compulsion, which stems from the death drive, mute in the foundation.

For the different authors, in each analytical process a new story is signified and inscribed.

Pillar of the theory and clinical practice, the Transference has remained over time one of the fundamental concepts of the psychoanalysis. The current developments clearly show that the Transference is situated at the crossroads of Intrapsychic and Interpsychic. The internal world of the analysand consists of psychic conflicts between internal Agencies (Conscious, Preconscious, Unconscious and Id, Ego and Superego) and conflicts issued of infantile intersubjective relationship with the Identification Imagoes. All these conflicts are re-enacted on the scene of transference in a relation, which involves two psyches. The founder of psychoanalysis speaks to the two scenes of the transferential movement at the crossroads of the inter-psychic and intra-psychic in 1937, when he maintains that the work of analysis consists of two quite different parts, that it takes place in two separate scenes and that it involves two people, each in charge of different task.

In 2017, in the environment of growing nuance and complexity of contemporary psychoanalytic thought and accrued clinical experience, the statement of *Transference as a movement, the movement inside the psyche, the movement between oneself and the other, and the movement between past and present* holds, as it absorbs, and transcends the divides of pluralistic psychoanalytic universe.

See also:

CONFLICT

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

SELF

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TRANSFORMATION(S)

Tri-regional entry

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION(S)

Wilfred R. Bion's epistemological model of transformations presents his basic model of psychic change in its most abstracted form. In this model, psychic change occurs through recursive processes of mental transformation, which produces mental growth and development.

All paradigmatic and epistemological issues developed by Bion previously in "A theory of thinking" (1962a) unfold in the texts "Learning from Experience" (1962b) and "Elements of Psychoanalysis" (1963), and converge to a deep and unprecedented psychoanalytical reflection in the book "Transformations" (1965). Originally, Bion gave the outlines of his theory of transformations in a presentation to the British Psychoanalytical Institute in 1963, and published the theory in his third book, "Transformations", in 1965 (Bion 1963b, V, pp. 93-114; Bion 1965, V, pp. 116-280). Due to its density and complex dialogue with several disciplines of thought, Transformations (1965), represents the utmost challenging part of the work of Bion, offering itself as a permanent defy to the reader.

With the clinical objective of trying to understand and treat psychotic patients, Bion constructed a model of what he called the 'thinking' of sensorial perceptions, emotional experiences and thoughts (Bion, 1962a, 1962b). In further exploring this 'thinking' process, he came to delineate the 'elements' of psychoanalysis like Euclid did in studying the elements of geometry and Newton in physics (Bion, 1963). The elements compiled in "Elements of Psychoanalysis" include concepts such as $PS \leftrightarrow D$, $L(\text{Love})$, $H(\text{Hate})$, $K(\text{Knowledge})$, etc. First published in "Elements of Psychoanalysis" and much elaborated and explicated in "Transformations", Bion's Grid categories denote the genetic development of thought on the Y axis, and the function or use of the thought on the X axis. Inspired by neopositivists' search for 'truth-value' of scientific statements, Bion attempted for psychoanalysis to become a predictive science not unlike so-called hard sciences.

Bion's "Transformations" (1965) shows these efforts in using abstract formulae. At the end of the book, it can be seen how Bion realized that the transformations that he described so far are at a representational level while the fundamental transformations in psychoanalysis are beyond this representational level. This implies that the abstract mathematical method may not be applicable when approaching these fundamental changes. At realizing this, Bion resorted

to other traditions of apprehension of reality as it is, in order to keep the analytic view, those of the so-called mystics, whose formulations also attempt to transmit something that is beyond verbal representation. At this juncture, Bion states that the numinous realm which he calls 'O' must be the compass of the analyst. Bion elaborated this approach further in 'Attention and Interpretation' (Bion, 1970).

According to James Grotstein (in Mijolla 2002-2005), "Transformations" (1965) thus represents Bion's last venture in employing mathematical notations to bring scientific rigor to clinical psychoanalytic phenomena. Transformations in O constitute 'a bridge to a new science', the 'intuitive', to which he thereafter devoted his efforts. Having already previously defined the mind that had to develop in order to think 'the thoughts without the thinker' [preconceptions], he then undertook to explicate how these thoughts evolve from sense impressions of emotional experience (beta elements) to alpha elements suitable for further mental processing. From there he proceeded to define the steps of 'mentally digestive transformation' that these beta elements and alpha elements undergo in the analysand and analyst in order to gain a status in a scientific system. O is the beginning and the end of the transformational cycle. Bion's epistemological transformation of psychoanalytic metapsychology was then complete (Grotstein, in Mijolla, 2002-2005, p. 1791, brackets added).

Bion's liberal applications of interdisciplinary models of various areas of mathematics (from Euclidian and projective geometry to non-Euclidian algebraic geometry and algebraic calculus), philosophy of science, aesthetics, art, together with the complicated, highly abstract and at times ambiguous presentation leaves room for different interpretations and different (even contradictory) accounts and **definitions**, emphasizing varying aspects of his Transformations in Latin American, North American and European psychoanalytic thought.

Keeping to the premise that transformation is turning one thing from its initial form into a new form, **North American definition**, following closely Bion's text, posits that:

Bion's theory models how the mind transforms one's pre-mental being-in-the-world into mental elements, including emotional experience and cognitive function. Its primary use in psychoanalysis is as a model shaping and orienting clinical observation; it is not a metapsychological theory meant to guide interpretation. The model contains three elements: (1) the sign O: initial unknown and unknowable situations or circumstances, both material and experiential, that are by definition non-mentalized, or not-yet-mentalized; (2) the sign $T\alpha$: unknown mental processes and functions that transform essential qualities of the initial situation into newly mentalized forms; the essential qualities, which Bion calls "invariants", remain constant throughout the processes of transformation; (3) the sign $T\beta$: the results or products of those transformations; these may be mental, material, and experiential, and they always retain the essential qualities of the invariant now rendered in a new form. In this model, one's observations when conducting an analysis may be represented as products of transformations, $T\beta$, in which essential qualities, the invariants, are most often emotional. The model of transformations in psychoanalysis aims to help analysts recognize that emotions may be transformed into a vast array of uniquely subjective mental forms.

In **Latin America**, faithfulness to the original Bion's text also guides Brazilian author of "The Language of Bion" Paulo Cesar Sandler (2005), a principal translator of Bion's opus into Portuguese, who especially underscores that "Transformation and Invariances are part of the same concept which forms an *observational* theory". Transformation "is defined by Bion as "a *total* analytic experience being subjected to interpretation" (Sandler 2005, p. 763, original italics). He further stresses that for Bion, Transformations and Invariances are a dynamic activity, covering wide range of human endeavors, among them painting, mathematics and psychoanalysis. It is in this context, that psychoanalysis belongs to the group of transformations. "The original experience, the realization, in the instance of the painter the subject that he paints, and in the instance of the psychoanalyst the experience of analyzing his patients, are *transformed* by painting in one and analysis in the other into a painting and a psychoanalytic description respectively" (Bion 1965, p. 4, emph. by Bion; Sandler 2005, p. 769).

Another important trend of contemporary **Latin American** theorizing on the subject, is a highly original 'wide sense' definition of 'Transformations', under the aegis of the 'vertex of complexity' and the principles of uncertainty and infinity (Chuster 2014, 2018), aiming to enrich the understanding of those mental processes that combine to produce the movement from a pre-conception and realization to a conception. Stressing that Bion viewed human mind as operating through nonlinear processes of growing complexity (Chuster 2014), here, a transformation is defined as a function that in an infinite set combines two elements in order to create a third one. Regarding Bion's use of mathematical models, this broad view considers that in many areas of mathematics, a transformation may simply be any function, regardless of domain and codomain. Multiple theoretical and clinical ramifications of this approach to 'wider sense' definition, in reference to the combination of elements performed by psychoanalytical functions as described by Bion (1965), and its further and contemporary developments are specified below in the Latin American section.

In **Europe**, "The Edinburgh International Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis" (Skelton 2006) notes that internal reconfiguration (transformation) was central to Bion's work, and that Bion saw psychoanalytic theories as group of transformations. A transformation being a change in form, for Bion, as a psychoanalyst, transformation is a change in forms in the mind, from realization to representation: just as painter transforms the landscape (the realization) into a painting (representation), the work of psychoanalyst transforms the facts of psychoanalytic experience (the realization) into an interpretation (the representation).

"The International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis" (Mijola 2002/2005) carries the entry Transformation written by North American James Grotstein, a noted Bion student and scholar, who writes, "Bion envisions psychoanalytic transformations as the psychoanalyst's attempt to help the analysand transform that part of an emotional experience of which he is unconscious into an emotional experience of which he is conscious. Transformation here would be changing the form but not the fundamental nature of invariant aspect of the emotional experience..." (p.1790-1791).

A notable European perspective on Bion's Transformations, relevant to Bion's development of his method of observation, comes out of the body of research exploring Psychoanalytic Object at the very foundation of all transformations (Vermote 2011, 2019), which is further explicated and specified in the Europe section.

On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a recognition of the importance of the built-in relationship between transformation and invariances (Sandler 2005, p. 156, 192).

Bion (1965) explains it via an artist's portrait of a poppy field. "We understand it", he says, "to portray a field because, during the transformation from landscape to painting, *'something'* has remained unaltered and on this *something* recognition depends"" (Bion 1965, p. 1). This unaltered aspect of the transformation is its 'invariant'. Similarly, the analyst interprets symptoms, dreams, etc. as transformations of invariants in the patient.

Paulo Cesar Sandler emphasizes that transformations 'are not a matter of the analyst's mere individual opinion' (2005, p. 765). They conserve 'seminal features of the material or immaterial fact, object or person observed' (p. 767).

In the words of Rafael Lopez-Corvo (2003), a Venezuelan author of "The Dictionary of The Work of W.R. Bion": "... the recognition of the identity of these elements that have changed [their form], would depend on the existing invariants" (p. 290).

There is also for most part a consensus in recognition of Bion's basic kinds of transformations in clinical practice, although with some variability in the focus of their explanation by different authors from different regions.

- a. 'Rigid motion transformation', which corresponds to past events which may now be relived in the classical transference;
- b. 'projective transformation', which corresponds to Melanie Klein's concept of projective identification;
- c. 'transformation in hallucinosis', which occurs in psychosis as well during the hallucinatory experience in the therapeutic setting, not necessarily implying any diagnosis
- d. 'transformation in 'O' by which Bion means a transformation of the ineffable nature of the analytic object, and/or of the analysand's symptom, through K (Knowledge link), to a state of 'Absolute Truth' or 'Ultimate Reality (from knowing reality to being real).

NB: * As a matter of style, the capitalization of concept titles may vary throughout the text of the entry, according to the cited author's original usage.

** At times, different regions and different language groups used different publications of Bion's works as a reference. Consequently, the paging of citations refers to the specific Bion's publication used by that region. Please refer to the chapter References for specification of which sources of Bion's texts were used by each region. In general, if

there are different texts with the same year, they either appear as a and b, or one of them (especially in case of Latin America), is marked by *.

II. THE OBSERVATIONAL THEORY OF TRANSFORMATIONS IN BION'S WORK

For the sake of comprehension, this section will start with the wider context of the roots of Bion's "Transformations", and proceed from those expositions of Bion's observational theory of Transformation closest to his text, towards those that view his work through a particular lens (i.e., complexity), or organize it around a particular theme (i.e., psychoanalytical object).

II. A. INTERDISCIPLINARY ROOTS AND THEIR USE

With the unprecedented access to Bion's library and notes on the margins of the books he read, Paulo Cesar Sandler (2005) constructs the long list of interdisciplinary sources of Bion's writing of "Transformations".

The list of prominent influences includes, among others, Plato's Theory of Forms, Aristotle's Mathematical objects, Pythagoras' and Euklid's theorems; Domain of Minus of St. John of the Cross; Rene Descartes' epistemology of 'thoughts constituting of the subject and not the other way around'; David Hume's Constant conjunction; Immanuel Kant's Noumena and phenomena and sensible intuition; G. W. Friedrich Hegel's perception of the truth, limits of idealism, religion and rational processes, the infinite and the absolute; Blaise Pascal's intuition, limits and possibilities of the search for truth; especially influential Sylvester's and Cayley's algebraic forms, transformation and Invariants; Jules Henri Poincare's selected fact and intuition; Max Planck's quantum theory; Albert Einstein's relativity; Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, influence of which was also explored by Arnaldo Chuster; R. B. Braithwaite's ideas of reality and his scientific deductive system, applicable to immaterial, including unconscious processes, influence of which on Bion's work was also researched and documented by Barnet Malin (2021); work on assertions by Tarski and Carnap; Bertrand Russell's paradoxes, theory of numbers and his view of personal authority; and Isaiah Berlin's sense of reality.

After a thorough research of Bion's library, Sandler feels he is in a position to emphasize the foundation of the twin concept of transformation and invariance, developed originally by mathematicians James Joseph Sylvester and Arthur Cayley, here 'translated' into psychoanalytic theory of observation: "The first transformation is linked to the act of observation about "something" (whatever it is); the observation itself creates an impression in the mind of the observer that produces transformation. Transformation means a change in form... The trans-formation, *the alteration in the apprehensible form ... also implies a*

conservation of seminal features of the material or immaterial fact, object or person ...” (Sandler 2005, p. 767, original font).

Throughout, Sandler (2005) emphasizes that the interdisciplinary sources, including the quasi-mathematical signs, symbols, equations and the grid, are used by Bion as *analogies* to further an understanding of the transformational representational communicative processes between and within the patient and the analyst, and to further precision of communication among the psychoanalysts. For instance, he saw mathematics (as a development of geometry) and the philosophy of mathematics, as an early attempt to deal with psychosis. In numerous examples throughout, Sandler (2005) documents that Bion is not ‘mathematizing psychoanalysis’, his use of mathematical analogies is aimed at investigation of primitive modes of apprehending reality. Similarly, terms borrowed from various branches of philosophy and other interdisciplinary sources is used, in Bion’s own words, “for psychoanalytical purposes because the meaning with which they are already invested comes near to the meaning I seek to convey “ (Bion 1965*, p. 6).

Those who expand understanding of Bion through the lens of complexity, uncertainty and infinity (Schuster 2014, 2018; Bergstein 2018) note the importance of his move from Euclidean to non-Euclidean geometry towards algebraic calculus, as the move towards the mathematics of change, approximation, and transformation of infinite processes. Avner Bergstein (2018) points out explicitly; “These days he [Bion] might talk about complexity theories in mathematics” Bergstein 2018, p. 197).

II. B. PSYCHOANALYTIC ROOTS

The most prominent psychoanalytic influences were, as acknowledged in Transformations throughout, Freud and Klein. Given that “The theory of transformation and its development does not relate to the main body of psycho-analytic theory, but to the practice of psycho-analytic *observation*” (Bion 1965*, p. 34), Bion provides the fresh formulation (not a new theory) of Freud’s earlier formulation of the objective of psychoanalysis, i.e., of Freud’s making the unconscious conscious (1900, 1915b), Or: ‘Where id was, there ego shall be’ (1933, p. 80), as in “to help the patient to transform that part of emotional experience of which he is unconscious into an emotional experience of which he is conscious” (Bion 1965* p. 32), while the emphasis is on the “nature of the transformation in a psycho-analytic session” (Bion 1965*, p. 34).

Most specifically, according to Sandler, Bion draws and further extends Freud’s illusory/hallucinatory character of transference (Freud 1912), draws on and further extends many other Freud’s contributions, such as resistance, free association (1912), interplay between manifest and latent contents and in day dreaming activities, the unconscious domain and unconscious communication (1915b), free associations, countertransference and ‘personal factor’ Freud (1909, 1933, 1938) and their extensions in Sándor Ferenczi (1909, 1928) and Theodor Reik (1948), construction (Freud 1938), representation, interpretation, observation of the genesis and vicissitudes of thought processes (Freud 1911), among others. Klein’s influence

is mainly felt in employing projective identification (Klein 1930, 1945, 1946) including his previous extension of its function as a communication, internal objects and part objects, and primitive symbolization, akin to psychotic actions and thought.

Their direct utility, most notably as it pertains to Rigid Motion Transformation (Freud) and Projective Transformation (Klein) is noted in various expositions of Bion's work, below.

II. C. USE OF QUASI-MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLS TO EXEMPLIFY BION'S CYCLE OF TRANSFORMATIONS: PAULO CESAR SANDLER

Sandler's (2005, p. 801) synoptic presentation of **a cycle of transformation** lays out the concept's symbols/signs, their definitions according to Bion (1965), and practical examples, which here serves to introduce, and to complement to, what follows in the next section, where these symbols/signs will be further specified and used in generalized quasi-mathematical equations:

'O' represents the numinous realm, ultimate reality, the thing in itself (Kant 1781); in 'O', one may find the invariants. It may be illustrated, according to Bion, by 'poppy-ness' of poppies.

T represents cycles of trans-formations: defined as changes in *form* (presentation) of events in the realm of *phenomena* and as such, they are counterparts of 'O'. Sandler gives a practical example of two people observing a field of poppies: a painter (π) and a drug addict (t).

$T\alpha$ represents processes through which a given transformation occurs. It is a process employing α elements, by which the individual arrives at $T\beta$. In the practical example, both painter and addict are aware of sense impressions. The painter couples these with his emotional experiences and paints the poppies on a canvas. The drug addict also couples the sense impressions with emotional experiences that differ significantly from those of the painter, and he thinks of opium.

$T\beta$ signifies the end product of a transformation; in case of a painter, it will be a picture depicting a field of poppies.

$T\alpha$ is used as a sign for a given analyst's cycle of transformations. $T\alpha\alpha$ then represents analyst's mental processes through which the analyst furnishes the interpretation. $T\alpha\beta$ would then stand for the interpretation or construction (Freud 1937). In Sandler's practical example, where $T\pi$ stands for painter's transformation, $T\pi\alpha$ stands for the painter's impressions, emotions and painting technique; and the $T\pi\beta$ for the picture.

In a psychoanalytic situation, where $T\pi$ is a sign for the patient's transformations, example of $T\pi\alpha$ would be a dream work, with $p\beta$ being a dream. In the case of a drug addict, Tt are drug addict's transformations, with $Tt\alpha$ standing in for impressions and desires, and $Tt\beta$ standing in for the drug addict's making opium (Sandler 2005, 801-802).

In a context of the Grid, gradually formulated since early 1960's, referred to and further developed in „Transformations“, in terms of the genesis of thinking (Bion 1962b 1967), Sandler (2005 p. 153) notes that the cycle of transformations can also be viewed as the process of development from pre-conception to conception (E to D categories of the Grid): When a pre-conception finds a realization, the conception is born. In a renewed cycle of transformations, the conception can be used as a new pre-conception (Sandler 2005, p. 153). This, too, is further specified in the next section.

II. D. STAYING (MOSTLY) WITHIN THE LIMITS OF BION'S TEXT (NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE)

The opening phrase of Bion's book, *Transformations*, is, “Suppose a painter sees a path through a field sown with poppies and paints it ...” (Bion 1965, V, p. 127). This initial situation or circumstance introduces his model for those mental processes that combine to produce the final painting of that field.

One may expand this scenario by casting the role of “a painter” with an iconic example. Imagine the moment when, in July 1890, in Auvers-sur-Oise during the days before ending his life, Vincent van Gogh arrived at a path leading into a wheat field under dark skies. He left the field having created one of Western art's greatest masterpieces. It is impossible to know how his unspeakably painful emotional experiences became represented in oil paint on canvas, only that this miracle occurred. Also unknowable is how the essence of the actual scene — path, wheat field, sky, perhaps crows — remained constant and recognizable in the finished painting. If van Gogh added the crows from his imagination, one cannot know how his emotional experience in the field transformed in part to emotional “crow qualities” that themselves were transformed into dark, crow-like brush strokes of intense emotionality. Finally, one cannot know how this masterful depiction of turbulent, roiling emotion presents not any wheat field with crows, but one that is unmistakably of van Gogh's creation.

Bion's theory of transformations provides the foundation for his entire psychoanalytic perspective, which employs emotions and emotional experience as core instigating elements informing all of his published work, including the theory of transformations in particular. His approach to emotions has clear roots in his earliest published works, which reference his experiences as a military psychiatrist, and at the Tavistock Clinic (Hinshelwood 2018). Bion produced a significant body of literature on unconscious group functioning before, during, and just after completing his psychoanalytic training (Mawson 2014), in which he proposed the concept of “basic assumptions” as unconscious defenses protecting the group from emotional pain encountered in work situations (Bion 1952, IV, pp. 205-245).

Bion wrote seven psychoanalytic contributions between 1950 and 1959. Three papers in particular contain origins of his theories of thinking, container-contained, and of functions, all of which inform his theory of transformations directly. “The differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic personalities” (Bion 1957, VI, pp. 92-111), includes the phrases “that-which-links” and “that-which-joins” to denote unconscious mental functions. “On arrogance”

(Bion 1958, VI, pp. 131-137) and “Attacks on linking” (Bion 1959, VI, pp. 138-152) propose that emotions and emotional experiences serve linking functions, conscious and unconscious, and as such are essential to the mind’s growth and development. These three papers also make explicit an important shift that was vital in developing the theory of transformations several years later, and which was evolving in Bion’s ways of observing psychoanalytic phenomena. The following passage from “Attacks on linking” demonstrates this shift:

“The conception of the part-object as analogous to an anatomical structure, encouraged by the patient’s employment of concrete images as units of thought, is misleading because the part-object relationship is not with the anatomical structures only but with function, not with anatomy but with physiology, not with the breast but with feeding, poisoning, loving, hating” (p. 146).

In sum: ongoing mental functions and processes served by emotions and emotional experiences became objects of psychoanalytic observation, and Bion provided a model for their always-evolving nature with the theory of transformations.

The theory of thinking preceded Bion’s model of transformations. He presented it in, “The psycho-analytic study of thinking” (Bion 1962a, VI, pp. 153-161; retitled “A theory of thinking” in 1967), and his first book, *Learning from Experience* (Bion 1962b, IV, pp. 261-365). The theory of thinking proposes a developmental scheme originating with emotions in which the mind develops its processes of thinking in order to modulate those emotions. He proposed the signs L, H, and K, to stand for emotional linking qualities related to loving, hating, and knowing. *Learning From Experience* also introduces Bion’s associated theory of functions (pp. 263-266; pp. 269-271). His second book, *Elements of Psychoanalysis* (Bion 1963a, V, pp. 7-86), continued these investigations. It contains an instrument he named “The Grid” (first introduced in *Learning from Experience*), which has particular relevance for the theory of transformations (see below, “Transformations, The Grid, and Lateral Communication”). Ultimately, Bion derived his theory of transformations from the theories of thinking and of functions (see below, “Transformations” and the “Theory of Thinking”).

Bion uses the term “transformations” in two related ways, one as the name of a theorized model of observation, and the other as a term describing a form of ongoing evolutionary mental change. The basic, mathematized form of the theory is:

$$O \rightarrow T\alpha \rightarrow T\beta$$

This may be applied to Bion’s first example of a painter in a field of flowers. To recap, a path and a field of poppies exists; a painter arrives, develops emotional experiences that evolve, and creates a painting reflecting those emotional states. Bion emphasized that this process preserves some essence or qualities of the actual field of flowers and the painter’s emotional states from start to finish.

Regarding the painter in the field:

- The total situation of the painter’s presence in actual path and field, and his initial emotional states, may be represented by the sign O

- The painter's evolving emotional experiences in the field are represented by $T\alpha$, in which the sign T stands for transformation; $T\alpha$ indicates the processes of transformation of the original experience
- The sign $T\beta$ indicates the product, or result, of the painter's transformed emotional experiences, and in this instance represents the painting and its emotional qualities

More generally:

- The sign O represents a total originating situation or stimulus of an ensuing series of transformations
- The sign $T\alpha$ represents "the process of transformation" (Bion 1965, V, p. 135)
- The sign $T\beta$ represents "the end product" of the processes of transformation (p. 135)
 - Additionally:
- The sign T alone represents all ongoing processes of change, that is, "the total operation which includes the act of transforming and the end product" (p. 135)
- Bion assigns the term "invariant" to represent the essence or qualities that remain constant from the total situation, O, through the painter's transforming emotional experiences, $T\alpha$, to the completed painting, $T\beta$.
- The invariant is essential to the mathematical representation of transformations, $O \rightarrow T\alpha \rightarrow T\beta$, even though Bion did not propose a sign for it.
- Bion assigned the mathematical term "realization" to indicate the actual fact of the total original situation, and used it to denote a form of O. In the example, the realization includes this particular painter being in that particular field of poppies at that particular moment, in his particular emotional state of mind; of the infinite set of possible painters, places, and moments from which a painting might emerge, this set of circumstances has been made real, or have formed a realization, from an infinite set of possibilities. Bion took the term "realization" from the mathematics of geometry. In psychoanalytic work, a realization may often represent an emotional state of being.
- Bion assigned the term "constant conjunction", borrowed from Hume, to denote fixed correlations between elements; constant conjunctions serve the function of keeping organization of previously observed elements or data intact. "Binding" indicates the process in which the new constant conjunction forms, and "constellation" denotes the entire process.
- Bion took the concept of the "selected fact" from Poincaré. The selected fact is that bit of observed data that brings organization to a previously unorganized field of data. Both selected facts and constant conjunctions function to organize data according to the properties of the invariant.

Sandler (2005, p. 22, p. 25) has noted that Bion's concept of mental transformations mirrors the physical world concept of transduction, in which the content of data remains constant, while the form of the data changes. Consider, for example, making an audio recording of someone singing a song. The microphone transduces the voice's air-borne sound waves into electrical impulses. Those impulses are fed into another transducer, a device that turns them into digital data. This series continues through the final transductions of the speaker cone's vibrations into sound waves carried in the air. In this example, O represents the total situation of recording someone singing the song; the data's content is "the song", which is the invariant; $T\alpha$ represents all of the transductions of form; and $T\beta$ represents the air-borne sound produced by the speaker cones. Transducers are "constant conjunction devices", in that they preserve the invariant (the song) while changing the form in which it is transmitted. All of these transductions may be identified because they exist in the physical world, which is not the case for the non-physical realm of psychic reality.

Bion did not alter the basic theory of transformations as represented by $O \rightarrow T\alpha \rightarrow T\beta$, and concentrated instead on examining each component in detail. However, this immediately became an extraordinarily complex undertaking. $O \rightarrow T\alpha \rightarrow T\beta$ may indicate an all-encompassing process of transformation. It may also represent one of innumerable, seemingly infinite transformations that comprise the total process, as reflected in the song and painting examples. This remains unimaginably complex in the psychoanalytic setting, which involves $T\alpha$ concerning ineffable emotional experience and non-sensuous psychic reality. Transformations emerge and evolve directly from preceding cycles, and so are recursive in nature. The model allows us to imagine that van Gogh's experience in the wheat field evolved through innumerable, simultaneous, recursive cycles of emotionally imbued transformations of unimaginable complexity that somehow produced a miraculous, singular, transcendent oil painting. Analogously, it provides a model in which a patient's unformed experience evolves through innumerable recursive cycles of transformations to produce unconscious mental processes and, eventually, experience and symptoms. Once more, Bion's theory of transformations suggests a model of *how* the mind develops, and not *why* the mind has developed as it did.

II. Da. The Sign 'O'

The most complex element of Bion's theory of transformations is the sign O. When introducing O, Bion likened the sign directly to Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself" (Bion 1965, *V*, p. 138). O therefore cannot be perceived directly; even non-mental sense perceptions are perceived by the brain and therefore cannot be linked directly with Kant's thing-in-itself. Perception can only offer a sense, or an intimation or intuition of whatever exists beyond it. O signifies a field of flowers in and of itself, without connection to any human presence or experience. How to conceive of reality existing apart from human perception has been a central problem of philosophy for thousands of years. Freud tackled this problem as well (Freud 1895, 1900). The sign O is therefore a cipher standing in for immaterial and metaphysical abstractions. Bion wrote once that O is linked with the "origin (O)" of the patient's responses

(Bion 1965, p. 139). One may speak about what the sign O represents, but one can never state directly what O is, or what exists antecedent to mental transformation. Bion eventually used several additional terms from philosophy and mysticism to evoke these ideas with respect to the sign O, including Ultimate Reality (borrowed from metaphysics), the Form (borrowed from Plato), and the godhead (borrowed from mysticism). For example, one may conjecture a three-sided Platonic Form inherent in the universe that one could name Triangle. The form Triangle has immaterial existence unrelated to human existence. All three-sided forms we encounter in our material and sense-based world, and which we call triangles, have been created by the mind through transformations of the invariant — the Platonic form Triangle. Such transformations evolve from transformations of O-as-Platonic Form Triangle into the $T\beta$ of any triangle we perceive with our senses.

Bion proposed that emotions and β -elements can serve as initial realizations, meaning that the sign O can represent an emotional experience or β -element (not related to $T\beta$; see below “Transformations and the Theory of Thinking” regarding β -elements). Bion indicates that emotions and emotional experience exist as a form of Ultimate Reality, thing-in-itself, or Platonic Form, which reflects his contention that the primary emotions are Truth. Felt emotional experience, or feelings, emerge as products from processes of transformation of primary emotional experience, equated with Truth and the sign O. Feeling is akin to a painting of emotional experience. Put the other way around, as products of transformations, named emotional experiences such as feelings of joy and sorrow are not represented by the sign O. The majority of psychoanalytic writings on the theory of transformations focus on O. Yet it is important to remember that Bion named his book *Transformations*, and not *O*. Bion began to explore O’s conceptual complexity in the last chapters of *Transformations* by adding the vertices of mysticism and religion to those of psychoanalysis, art, and mathematics. He extended his investigations of O throughout his fourth book, *Attention and Interpretation* (Bion 1970, VI, pp. 213-330).

II. Db. Transformations as an Observational Model for Ongoing Change

One illustration often used to depict transformations as processes of ongoing change comes from Plato. In the most well-known English translation, Plato attributed the following words to Socrates, who spoke of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus: “Heracleitus [sic] says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream” (Plato Cratylus 402a, p. 67) or, put more colloquially, “one can’t step in the same river twice”. The river into which one steps is the realization, and its waters flow — transform — continuously. The waters of the moment of stepping in are the observable products of the river’s never-ending flow transformation. The immaterial concept “River” is the invariant that stays constant through ongoing transformations of all rivers’ waters. These statements present what one might call an observational model of rivers, and they do not offer an explanatory theory of why rivers are the way they are. In like manner, the theory of transformations, despite its name, offers a model for observing evolution and growth of mental life, and not an

explanatory theory to use for interpretation of why one's mental state might be as it is. Bion seems not to have written anything mentioning Heraclitus, although Grotstein wrote of his analysis with Bion: "On one occasion he reminded me of Heraclitus' koan ..." (Grotstein 2007, 27; see also p. 213).

A moment's reflection reveals the relevance of the transformations concept to circumstances other than the mind. The transformations model applies to rivers, seasons, the life cycle, art, philosophy, mathematics, religion — to all that changes over time, both living and inert. It can be applied so broadly, and on such a vast scale, that the concept practically surrenders itself to common sense. Bion's primary application for his model was for psychoanalysis as a discipline observing ongoing growth and evolution of mental and emotional life. It is a model in four dimensions, that is, a model based on constant flow, evolution, and growth of the processes and functions of the mind. As such, it re-orientes psychoanalytic observation away from searching for over-simplified, two-dimensional snapshots of drive derivatives, unconscious phantasies, interpretations etc. in the clinical encounter. This fundamental adjustment of observational vertex reflects Bion's evolution as a psychoanalytic clinician and theorist. From this perspective, the theory of transformations subtends Bion's entire approach to the mind and psychoanalysis. As such, it functions as a hub linked with the theories of function, thinking, container-contained, $PS \leftrightarrow D$, the emotional links L (love), H (hate) and K (knowledge), the Grid's depiction of the genesis and function of thought, the basic Kleinian mechanisms of projective identification and the PS (Paranoid-Schizoid) and D (Depressive) positions, the Freudian concepts of the reality and pleasure principles, and more. (See also separate entries CONTAINMENT:CONTAINER-CONTAINED, PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION, OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES, THE UNCONSCIOUS, EGO PSYCHOLOGY)

II. Dc. Transformations and the Theory of Thinking

Thinking as conceived by Bion shares structural similarities with the model of transformations. In its most general form, thinking comes into being in order to manage pre-mental, emotionally imbued states. These emotion-based, pre-mental elements undergo transformation into mental elements that the mind may manage and use through thinking. Ultimately, the mind produces meaning in great measure to contain primary emotional experiences. Bion wrote, "in my theory ... an emotional experience is transformed ... to make dream thought, unconscious waking thinking and storage in the mind (memory) possible" (Bion 1962b, IV, p. 321). Bion used the term "transformed" in its colloquial sense, as this citation from 1962 precedes the developed theory of transformations. This supports the inference that Bion abstracted the theory of transformations from the theory of thinking (for example, Bion 1962b, p. 296; pp. 327-331). Outlining the theory of thinking briefly demonstrates its structural relationship with the overall model of transformations.

Bion's theory of thinking begins with the symbol " β -element" — which has no relation with the sign β used in the theory of transformations. β -elements represent pre-

mental phenomena usually associated with sense perception and interoceptive somatic registration, and which includes registration of sensations of primary emotion. Bion likened the β -element to sense impressions analogous to physical sense impressions. He proposed the sign “ α -function” to represent the processes of transformation in which those psychic sense impressions become mental phenomena. The term “ α -elements” represents the product of transformations through α -function, and the sign α -elements represents the first mental elements available to the primitive mind (again, the sign “ α ” has no relationship with its use in the theory of transformations). This fundamental transformation, from non-mental β -elements to mental α -elements, constitutes the basic process of the theory of thinking. Bion worked through many dimensions of this basic process of transformation, including how the mind disrupts the thinking process in the service of primitive defense (see below).

Bion’s approach contends that pre-mental and proto-mental elements stimulate mental development — thinking — in order to manage them. In Bion’s notion of “thoughts that have no thinker” (for example Bion 1967b, VI, p. 201), the pre-mental realm inherently contains the invariant waiting to be transformed into thought. In other terms, the thought without a thinker points towards “the idea of infinitude [which is] prior to any idea of the finite. The finite is ‘won from the dark and formless infinite’” (p. 201). Bion links the concept of primary “thoughts” in part to β -elements (for example, Bion 1963a, V, pp. 80-81), and to the concept of inborn mental organizations called “pre-conceptions” (for example, Bion 1962a, VI, 163-161; Bion 1965, V, p. 175). Pre-conceptions seem analogous in many ways to Chomsky’s early concept of mental deep structure (Chomsky 1965). Bion’s prototypical examples of pre-conceptions are “the breast” (as with the Platonic form triangle, perhaps this might be written more helpfully as The Breast), and the Oedipus complex. Bion proposed that an infant feeding at the breast — an actual situation suitable to function as a realization — has an emotional experience shaped by the innate pre-conception of “the breast”. Bion wrote, “I shall suppose that an infant has an inborn pre-conception that a breast that satisfies its own incomplete nature exists. The realization of the breast provides an emotional experience” (Bion 1962b, IV, p. 337). The pre-conception brings together pre-mental and proto-mental elements with the emotionally experienced function of feeding within the relationship occurring in the realization of an infant at the breast. The breast organizes an emotional invariant for subsequent transformations, which among other functions may organize unconscious object relationships. Bion wrote, “We must assume that the good breast and the bad breast are emotional experiences” (p. 302). To that end, Bion represented the three largest categories of emotionally imbued linking functions as L, or loving, as in a good breast; H, or hating, as in a bad breast, and K, or knowing (see “Transformations in K and O, below).

However, thinking does not develop when the breast finds a realization in a contented feeding infant. Rather, thinking arises when the infant is frustrated, and cannot produce a realization to permit satisfaction. For example, when the infant is hungry and no realization meets the pre-conception of the breast, Bion imagines an emotional relationship nonetheless, in this case with a “no-breast” (or No-Breast). The No-Breast relationship links overwhelming and painful emotional qualities of not feeding at the no-breast. These range

from frustration to “nameless dread”, or “fear of dying” (Bion 1962a, VI, p. 159), later called “sub-thalamic fear” (Bion 1973, VII). Thinking develops in order to transform frustration and worse; thinking transforms the emotional experience of not feeding at the withholding No Breast. Eventually a realization — mother, her breast, etc. — appears and becomes the incarnation of the pre-conception The Breast. In so doing, it “satisfies [the infant’s] own incomplete nature” (1962a, VI, p. 159)).

II. Dd. Transformations, the Grid, and Lateral Communication

With his “Grid” Bion aimed to deepen the theory of thinking (for example, Bion 1963a, V, pp. 93-114; 1963b, V, pp. 101-114). The series of rows and columns depict transformations of thought components and their functions, including functions intended to prevent thinking. Its rows present the phylogenetic evolution of thinking, from the primitive pre-mental, or β -element, to a highly evolved system of thought Bion termed “Algebraic Calculus”. Its columns outline the evolution of functions that elements of thought may serve, from a “statement”, which may itself represent an initial emotional experience, or a Truth, in the first column, to the final function of action, in the sixth. One of the Grid’s most significant features is column 2, which represents the primary defensive function of dissembling and even destroying truth, when truth itself is perceived as threatening self-destruction (see below “Transformations and Emotional Truth”). Bion emphasized that an analyst should not use or recall the Grid while doing clinical work, because this forces the analyst’s retreat from immediate emotional engagement within the clinical moment. Rather, he hoped the Grid would help analysts consider the events of sessions in retrospect, while in a state of what he called “meditative review”, which would also help develop analytic intuition (Bion 1963a, V, p. 83).

Additionally, one of Bion’s greatest hopes was that the Grid might help improve communication between analysts about clinical material by bringing consistency and clarity to descriptions of clinically observed transformations in mental functioning. He called this lateral communication (for example, 1970, VI, p. 293).

II. De. Transformations and the Psychoanalytic Situation

The theory of transformations serves as “a method of critical approach to psychoanalytic practice and not [as] new psychoanalytic theories” (Bion 1965, V, p. 131). The difference is crucial. By “psychoanalytic theories”, Bion refers specifically to elements of metapsychology pertaining to the clinical situation, for example, the Oedipus complex, projective identification, and others. By contrast, the theory of transformations addresses ways in which the analyst observes the clinical situation: “the theory of transformations is inapplicable to any situation in which observation is not an essential. Observation is to be made and recorded in a form suitable for working *with* but inimical to wayward and undisciplined fabrications” (Bion 1970, VI, p. 161; italics in original). He also wrote, “For my purpose it is convenient to regard psycho-analysis as belonging to the group of transformations” (Bion 1965,

V, p. 129). From this vertex, the analyst aims to observe ongoing evolution of emotional experiences and psychic reality of patients and themselves, especially within the immediate clinical relationship. He wrote, “The theory of transformations is intended to illuminate a chain of phenomena in which the understanding of one link, or aspect of it, helps in the understanding of others. The emphasis of this enquiry is on the nature of the transformation in a psychoanalytic session” (p. 156). Bion also wrote that with the “term ‘transformation’ ... I am concerned with a function of the personality”, which demonstrates a large-scale use of the concept (Bion 1965, V, p. 137). In both cases, this form of observation requires that the analyst avoid keeping metapsychological theories at the ready, because applying them directly to the observed material distorts it (thus Bion’s singular methodological injunction to “abandon memory and desire” [Bion 1967a]).

Unstated but inferable is that the analyst intuitively perceives products of transformations, i.e., $T\beta$, which are in the domain of psychic reality. The third paragraph of Bion’s classic paper, “Notes on memory and desire”, puts it this way:

“Psychoanalytic ‘observation’ is concerned neither with what has happened nor with what is going to happen, but with what *is* happening. Furthermore, it is not concerned with sense impressions or objects of sense. Any psychoanalyst knows depression, anxiety, fear, and other aspects of psychic reality ... These are the psychoanalyst’s real world. Of its reality he has no doubt. Yet anxiety, to take one example, has no shape, no smell, no taste; awareness of the sensuous accompaniments of emotional experience is a hindrance to the psychoanalyst’s intuition of [psychic] reality” (Bion 1967a, VI, p. 205; *emph. by Bion*).

Bion added signs to the basic mathematical model specifically for psychoanalysis. He proposed that “a” indicate analyst, and “p” indicate patient. The patient’s transformations are noted $O \rightarrow Tp(\alpha) \rightarrow Tp(\beta)$, and those of the analyst are noted $O \rightarrow Ta(\alpha) \rightarrow Ta(\beta)$. This more detailed version of the notation permits more specific definition of its terms. For example, $Tp(\beta)$, the product of the patient’s transformations of the total analytic situation, may include observable facts about the patient such as behavior, speech, etc., but most importantly may denote psychic reality.

The nature of O in the psychoanalytic session has presented many conceptual challenges that remain controversial. Bion’s initial writings on O indicate that the total clinical situation and associated emotional experience serve as realizations, or O , capable of undergoing transformation. Bion wrote, “The patient enters and, following a convention established in the analysis, shakes hands. This is an external fact, what I have called a ‘realization’. In so far as it is useful to regard it as a thing-in-itself and unknowable (in Kant’s sense) it is denoted by the sign O ” (Bion 1965, V, pp. 137-138). One may read this passage along the lines of Yun Men’s koan: In walking, just walk; in sitting, just sit; above all, don’t wobble. Analogously, when patient and analyst shake hands, they just shake hands; above all, don’t think about it (until later). From this perspective, the original (O) situation of patient and analyst in and of itself is devoid of meaning because it exists before meaning has been (co)-created. As a consequence, the situation is not directly interpretable; it is a happening in the

world, represented by the sign O.

Bion emphasized that the total clinical situation always involves both patient and analyst: “In psycho-analysis any O not common to analyst and analysand alike, and not available therefore for transformation by both, may be ignored as irrelevant to psycho-analysis. Any O not common to both is incapable of psycho-analytic investigation; any appearance to the contrary depends on a failure to understand the nature of psycho-analytic interpretation” (Bion 1965, V, p. 169). Bion’s intention was to privilege the observational vertex of immediate, ongoing evolution of the session as the primary field of contact with and observation of the patient. This field defines both patient and analyst as participant-observers. These considerations underpin Bion’s emphasis of doing analytic work in the “here-and-now” more than those suggested by the concepts of transference and countertransference, which are themselves forms of developed transformations of observed phenomena from the field.

Bion wrote that observing as a psychoanalyst (as opposed to observing as a cognitive therapist, for example) requires development of one’s psychoanalytically oriented “intuitive capacity”, which is in part shaped by one’s theoretical perspectives. He wrote that while “O must be available to Ta (α) and Tp (α) ... the analyst must have a view of the psycho-analytic theory of the Oedipus situation. His understanding of that theory can be regarded as a transformation of that theory and in that case all his interpretations, verbalized or not, of what is going on in a session may be seen as transformations of an O that is bi-polar. One pole of O is trained intuitive capacity transformed to effect its juxtaposition with what is going on in the analysis and the other is in the facts of the analytic experience that must be transformed” (Bion 1965, V, p. 170). That is, the analyst must determine to what degree the actual situation corresponds, or does not correspond, to the analyst’s “trained intuitive capacity” as organized by, for example, the Oedipus complex theory. Bion’s last psychoanalytic book, *Attention and Interpretation*, continued his explorations into the nature of O in psychoanalysis and beyond (Bion 1970, VI).

II. Df. Transformations and Emotional Truth

The nature of O for psychoanalysis is of emotion and emotional experience. Bion, in two of many examples, wrote: “In our work, O must always be an emotional experience, for the assumption in psychoanalysis is that patients come for help with, and therefore presumably want to talk about an emotional difficulty (Bion 1963b, V, p. 106); and “Psychoanalytic theories, patient’s or analyst’s statements are representations of an emotional experience” (Bion 1965, V, p. 156). For Bion, emotional, and therefore psychic reality was Truth; Grotstein called “truth the invariant, and emotion its vehicle or container” (Grotstein, 2007, p. 218).

Truth often presents overwhelming mental and existential conflict — one must either evade or destroy it defensively in order to survive, or accept, bear, and suffer it in order that the mind and personality may survive, grow, and develop. This directly echoes Freud’s (1911) “Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning”, which describes the reality and pleasure principles. The greater the perceived threat from emotional reality, the more likely the

pleasure principle will organize active defenses against it. Freud's theory shapes Bion's version of mental development. Emotional overwhelm, catastrophe, annihilation, fear of dying, nameless dread, and other similar states of incapacity to tolerate frustration (Bion 1962a, VI, p. 159) drive the mind to destroy or escape this unbearable truth. Bion placed the mental function of opposing the truth at all costs in column 2 of the Grid. Bion described a last resort defense before psychosis, in which the primitive mind attacked its own capacity to think, i.e., attacks on linking (Bion 1959, VI, pp. 138-152). Bion refocused the Oedipus complex to suggest that the analyst and patient's curiosity in searching for the truth displays arrogant stupidity in their belief that, unlike Oedipus, they would be able to face, metabolize, and think about what they discovered (Bion 1958, VI, pp. 131-137). When psychoanalytic observation and clinical work deepen to these realms and anxieties, both participants may experience growing feelings of dread and terror. Bion once said that "In every consulting room there ought to be two rather frightened people: the patient and the psychoanalyst" (Bion 1973, VII, p. 10). The capacity to transform emotional truth through thinking is thus vital to survival.

II. Dg. Transformations, Emotional Turbulence, and Catastrophic Change

Bion discusses what he calls emotional turbulence and catastrophic change in numbers of passages. Catastrophic change refers to the result of transformations of such intensity that their impact on the actual situation and the personality become overtly manifest. "Catastrophic" indicates the scale of the situation, and not necessarily any moral quality of disaster or badness. It may initiate what Bion called, "subversion of the system" (Bion 1965, V, p. 133), which may entail either disaster or profoundly needed growth through disruption of the status quo (Bion used the concept for society as well [Bion 1966, VI, pp. 21-43]). In catastrophic change, emotion rises to the level of "violence", but again this violence may function in the service of both defense and growth. Sometimes transformations at the level of catastrophic change and violent emotion are necessary to disrupt the power of Grid column 2 resistances against thinking and Truth, in order to make subsequent evolutionary growth and development possible.

II. Dh. Transformations in K and O

Bion introduced the emotional linking signs L, H, and K — loving, hating, and knowing — in *Learning From Experience* (Bion 1962b, IV), and continued studying them in *Elements of Psychoanalysis* (Bion 1963a, V). The concept of transformations in K, or T(K), brings thinking together with the emotional invariant qualities that orient the mind towards or away from Truth (see Fisher 2006).

With respect to the emotional turbulence of undertaking painful and frightening work, Bion wrote, "transformations in K are feared when they threaten the emergence of transformations in O [see below]. This can be restated as fear when $T\alpha \rightarrow T\beta = K \rightarrow O$. Resistance to an interpretation is resistance against change from K to O" (Bion 1965, V, p.

268). Bion notated the impact of Grid column 2, or anti-truth and anti-growth emotions on the linking functions with the signs -L, -H, and -K (for example, Bion 1962b, IV, pp. 361-365). Transformations in -K are active defensive processes of not-knowing, often stimulated by emotions of envy, greed, fear, and others. Transformations in -K attack and distort thinking processes with the aim of misunderstanding, evading or destroying Truth. Transformations in L and H, and their Grid column 2 defensive functions, may be considered similarly within the total theory of transformations.

The concept of transformation in O, or T(O), is complex. The phrase just cited — “transformations in K are feared when they threaten the emergence of transformations in O” — indicates that T(O) does not involve thinking, language-based meaning, and conscious rational thought. Losing one’s sense of meaning and being subjected to meaningless sensory experience is frightening in ordinary circumstances. Nonetheless, Bion was interested in T(O) particularly with respect to psychoanalytic observation, and this presents many conceptual difficulties. It may help to recall Bion’s claim that “In every consulting room there ought to be two rather frightened people: the patient and the psychoanalyst” (Bion 1973, VII, p. 10). For Bion, T(O) “is a special case of Transformation; it is of particular concern to the analyst in his function of aiding maturation of the personalities of his patients” (Bion 1965, V, p. 268). To be clear, fright is not the goal nor the mutative element, but Bion held that psychoanalytic work that faces Truth is most often frightening. T(O) for analyst and patient may represent the capacity, frightening as it may be, to release oneself from the blinders of certainty of T(K), that is, of meaning or knowledge, and so promote evolutionary growth through receptive intuition of underlying emotional Truth. One more example makes the point:

“[...] the analytic situation itself, and then the psycho-analytic occupation or task itself, are bound to stimulate primitive and basic feeling in analyst and analysand ... love, hate, dread, are sharpened to a point where the participating pair may feel them to be almost unbearable: it is the price that has to be paid for the transformation of an activity about psycho-analysis into an activity that *is* psycho-analysis” (Bion 1970, VI, p. 276; *emph. by Bion*).

Analysts struggle to write clearly about T(O), because it indicates notates experience transcending logic, thinking, memory, desire, and all similar cognition. As with the nature of O, it is impossible to state the nature of T(O) directly. Bion’s texts became increasingly diffuse, opaque, and controversial, as he struggled to write about the un-writable. For example, he wrote,

“transformation in O, that is from K → O ... involves ‘becoming’ [and] is felt as inseparable from becoming God, ultimate reality, the First Cause. The ‘dark night’ pain [a reference to the work of 16th century mystic St. John of the Cross] is fear of megalomania. This fear inhibits acceptance of being responsible, that is mature, because it appears to involve *being* God, being the First Cause, being ultimate reality with a pain that can be, though inadequately, expressed by ‘megalomania’” (Bion 1965, V, p. 269; *original italics*).

The last chapters of “Transformations” and the entirety of “Attention and Interpretation”, reflect Bion’s struggles to express his proposals. His last major work, a three-part novel entitled “A Memoir of the Future” (Bion 1975, XII; 1977, XIII; 1979, XIV), was not a psychoanalytic text *per se*, but used psychoanalytic ideas and situations within its deeply idiosyncratic structure, while attempting to evoke, allude, or point towards so many ideas the author could not express in formal psychoanalytic discourse.

II. Dj. Rigid Motion and Projective Transformations

Bion described these forms of transformations with respect to neurotic and primitive forms of mental functioning. Rigid motion transformations refer to the former, and projective transformations to the latter. To be clear, the term “rigid” does not indicate pathological mental brittleness, but rather that the invariant remains undistorted through the series of transformations. Rigid motion transformation corresponds to Freud’s classic concept of neurotic transference. Projective transformation corresponds to Klein’s (1946) concept of projective identification. Projective transformations distort the invariant, just as a film projector placed askew, at a large angle to the viewing screen, projects distorted images. Bion used many mathematical examples to illustrate these ideas.

II. Dk. Transformations in Hallucinosi

Transformations in hallucinosi comprise both a fundamental aspect of psychoanalytic clinical observation, and a ubiquitous but often covert state of being. This topic takes up mental states foreclosed to language-based communication or T(K), and which are related to T(O). Again, this makes it impossible to describe transformations in hallucinosi directly, and the relevant texts are unclear, vaguely mystical, and often quite ambiguous. Bion understood that his text was very difficult, and encouraged readers to take the time to work with it (Bion 1970, VI, 243-244). Not surprisingly, this has created significant controversy on how to interpret his intentions (for example, Civitarese 2015a, 2015b; Sandler 2015). The central passages consist of Chapter 10 of “Transformations”, in particular pp. 242-246, and especially Chapter 3 of “Attention and Interpretation”, entitled “Reality sensuous and psychic” (Bion 1965, V, 240-257; 1970, VI, 242-254). One minor point of confusion comes from the fact that North American psychiatry does not use the term ‘hallucinosi’, whereas in British psychiatry, hallucinosi refers to the state in which hallucination occurs; this is how Bion uses the term (Bion 1965, V, p. 199). Another point comes from Bion’s indirectly stated yet crucial proposition that transformations in hallucinosi may be applied to work with all patients, and not only those suffering psychotic states.

Bion described symptomatic hallucinosi in a straightforward manner:

“In the domain of hallucinosi the mental event is transformed into a sense impression and sense impressions in this domain do not have meaning; they provide pleasure or pain. In this way the unsense-able mental phenomenon is transformed into a β -element

which can be evacuated and reintroduced so that the act yields, not a meaning, but pleasure or pain” (Bion 1970, VI, p. 251).

Thoughts are transformed to non-mental sense impressions; thinking, and thus language-based communication is destroyed. Although he does not state it directly, pathological hallucinosis may be represented as $K \rightarrow O$. This set of transformations might be described more precisely as transformations *to* hallucinosis, although Bion does not use this phrase.

Bion was interested in psychoanalytic approaches to psychotic patients throughout his career. This is difficult work because, “the medium of the analysand’s transformation lies in the sphere of action, that of the analyst in the sphere of thought and its verbal representations” (Bion 1965, V, 248). The domain of hallucinosis may be represented in the model by O. Making contact with psychotic patients within the domain of their hallucinosis presented the greatest challenge, both conceptually and practically. Being with the psychotic patient constitutes an O shared by patient and analyst (Bion 1965, V, 169-170), and transformations in hallucinosis denotes both the specific work of transforming observations made in contact within this shared O, and the general circumstance of processes of transformations occurring in states of hallucinosis. It may be helpful to think of it as transformations *within* hallucinosis.

Bion offers an example demonstrating that observing from T(K) and observing through transformations in hallucinosis produce vastly different interpretations of the clinical situation shared patient and analyst. His psychotic patient found that Bion’s words:

“flew over his head and could be detected in *what to me were patterns on a cushion*. ... [By contrast,] he was able, in a state of hallucinosis, to see that the patterns *were really my words travelling through his eyes*, to him. Furthermore, the ‘meaning’, which could not be grasped outside the conditions of the hallucinosis, was perfectly clear in a state of hallucinosis. The ‘meaning’ of a statement in hallucinosis is not, however, the same as its meaning in the domain of rational thought” (Bion 1970, 251; italics added).

The first italicized phrase indicates how Bion, and presumably every analyst would perceive, or ‘interpret’ the object on the couch: it is a cushion with patterns on it, the result, T(β), of the analyst’s transformations in K, T(K), from looking at it. Without describing how he observed transformations in hallucinosis, Bion gives the result, T(β), transformed into his thoughts, T(K): “the patterns were really my words travelling through his eyes, to him”. These two observed results could not be more different, and the difference is vital to appreciating psychotic states. Bion clarifies that the “meaning”, which he puts in quotations, has to do with “sense impressions in this domain [that] do not have meaning; they provide pleasure or pain” (Bion 1970, p. 251). Bion states as a general precept that analysts must listen with trained analytic “intuition” (Bion 1965, V, p.243; 1970 p.246) in order to apperceive the total situation and effect transformations into ideas such as “the patterns were really my words travelling through his eyes, to him”. Analysts must observe and intuit the “meaning” that is “perfectly clear in a state of hallucinosis”, and therefore trained intuition is a core element of analytic observation and transformation of the observed.

The kernel of the problem lies with how the analyst may observe transformations in hallucinosis. The issue goes beyond purely technical questions, and takes up the state of mind and state of being of an analyst when working to observe transformations in hallucinosis. In terms of the model, the analyst aims to be in a state devoid of T(K), that is, to abandon memory, desire, explanation, and thinking as maximally as possible while observing. Describing this state of mind directly is impossible, because description is a function of T(K). In “Attention and Interpretation”, Bion attempted to evoke qualities of this observational state with descriptors including, “becoming O ... he must be it ... real ... be at one with ... become at one with ... at-one-ment ... ultimate reality and truth ... formless infinite ... ineffable experience ... an act of faith” (Bion 1970, pp. 242-254).

Bion’s text becomes most ambiguous when he tries to describe the relationships that hallucinosis and transformations in hallucinosis have with the total clinical situation. One should remember that Bion was not writing about technique, but about models of observation. The difference is crucial: if read as technique, one may take Bion to be suggesting what to do in the clinical situation, and how to do it, whereas when read as a model of observation, Bion attempts to describe what cannot be described, that is, the state of mind and being of the analyst when making their best efforts to be maximally open to observation without imposition of T(K), that is, without memory and desire.

Below are three grammatically ambiguous passages demonstrating the problem of interpreting Bion’s text:

I. “Receptiveness achieved by denudation of memory and desire ... is essential to the operation of psycho-analysis and other scientific proceedings. It is essential for *experiencing* hallucination or the state of hallucinosis. This state I do not regard as an exaggeration of a pathological or even natural condition: I consider it rather to be a state always present, but overlaid by other phenomena, which screen it” (Bion 1970, VI, p. 250; emphasis added).

II, “to appreciate hallucination the analyst must *participate in* the state of hallucinosis” (ibid, p. 250; emphasis added).

III. “By eschewing memories, desires, and the operations of memory [the analyst] can approach the domain of hallucinosis and of the ‘acts of faith’ by which alone he can become *at one* with his patients’ hallucinations and so effect transformations O → K”. (ibid, p. 250; emphasis added).

The first and second emphasized passages read ambiguously with respect to the grammatical object of the verbs “experiencing” and “participate”. Does the analyst experience and participate in hallucinosis *per se*? This seemingly more straightforward reading contextualizes the verbs as aspects of technique, of what the analyst does in session. It is as if Bion recommends that the analyst hallucinate and / or participate actively in hallucinosis. Another reading takes the total analytic situation itself as the object of the verb, that is, the analyst may experience and participate in the analysis by fulfilling their part, or role, or analytic function while working with their patient’s state of hallucinosis. This contextualizes the text

more towards description of the observational framework. With respect to the third emphasized passage, a reading of clinical technique may suggest that to become “at one” with the patient’s hallucinations involves a form of merger with the psychotic patient. A reading shaped by observation may indicate that the scientific “act of faith” of pure observation brings the analyst in the closest possible contact, “at one”, with the object of observation, “his patients’ hallucinations”, in order to “effect transformations in $O \rightarrow K$ ”.

Finally, Bion proposed that all clinical observation should include and begin with the analyst’s maximal openness to transformations in hallucinosis. This makes sense from a theoretical perspective in that it allows analysts to apperceive clinical material not available when observations are made in $T(K)$. Bion wrote, “The psychoanalyst’s domain is that which lies between the point where a man receives sense impressions and the point where he gives expression to the transformation that has taken place” (Bion 1965, V, p. 245). This is the conceptual domain in which transformations of sense impressions, including those of frank hallucinosis, may proceed towards products, $T(\beta)$, in K , for which the analyst “gives expression” in thoughts and words. More specifically, Bion wrote that:

IV. “The concept of hallucinosis needs to be widened to fit a number of configurations which are at present not recognized as being the same.

V. Transformation, in rigid motion or projection, must be seen to have hallucinosis as one of its media” (Bion 1965, V, p. 245).

He supported statement 4 when writing “This state I do not regard as an exaggeration of a pathological or even natural condition: I consider it rather to be a state always present, but overlaid by other phenomena, which screen it” (Bion 1970, VI, p. 250). The potential to be maximally open to observation by abandoning memory and desire, i.e., $T(K)$, so as to allow transformations in hallucinations exists ubiquitously; undertaking a scientific “act of faith” and aided by analytically trained intuition, the analyst aims to enter this state for all clinical observation. Statement 5, while very condensed, indicates that rigid motion and projective transformations, both of which fit the model of $T(K)$, emerge from the more primitive realm of ubiquitous transformations in hallucinosis.

Ultimately, readers must decide for themselves how to interpret Bion’s texts on these issues most meaningfully.

II. E. BION’S TRANSFORMATIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPLEXITY (LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE)

Bion stressed that the human mind does not operate through predictable relations, such as that of cause and effect, but through nonlinear processes of growing complexity (Chuster 2014).

The theory of transformations has the advantage of screening emotional experience while proposing a new range to the analytical field, making it a field not of cause and effect,

not of origins and explanations, but of many interpretative possibilities of a blooming present of meanings. As this current moment is always changing, the principle of uncertainty must be on sight of all interpretations. Psychoanalysis is constantly the beginning of a wide and complex investigation of a living and complex object: the mind.

II. Ea. Introduction of the Vertex of Complexity

In order to expand his proposition of such complex object Bion located psychoanalysis amongst the fields of art and mathematics. His intention was dealing with observations of an ever-changing subject, which requires a new way of thinking. That means to use many vertices at the same time, like in a non-Euclidian space.

The relationship between art, psychoanalysis, and mathematics is an example of Complexity. Briefly speaking, Bion creates a bridge between different disciplines in a space that does not belong to any of them. This bridge creates a flow of imaginative thoughts facing the scientific knots, the uncertainty of ideas, the contradictions of logics, aiming to generate a permanent tension while searching for knowledge (K link), which may be coherent with the incompleteness of psychoanalytic investigation.

Bion's example of the painting of Monet at the beginning of "Transformations", and subsequently in his 1968 Buenos Aires seminar (Bion 1968), and its contemporary reproduction and elaborations (Aguayo, Pistiner de Cortinas and Regeczkey 2018), invites the reader to participate in the observational model used by impressionist painters: "...if we take a famous painting, let's take, for example, a famous impressionist painting by Monet, we admire and take a picture of it and then we know K. That is, we know that the picture portrays some poppies in a field and a few houses in the distance, and we can appreciate the paths that lead us to them. ..." (Aguayo, Pistiner de Cortinas and Regeczkey 2018, p. 44).

The impressionist painters, vividly influenced by the scientific information that the eye blends the colors, painted the images placing brush strokes of colors in a way that the eye could mix them. If the observer stays in a 'good enough distance', he/she will 'see with his/her emotions' the image (experience the emotional impact of the image). However, if one gets too close to the painting one will be seeing just a blur; in case one gets too far, the emotional impact of the image will be absent or very weak. The same applies to the analyst in the process of "painting" the patient by virtue of an interpretation.

The general idea found in art is the different kind of look that a painter (or a psychoanalyst) can have, while using invariants that may be (or not) recognized by the observers.

"The painter by virtue of his artistic capacity is able to transform a landscape (realization) into a painting (the representation). He does so by virtue of invariants that makes this representation comprehensible" (Bion * 1965, p.5).

The main issue is the painter's capacity to create an interpretation of reality using invariants and variables. Where does this capacity come from? Bion named this origin by the

sign “O” (Bion* 1965, p. 15). In this context, Chuster conceives of “O”’s initial meaning as “ontos”, as in ontology (i.e., nature of existence, being).

The concept of "O" is an expansion of the previous and basic concept of pre-conception (1962a) seeking a realization to give birth to a conception. The main proposition of such model is to change, at least for some moments, our way of thinking of the classical psychoanalytical concepts such as the concepts of unconscious, resistance, repetition, drives and so forth. Therefore, Chuster theorizes that “O” is also “Opus”, a work in progress (Chuster, 2018) to every direction: analyst, analysand, theory, practice, logic, and epistemology.

Bion summarized those ideas by the following phrase: “By considering the psychoanalytic experience in the light [...] of a theory of transformations it is possible to see the problems of thinking afresh”. (Bion 1965, p.38)

For instance, Bion proposed to think of the resistance phenomena by another vertex, which he called the inaccessibility of O. It is inaccessible for both sides of the analytic link. However, in any way, such proposition will move the overall objective of the text to understand transference as various forms of transformations. It is a new way of thinking. It is complexity brought to psychoanalysis (Chuster, 2018).

In summary, when it is possible to introduce the vertex of Complexity to understand Bion’s ideas it may be easier to perceive that he is proposing to think in a different way in every step and in every concept one might be using during one’s work. Therefore, transference is conveyed by feelings of surprise; it is the new and unknown element in the field.

II. Eb. Genesis of ‘O’ and Relevance of Space-Time Theory

The idea of “O” in a way is a counterpart of the Kantian aphorism of empty thoughts and blind intuitions trying to fulfill each other. Chuster (1999, 2002, 2014, and 2018) recognized that Bion expanded such idea using Gödel’s (1931) ‘Undecidable proposition’ of the ‘Second Incompleteness theorem’ applicable to formal systems of sufficient complexity in observation, the same applied by Heisenberg’s in his Uncertainty principle. The overall idea means that in every link there is a point of observation where one cannot truly decide what belongs to one side or to the other. For instance, there is a point where one does not know if something belongs to the patient or to the analyst. One may add many other links: family-patient, society-family, mother-baby, mouth-breast, fetus-uterus, and so on. This undecidable point is “O”. The decisions by virtue of interpretations are due to the work in progress that may rise from such point of uncertainty. Yet, interpretations always are transient thoughts, made to a single moment of decision. The next moment makes the past decision unacceptable.

Bion also translated “O” using the aesthetics of the language of John Milton in “Paradise Lost”: “the void and formless infinite”. That phrase makes very clear his idea of infinity as a definition for unconscious mind. Therefore, “O” defines Unconscious as something always beyond what we may think it is. It is something always in expansion (work in progress), an ineffable essence, rather inaccessible like an ultimate reality, or an ultimate truth. This

proposition deeply connects to the problems of observation, which is present in the epistemological criticism coming from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (1929).

This criticism requires that one should look for a new observational system when the current method saturates with interpretations blurred by the many possible emotional attachments to the observed object. The general proposition is that the observer should change the observed fact to a new system in order to verify its validity. Bion chose the metaphors of algebraic projective geometry, which occupies a central place in modern mathematics and has multiple conceptual connections with such diverse fields as complex analysis, topology and number theory.

The mathematical theory of functions consistently applied to the theory of thinking is probably the main reason that led Bion to choose such mathematical instrument as a system of verifiability for the analytical theories. Thus, the breast becomes a point, the movement of the mouth to the breast a line, the two breasts become two points, the projective identification become a hyperbole: "it is convenient to postulate the existence of a mind represented entirely by points, positions of objects, places where something used to be, or would be at some future date. Objects perceived in space contribute to the transformation of these elements (analogous to ξ) into specific no-things" (Bion*, 1965, p. 106).

This new space is comparable to the non-linear mathematical concept of Hilbert space (Chuster, 2018), which is a non-Euclidian space. Bion himself says that his intention in using such model was to do for psychoanalysis the same that non-Euclidian models did for geometry. It gave to geometers freedom of thought.

For instance, one can observe the mechanism of projective identification in a geometric system as the movement of a hyperbole throwing objects into the air on a curved trajectory onto a distant target. Such distance (corresponding to degrees of distortion in space) defines the type of transformation, as well as its duration in time (intensity). It is important to emphasize that such observational system always introduce two parameters: time and space. "By using the term hyperbole, I mean to bind the constant conjunction of increasing force of emotion with increasing force of evacuation. It is immaterial to hyperbole what emotion is; but on the emotion will depend whether the hyperbolic expression is idealizing or denigrating" (Bion, 1965*, p.142)

Another important aspect of the time-space theory is the occurrence of transformations in cycles. The cycles remain in constant progression under certain conceptions are arrived at that could produce a degree of stability to them (relative repetition). However, at the same time, cycles present the idea of vulnerability and instability as they tend to an inertial point. Bion's metaphor of the image of trees reflected in a mirror of water, as effected by atmospheric conditions, illustrates the instability of the observational system (turbulence) as well as the conditions of the cycles determined by invariants (1965, p. 47).

In other words, the cycles depend on the emotional experience produced by a specific combination of links.

In chapter seven Bion wrote: “The point and the line represent visual images which remain invariant under a wide range of conditions. The same is true of the visual images associated with the propositions of Euclid; hence the propositions themselves are communicated over long periods of time and between widely separated cultures and races” (Bion 1965*, p.93).

II. Ec. The transformations described by Bion and the Experience of Space-Time

1) Transformations in hallucinosis. They are transformations that occur in the breakdown of the limits of the capacity of human thought. The expression is to be differentiated from hallucinations, which are sensorial and part of the field of psychotic transformations.

The degree of distortion of thinking in hallucinosis corresponds to a particular moral logic, produced by two features: cruelty of the superego and rivalry with O, both capable of destroying life values. The two properties trigger a process whose ultimate objective is to prove that the logic of lies is better and safer than seeking the truth. Other possibilities are to prove that actions are better than words, or that someone is better than others are. Those are examples of false premises underlying the moral logic, despite considered formally correct. The interpretation of the false premise is what allows us to break the cycle of the transformations in hallucinosis and move to the cycle of projective transformations. Otherwise, we will be wasting time discussing with a liar.

2) Projective transformations. They connect meanings that have not reached yet verbal language. They could be meanings inside actions and connected to feelings, therefore they are more easily perceptible than in transformations in hallucinosis.

“The analyst’s transformations employ the vehicle of speech just as the musician’s transformations are musical and the painter’s pictorial. Though the analyst attempts to transform O, in accordance with the rules and discipline of verbal communication, this not necessarily the case with the patient” (Bion 1965*, p. 61).

The interpretations should try to display something so far existing out of verbal language. If the language of interpretations expresses those facts, then one finds a point to get out of the cycle of projective transformations. Otherwise, the cycles of projective transformations could be comparable to infiltrations of water into a wall. It pursues invisible paths until something like a water leak may appears to the observer with no clue to where it begins (the disconnection between the meaning and its source as in somato-psychotic symptoms or in some inadequate actions).

Another example is an increase of idealization (inhibition of thinking), as opposed to realization (creation of thoughts). However, if any development of communication occurs one can talk and expand on what happens at this primitive level of human interaction and then a cycle of rigid motion transformations might begin.

3) Rigid Motion Transformations. The word rigid has nothing to do with rigidity but with the geometry of a transposition of points: like using, as Freud did, the past events, to understand what occurs in the present. Such understanding exemplified by a Freudian interpretation can lead to a transformation in K.

4) Transformations in K. The interpretations aim at knowing about oneself to the point that they transform into some personal wisdom. However, it should be noted that the work of the analyst could go only up to the point that directs $K \rightarrow (O)$, the analytic transformation. The rest of the job is the working through of the analysand, which may lead (or not) to a transformation in O.

5) Transformations in O. This transformation is the movement of becoming oneself due to an incarnated K (wisdom); it happens only in the analysand's internal time. There is no spatial distortion, no projection at all. There is only a kind of "fall" into one self (no knowing about, just becoming).

In a highly theoretical excursion of his own, Arnaldo Chuster (Chuster 1999, 2002, 2014, 2018) views the experience of space-time envisaged by the theory of transformations as an original point of Bion's work (1965*). In this context, time and space are parts of the function that create our existence as human beings. Therefore, they are innate everlasting parts of the pre-conception, as well as our conceptions and concepts that allow one to live with oneself and with oneself in groups.

This definition creates a polemic, as one of the meanings expresses the presence of time in the Unconscious, as the future Unconscious time, which is meaningful when thinking of Bion's complexity ideas in "A Memoir of the Future" (1975) or in what he calls an 'act of faith' in "Attention and Interpretation" (1970). This hypothesis is workable only within the context of complexity. It is not workable (or sensible) in the context of deterministic or hermeneutic models.

Each kind of transformation conveys a different emotional experience of time, as well as a different experience of images (space forms) present at the unconscious level. One may consider here the unconscious-to-unconscious communication described by Freud, but not exactly explained by him. In a subtle, complex and deep way, Bion is explaining it.

For example, transformations in K produce an experience of time like the one founded in a simple logical referential time; an information that connects to a specific image, which is like the image of a point (.) at the more primitive level of the mind.

In rigid motion transformations, the experience is a circular time; a meaning seems always to return and connects with the image of a circle in the more primitive level of the mind.

Projective transformations are experiences where something seems to breakdown and breakup as in the movement of a sinusoidal line; it is an oscillatory time.

Transformations in hallucinosis are experiences of a miscellaneous time: past, present and future seems to be the same, and the deep image is like a picture of dispersing lines, as in a scribble. Therefore, the feeling of confusion and tyranny can be the final product of it.

In general, the main factor is the decipherment of the relation time-space in the images while they are organizing over language levels.

The initial meaning of the image lies on the surface of the object, then in order to deepen it, one need to "scan" the image. This is the work of the analyst's alpha function. The alpha-function establishes the link between the emitter and the receiver generating a space of connotative symbols: a space for dreaming and imagination.

It is worth to note that each type of transformation corresponds to a form of "scanning" (dreaming) of the reality reported by the analysand.

For example, in transformations in K the images establish causal relationships between events. Transformation in K thus consists of a rule of periods in space, where the period signifies a particular reference. An example would be a simple information of a kind like the analytic session is at 14:00hs on Monday.

In rigid motion transformations there are significant circularities; the past explains the present that explains the past. The reciprocity/circularity of $(.) \leftrightarrow (+)$ denotes the link between a cause and an effect.

The projective transformations are represented by something usually called magic thoughts. The projective transformations/magic thoughts may cause rupture of the working through, because the first idea does not explain the second, but gives it a sense that the meaning was not there before. For example, an affirmative like the crowing of the rooster makes the Sunrise become more beautiful. The sign $+ (.)$ ----- carries an image/ sense that there is something hidden (out of language or absence of meaning).

In transformations in hallucinosis, the individual, rather than using images according to learning from experience, finds him/herself living under the pressure of his own images. It can happen the same with lies. He/she no longer can decipher the scenes of the image, but he/she lives in a set of scenes without grasping a temporal organization (common sense). Sometimes it may happen like in a bad dream or a nightmare in which images become impossible to decipher. The reason is that he/she cannot change them to an abstract dimension.

The presence of such images in the analytic link exemplifies an analysand who feels the analyst's interpretations as attempts to prove the superiority of analysis over his (analysand's) logic, which make him feel humiliated. His reaction is to attack back trying to prove that the analyst is doing a wrong job. In order to find a way out of those painful feelings of inferiority the analysand makes a reversal of perspective, which aims at turning the analyst out, leaving him paralyzed. This may cause the well-known feelings of sleepiness or waste of time on part of the analyst.

This situation can be interpreted but if the analysand cannot leave behind his/her superiority feelings fueled by hatred, he/she may try to prove that lies are superior and better than searching for truth.

II. F. CENTERED ON PSYCHOANALYTIC OBJECT (EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE)

II. Fa. The Psychoanalytic Object

What is transformed in Bion's observational theory of Transformations is the psychoanalytic object, so it is difficult to write about transformations without writing about Bion's concept of the psychoanalytic object. The psychoanalytic object is the object that psychoanalysis is concerned with, just like a mathematical object is the object studied by mathematics. According to Bion, the psychoanalytic object is unknowable, it can only be intuited and needs at least three Grid categories to be apprehensible at a representational level. It can be compared to the unknowable Kantian noumenon which may be reflected in numerous phenomena. The psychoanalytic object is a 'constant conjunction of invariants'. In Bion's view, analysts should focus on the intuition of these constant conjunctions, and refrain from a cause-effect approach and reasoning. In other words, analysts should focus on pattern recognition, which happens in a relaxed, open way, leaving logical deductive thought behind. Psychoanalytic objects are invisible, colourless, odourless and shapeless. It may be patterns of relationships, of behavior, of attraction, of attachment, of personality and so on. They are constituted of fixed links and appear indirectly in the stories and behavior and thoughts and feelings in the sessions and clearly in the transference-countertransference. According to Bion's (1965) discussion of Transformations, the appearance of a psychoanalytic object can be very different according to the level of transformations that it undergoes.

II. Fb. Four Types of Transformations

Bion discerns four kinds of transformations: three transformations in Knowledge (K) at the level of representation of the psychoanalytic object and then the transformations in O, which is a new changing experience that alters the psychoanalytic object – a change that eventually may be grasped at a Knowledge or representational level.

To differentiate and describe the three different transformations in knowledge or T(K), Bion uses projective geometry (Vermote, 2019). Here, the image of a triangle as a constant conjunction of the invariants A, B, C (the points that triangle connects) is instrumental. The triangle is used as a metaphor for a psychoanalytic object consisting of a constant conjunction between elements (Vermote 2019).

II. Fba. Rigid Motion Transformations

Rigid motion transformations are transformations within a (two-dimensional) plane like in Euclidean geometry; they do not entail much deformation of the psychoanalytic object. When one projects or glides a triangle from one plane to another, as from one piece of paper to another, it remains the same triangle. For Bion this is a metaphor for what happens in the classical transference of whole objects in psychoanalysis. The repetition of Oedipal rivalry in transference would be an instance of such a classical situation. In a rigid motion transformation, the relationship between invariants can easily be perceived during the transformation.

II. Fbb. Projective Transformations

Compared with a rigid motion transformation in the same plane, a transformation from three dimensions to two dimensions, a projective transformation, geometrically causes gross deformations of the original object. For instance, when a sphere is projected onto a plane, it becomes a circle. This kind of transformation may be a metaphor for projective identification in the transference, where what is transmitted is deformed. The relation between the invariants remains stable but is much more difficult to recognize than in a simple projection. Bion gives the example of a patient who adds all kinds of material that has nothing to do with the experience that he is talking about, so that the invariants of the original experience become almost unrecognizable in the session.

II. Fbc. Transformation in Hallucinos/Infinity

Transformation in infinity occurs when there is a projection within a space with infinite dimensions. This kind of geometrical transformation may be a metaphor for what happens in sessions with psychotic patients, hence the name '*transformation in hallucinos*'. Bion (1970, p. 13) gives the example of a patient talking about ice-cream, a word which comes back many sessions later without any link and may now be heard as 'I scream'. The words used, 'Ice-cream – I scream', are like widely separated points in space. In this kind of transformation, it is very difficult to recognize the invariants and their conjunctions, that reflect the original object. Links are attacked and disappear, and points are scattered in infinity. There are no longer any thoughts to hold on to in infinity; it is experienced as an enormous frightening space without thoughts that can be seen as lines that give a frame. What remains for psychotics is as Pascal puts it: 'Ces espaces infinies, m'effrayent' ["The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me."] (Blaise Pascal 1669, p. 73; in Bion 1965/1984, p. 171). The result is "an intolerance for and fear of the 'unknowable' and hence of the unconscious in the sense of the undiscovered or the unevolved » (ibid.). Instead of thoughts giving rise to a three-dimensional containing space, there is continuous destruction of thoughts by the obstructive object in psychosis (the opposite of a containing object, often in the form of a primitive destructive super-ego), which is seen by Bion as a greedy, destructive, all absorbing entity.

II Fbd. Transformation of the Psychoanalytic Object – Transformation in ‘O’ as compared to in ‘K’

Bion compares *the transformations of the psychoanalytic object* with the reflection of a tree in the water. If the unknowable psychoanalytic object is the tree, then in Rigid Motion Transformation – the constant conjunctions of elements – makes it possible to recognize the tree by its in reflection in the water, in projective transformation the water is stirred by the wind and one cannot see it clearly, in transformation in hallucinosis (following Bion’s metaphor), one could say that the reflection is similar to reflection on the pieces of a broken fragmented mirror and it is difficult to perceive the tree (only by intuition).

In trying to reach *the original psychoanalytic object* behind the representations or in the metaphor of the tree, beyond the reflections of the tree, Bion sees that he cannot go further than three or four levels of transformation so to speak and that then one is in the unknowable, unrepresented. The original unrepresented object (the tree in the metaphor) cannot be known. He calls it O, probably from Origin – the unknowable origin from where the transformations start. This unrepresented O cannot be seen, be smelled, be heard as it is beyond the domain of the senses. It is a-sensuous. The constant conjunctions at this level can only be seen by intuition (as a Seer does).

The definition that Bion gives of O in the later publication of “Attention and Interpretation” is:

“I shall use the sign O to denote that which is the ultimate reality represented by terms such as ultimate reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in- itself. O does not fall in the domain of knowledge or learning save incidentally; it can be ‘become’, but it cannot be ‘known’. It is darkness and formlessness but it enters the domain K when it has evolved to a point where it can be known, through knowledge gained by experience, and formulated in terms derived from sensuous experience; its existence is conjectured phenomenologically” (Bion 1970/1986, p. 25).

To ‘*the late Bion*’ (starting at the end of his book „Transformations“), the analyst should be in this dimension when psychoanalyzing. In this undifferentiated, unrepresented, unknowable dimension, perceiving is actually becoming and at this moment also a transformation in O.

In *a transformation in O* (Bion conceived his transformation in O later than his metaphor of the tree, but following his metaphor), it could be said that there is an intuitive contact with the tree itself and not only with the reflections, representations. The tree at that moment is seen in a way a mystic sees it, meaning not by perception but in an empty space where the tree can appear, where one becomes the tree.

Such a Transformation in O is very different from the Transformations in K that Bion described so far. A Transformation in K is a way of representing or mentalizing an experience, a psychoanalytic object. At that level, a transformation in hallucinosis was seen as pathological. In Bion’s later point of view a Transformation in O is a new experience instead of a

representation of an experience that already happened. This experience is outside (verbal) representations and therefore in infinity. In a successful analysis two or three such transformations may happen and they make an analysis terminable (Bion, 1970/1986). To facilitate a transformation in O, the analyst must be as close to the infinite as possible in Bion's words. From there he can intuit the spontaneous movement from O to K. The analyst should wait till a transformation in O happens and spontaneously gets a form in K. The movement is always from O to K, only when this happens the T(O) can get a form. The analyst cannot will such an experience, such a Transformation in O. Bion developed a technique to be susceptible, sensitive to this and to be able to experience, to become O. It boils down to be in a state of Faith with no memory, no desire, no understanding, no coherence. In any circumstance the analyst at this level should refrain from being blinded by reasoning and the sensuous appearance of the patient.

III. POST-BIONIAN AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

III. A. LATIN-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTRIBUTION

According to Elias Rocha Barros (2015, 2017), Latin American clinical practice is, on the one hand, firmly structured around foundational Freudian concepts but also more and more colored by Kleinian and Bionian theory in their broader and more general aspects. Thus, according to Barros (2015), while for Bion, Transformations was a very specific concept, in Latin America, it gradually gained a wider meaning and became a broad theory of psychic change. In his view, in Latin American psychoanalytic culture Transformations has been itself transformed, and defined by some as "... the series of changes experienced by a *group* of *elements* that vary from a previous to a subsequent stage, where the recognition of the identity of these elements that have changed, would depend on the existing *invariants*." Lopez-Corvo (2003, p. 290).

However, Barros (2018) stresses that he himself works with transformations, as it applies to the internal movement from the presymbolic to symbolic processes in "Bion's sense and possibly amplifying it to signify a change in the structure of the mind and not in its content ... a transmutation of the very structure (and structuring capacities) of the mind, which results in the expansion of the capacity to think one's experience " (p. 226).

Brazil may be in a unique position, on one hand being a site of internationally valued scholarly research into 'The Language of Bion' by P.C. Sandler (2005), on the other hand a site of a substantive creative flourish and further development of the concept. Here, following the series of Brazilian lectures by Bion, his book has been intensively studied, much valued, and followed by many substantive original contributions. The Brazilian Society of Psychoanalysis of São Paulo (SBPSP) organized several meetings about Transformations,

followed by book publications edited by Evelise (de Souza) Marra, Cecil Jose Reza, and Marta Petricciani (2018, 2020) with many original papers.

Among examples of original creative extensions are the concept of *autistic transformation and unintegrated transformations* developed by Celia Fix Korbivcher and the developments on the *theory of complexity* through the ethical-aesthetic principles clarified by Arnaldo Chuster.

III. Aa. Arnaldo Chuster's Ethical-Esthetic Principles

Chuster (1999, 2002, 2011, 2014, and 2018) described how “Transformations” is a very sophisticated and intuitive Bion’s application of the Theory of Complexity by means of the Uncertainty principle of observation. This principle unfolds to what Chuster named ethical-aesthetic principles of observation. These ethical-esthetic principles of observations include complexity (which encompasses all others), uncertainty, infinity, singularity, incompleteness, undecidable of origin, and negative capability. All of them are also extensions of Bion’s concept of “Three Principles of Living” (Bion 1979b, p. 329). which Bion derives from, and juxtaposes to, Freud’s Two Principles of Mental Functioning. They are: “First, feeling; second, anticipatory thinking; third, feeling plus thinking, plus Thinking. The latter is synonymous with prudence or foresight * action” (Bion 1979b p. 329). In Chuster’s view, epistemologically speaking, they should guide any model’s application. The associated ethical and esthetic vertexes (points of view) are intended to create language for interpretations of any living reality

Over the past 20 years, Chuster (1999, 2002, 2011, 2014, 2018; Chuster et al. 2014) has made various clarifications and additions of the Bion’s Theory of Transformation. He takes as his starting point Bion’s psychoanalytical model, which proposes to think in a new way embodied in the movement of the nucleus of the psyche, which Bion called pre-conception. The model stating that preconception seeks a realization to generate conceptions (thoughts) is a model of three periods, epistemologically distinct from the four steps of instinctual drives of Freudian model. One can say it is a non-structural model.

The preconception movement observed by means of the principle of complexity traces human evolution in a new way; in fact, one might consider the preconception model a representation of such complexity that Bion also called “O” (1965). The preconception model considers that humans are slow to develop ‘neotenic creatures’, retaining some pre-natal and neonatal characteristics well into advanced stages of their development (Chuster, 2018). They are born very immature in order to lessen innate factors and amplify the capacity of learning from experience. Life is a matter of learning from experience, located in the mysterious mind.

As an example of *Complexity of pre-conception*, one can investigate its production and products in the realm of thoughts and language, that is, the production of meanings and words as well as its effects in the body. Every thought (conception) refers to an indeterminate state, a totality always open to change, which is constituted by means of a referential link where ‘container’ and ‘contained’ interact constantly at the limits of the alpha function’s capacity –

an extension in life of the interaction between the mother and the baby through the reverie function. This referential link is fundamental to the analytical process. It expresses itself effectively as indetermination in the psyche, and in psychoanalysis by transformations of the associative process. For example, when a patient tells a dream, nobody can predict what the associations to it will be and where they will lead. Likewise, nobody can predict what changes from one mental state to another will ensue after an interpretation. This is the ethical-aesthetical principle of *Uncertainty*, added to a principle of *Incompleteness*. Another consequence of this link is the infinite character of its development. Chuster (1999, 2002, 2014, and 2018) named it a *principle of Infinity*. This allows for a notion that the human unconscious necessarily goes beyond what is under the cloak of the term “Freudian Unconscious”. For example, if one speaks of (the) Unconscious, it means it is already outside the subject. The unconscious has already expanded and demands a new interpretation. It is necessary to introduce another term into the discussion: the nearest for Bion is the term *inaccessible*, so that inaccessibility may be considered *another ethical-aesthetical principle*.

The most important preconception for psychoanalysis is the *oedipal preconception*, because it includes all the others. Once again, using the principle of complexity, it proposes one should think beyond the realm of the classic application of the theory of the Oedipus complex. For example, if the analyst makes associations with the myth of Oedipus, those associations will never be the same in different moments of his/her practice, and one can never predict where they will lead. Another important characteristic of the oedipal preconception is its constant reference to the mental (sphere). For example, the baby first seeks the mind of the mother, in order to arrive at the physical breast, and not the other way around. Therefore, the oedipal preconception contains a triangle: the mind of the baby, the mind of the mother, and the breast.

It is in the tridimensional space that the mother’s mind reserves to receive the preconception of the baby where a conception arises. It is in such space of creation where the baby feels the rhythm of the milk, of gentleness and of love. It is not difficult to understand, in this model, why some children do not succeed in taking the breast, if the mother’s mind is not there. Alternatively, why there exists in many people dissociation between the material and the psychic (Bion, 1962a,b).

In a complementary and spiral way, the oedipal preconception seeks the mind of the parents in order to conceive of the reality of the family, analogically as the family seeks the society, and society seeks improvement of the many levels that support the babies. If this does not occur adequately, the individual may spend life in a state in which he feels things but does not suffer (experience) them, which means also that he cannot solve his problems because he cannot experience (conceive of) them.

The *realization of the oedipal preconception* shows *two tendencies*: ‘*social-ism*’ *tendency as opposed to the narcissistic tendency*. Such tendencies spread in a spectral model, a non-structural field of work and are one of the facets of the psychoanalytical object (Bion, 1962a). A practical aspect of such spectral view is in the fact that for social-ism to occur it is necessary that the psyche renounces the possibilities that are embodied in the term omnipotence

(narcissistic pole). For example, for an individual to socialize' (i.e., to relate to others) depends on renouncing the belief in a single explanation for facts. Such belief reproduces the experience of the baby as being the center of the world and that the breast is constantly at his disposition. Without giving up such belief, which involves tolerating the frustration of incompleteness (principle of *Uncertainty*), the human babies do not succeed in passing to another level of psychic experience, which is thinking. To think is a process, which implies recognition that a link exists between two other people apart from him. If this tridimensional concept is not accepted, there will never be social-ism and the individual will not be able to enjoy the benefits of a third person, initially the father, later the family, finally the society. All of them possess a 'container' that complements the mother's function in those areas where she cannot or is not capable of functioning.

All the *ethical-aesthetical principles* express human *capacities*, and, at the same time, its *limits*. There is a constant interaction between capacity and limits. The characteristics of oedipal preconception in Bion suggested that where Freud speaks about the *dissolution* of the Oedipus complex, Bion's ideas of transformations (meaning: transformation as both creation and destruction of forms), also perceived the *evolution* of the Oedipus complex (Chuster, 2018). That is, in a certain way one can say that Bion put the future of humanity upon the dependence on a growing ability to cope with the simultaneously increasing differences between human beings. Chuster named this an ethical-aesthetical *principle of singularity* (Chuster 2002), in order to observe and emphasize all the clear confrontations in which it is impossible to decide about the origins of the facts (*undecidable principle*) and a solution between individuals can no longer be purely and simply effected by means of the elimination of what is different.

For example, some patients hold the belief that a group only establishes itself by first excluding of what is different, then devaluing the difference (i.e., 'otherness') and, finally, moving to destroy it. Such example of transformation in hallucinosis excludes the singularity of the internal group of the individuals. In some patients, this can be observed as a predisposition to involve the analyst in a conniving relationship, disrespectful of the truth, in which the social representation of the individual is not considered and discussed, disregarding his responsibility for events, and/or disregarding the fundamental necessity to have more than one vertex to elaborate conflicts (principle of *Complexity*). Moreover, one need to observe and interpret what Chuster called an *ethical-aesthetical barrier* (Chuster 2018) based on trust and sincerity of words that generates character, based on courage, compassion and respect for life and truth.

The analyst must place himself in the session in a mental state susceptible to receive the turbulence of the applications of the psychoanalytical object (Bion 1962b). For this, he needs to rely on his *psychoanalytical personality* function. In this regard, the abilities between analysts vary greatly, as well as within each analyst from one situation to another. The psychoanalytical ability is not stable, because it depends on the interaction with both the oedipal configuration and its evolution. What can improve this ability, besides a personal analysis, as best as possible, (although one cannot a priori define what that may be) is a *mental*

state as free as possible of memory, desire and the need for comprehension. That means one should try to observe the present moment free of any expectations brought by past ideas or desires of future results. The terms used by Bion carries a powerful penumbra of associations, a kind of a mystery in its core, aimed at forcing analysts to think repeatedly about their technique.

The associative exercise with the myth of Oedipus (Chuster, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2014, 2018) helps to develop the intuition and the capacity to decide an adequate version of 'language of achievement' (Bion, 1970) to be used in the history that unfolds in the analytical process. At the same time, one needs a kind of 'guardian angel', which Chuster named '*ethical-aesthetical principles of observation*' (Chuster, 2002, 2003, 2014, 2018).

III. Ab. Celia Fix Korbivcher's Autistic Transformations and Unintegrated Transformations

Celia Fix Korbivcher (2005, 2010, 2013b, 2017) further develops Bion's approach in proposing two new groups of transformations: *the autistic transformations and unintegrated transformations*. These concepts represent an effort to facilitate the understanding of autistic and unintegrated cores in neurotic patients, expanding the understanding of clinical situations when the atmosphere of analysis looks like an "absence of affective life" or when states of threat of the loss of existence itself prevail expressed by intense corporeal manifestations without representation in mind. Both causes in the mind of the analyst a high level of distress. In autistic states the patient holds in his/her mind the analyst as someone deprived of existence. This has an impact of generating unintegrated states in the analyst's mind, which often disrupts his capacity to identify the quality of the patient communication.

Korbivcher (2005, 2010, 2013a,b, 2017) gradually formulated a synthesis of Bion's work, mainly his ideas of psychotic and non-psychotic parts of personality (1957) and his Theory of Transformation (1965), together with Tustin's work on Autistic and Unintegrated States (1986, 1990).

The evolution of Korbivcher's synthetic contribution can be traced to specific elements of Tustin's and Bion's conceptualizations.

According to Frances Tustin (1986, 1990), autistic phenomena appear mainly in individuals with exacerbated sensitivity and extreme auto-sensuality. For these individuals, awareness of bodily separation from their primary object occurred abruptly in infancy or early childhood and before they have acquired the capacity to bear it. They experienced separation as if parts of their own body or of their self was torn away from them, with a consequent deep threat of imminent annihilation, with resultant internal holes, an analogy to "black holes". Such experiences lead the individual to develop autistic maneuvers, in which he withdraws himself into a "protective shell" and remains absorbed with auto-sensual activities. The relationship established with the object in the autistic realm occurs through *autistic objects and autistic shapes*. The individual, in this way, obtains a state of continuity with the object protecting him

from unbearable experiences of vulnerability when facing the awareness of separation from the object. Autistic objects are experiences with hard objects and by the contact with borders. The autistic object covers the awareness of the absence of the object, so there is a suppression of the feelings of terror coming from the object's absence. Autistic shapes consist of sensorial experiences that acquire forms that are entirely particular to that individual, not shared with others. These are experiences with soft objects as well as with bodily substances felt as comforting and calming. Their physical action promotes the rudiments of the notion of limits that contain a space in their interior (Tustin, 1986, 1990).

Further, Korbivcher (2005, 2010, 2013b, 2017) developed ideas, linking autistic and unintegrated phenomena to Bion's theory, particularly to the theory of Transformations and his thoughts on embryonic mind written in his last papers.

The notion of Bion about a multidimensional mind offers a basis for the idea of other types of transformations.

Korbivcher expanded on Tustin's inclusion of autistic and unintegrated phenomena in the theory of Transformations and proposed the constitution of *two new groups of transformation: autistic transformations and unintegrated transformations* that could be located along with transformations of the neurotic and the psychotic range.

Autistic transformations according to Korbivcher develop in an autistic environment, which implies the absence of the notion of an object. The relationship between "me" and "not-me" is substituted by "sensations objects" – autistic objects and autistic shapes – with no representation in the mind. Absence of emotional life, emptiness, and auto-sensorial activities are some of the invariants in autistic transformations.

When Bion introduced the concept of transformations in hallucinosis in the theory of Transformations (1965), he considerably expanded the field of observation in psychoanalysis. He highlighted psychotic phenomena with different qualities than those considered thus far just projective identification phenomena. With the introduction of autistic transformations in the theory of Transformations, the field of phenomena widens even further. The non-representation phenomena present in the mind are included in autistic transformations, which make those transformations belong to a separate universe – *an autistic area* – organized by a specific logic, different from those of neurosis and psychosis. In neurotic and psychotic areas, according to Bion (1962b), the emotional links L (love), H (hate), K (knowledge), and their negatives permeate any relationship that connects objects. In the autistic area, however, there is no notion of internal or external object, so we may presume that this is an area of absence of links, *an area of "no-links"*. The dimension of the mind to which autistic transformations belongs is of "existing" and "not existing" and not K or – K (knowledge; no knowledge) as they occur in the groups of transformations proposed by Bion.

Autistic phenomena would belong to an area connected to *beta elements*, but they are *of different quality*. Bion defined beta elements as sensorial elements not transformed by alpha function and therefore, they are not appropriate for thought. They are non-digested sensorial stimuli, and are unloaded or expelled, with the intention of freeing the mental apparatus of the

accumulation of tension. This creates a barrier made of beta elements - the Beta screen - which means an accumulation of beta elements.

Autistic phenomena, on the other hand, have a motionless nature of *belonging to the inanimate world*. One can suppose that, like alpha and beta elements, which, when grouped, give rise respectively to the contact barrier and the Beta screen, the grouped autistic elements create a protective “autistic barrier”. The individual seeks protection through this autistic barrier and, with auto-sensual activities, generates his own object, an object with autistic characteristics (Tustin, 1986, 1990). Unlike beta elements, autistic elements do not provide relief through discharge, but offer protection in situations in which the individual is in a state of terror facing the threat of losing the notion of his own existence. (Korbivcher, 2005, 2010, 2013b)

According to Esther Bick (1968, 1986), unintegrated phenomena manifest in all human beings since birth. These states can move toward some integration through a continuous interaction with an object that can fulfill the infant’s initial sensorial needs. This interaction provides the constitution of the rudiments of the notion of self. If this interaction does not occur in a favorable manner, the infant may experience states of extreme vulnerability. Therefore, a chaotic state caused by the terror of losing the limits of one’s own body emerges. Ultimately, what prevails is the threat of losing the notion of existence itself. Threats of falling into a “black hole”, dissolving, and spilling are expressions of these states.

Tustin (1986), referring to non-integration, writes:

“In psychotherapy, as patients emerge from autism, they show very clearly that they are on the brink of ‘falling’ or being ‘dropped’. Breaks of continuity of the physical presence of the analyst, such as weekends and vacations are not experienced by such patients as rejection, as they would be in patients in a neurotic state of response, but as actual physical breaks ... Quite literally and physically, they feel they are ‘let down.’ The ground seems to have opened beneath their feet, and they feel on the edge of a chasm which opens before them ... In their elemental state of psychic development they had felt that they were falling into a void with nothing to catch them or to break a fall” (p. 193f.).

This primary wound of the physical separation from the mother can then reappear in the other situations of separation. In Tustin’s (1990) view, the loss of the notion of existence is likely the greatest threat that a human being can experience. She stated that this threat is worse than death itself. When facing death, a human being leaves the body behind, whereas when the threat is the loss of the notion of existence itself, nothing remains.

In his late works, Bion (1977*, 1979b, 1980, 1991/1992, 1997) demonstrated a strong interest in the functioning of the embryonic mental states and in the manifestations of primordial phenomena.

In 1975 he posed the following questions in a meeting of the Los Angeles Psycho-Analytic Society: “Is it possible for us, as psychoanalysts, to think that there may still be vestiges in the human being that would suggest a survival in the human mind, analogous to that

in the human body, of evidence in the field of optics that once there were optic pits, or in the field of hearing that once there were auditory pits? Is there any part of the human mind, which still betrays signs of an ‘embryological’ intuition, either visual or auditory?” (Bion 1989 [1977], p. 42).

According to Bion (1991/1992), the mental equivalents of embryonic remnants are visible even when the individual exercises the developed function of speech. One of the fundamental discoveries of psychoanalysis is contact with these archaic mental states, primitive patterns of behavior, and manifestations that can be detected even in the most civilized and cultured individuals. Subsequently, Bion also referred to a state of mind in which ideas or thoughts had never been conscious and/or unconscious and whose origin is out of reach: “... the nearest I can get to giving it a provisional title, is the inaccessible state of mind. ...” (Bion 1997, p. 50).

In reference to *proto-emotions*, Bion (1974, 1975) proposed the term ‘sub-thalamic fear’. He defined it as a type of fear that is not controlled by the mind and, therefore, does not acquire meaning. Sub-thalamic fear refers to bodily manifestations of remnants of prenatal parts involving the adrenal glands and adrenaline secretion, which are activated at certain moments, leading the individual to unthoughtful fight and flight reactions.

Korbivcher hypothesizes that Bion in his last works may be perhaps starting to formulate in this way a category of phenomena akin to *unintegrated phenomena*. Consequently, she argues for inclusion of that kind of phenomena in the theory of Transformations.

Unintegrated transformations, per Korbivcher, are characterized by intense non-mental bodily manifestations. They are developed in an unintegrated domain, resulting in the absence of the delimitation of the self and of the notion of a separate object. A state of permanent threat and vulnerability and a state of terror of losing the notion of existence itself are some of the invariants in unintegrated transformations.

Autistic phenomena evolve from unintegrated phenomena. Thus, they are related but have different characteristics. In unintegrated states, the relationship between “me” and “not-me” is not established by projective identification, as in neurotic and psychotic areas, or by adhesive equation, as in the autistic areas. In these states, there is no adhesion or identification with an object. There is no discrimination of interior or exterior. By contrast, the self-spreads, causing the state of a permanent threat of falling, spilling or dissolving. In these circumstances, the individual typically reacts by attempting to create autistic protective maneuvers as a means of obtaining a more cohesive state through his body.

Unintegrated transformations provide the expansion of the analyst’s observation field to the unintegrated part of the personality beyond the autistic part. So, the analytical field expands to areas that are not yet integrated, in which the notion of a boundary that can hold emotional content together has not been developed.

Taking the notions embodied in “Transformations” as a model, autistic and unintegrated transformations modify the understanding of autistic phenomena and unintegrated phenomena.

The analyst becomes involved in the context of the emotional experience shared with the patient, and his observations emerge as a link from a chain of successive movements deriving from the pair's interaction (Korbivcher, 2005. 2010, 2013b). The proposal of autistic transformations and unintegrated transformations allows the analyst, based on his emotional experience, to identify autistic and unintegrated phenomena in neurotic patients as well, with the ensuing consequence of having an added opportunity to transformatively affect them.

It is necessary to point out, however, that by proposing autistic transformations, one is dealing with mental configurations of autistic characteristics rather than with pathological autism. Similarly, to how Bion (1965*) emphasizes hallucinosis phenomena by proposing transformations in hallucinosis, which are not hallucinations, Korbivcher is proposing autistic transformations to distinguish between autistic phenomena and pathological autism.

III. B. NORTH AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS

Bion's work has not influenced North American psychoanalysis to the same extent as in the other IPA regions. One may count the number of class hours offered on Bion by those North American institutes certified by the International Psychoanalytical Association that post their training programs online. In those institutes, the number of seminars covering his work range between none and eighteen. Most offer around four to six classroom sessions over the four or five years of training (the institute offering eighteen seminars is an outlier). If an institute's curriculum reflects its psychoanalytic values, one may say that North America acknowledges Bion's work, but does not emphasize it.

Relatively few North American analysts would state that they work primarily in accordance with Bion's approach. Additionally, how one defines terms such as "Bion's approach" or "Bion's theory" inevitably reflects one's personal study and interpretation of his work, which Bion encouraged explicitly. Bion had visited Los Angeles for a set of seminars and supervision the previous year, in 1967. He moved there in 1968, even though his work had little practical influence in the United States. Bion had become very well known in the UK as a leader of the Klein group, and had served as President of the British Psychoanalytical Society, but he detested the politics and difficulties associated with the job. More than that, many of his colleagues began to doubt his adherence to Kleinian ideas as he presented his newer ideas to his colleagues. Invoking Prometheus, Grotstein described why Bion "fled" Britain: "Some say that before he came to Los Angeles, Bion's liver was metaphorically eaten by vultures in London" (Grotstein 2007, p. 20). Much of the problem centered on Bion's concept of O — the starting symbol of Bion's theory of transformations — which he first presented to the society in 1963 (Bion 1963b). Bion quickly found himself marginalized at the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, which manifested the prevalent North American psychoanalytic culture of American ego psychology, which itself was deeply averse to Kleinian ideas. He was sought out as an analyst only by a small number of candidates and colleagues. Several of Bion's analysands began teaching his work locally, but it was his analysand, James Grotstein, whose contributions eventually seeded North America with Bion's ideas.

Recent North American psychoanalytic dictionaries divide Bion's writings into three periods: the early period, when he explored the functioning of groups; the middle period between mid-50's and mid-seventies of theory building; and final period when he expressed himself in a literary form (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012, p. 24). However, as with the international community, 'Bion-informed' North American analysts mostly use Bléandonu's method of dividing Bion's work into four periods: the early, pre- psychoanalytic group period; the psychosis period, extending from 1950 through 1959; the epistemological period of theory building, from 1962 through 1970; and the later period, which encompasses the international seminars, several short papers, and a three-part novel (Bléandonu 1994). Bléandonu subdivides the epistemological period chronologically into two parts, the later part commencing with Bion's book, *Transformations* (Bion 1965). Internationally, some psychoanalysts use only those of Bion's concepts published up until about 1963 or 1965, while others use all of his work. Analysts internationally have adopted the term "late Bion" to denote his work from *Transformations* onwards, until his death in 1979. In this context, *Transformations* (1965) may be viewed as marking both the transition between middle and "late" Bion, as well as origin of the differences between the two groups of analysts working with his concepts. Consequently, a North American version of Bion's theory of transformations is inevitably marked by the same differences and variations.

For the sake of complete representation, this entry includes a section describing additional usages of the term that do not refer to Bion's work, within other orientations of North American psychoanalysis.

III. Ba. James Grotstein

James Grotstein was the preeminent North American — and, perhaps, international — scholar of Bion studies. His work has influenced every North American contributor to Bion studies, most of who communicated with him directly in some form. Grotstein's first and last published contributions took up Bion's work (Malin and Grotstein, 1966; Grotstein, 2019), and he contributed four books related directly to Bion's influence and work (Grotstein 1981, 2000, 2007, 2009a, b). Perhaps "A Beam of Intense Darkness: Wilfred Bion's Legacy to Psychoanalysis" (2007) offers Grotstein's most encompassing rendition of Bion's approach to psychoanalysis. Grotstein did not structure his book as a Bion primer for the new reader. Rather, it reflects his personal and complex take on the whole of Bion's work. While his papers and books are comprehensive in content, Grotstein's writing style is evocative, effusive, poetic, and allusive, which may overload some readers. His intention seems to have been to put everything he could think of in as many ways as possible, hoping that readers would find those parts that spoke most directly to them.

Chapter 20 discusses transformations (Grotstein 2007, pp. 213-234). It succeeds best for readers with a basic understanding of the concept. Grotstein advanced the position that "Bion invoked the concept of transformations to move psychoanalytic thinking from stasis to flux – that is, the constancy of movement and change – and to help us to understand the

intermediate processes by which we ‘learn from experience’: how we ‘digest’ experiences and ‘metabolize’ them into emotional meaning *and* objective significance” (p. 213; italics in original). He wrote that the concept of transformations “is the mathematical function of adjusting to being alive. Remaining emotionally human is its incarnation” (p. 233). Grotstein states that the primary O, or the primary transformed, of psychoanalysis is, equivalently, emotions, emotional experience, and “emotional truth” (p. 219). He describes transformations with metaphoric models of the “alimentary canal”, “synapse”, “immune system”, and the “Möbius strip”, intending each metaphor and its description not only to describe one of transformations’ (innumerable) forms, but also to evoke the reader’s imagination to further transform and organize their understanding of the concept as they find useful. Grotstein adds these to Bion’s forms of rigid motion and projective transformations, as well as transformations in hallucinosis, to which he devotes several pages of discussion. He also discusses Korbivcher’s contribution of “autistic transformations” (pp. 229-230).

III. Bb. Lawrence Brown

Lawrence Brown, who has written on Bion’s work extensively, wrote a book entitled, “Transformational Processes in Clinical Psychoanalysis: Dreaming, Emotions, and the Present Moment”, which he dedicated to Grotstein (Brown 2019). Brown makes significant contributions to studying and applying Bion’s work in this incisive and thoughtful book. Its title situates Bion’s theory of transformations as the core orientation for psychoanalytic observation, clinical intervention, and subsequent theorizing.

Chapter 4, “Bion’s *Transformations* and clinical practice”, presents an excellent overview of the concept suitable for both newer and more advanced Bion students alike, and explores its clinical ramifications in depth. Brown emphasizes the orienting power of Bion’s work when stating that the theory of transformations and its wide-ranging applications may well “suggest a new and additional *Weltanschauung* for psychoanalysis; a world view that emphasizes constant change, evolution and growth” (p. 203). He offers two chapters studying Korbivcher’s proposal of autistic transformations, and adds another category he calls somatic transformations; his clinical example depicts “a transformational process occurring that oscillated between Ms. G.’s body experienced as dismembered and, only moments later, she was sufficiently integrated to communicate verbally” (p. 217). Brown’s work provides a creative and useful example of considering psychoanalysis from the vertex of transformational processes.

Together, Grotstein and Brown’s books provide a comprehensive overview of North American perspectives on Bion’s work in general, and the theory of transformations in particular.

III. Bc. Howard Levine

Howard Levine has made significant use of Bion’s concept of transformations through

multiple papers and two books, one edited with Brown, and the other with Giuseppe Civitarese; the latter contains Levine's paper on O, the originating element of transformative mental processes (Levine and Brown, 2013; Levine and Civitarese 2016). Levine uses the term "transformations" more frequently than most other North American contributors on Bion's work. For example, he wrote that according to Bion "the therapeutic action of analysis—the aim of which is transformation and expansion of the patient's capacity for psychic functioning—is closely linked to the analyst's function as container for the patient's unmetabolized and projected emotional experience"; "This is a view of the ego as possessing a vital and continuing function of unconsciously transforming, naming, signifying, resignifying, organizing, and reorganizing via recall and association"; and, "The capacity to transform the inchoate raw data of experience into psychologically representable (mentalizable) elements is a major goal of psychological development, the essence of successful human mental activity and at the heart of the transformational aims of the psychoanalytic process" (Levine 2007, p. 963; Levine 2009, p. 342; Levine 2014, p. 218). In all cases, Levine employs Bion's basic concept without modification.

III. Bd. Annie Reiner

Annie Reiner examines the O concept within the theory of transformations by focusing on its all-encompassing mystical, metaphysical, and religious elements in her book, "Bion and Being" (Reiner 2012). "O represents an ineffable metaphysical state beyond rational understanding and, therefore beyond verbal description" (p. *xii*). She writes of achieving the mental state suitable for contact with and access to O, and refers to it as signifying a "daunting and infinite new analytic space"; "a place of experiential awareness rather than judgment", a "state of mind, a state of flux"; "selfhood and being"; "a kind of truth known to us on an instinctual level beyond conscious awareness"; other descriptors appear throughout the book (pp. *xii*; 2, 37). Reiner invokes poetry, religion, art, philosophy, and other vertices to evoke intimations of the concept, which she also states clearly lies beyond language and cognitive thought (see also Chapter 3 of "The Quest for Conscience and the Birth of the Mind" [Reiner 2018]).

III. Be. Thomas Ogden and Judith Mitrani

Two other North American contributors, **Thomas Ogden** and **Judith Mitrani**, integrate Bion's work into their multi-dimensional approach to primitive states of mind. Ogden's papers and books do not examine transformations *per se*, because his general interests are oriented towards Bion's concepts of reverie and normal projective identification. He mentions the term rarely, using it in Bion's basic way, for example, "Bion proposes a group of psychological functions (which together he calls 'the alpha function') that convert sensory impressions into a form which can be psychologically recorded, organized, and remembered. These transformed sensory impressions are then available for conscious and unconscious thought" (Ogden 1992, p. 139). Like Ogden, Mitrani tends to focus on similar aspects of Bion's

work, and when using the term “transformations” employs it similarly as well. She writes that the container function involves, “Alpha-function or the metabolic or transformational capacity of the container or its ability to detoxify or render meaningful those projected aspects of the infant’s experience” (Mitrani 1996, p. 121). Years later she wrote that the mother “must bear the full effect of these projections upon her mind and body for as long as need be in order to be able to think about and to understand them, a process that Bion referred to as transformation” (Mitrani 2014, pp. 19, 68).

III. Bf. Louis Brunet

An example of a Canadian-French integrative approach is **Louis Brunet’s** (2010) synthesis of ‘Late Bionian’ (as per Grotstein, 2005) and French (De M’Uzan, 1994) thinking on the subject. Brunet offers a specific clinical construction of Containment with “fantasmatic” and “real” aspects that have to be understood jointly. Brunet’s complex taxonomy of five steps, leading to an adequate containing ‘transformative’ response, includes intermediate steps of Grotstein’s (2005) elaboration of ‘inductions that touch the mother/analyst’ and De M’Uzan’s (1994) amalgam of such ‘inductions’ together with mother’s/analyst’s ‘touched off’ unconscious conflicts and anxieties, resulting in ‘chimeras’. Such chimeras must be “understood and transformed” by the analyst/mother. This work may be seen as “psychic digestion” both of the projections of the patient/child and of the analyst’s/mother’s own conflicts and affects mobilized by the projection. The analyst/mother must then give back a “digestible content,” while countering a danger of sending to the patient counter-projective identifications (See the separate entry CONTAINMENT). The emphasis here is on the transformative interpretation, which echoes Grotstein’s view; and in a different way also in French Canada influential was André Green (2006), who conceptualizes transformation as a passage from id impulse to unconscious representation.

III. Bg. (Different) Use of the Term in Other Conceptual Frameworks of North American Psychoanalysis

III. Bga. Developmental Transformation

Generally, as one of the main concepts of epigenetically conceptualized contemporary psychoanalytic developmental theory, the concept of ‘developmental transformation’ reflects the internal *capacity to organize and reorganize experience, and consolidate and reconsolidate new psychic structures and formations*, throughout life. As compared to other modes of change, which result from gradual progression and quantitative shifts, developmental transformation is defined as *a new way of organizing the antecedent components* (Olesker 2011).

So broadly defined concept of developmental transformation presents an intense interest for wide range of North American analysts, ranging from contemporary Freudians to Self Psychologists.

III. Bgaa. Contemporary Freudian Elaboration of ‘Developmental Transformation’

Developmental Transformation is an heir to studies of complex nature of psychosexual (Freud 1905) and psychosocial (Erikson) development, including Freud’s transformation of pleasure ego into reality ego (1911), re-transcription of memory and transformation of meaning in *Nachträglichkeit* (1895, 1918), transformation of traumatic affects into signal affects (1926); Erikson’s age specific crises (1950, 1956, 1984), as a whole life extension of embryologic concept of epigenesis (successive formation of entirely new structures) throughout the life span of the relations of self with other, Anna Freud’s (1963) developmental lines, and others.

Example of second generation of studies of developmental transformations of drive and affectivity, was the area of transformation of the traumatic anxiety into signal anxiety. This approach, pioneered by Schur (1955) and followed by number of contributors (Engel 1962, Schmaele 1964, Krystal 1974, 1985) postulates that affect precursors undergo epigenetic developmental transformation which includes de-somatization, differentiation and verbalization. As a result, affects become usable as signals.

More recently, Jack Novick (1999), and Kerry K. Novick and Jack Novick (1991, 1992, 1994, 2001) examine the multifaceted relationship between trauma, memory, *Nachträglichkeit*/deferred action in view of post-oedipal developments of latency and adolescence, with resultant re-formulations of *Nachträglichkeit* as ‘the past transforms and is transformed by the present’, where each phase brings something unique to the mix, which may compensate for earlier difficulties or raise prior dormant issues to traumatic intensity (J. Novick and K. Novick 2001). In view of these authors, the concept of developmental transformation is to serve as a layered counterpoint to a view of adult memories of latency and adolescence having mainly a defensive screen function (Novick and Novick 1994).

Similarly, Harold Blum (1994, 2008) revisits and updates Freud’s evolution of his views of trauma, memory, representational processes and pathogenesis, in the context of analytic reconstruction. Considering the complex temporal and causal issues involved in the transformation of meaning and function throughout development, he proposes the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* as an unrecognized precursor of the concept of developmental transformation.

Focus on discontinuity of progressive organizations and reorganizations, yielding developmental transformations (A. Freud 1936, Neubauer 1996, 2003) of drive and affectivity and memory, object relations, ego and self, giving rise of various inner reorganizations of conflicts, compromise formations and unconscious fantasies (Brenner 1982, Kris 1988), has clinical implications in analytic work with widened scope of patient populations, where there is an acknowledgement of different paths to facilitate developmental transformation. Clinical interventions which can facilitate the dormant transformative capacity (Lament 2003, Olesker and Lament 2008), acting as a new platform for further growth (Olesker 2011) may include analytic construction (Freud 1937) and reconstruction of meaning of the memories, leading to reorganization that encompasses multiple self and object representations (Blum 1994, 2019). On a session-to-session minute-to-minute basis, such constructive and reconstructive work may necessitate ‘rolling’ (i.e. ongoing, continuous) metaphoric interpretative translations-

transformations, between, and of, different experiential domains, from pre-psychic pre-symbolic (action, somatosensory, visceral) modes of experience towards unconscious symbolism of dreams and finally preconscious symbolism of language, may constitute a meeting point with Bion's as well as Green's conceptualizations of transformation (Grotstein 2014, Green 2006, Papiasvili 2016, Papiasvili and Mayers 2017).

III. Bgab. Transformation of the Self in Self Psychology

From the point of view of Self psychology, the self as a core of personality, is developmentally established, preserved and transformed in the context of selfobjects, defined as others who are experienced as part of the self and who serve essential functions for the self (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012). In the clinical context, this was thought to be accomplished through the process of '*transmuting internalization*', through which the patient becomes able to take over the selfobject functions previously provided by the analyst (Kohut 1971). More recently, Socarides and Stolorow (1984) elaborated on the developmental transformation of affectivity within the frame of Self Psychology, highlighting the use of affects as self-signals, and on the primary role of selfobject transference bond as the central developmentally transformative agent, questioning the importance of the 'optimal frustration' leading to 'transmuting internalization'.

III. Bh. Hybrid Model: Transformation Subsystems and Transformational Function in The Bi-Personal Field of Robert Langs

Drawing on contributions of Post-Kleinian Object Relations theories, especially Bion, Winnicott, Racker, Grinberg and Bleger, added to by Freud, Stone, Greenson and Gill, Searles and Green, prominently inspired by Barangers (1961-62, 1966, 1969, 2008) conceptualization of Psychoanalytic Situation as a Dynamic bipersonal Field, Langs (1976) constructs an elaborate model of the Communicative bipersonal Field, with specific articulation of transformative properties, specially within the realm of his B and C type fields. Modifying Freud's Topographic Theory of the Unconscious, Preconscious and Conscious systems, which in Langs' model become 'Deep Unconscious', 'Superficial Unconscious' and 'Conscious' systems, in conjunction with Signal theory of anxiety, Langs stresses the unconscious perception rather than unconscious fantasies and conflicts. Triggering anxiety signals, emotionally laden perceptions are visually encoded and stored in the Deep Unconscious system, according to the laws of primary process. Transformation subsystems operate between the Deep Unconscious and Conscious systems, effecting first the visual encoding of elements of emotionally intense and intolerable unconscious percepts and their storage in the Deep Unconscious. Their transformation and access to the conscious mind are facilitated by the analyst's interpretative here-and-now interactively affectively tuned messages. Therapist's transformative interpretive action is progressively introjected by the patient as a transformational function, through complicated working through process. Because the most emotionally intense unconsciously transmitted and encoded messages inevitably involve

elements of primitive death anxiety and projections of death images, both analyst and patient may be affected by them and the transformation processes of both can become mutually impeded in a repetitive mutually enforcing transference-countertransference-resistance cycle within the bi-personal field without clearly delineated boundaries. In this context, Langs also describes how particular dysfunction of the transformation subsystems and lack of activation of transformative function may result in psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and delusions.

III. C. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

III. Ca. Antonino Ferro

Antonino Ferro developed the idea of “transformations in dreams”, to describe the analyst's attitude to receive the patient's communications as if it were the narration of a dream; this attitude allows the analyst to make the patient's communication less concrete, i.e., ‘to deconcretize’ it.

These transformations in dreams become the “vertex” organizer of the field (see entries INTERSUBJECTIVITY, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS) and produce "characters" which generate narrative derivatives that transform the analyst-patient relationship. Therefore, session after session analyst and patient change their mutual positioning and the activity of deconstruction or ‘de-concretization’ of the manifest text opens it up to as many levels of interpretation as possible as well as to intercepting a wide polysemy of meanings in the patient's telling.

“By combining Bion's concept of waking dream thought with those of the field and of the characters of the session, we arrive at a space-time in which maelstroms of β -elements are transformed by the field's ‘ α -function’ into oneiric thoughts of the field. We work on these with *narrative transformations* (which are not decoded, but in which transformation takes place through the encouragement of narration), in addition to the classical transformations described by Bion (1965) — rigid-motion transformations, projective transformations, and transformations in hallucinosis — and transformation in dreaming as postulated by myself.” (Ferro 2009, p. 219)

III. Cb. Fernando Riolo

Riolo (2007) considers the different types of Bionian transformation as the forms assumed by the relations between the non-psychotic and psychotic parts of the personality—that is, between, on the one hand, the part which, being capable of tolerating conflict and frustration, and, on the other, the part—characterized by omnipotence, hate, envy, greed, rivalry—that is unable to tolerate the absence of satisfaction and the existence of objects independent of the self, so that it has to construct an internal and external reality directed towards the evacuation of frustration, the experience of self and the knowledge of self.

In Riolo's view (2007), the fate of meaning lies between these two processes: together with affect and representation meaning may be recognized, repressed, projected, denied or expelled. Riolo concludes that analysis, in its specific co-operational sense, becomes a system of transformations whereby unconscious somatopsychic processes—whether or not repressed—acquire the conditions for representability and become capable of translation into thoughts and meanings. That is in fact what analytic transformation consists of: what was originally a drive-related or affective quantity, a sensation, emotion or action, is turned into a dream image, the representation of a wish or anxiety, a word, an interpretation or a meaning.

III. Cc. British Elaborations

On the whole the British have largely held onto Bion's earlier work on 'K' (from "Learning from Experience") and differentiated this from the defensive 'knowing-about' referred to in Transformations. They combine this earlier version of 'K' with thinking about 'O' mostly from the point of view of 'being'.

In relation to the book "Transformations", British analysts have tended to focus on the clinical illustrations (Abel-Hirsch 2019). These are highly thought of. They include the patient in whom there is a dramatic change of state in which what were bodily pains, become threatening external figures. Another illustration, and one that has had a considerable impact on British clinical work, is of the patient who is 'acting out of rivalry' (Bion 1965, p. 136). It illustrates 'transformations in hallucinosis' in which "a deep-seated and all-pervading rivalry with the aims of analysis has been awakened... He [the patient] persistently probes the analyst to elicit unhelpful responses. Bion suggests that these activities and sensations essentially are the same as hallucinations" (Taylor 2011 p.1107). Bion's clinical illustrations are drawn on for the light they throw on the patient's model of mind and the nature of enactment in the session. His clinical work being a resource for analysts across the British groups (Contemporary Freudian, Independent, Kleinian).

The British tradition places great emphasis on the patient and analyst 'being-in' the session - with discipline of memory and desire - but with little reference to transformations in 'O'. Influential in this tradition is the work of **Betty Joseph** (1989). It is likely that this close colleague of Bion read past Bion's references to godhead, faith and 'O', but grasped the significance of Bion's attention to 'being' rather than 'knowing about'.

The editor of The Complete Works of W. R. Bion, **Chris Mawson**, in fact links the shift in Bion's thinking from epistemology [Learning from Experience] towards mental growth [Transformations] to discussions between Bion and Betty Joseph in the mid-1960's (Mawson 2019 p.619). For Joseph 'being' involves following the way the patient's internal object relations become expressed and played out in the present of the sessions. Bion's view that there is a reality that is intrinsically unknowable is not present in Joseph's work and possibly not in many Kleinian analyst's work. However, it is present for example in the work of the British Independent analyst **Michael Parsons**: "The existential uncertainty of knowing that we can

never be finally certain of who we are or what we are doing, has something terrible about it. It calls, in Bion's language, for faith in the 'O' of psychoanalysis." (Parsons 2005 p.32).

III. Cd. Avner Bergstein's Synthesis

In addition, creatively synthesizing British, Italian and Latin American contemporary thought **Israeli analyst Avner Bergstein** (2018), makes use of 'object centered' as well as 'field-centered' post-Bionian perspectives, as he further develops both within the context of complexity theory (2018). In this context, he draws on Chuster (2014) and Meltzer (1986), tracking Bion's move from a causal/explanatory attitude to an attitude that seeks to understand and accept the uncertainty that is inherent in the infinite complexity of human development and personal relations. In his view, this is the move from a finite two- or three-dimensional space to an infinite, complex, multidimensional space that the personality in whom psychotic mechanisms are paramount often reduces to a one-dimensional point. It is then especially within the purview of unrepressed unconscious of the psychotic parts of personality, on the edge of breakdown and fragmentation, that the deep clinical application of Bion-informed complexity, uncertainty and the infinite, find the area of psychoanalytic effectiveness.

IV. CONCLUSION

Due to its high abstraction, density, ambiguity and a complex interdisciplinary dialogue at its roots, Bion's "Transformations" can be considered the utmost challenging part of his work, presenting itself as a permanent defy to the reader.

In Latin America, such challenge was particularly undertaken in Brazil, where "Transformations" was intensively studied and much valued. The site of a scholarly research of Bion's thought, prominently including "Transformations" (Sandler), Brazil is also the site of many original contributions to various aspects of "Transformations" specifically. One example of such a creative flourish is work of Arnaldo Chuster and others, who clarified and expanded the richness and depth of epistemological thinking of multiple dimensions of Bion's Transformations as the theory of observation as well as its application in clinical work.

Among prominent contemporary developments is Chuster's work on ethical-esthetic principles of observations, under the aegis of an overriding principle of complexity, which includes specific principles of uncertainty, infinity, singularity, incompleteness, undecidable of origin, and negative capability.

Other substantive contemporary development comes from the work of Celia Fix Korbivcher, who added to Bion's Transformations categories of unintegrated and autistic transformations. The concept of Autistic transformations, particularly, is a significant

contemporary development, which represents an effort to improve the understanding of autistic cores in neurotic patients, expanding the transformative aspect of clinical situations when the atmosphere of analysis looks like an "absence of emotional life", which causes in the mind of the analyst a high level of distress (while in the patient's mind, the analyst is someone deprived of existence).

In North America, Bion's theory of transformations is understood as underlying his:

- theory of functions
- theory of thinking and learning from experience
- theory of container-contained
- theory of emotional growth and development
- evolved system of clinical methodology and observation
- concept of observation of a personality
- theory of dreaming
- concept of aesthetics
- concept of evolution from the infinite realm of non-sensuous / psychic reality to the finite realm of sensuous and language based reality
- concept of evolution from unconscious to conscious mental processes
- concept of lateral communication
- concept of clinical intuition
- concepts of emotional turbulence and catastrophic change.

North American contribution lies primarily in furthering the theoretical conceptual elaborations and application to specific clinical conditions, e.g. metaphoric rendition of the generative flux of transformative movements (Grotstein, Reiner), extension of the range of evolution, growth, and psychic functioning (Brown), expansion of the representational range (Grotstein, Brown, Brunet), and integration of Bion's work into multidimensional approach to primitive states of mind in clinical situations (Ogden, Mitrani, Brunet, and, in a different way, Langs).

In addition, contemporary Freudian analysts use the term in the different context of the epigenetic concept of 'developmental transformation', and Self psychologists use it in the context of the 'transformation of the self'.

In Europe, the understanding of Bion's "Transformations" is guided by the thesis that what is transformed is the psychoanalytic object, a constant conjunction of invariants, whose appearance can differ according to the level of transformation it undergoes.

Among the numerous contemporary contributions are studies of transformations in dreams and narratives, to ‘deconcretize’ patients’ communication and generate polysemy of meaning (Ferro); view of psychoanalysis as a system of transformations, where somatopsychic processes acquire status of representability capable of translations into thoughts and meaning (Riolo); detailed clinical studies of movement from ‘knowing about’ to ‘being’ (Joseph), and exploration of the area of unrepressed unconscious of psychotic parts of personality with tendency to reduce multidimensional complex spaces into a unidimensional point (Bergstein).

Overall, wide ranging differences in interpretation of Bion’s work on “Transformations” and consequent plurality of its contemporary developments notwithstanding, there is an acknowledgement that it presents a substantive way to widen and deepen the field and tools of observation, orienting and ‘sensitizing’ the analyst during the session (and between sessions) to the parts of patients’ personalities, otherwise not readily accessible to the analytic view and discourse, requiring *psychic work of transformation in order to bring about change and growth*.

See also:

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

EGO PSYCHOLOGY

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

PSYCHOANALYTIC FIELD THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

THE UNCONSCIOUS

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THE UNCONSCIOUS

Tri-Regional Entry

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Allannah Furlong (North America) and Judy Gammelgaard (Europe)**

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I. INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITION

The notion of the unconscious has been universally accepted as the foundational discovery of psychoanalysis and a core assumption of psychoanalytic theory since its very beginning. Even though the concept underwent successive transformations in Freud's thinking, the unconscious of Freudian topography with its implication of a de-centered theory of subjectivity stands out as the distinctive and radical insight of classical psychoanalysis. While Freud was not the first to use the term, he was the first to give it a crucial and systematic place in his metapsychology and to develop a methodical approach to its various manifestations. Freud (1912a) has given a short excellent account of the grounds for the hypothesis of unconscious psychic processes, pointing to clinical phenomena like post-hypnotic suggestion and neurotic, primarily hysterical, symptoms, but also to non-pathological phenomena like jokes, parapraxes and dreams. The assumption of unconscious phenomena can be traced back to the practices of spiritual healing, animism, magnetism, mesmerism, hypnotism and XIX century medical psychology. These practices have in common the dual concept of the mind, which is made of what is observable and, its obverse, i.e., what is hidden and intuitively believed and/or perceived. While in the early years of his career, Freud seems to have embraced this neo-Cartesian dualism, gradually there emerged a conception of a radically different kind of unconscious, one that is not a second consciousness but a series of ongoing "psychical acts" which are qualitatively different from the rational, adult, conscious mind.

Psychoanalysts are not alone in their subjugation to the "stranger within", but they are unique in making the epistemological, clinical, and ethical implications of this disruptive, yet potentially transformative, presence the daily object of study. Absent the notion of unconscious processes, Freud argued, we are at a loss to explain mental phenomena (1915c, pp. 166-171). He "was never tired of insisting upon the arguments in support of it and combating the objections to it" (Strachey, in: Freud, 1915c, p.161).

Freud's first published use of the term "unconscious" occurred in 1893 in "Studies of Hysteria" (Freud, 1893) and the very last unfinished scrap of his theoretical writing from 1938, entitled "Some Elementary Lessons in Psychoanalysis" (Freud 1940c) is a fresh vindication of the term.

Summarizing, expanding and updating recent regional dictionaries (Akhtar, 2009; Auchincloss, 2012; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1973; Borensztein, 2014), the following **definition(s)**, of the Unconscious can be formulated:

Throughout the evolution of psychoanalytic theory, the concept of (The) Unconscious is used mainly in the following ways: the **Dynamic Unconscious**, which refers primarily to actively repressed material, unacceptable to the conscious mind; in a broad sense, it refers to all contents that are actively kept out of conscious awareness and which exert pressure in the direction of consciousness; the **System Unconscious**, which refers to an aspect of mind operating solely according to the 'pleasure-unpleasure' principle and 'primary process' thinking, governed by 'unconscious logic'; the **Descriptive Unconscious**, also called 'preconscious', which refers simply to the fact that a mental content is not at the moment conscious. The **contents of the Unconscious** include instincts (drives) and instinctual representatives; material accrued due to 'primal repression'; contents pushed down by the force of repression; and phylogenetic schemata that organize 'primal phantasies'. The **Unconscious as a quality**, in an **adjective form**, appears in the Structural theory/Second Topography of Id, Ego and Superego. Here the whole of ID (ES=it) is unconscious, but parts of Ego (Ich=I) and Superego (ÜBER ICH = Ideal I, internalized moral principles) are unconscious as well. Throughout the Freudian oeuvre and in many post-Freudian and contemporary psychoanalytic models, the adjective form is also part of ancillary notions such as **unconscious processes** and **processing**, unconscious **object relations**, unconscious **conflict**, unconscious **fantasy**, unconscious ego **functioning**, unconscious **communication**, unconscious **logic**, amential unconscious, and the 'real' (undecipherable) unconscious.

Chronologically, Freud's work can be divided into the following time periods: **The Discovery of the Dynamic Unconscious** which covers the period 1893-1900, until the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams*; the period between 1900 and 1923 can be titled either **The System Unconscious** or **The Topographic Unconscious**. Lastly, the period after 1923, following the publication of *The Ego and The Id*, can be referred to as **The Unconscious of the Structural Model/Second topography model** of the Mind. As Freud's theory building was non-linear and marked by increasing complexity, these necessarily overlap.

As a matter of form and style, Freud's abbreviations of Ucs, Pcs, and Cs will refer to the words Unconscious, Preconscious, and Conscious, respectively. Use of the capital or small letters in words like Unconscious, Id, Ego, Superego is consistent with the specific school's usage. The nomenclature of Topographic Theory (English-Speaking North American Psychoanalysis) is synonymous with the First/Early Topography of European and parts of French-speaking Canadian psychoanalytic parlance; North American Structural Theory and Late/Second Topography of European and parts of French-speaking North American psychoanalysis are also synonymous. Throughout, both names for respective theories are used side by side. Unless stated otherwise, the italics are used throughout to highlight conceptual terminology.

Freud's major theoretical contributions to the subject of the unconscious can be found in the following works: Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900b), *Papers on*

Metapsychology (1915 a, b, c) and *The Ego and The Id* (1923a). A summary of Freud's conceptualizations of the unconscious can also be found in: *The Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1916, 1917), *Two Encyclopedia Articles* (1923b), *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1933) and *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1940a). Strachey cautions the English reader to observe that an ambiguity resides in the English word 'unconscious' which is scarcely present in the German. The German words 'bewusst' and 'unbewusst' have the grammatical form of passive participles, and their usual sense is something like 'consciously known' and 'not consciously known'. For Freud, *consciousness and unconsciousness were both passive experiences*.

II. OVERVIEW OF FREUDIAN CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

II. A. The Discovery of the Dynamic Unconscious (1893-1900)

Psychoanalysis was born with Freud's revolutionary *discovery of the dynamic function of defense* in the etiology of hysteria. The defense against remembering (repression) clued Freud into the importance of resistance, "...a *psychical force in the patients which was opposed to the pathogenic ideas becoming conscious (being remembered)*. A new understanding seemed to open before my eyes when it occurred to me that this must no doubt be the same psychical force that had played a part in the generating of the hysterical symptom and had at that time prevented the pathogenic idea from becoming conscious" (Breuer & Freud, 1893-1895, p 268, original emphasis). This force of resistance, like its opposing counterpoint the upward force of the rejected pathogenic material, was to a certain extent quantifiable with memories "stratified" in proportion to their nearness to the "pathogenic nucleus". Moreover, it was precisely through its repression that the idea became the cause of morbid symptoms, that is, became pathogenic (ibid, p 285). In order to succeed, repression demands a permanent expenditure of force. Symptoms are the result of the failure of repression, that is to say, the return of the repressed. Simultaneously, the affect that is torn from the repressed idea, is used for a "somatic innervation" (ibid, p 285) appearing as a hysterical conversion into a bodily symptom. The innovative psychoanalytic method of free association developed out of the realization that "*it is quite hopeless to try to penetrate directly to the nucleus of the pathogenic organization*" (ibid, p 292, original emphasis) since the interior layers of the pathogenic organization are increasingly alien to the ego (ibid, p 290).

Not all experiences from early childhood undergo repression. The Freudian theory stipulated that the content of the unconscious consists in fixated childhood wishes marked by infantile sexuality. In this early period, as known from his correspondence to Fliess, (Freud, 1892-1899), Freud was developing what has become known as *the seduction theory*: the child has been seduced by an adult, a relation depositing disturbing traces which later appear in

consciousness, displaced and distorted by forces opposing their becoming conscious. The seduction theory was essentially a theory of pathogenic pre-adult sexual trauma, as a sole determinant of later psychopathology. The childhood traumatic experience may have been forgotten, dissociated, or repressed, only to be reactivated or to exert a deferred traumatic effect in adolescence, after puberty. An enduring legacy of the dynamic aspect of the unconscious was the notion of forces paired in dynamic opposition, resulting in new psychic formations. During 1893-1895, Freud spoke of the opposition between the affects associated with traumatic events and the moral prohibitions of the society. As Freud proceeded with his self-analysis, during 1895-1900, he came to see the opposing forces as increasingly more internal: during this time, the construction of his initial conception of the mental apparatus, organized by two forces paired in dynamic opposition, the unconscious wish and the reality oriented prohibition, was underway.

During this era, when the theory of the unconscious was not yet systematized, Freud was struck by the idea that psychic material was subjected from time to time to a *rearrangement*, a *transcription*. In his private correspondence to Wilhelm Fliess dated December 6, 1896, Freud (1892-1899) tells Fliess that he is working on the assumption that the "*psychical mechanism*" occurs in the form of *memory traces*. These are subjected to a process of stratification, rearranged in accordance to perception, and the memory traces become further subjected to transcription. What is being postulated here is that a transcription of scenes heard and seen but not yet properly understood continuously takes place in the psychic apparatus. This is the first indication of the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*. In the never published during his lifetime draft of the *Project* (1895), Freud explained hysteria in terms of *Nachträglichkeit*: "...a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action [*Nachträglichkeit*]" (Freud, 1895, p.365). Seen in this light, the unconscious contains distorted memory-traces of scenes from earliest childhood, which have been impossible to translate because the child has not yet mastered language or because at the time these scenes have been impossible for the child to understand. As a consequence, they have the quality of unsymbolized "*things*". This initial causal mechanism of the unconscious receded to the background when, in the next stage of theory development, Freud emphasized fantasy in place of pre-adult seduction trauma/scene as a sole determinant of later psychopathology (Freud, 1892-1899, Letter of September 21, 1897, p. 260). The idea of recollections as internal foreign bodies acting as inner attack was overshadowed by the idea of fantasy which gradually became the cornerstone of what Freud called psychical reality, although not without subsequent repeated questioning of the relative importance of '*sexual trauma*' vs '*fantasy*'. The realization of the importance of fantasy in mental events opened the door to the discovery of infantile sexuality and of the *universal fantasy of the Oedipus complex*, which is described in the ensuing letter of October 15, 1897: "One single thought of general value has been revealed to me. I have found, in my own case too, falling in love with the mother and jealousy of the father, and I now regard it as a universal event of early childhood... If that is so, we can understand the riveting power of Oedipus Rex ... the Greek legend seizes on a compulsion which everyone recognizes because he feels its existence within himself. Each member of the audience was once, in germ and in phantasy, just such an Oedipus and each one recoils in horror from the

dream-fulfillment here transplanted into reality, with the whole quota of repression which separates his infantile state from his present one" (Freud, 1892-1899, p. 265).

Never abandoning sexual trauma as etiological, Freud (1914, p. 17) would later state that "psychical reality requires to be taken in account alongside practical reality", and, "Phantasies of being seduced are of particular interest, because so often they are not phantasies but real memories" (1917, p. 370). Later, the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* was revived and extended in the seminal case of the Wolf Man (Freud, 1918). The challenge of articulating the impact of traumatic stimulation coming from outside in the form of perceptions with traumatic stimulation coming from the interior of the mind in the form of drives and fantasies preoccupied Freud throughout his writings.

In a related development, from 1897 on, Freud gradually started outlining the rough contours of processes and mechanisms that govern the unconscious, later known as 'primary process'. On July 7, 1897, he wrote: "I know roughly the rules in accordance with which these structures are put together and the reasons why they are stronger than genuine memories, and I have thus learnt fresh things to help in characterizing the processes in the Ucs" (Freud, 1892-1899, p. 258). It is also during this era that he laid down the roots of his 'first theory of anxiety' (Freud, 1892-1899, pp. 189-195), which postulated not only direct transformation of the repressed libido into the affect of anxiety, but represented also the first recognition of, and causal connection between, anxiety and what came to be known later as the traumatic state.

II. B. The Topographic Unconscious: The System Ucs 1900 – 1923

In the early topographical model of the psychic apparatus, the unconscious as a noun was characterized by having a certain content, consisting of repressed representatives of the drives, which work primarily through condensation and displacement in accordance with the primary process of free mobile energy. Only by being strongly invested with ('cathected by') libidinal energy can these unconscious ideas gain access to the preconscious/conscious system. Due to the censorship of the preconscious, this process will, however, always take the form of a compromise-formation evidenced by symptoms, dreams and parapraxes.

It was mainly through the study of dreams that Freud realized that the unconscious has to be qualified, not only through the lack of consciousness but through its way of working, which led to his introduction of the important concept of primary processes. In chapter seven of "The Interpretation of Dreams" Freud noted the absurdity of the dream-work, which could not simply be ascribed to the work of the censorship. "Thus we are driven to conclude that two fundamentally different kinds of psychical process are concerned in the formation of dreams. One of these produces perfectly rational dream-thoughts, of no less validity than normal thinking; while the other treats these thoughts in a manner which is in the highest degree bewildering and irrational" (Freud 1900b, p. 597). Primary process and *primary process unconscious symbolism of dreams* is characterized by freely flowing psychical energy, which passes unhindered by means of the mechanisms of condensation and displacement. Owing to the freedom with which the energy can be transferred, *intermediate ideas*, which resemble

compromises, are constructed by way of condensation. The reality bound logical laws of thinking – the secondary process and its language symbolism – do not apply for the primary process. Above all this applies to the law of contradictions. Contradictory ideas exist side by side without abolishing each other. *They may combine in ways that would never be tolerated by conscious thought. Finally, in primary process, ideas transfer their intensities to each other, standing in “the loosest mutual relations”* (ibid. p. 596). While Freud started by ascribing to the censorship the decisive role in the irrational processes of the unconscious, he ended up by according the primary process a commanding place alongside the logical thoughts of consciousness. The irrational processes, he writes, “are the *primary* ones. They appear wherever ideas are abandoned by the preconscious cathexis [investment], are left to themselves and can become charged with the uninhibited energy from the unconscious which is striving to find an outlet” (ibid. p. 605). Thus, the primary process is a mode of functioning in psychic life freed from the inhibitions of conscious thinking. Primary process should be understood as an organizing principle existing in normal adult life as an alternative to the dominant logical and verbal organized secondary processes with its communicative language symbolism. One important characteristic of primary process is tolerance of ambiguity and of contradiction. Another is its hallucinatory, wish-fulfilling guise, as a perceptual act in the present (Freud, 1912a). Thus understood, primary process is a cognitive process, which differs substantially from the definition of cognition in cognitive psychology.

It was however, in his metapsychological texts that Freud (1915 a, b, c) systematized the concept of the unconscious in its economic, dynamic and topographic assumptions.

In “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (Freud, 1915a), the instincts are defined as a border concept between the physical and the mental realms.

In “Repression” (Freud, 1915b), Freud distinguishes between *primal repression*, which is “the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being denied entrance to the consciousness” (Freud, 1915b, p. 148), and ‘*repression proper*’, the ‘*after-pressure*’.

In “The Unconscious” (1915c), the topographic theory finds its zenith. Freud begins by reviewing the concept of a *dynamic unconscious*, one that exerts *counterforce to the act of repression*. He goes on to establish the existence of the unconscious through its derivatives: parapraxes, symptoms and dreams, and demonstrates that feeling, thinking, remembering and doing are mostly under the influence of unconscious derivatives as well. Freud makes a distinction between *latent* acts, which are temporarily and only *descriptively unconscious*, but which can become conscious by connecting with a word, and *repressed* processes and contents, which are permanently unconscious, and which are dynamically kept out of consciousness (corresponding to *dynamic unconscious*). There is no ‘either - or’ in the unconscious; the *primary process* and its features – *telescoping, displacement and condensation* – apply equally to the unconscious as they did previously to the ‘dream process’ fifteen years earlier. Freud postulates the presence of two censorships, one between the systems Ucs and Pcs that, in certain circumstances, may be circumvented and a second censorship between the systems Pcs and Cs. Emotions, feelings and affects are excluded from the Ucs. An affect is said to have been ‘unconscious’ only after the connection between the repressed idea and the emotion is restored.

After pointing out the different modes of functioning of the conscious and unconscious systems, Freud further discusses the processes of *becoming conscious* and those of *becoming unconscious*. He offered two alternative hypotheses: 1) the thesis of an inscription in two places, and 2) the thesis of a functional change. When a psychical idea is transposed from the unconscious to the conscious does that mean, he asks, that we have a “fresh record – as it were, a second registration – of the idea in question ... and alongside of which the original unconscious registration continues to exist. Or are we rather to believe that the transposition consists in a change in the state of the idea, a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality?” (Freud, 1915c, p. 174). The first hypothesis is the topographical one and thus connected to the topographical separation of the conscious and unconscious systems. It suggests that an idea can exist simultaneously in two localities in the psychic apparatus and unless resisted by censorship can move from one system to the other. The hypothesis rests on the assumption that interpretation will create a connection between the two inscriptions localized in the unconscious and preconscious systems respectively. Experience shows, however, that this is not always the case. The character of the unconscious is quite different from what we communicate in words or, as Freud had written, the information given to the patient about his repressed memory does not necessarily put him in touch with the unconscious memory trace: “To have heard something and to have experienced something are in their psychological nature two quite different things, even though the content of both is the same” (ibid, p 176). Closer examination of the mechanism of repression, understood as withdrawal of investment (cathexis), favors the second hypothesis. Freud then addresses a question in which system the withdrawal occurs and to which system the withdrawn energy belongs. Proceeding from his experience that a repressed idea keeps its investment, he concludes that only the preconscious investment can be withdrawn from the idea. Restated differently, repression is a process belonging to the preconscious. It then follows that what happens during repression is a withdrawal of mental energy (cathexis) from the preconscious idea, while preserving the unconscious investment. This is consistent with the second hypothesis, namely that in this case, the transition between the unconscious system and the preconscious/conscious system does not consist of a new registration but of a change in its state, i.e. a change in the quality of mental energy devoted to it. Both hypotheses serve to draw attention to the co-existence of two contradictory processes demanding two different explanations. The hypothesis of *registration in two locations* may be suitable for illustration of the process of becoming conscious, while the hypothesis of *functional change* is appropriate when describing the process of repression pointing to an asymmetry between becoming conscious on the one hand and repression on the other.

The third important hypothesis emerges, as Freud investigates the representational world of the unconscious realm, distinguishing between thing- and word-presentations. The proposal of *differentiating between word- and thing-presentations* was the result of observations, which went beyond the dreams and the neuroses. “It is only the analysis of one of the affections which we call narcissistic psychoneuroses that promises to further us with conceptions through which the enigmatic Ucs will be brought more within our reach and, as it were, made more tangible” (Freud, 1915, p. 196). In schizophrenic speech, words can be

subjected to the primary process of the unconscious with the result that words become concrete or thing-like. Freud took this observation to mean that what was earlier described as a conscious presentation of the object must be differentiated into presentations of words and presentations of things respectively. The conscious idea includes the thing-presentation and the word-presentation belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation, with its hallucinatory quality, is characterized by only thing-presentation. The German wording of what we are to understand by thing presentation is worth noting: Freud talks of “*Sachbesetzungen der Objekte*” (thing-cathexes of the objects) indicating that in the unconscious there is no distinction between the thing and the representation of the thing. However, one cannot, in the state of alert focused consciousness, reproduce the thing-quality of the unconscious; one can only passively await its appearance.

Through this era, Freud was engaging ideas from the earlier period in new contexts and starting to develop ideas, which would become fully systematized only in the next stage of theory development.

“A Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (Freud, 1905a), which forms a conceptual link between “The Interpretation of Dreams” and “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”, in regard to infantile sexuality, is also notable for its pioneering attention to the dynamically unconscious phenomenon of *transference*.

In “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905b) Freud explored the stages of *psychosexual development* and *infantile (unconscious) sexuality*.

The intricacies of sidestepping the censorship with modified use of the primary process ambiguities and partial freeing of the instinctual impulses in jokes is thoroughly investigated in “Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious” (1905c).

In “Totem and Taboo” (1912-1913) Freud discussed the transformation of unconscious hostility into excessive affection (p. 49), as well as the unconscious projection of hostility onto the deceased, as follows: “The hostility, of which the survivors... wish to know nothing, is ejected from internal perception into the external world... It is no longer true that they are rejoicing to be rid of the dead man; on the contrary, they are mourning for him; but... he has turned into a wicked demon... eager to kill them. It then becomes necessary for... the survivors, to defend themselves against this evil enemy; they are relieved of pressure from within, but have only exchanged it for oppression from without” (pp.62-63). The text is an exquisite exposition of the *phylogenetic schemata that manifest through primal fantasies*, as one of the contents of the unconscious.

In “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis” (1918) Freud referred to the difficulty young children experience in discriminating between what is conscious and what is unconscious, and what is a ‘*reality*’ and what is a ‘*fantasy*’. The difficulty arises because “the system Cs is still in the process of development” (p.105). This is a further elaboration on the dual nature of the mind in development, which Freud already theorized about three years earlier, when writing on the communication between the systems Cs and Ucs: “A sharp and

final division between the content of the two systems does not, as a rule, take place till puberty" (Freud, 1915c, p.195).

In "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919), presaging the dual instinct theory, Freud explored the sado-masochistic unconscious fantasies of boys and girls of being beaten by the father and mother. In this key text on fantasy formation, Freud distinguished three phases starting with the child witnessing another child being beaten. It is, however, the second phase which "is the most important and the most momentous of all" (p 185) for two reasons. On the one hand, masochism is viewed as a secondary formation/phase of the sadistic instinct turned upon the self and repressed in the process. This is linked to a universal unconscious infantile sexuality lying at the core of neurotic phenomena: "infantile sexuality, which is held under repression, acts as the chief motive force in the formation of symptoms; and the essential part of its content, the Oedipus complex, is the nuclear complex of neuroses" (p. 204); and it becomes a universal fantasy heritage: "Man's archaic heritage forms the nucleus of the unconscious mind; and whatever part of that heritage has to be left behind... because it is unserviceable... falls a victim to the process of repression." (Pp. 203-204). On the other hand, the child's fantasy production can only be verified indirectly: "We may say of it in a certain sense that it has never had a real existence. It is never remembered; it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of analysis, but it is nevertheless a necessity on that account" (p.185).

"Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (Freud, 1920) is a transitional text, mostly known for adding the aggressive drive to the sexual drive. In this final account of his 'dual instinct theory', Freud also elaborated further on the timelessness and pervasive nature of the unconscious as follows: "We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves 'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporarily, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them..." (p.28). Presaging his next stage of theory development, he also introduces the notion of unconscious ego: "It is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious, and notably what we may describe as its nucleus; only a small part of it is covered by the term 'preconscious'" (p.19). This text also reformulates the concept of the *unconscious conflict*: While previously, the conflict was seen as *between sexual and ego preservative instincts* (Freud, 1911c, 1914b), now, in 1920, the conflict is *between the instinctual drives and defense*. Although various defenses, other than, or as part of, repression, were already identified, in the course of this period (Freud, 1908, 1909b, 1911c, 1915a), the defenses were not systematized, and repression was used as a synonym for defense, when it came to conceptualization of unconscious conflict.

II. C. The Unconscious of the Structural Model/Second Topography: 1923 – 1939

When Freud changed his (first) topographical model into the Structural theory/second topography of the Id, the Ego and the Super-ego in 1923, the Unconscious was abandoned as a system and, in part, replaced by the Id. This transformation meant a thorough change in Freudian theory not only with regard to the unconscious but also concerning the ego and the drives. The main difference between the unconscious and the Id is that in the deeper strata of

the Id there are no representations. The Id is made up of sexual and aggressive instinctual impulses, previously described in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (Freud, 1920). In later Freud’s metaphor, the Id is “a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations” (Freud, 1933 p. 73).

In contrast to the Id, the Ego has been used throughout Freud’s writings, but is hereby further refined through the development in his thinking, building on his previous introduction of the concepts of narcissism and identification (Freud, 1914b). Among substantial changes in the organization of the Ego in 1923 is the full recognition of *unconscious ego functioning*, roots of which go back to 1895. Then, Freud had evoked the image of “an infiltrate” to describe the difficulty separating “the pathogenic organization” from the ego itself in remarking that “In fact the pathogenic organization does not behave like a foreign body, but far more like an infiltrate. In this simile the resistance must be regarded as what is infiltrating” (Breuer & Freud, 1893-1895, p 290). In the new Structural model, many previously identified defense mechanisms (identification, incorporation, projection, introjection, reaction-formation, undoing, regression, etc.), different from, and in addition to, repression, are further systematized and clearly located in the unconscious ego.

The possibility of other forms of defense had a long history going back to the 1890s. At that time Freud (1894, 1896) had introduced a type of defense that had more radical regressive pathogenic implications for psychic balance than the repression seen in neurotic patients. This intuition was made more explicit in Freud’s (1911c) study of the Schreber case with the introduction of the mechanism of “*repudiation*” or “*rejection*” by the ego (*Verwerfung*), a drastic process for which later Lacan would invent the term “*foreclosure*”. This non-neurotic mechanism of defense was taken up again in the Wolf-Man (Freud, 1918) and posited as a process of erasure or deletion of the mind’s ability to represent. This process is much more than censorship or repression, it is rather *representational abolishment* causing a hole or emptiness in the mind. This line of thinking was supplemented when Freud in 1925 (1925h) introduced the mechanism of negation [*Verneinung*] and further on when in 1927 (1927) he described the splitting of the ego [*Ich Spaltung*], a concept he would take up again in his text on “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense” (1940 [1938]). As long as Freud worked within the model of the unconscious as system, attempting to unveil what was repressed through the act of interpretation, the unconscious was apprehended in its ‘positive’ forms of content such as fantasy, wishes, thoughts etc. With the introduction of the ‘negative’ forms of defense, Freud’s view of the ego was substantially altered. Alongside the sexual disturbances of the neurotics, he now included a potential form of perversion of the functions of the ego. These are the disturbances one may observe as “the inconsistencies, eccentricities and follies of men” (1924, p. 153). It has been mainly post-Freudian writers who have teased out the principle of the ‘negative’ as a basic assumption throughout Freud’s writings. Bion (“negative capability”), Lacan (the word as absence of the thing), Green (“the work of the negative”), Zaltzman (“the anarchist impulse”), and others recognized that the unconscious is not only a hidden presence/striving for representation but is equally constituted by powerful forms of absence, ascriptions both protective and destructive.

The content of the Ego of the 1923 Structural Model/Second Topography is mostly preconscious, but its significant portion is dynamically unconscious. This notion, too, has its precursors in the (first) Topographic theory, when, in the 1915 paper on “The Unconscious”, Freud had already remarked that, “A very great part of this preconscious originates in the unconscious” (Freud, 1915, p. 191). In an elaboration, Freud noted the thoughts he referred to as having all the earmarks of having been formed unconsciously, but “were highly organized, free from self-contradiction, have made use of every acquisition of the system Cs., and would hardly be distinguished in our judgment from the formations of that system” (ibid, p. 190). Here, even before the Structural theory of 1923, Freud presented a thought formed in the unconscious and having the qualities of secondary process thinking. However, the systematic elaboration of such observations of various components of the Ego had to wait until “The Ego and the Id” (Freud, 1923a), the text, which inaugurated the Structural Theory/Second Topography.

“The Ego and The Id” (1923a) is often viewed as Freud's last major theoretical work. Here, he postulated two types of unconscious: the latent unconscious and the dynamic one. The ‘*latent unconscious*’ is capable of becoming conscious (through connections with words) and should be considered strictly a descriptive term. The ‘*dynamic unconscious*’ is the part of the unconscious that, on account of primary repression, is not capable of becoming conscious. Freud adds that the term ‘*unconscious*’ should be preserved for the ‘*dynamic unconscious*’ even though, according to him, it is impossible to avoid the *ambiguity between the descriptive and the dynamic unconscious*. The Ego, the content of which is mostly preconscious, has two surfaces, an internal one and an external one. In contrast to his original association of Ego with consciousness, in the Structural Model only the external perceptual surface, also called “*the coherent ego*” is conscious. Meanwhile, the internal surface, the surface that faces the Pcs is dynamically unconscious. Here, Freud came to the issue of *unconscious resistances*, which became one of the most important factors in his move to the Structural Model, and was central in addressing the difficulty of restricting primary process to the repressed unconscious. He wrote: “Since, however, there can be no question but that this resistance emanates from his ego and belongs to it, we find ourselves in an unforeseen position. We have come upon something in the ego itself which is also unconscious, which behaves exactly as the repressed – that is, which produces powerful effects without itself being conscious and which requires special work before it can be made conscious” (p.17). Freud conceptualized “the antithesis between the coherent ego and the repressed which is split off from it” (p.17), and he added that the unconscious no longer coincides with the repressed; all that is repressed is unconscious but, not all that is unconscious is repressed. Furthermore, as a mental projection of the surface of the body, “The ego is first and foremost a body-ego” (p.27). The Ego is the representative of the external world (reality) while the Superego becomes the representative of the internal world, i.e., the representative of the Id. Superego is a special grade of the Ego, representing internalized moral prohibitions and ideals of the society, and an heir to the Oedipus Complex. The two classes of instincts from 1920, Eros and Thanatos, “fused, blended, and alloyed with each other” (ibid, p.41) are here located in the Id. Freud wrote: “The dangerous death instincts are dealt within the individual in various ways: in part they are rendered harmless by being

fused with erotic components, in part they are diverted towards an external world in the form of aggression, while to a large extent they undoubtedly continue their internal work unhindered" and he added, "the more a man controls his aggressiveness, the more intense becomes his ideal's inclination to aggressiveness against the ego" (ibid, p.54). Ego is an organization, striving for synthesis, a 'peacemaker' mitigating between conflicting tendencies of Id and Superego, and an 'ambassador', striving for compromise between three psychic agencies/systems of the Id, Ego and Superego, and the external world.

Full exposition of the unconscious inter-systemic conflict between the three systems/structures of the mind – Id, Ego and Superego – and the second theory of anxiety followed three years later, in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (Freud, 1926). Here, seat of anxiety is located within the Ego. *Anxiety* was now thought of as the *motive for defense*, not its result. *Signal anxiety* is a transformed rudimentary archaic traumatic anxiety, signaling dangers connected with the loss of the object, loss of the object's love, castration, and the loss of internal acceptance/'love by superego'. Anxiety activated defenses, which were now firmly located within the unconscious Ego. The account of defenses continued to expand: in "Fetishism" (1927), Freud described '*disavowal*', the unconscious belief of simultaneous knowing and not knowing (p.154). In "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense" (1940b [1938]), Freud, building on the mechanism of disavowal, discussed the *unconscious splitting of the Ego* at the expense of its synthetic function.

Throughout, Freud's revisiting his earliest ideas in the new context continued:

In an exemplary demonstration of continuity between the earliest and the latest stages of the theory building, in "Constructions in Analysis" Freud (1937a) returned to the thing-cathexes of objects in the unconscious, a hypothesis suggested already in 1895. In *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud (1895) had suggested that hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences also understood as internal "*foreign bodies*". In 1937, this thesis is revisited by an observation that when he had proposed a construction, the patient reacted with an "*ultra-clear*" recollection, a *Sachbesetzung der Objekte*. Freud theorized these recollections to be hallucinations repeating psychic experiences from early childhood, which were later forgotten but now returned as such "*ultra-clear*" recollections. The "*ultra-clear*" recollection betrays the eruption of the unconscious as unmediated "presence", a perceptual-sensory revival/return of an un verbalized or repressed rudimentary 'thought'/fantasy.

Another example of reviewing early ideas in the new context is "Moses and Monotheism" (Freud, 1939). Here, Freud depicted the fate of the Unconscious, memory and repression from a socio-historical angle, stating: 'When Moses brought the people the idea of a single god, it was not a novelty but signified the revival of an experience in the primeval ages of the human family which had long vanished from men's conscious memory... We have learnt from the psycho-analyses of individuals that their earliest impressions, received at a time when the child was scarcely yet capable of speaking, produce at some time or another effects of a compulsive character without themselves being consciously remembered. We believe we have a right to make the same assumption about the earliest experiences of the whole of humanity" (pp.129-130). In a *Nachträglichkeit* fashion, he also recapitulated the idea of the traumatic

etiology of neurosis from the time of the so-called seduction theory, developed in 1895-7, in a modification of the formula: ‘Early trauma—defense—latency—outbreak of neurotic illness—partial return of the repressed’ (Freud, 1939, p. 80) with reference to individual psychology.

The metapsychological assumptions of the Unconscious were formulated simultaneously and progressively throughout Freud's work; the Structural model, where ‘*being unconscious*’ appeared as a *quality*, did not appear overnight, neither did it completely replace the Topographic model. There is ample evidence that the elements of the Structural Theory were being gradually formulated and anticipated, long before 1923. Likewise, the Unconscious, particularly the Dynamic Unconscious, continued to be part of all mental structures of the Structural Theory: it filled the Id and much of the Superego, and the unconscious portion of the Ego, the defenses.

III. POST-FREUDIAN EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

In the post-Freudian psychoanalytic theorizing, the unconscious has undergone remarkable changes, along with the growth of several new clinical and theoretical models across all three regions. It will be noted that the first contributions that follow – (North American) Contemporary Freudian Theories: Structural Theory/Ego Psychology and the Modern Conflict Theory – have marked similarities. The differences are subtle, often a matter of emphasis, rather than core substance. But, however subtle, they are important: for example, their emphases on unconscious ego functioning and processes, including the unique role of the unconscious ego in forming defenses and resistances; and the synthesizing function of the mind dealing with conflict, respectively. The contemporary diversity of views on the Unconscious spans the contributions of theorists of Kleinian, Bionian, Self-Psychology, Relational, French, and Latin American persuasions, as well as interdisciplinary Neuro-Psychoanalytic views. The list concludes with various approaches to the Group Unconscious.

III. A. Post-Freudian Developments of Structural Theory

Freud's (1920, 1923a, 1926) revisions of theory provided the impetus for rethinking ideas about the unconscious particularly in North America where many ego psychologists emigrated during the 1930s. For many of these North American analysts, writing during the 1940s and 1950s, the unconscious emerges through an undifferentiated matrix that yields the potential for future ego development and functions. Some of these functions are free from the effects of conflict, what Hartmann (Hartmann, 1939; Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946) called primary autonomous functions, while others only become secondarily autonomous after the resolution of conflicts. In this process, all aspects are mediated by relationships as identifications become the major ego function for facilitating this “neutralization” of energy. Post-Freudian Structural Theory gradually added genetic, developmental and adaptive

considerations (Rapaport and Gill. 1959, Freud, A. 1965) to the existing dynamic, structural and economic theories of Freudian metapsychology.

Emerging here is an important theme: the increasing significance accorded to experiences with people in the child's environment. With this development, growing importance is being given to new sources of unconscious contributions to transference activity. Considering mounting influence from Budapest and Berlin and later from the British Middle School analysts and the early Kleinians, contemporaries of Hartmann continued the object relations' discussion by giving greater depth to the conscious and unconscious aspects of very early developmental periods. Edith Jacobson (1964) investigated the self and object worlds, and Margaret Mahler (1963; Mahler et al. 1975) provided the classic formulations of separation-individuation later revisited by Stern (1985). Attention was directed to the impact of the pre-Oedipal period of childhood on later development, as well as to the ways in which external controls, deriving in part from the child's transactions with the parents, are internalized. Here the emphasis was on how the various unconscious strivings (engaged, filtered, gratified or denied within an ego psychological / object relations fabric) were molded from Freud's (1926) central concept of childhood dangers of the loss of the object, loss of the object's love and castration.

Jacobson (1964) made a special contribution to the unconscious. She postulated that undifferentiated instinctual energy develops into libidinal and aggressive drives "under the influence of external stimulations" (1964, p. 13). Frustration and gratification, laid down as memory traces of childhood conflicts organize these affective experiences into each individual's personally tailored pleasure – unpleasure spectrum, with personal upper and lower limits. This new ego psychological model allowed for a clearer picture of the evolution of the self and object representations thought to be present in all three psychic agencies (Id, Ego and Superego).

Ego Psychology changed as theorists insisted on clinical findings to support metapsychological assumptions. Here the evolution included some members of the early group (e.g. Mahler, Jacobson) as well as new generations of thinkers (e.g., Beres, 1962; Arlow & Brenner, 1964; Kanzer, 1971; Rangell, 1952; Wanh, 1959). This new era was signaled by the Arlow and Brenner (1964) monograph, in which they collapsed the metapsychological perspective under the structural point of view. This shift helped open the door for new ways of thinking about the unconscious. This included new integrationalists such as Kernberg (1966), Kohut (1971), and Rangell (1969b). The traditional ego psychological approach had now become the structural model, an approach that was primarily accepted by a majority of analysts in North America until well into the 1970s.

One of the primary changes in the zeitgeist of this thinking was a reaction against the metapsychological orientation. Informed by the methodology of 'operationalism' (focus on concrete operations), the anti-metapsychological emphasis was developed first in the works of interpersonal/cultural theorists HS Sullivan (1953), Horney (1941) and Fromm (1941), who often selectively used the concept only as a secondary descriptive term rather than as a major aspect of psychic life. However, even in their formulations, the 'alienated', 'bad', 'not-me'

parts of oneself had to be kept out of awareness and pushed deep into the ‘immutably private’ unconscious. While not mainstream, this approach has contributed directly and indirectly to psychoanalytic conceptualizations and dynamic work with serious pathologies, conceptualizations of early development and deepening of the understanding of unconscious transactions within the transference-countertransference field.

The next challenge that influenced conceptualizations of the unconscious came from within the metapsychological point of view itself. The major contributors to this challenge were: Merton Gill, who renounced the topographical perspective (1963) and then the remainder of metapsychology (1976; 1994); and George Klein (1976). They eventually delineated two psychoanalytic theories: (1) a clinical theory based on indisputable empirical observation; and, (2) a speculative abstract theory. Roy Schafer (1976) proposed an action language that attempted to explain psychological phenomena in dynamic formulations using verbs and adverbs and not nouns or adjectives. In addition, Schafer advocated for the use of language in a manner inclusive of motivational forces and their consequential actions, as action sequences. This was another nudge in the direction of *intersubjectiveness*. Later anti-metapsychologists include Kohut (1977) and Gedo (1979). Gedo rejected metapsychology because it lost sight of the “person” as “agent” suggesting *a model of self in relation to its objects* as a corrective. New groups began to develop, adding Interpersonal, Self-Psychology and Relational perspective practitioners (Gerson, 2004; Hatcher, 1990). Their clinical unit of attention was interpersonal with the exception of Thomas Ogden (1992a & b) and Jay Greenberg (1991), both of whom returned to attending to unconscious motivational forces.

These developments were accompanied by another group of changes, “metapsychological modifications,” which elevated the use of the structural model and psychic conflict (Arlow & Brenner, 1964), the role and function of unconscious fantasy and transference (Arlow, 1961, 1963, 1969a&b; Arlow and Richards, 1991; Abend, 1990, Gill, 1982; Gill and Hoffman, 1982), the development of character (Abraham, 1923, 1925 & 1926; Reich, 1931 a & b), the *sequencing of the intrapsychic process* (Rangell, 1969a), ‘*unconscious decision-making function*’ (Rangell, 1969b, 1971), and an *extended* view of *compromise formation* (Brenner 1976, 1982, 2006).

Woven through these theoretical developments are changes in how the unconscious was conceptualized: a static *view of the unconscious*, focused primarily on its content gave way to one that has both *fluid and structured dimensions*. The idea that the unconscious functions through the organization of fantasy, multiple ego states, and identifications (e.g. transference activity, dissociations, narcissistic modes of relating, various internalized object relations, etc) but also fluidly adapts as an active, flexible process to maturation, insight and integration begins to seep into the groundwater of thinking about unconscious functioning. The concept of the unconscious began to be thought of as having both *structuring and processing dimensions*.

Arlow (1969 a, b) and Beres (1962), separately and together (Beres & Arlow, 1974) showed how *unconscious fantasy* is not only an organized thematic dimension of the unconscious but, also a dimension that – as an expression of more archaic wishes – *matures*

with development. This coincides with the Sandler's (1984, 1987, 1994) and with Rosenblatt's (1962) work on *past and present unconscious* and on unconscious representations. It also presages later formulations (Bachant and Adler, 1997) of transference in relation to adaptive and archaic unconscious functioning.

Arlow and Brenner's (1964) "Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory" revealed a radical reconstruction of the concept of the unconscious. At the core of this reorganization is the relationship between anxiety and conflict. Anxiety for Arlow and Brenner became the crucial factor in the development of conflict between ego and id, and in the ability of the ego to oppose the instinctual drives. Too much unpleasure leads to anxieties connected with the dangers of childhood. These anxieties act as a crucible of fears that organize the unconscious and continue to affect the person (Richards and Lynch, 2010).

Loewald was another theorist who contributed significantly to the further developments of the concept. He has been compared to Sullivan, Klein, Rado, Kohut (Cooper, 1988) and Winnicott (Chodorow, 2009), Fairbairn and Guntrip. Loewald, however, considered himself an ego-psychologist.

In his work, Loewald stressed the *essential role of object relations in both psychic formation as well as the change* brought about through analysis. His emphasis on the interaction in object relations breathed life into the ideas of drive fusion and neutralization, analytic neutrality and therapeutic action. For example, he regarded the psychic structure of the instincts and the id as originating in the interaction of the infant with its human environment (mother) (Loewald, 1978). This is very close to preceding Jacobson's (1964) formulations. *Instincts* were viewed by these theorists as the *product of interaction*. Up to this point, Loewald was in synchrony more with analysts like Fenichel, Jacobson (1964), Mahler, Stone (1951); and at odds with analysts like Hartmann (1939), Loewenstein (1953) and Kris (1956 a, b, c). Loewald, however, took his thinking a little further by identifying interaction as the critical aspect in the internalization of the subjective representation of the self and other. He went further by veering away from the reified sense of psychic agency, defense and inter/intra-systemic conflicts. Instead, he focused on the nature of interaction with the (human) environment noting the role it "plays in the formation, development and continued integrity of the psychic apparatus" (1960, p. 16). *Interaction* becomes for Loewald not only the source of the drives (1960, 1971, 1978), but a *central aspect of unconscious processes*. This stress on *interaction as a basic building block of the mind* guided Loewald's theory of the unconscious, drawing upon and heavily modifying the adaptive and genetic aspects of Freud's metapsychology while leaving the structural/topographical models adrift. He believed that "...in an analysis, ..., we have opportunities to observe and investigate primitive as well as more advanced interaction processes, that is, interactions between patient and analyst which lead to or from steps in ego integrations and disintegration" (1960, p.17). Just as was the case for Winnicott in the UK, Loewald and Jacobson in the US can be seen as *the forerunners of the intersubjective movement*.

By the early seventies, experiences with people in the child's world had become indispensable in conceptualizing the development of the mind (Arlow and Brenner, 1964;

Spitz, 1957; Mahler et al, 1975; Jacobson 1964). These experiences with early objects, through their inevitable gratifications and frustrations, shape and color the child's developing ego functions (including self-definition through identifications) as well as moral/ethical canons. Within the psychoanalytic setting, these *early experiences with others tailor the fabric of unconscious wishes and fears* that can produce acting out, transference/countertransference actualizations, enactments and boundary violations (Lynch, Richards, Bachant 1997).

Throughout 1960s and 1970s, Arlow has been *extending* further Freud's notion of *unconscious fantasy*. While Freud viewed unconscious fantasy as a derivative of unconscious wish, Arlow sees it as a compromise formation that contains all components of structural conflict (Papiasvili, 1995). In this extended view, unconscious fantasy organized the powerful driving wishes, fears, and self-punitive impulses triggered by developmental tasks. Every individual creates his or her own unique set of unconscious fantasies. These reflect mental sets that attempt to understand, respond to, manage and integrate major conflicts, experiences and relationships. Abend (1990) later expands this already expanded concept and adds that fantasies "can function to alter and disguise other fantasies as well as provide gratification" (Abend, 1990, p. 61). Throughout development, the essential narratives of the unconscious fantasies endure, though their manifestations undergo endless transformations resulting in different "editions" corresponding to different developmental stages. Unconscious fantasies shape our character traits, determine our behavior, our attitudes, produce our symptoms, and are at the heart of our professional interests and love relationships. In the psychoanalytic situation, unconscious fantasies are at the root of all transference attitudes and activities.

While such unconscious fantasies are modifiable and continue to mature as the person unconsciously searches for newer more effective solutions, their origins remain archaic and fixed, and as such continue to exert a dynamic role on experience. Therefore, unconscious transference activity can be seen as having both structural and process aspects. Arlow and Richards contend that the unacceptable wishes of childhood "take the form of persistent unconscious fantasies, exerting a continuous stimulus to the mind", (1991, p. 309) eventuating in compromise formations on a continuum from adaptive to maladaptive.

Leo Rangell asserted that the domain of psychoanalysis was the area of unconscious intrapsychic conflict (Rangell, 1967). He charted twelve sequential steps in the emergence of unconscious conflict (Rangell, 1969a), which advanced from the initiation of the precipitating stimulus to a final psychic outcome. Rangell (1969b, 1971) focused on the *unconscious decision-making function of the ego*, in the context of the unfolding of the ubiquitous unconscious intrapsychic process. Through this function, the individual unconsciously chooses whether or not to institute defense to minimize anxiety signaling danger. Over time, unconscious choices are incorporated into durable character traits and fixed expectations from the individual. Through his twelve step sequence of the intrapsychic process, Rangell also posits a 'unitary theory of anxiety', connecting the first theory of anxiety of the Topographic model and the Signal Theory of Anxiety of the Structural model, through *the transformation of the traumatic anxiety (passive experience of the ego) into signal anxiety of ego anticipating the danger*.

Following Freud's paper on Narcissism (1914b), which was simultaneously a precursor of Structural theory as it was a precursor of Object Relations theory, many contemporary Freudians tended to see *object relations as an aspect of overall psychoanalytic conceptualizations* (Blum, 1998). As Object relations became a more central interest, there were original efforts to integrate Ego Psychology/Structural Theory and Object Relations. Kernberg (1982, 2015) formulated a view of *pre-oedipal unconscious intrapsychic conflict* considered characteristic of borderline individuals in which the unconscious conflict is *between internalized opposing units of self- and object representations and their respective affective dispositions*. Within this conceptualization, affects, which are gradually integrated into the drives, are considered to be a primary (unconscious) motivational system (See separate entries OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES and CONFLICT). Recently, Bach (2006), Ellman (2010), C. Ellman et al (1998) have incorporated ideas from the British Object Relations School and attended especially to fears of separation, loss of self, and use of the object by the self. Pointing to the difficulty in seeing another person's point of view, they introduce *empathy as a tool for making conscious what had been unthinkable*. Ellman (1998) has expanded the access to the unconscious by conceptualizing *enactments as bridges* to understanding unconscious fantasies.

III. Aa. Contemporary Structural Theory / Ego Psychology

In the view of modern Structural theory/Ego Psychology, not everything is a compromise formation: repression and other specific defenses are not compromise formations; the ego not only effects compromise, but ego could decide between alternatives (Blum, 1998; Rangell, 1969). Within this school of thought, Kris's (1956c) and Hartmann's (1939; Hartmann, Kris & Lowenstein, 1946) discussion of the *nature of repression is extended*, in theory and in relation to detailed clinical material, to include a multitude of developmental and clinical processes co-occurring (Busch, 1992, 1993; Gray, 1994; Ellman, 2010). Embracing Freud's concept of the unconscious ego as the key to working through (Freud, 1914a), and refining further the concepts of unconscious ego functioning, contemporary Structural Theory and Ego Psychology study the different forms of the unconscious in a manner which respects the limitations in their explanatory range. These trends become potentially a counterbalance to another contemporary trend of replacing the dynamic unconscious by the *implicit, procedural, automatized, and nonsymbolized nonconscious*. As an example of such an approach, procedural memory and automatization of mental processes can be used to understand the way in which various ego processes, such as defenses, remain so stubbornly resistant to change, and need a good deal of working through, with practice not using the particular maneuver or defense, and using others, required before the hold of the defense can be undone. Psychoanalysis can, through the study of such processes as defenses, deepen the understanding of this form of unconscious, which takes place through proceduralization and automatization.

Many contemporary Ego psychologists observe that repression seems to have lost its justifiable place as a major pivot of analytic work. Seen from this perspective, it is as though various denial defenses such as minimization, and especially stressing other realities (such as

unsymbolized and procedural memories), are used to cover over a specific unwelcome reality (in this case, the importance, in most people, of the active repression of declarative memories and their associated affects).

By using the ego psychological method of differentiating various processes and modes of thought, contemporary ego psychologists approach the study of unprocessed and unsymbolized post-traumatic memories, without reducing the entire unconscious with its the primary process to this mode of memory and mental processing. Outside of American Ego Psychology, many authors have proposed conceptualizations of the unsymbolized (e.g. Bion, 1962; De M'Uzan, 2003). Valuable as their clinical expositions have been, Ego Psychologists view them as conflating various processes, such as developmental ones related to ego growth and the growth of the secondary process out of areas of the primary process, with the traumatic process. Within American Ego Psychology, Alvin Frank (1969), in his evocatively titled paper "The unrememberable and the unforgettable: passive primal repression", described this area of *unprocessed functioning* with some very striking clinical examples.

Recently the term "*zero process*" has been proposed for this form of mental functioning (Fernando, 2009, 2012), differentiating it from the primary process. For instance the *frozen*, "*present moment that is always just happening* and never changing" characteristic of the zero process, which describes its 'timeless' nature, is quite different from the free-wheeling, constantly moving, but never wearing away, characteristics of the primary process, which describes its 'timeless' nature. Similarly, '*concreteness*', '*lack of abstraction*', '*lack of secondary process symbolization*', and '*lack of integration*' are markers that could be applied to both the primary and zero processes, and yet they have somewhat, sometimes very, different meanings in the case of each of these important classes of mental processing. The 'zero process' offers a tool for conceptualizing *post-traumatic mental functioning*, and delving into its characteristics. At the same time, the importance of the two other great classes, primary process and the secondary process, of mental processing, and of the way in which the mind organizes itself and functions through them can be processed. This highlights the interaction between these forms of functioning. In the zero process there is a very different form of the unconscious, a strange sort of '*parallel universe*', which people can slip into and then out of, in a manner quite different from the 'system unconscious' or Id that Freud described. In view of modern Ego psychologists, all of these realms of the unconscious continue to be important factors in normal and disordered mental functioning, and it is time to expand the conception of the mind to include all of them.

III. Ab. The Unconscious in Modern Conflict Theory (MCT)

Modern Conflict Theory has moved away from a focus on derivatives of the psychosexual stages of development to one that is centered on the processes of conflict and compromise formation (Arlow, 1966, 1981; Brenner, 1982, 1999, 2006; Richards, 1986). Central to this approach is the importance of understanding the unique fantasies, desires, wishes and fears that were organized by the child's relationships with others. An understanding of

intrapsychic processes, manifest through unconscious fantasies that are molded by and expressed in a mixture of psychological, biological and social determinants are considered central to Modern Conflict Theory.

Although previously Abend (1980, 2005), Brenner (1999, 2002), Rothstein (2005) and Richards (1986) described compromise formations as a (reified) thing, the position of many Modern Conflict Theorists today is that this dimension of mental activity is better understood as the continuous operation of a *process* that continually seeks better solutions to resolve conflict and its unpleasure. The mind is always *synthesizing* (Rangell, 2004, 2007) and much of what it strives *to manage* are *unconscious conflicts*. Rangell's (1963a, b; 1969a,b; Lynch and Richards, 2010) sequencing of the intrapsychic (*unconscious decision making*) processes contributes to this process perspective. In Modern Conflict Theory there is no concept of 'The Unconscious' as a structure or place where secret memories are hidden and from which they can be elicited by analysis. Instead of being a noun, the word *unconscious* is used as an adjective or adverb to designate *unconscious affect, unconscious fears, unconscious prohibitions, and unconscious ways of defending oneself* from un-pleasure and unconscious fantasy, which are hypothesized and investigated to loosen their power to motivate present behavior.

Essential to the understanding of Modern Conflict Theory is the idea that *unconscious contributions to human functioning have both structuring and processing dimensions*. The structuring aspect of unconscious activity is seen through its organizing influences on psychic life. Transference activity, patterns of relating to self and others (including guilt and self-punishment), dissociations, the intersubjective field and internalized object relations are structured in particular ways around *unconscious fantasies*, unique to the individual. Unconscious processes have a *fluid dimension, creatively adapting to present realities with maturation, insight and integration* or disintegration into anxiety or depressive affect.

The role of *fantasy* in the development of unconscious activity is understood as a *prime organizing force* having its origin in a complex *interplay of environmental and intrapsychic factors* (Arlow 1969a, b; Arlow & Richards, 1991). Unconscious fantasies are organizations that aim to help the person maximize pleasure and minimize unpleasure. For Modern Conflict Theorists, every unconscious fantasy is an expression of how the synthesizing function of mind deals with conflict. The contents of these unconscious fantasies are derived from the ambivalencies and conflicts of childhood and their variants throughout the life cycle.

Complex elements form in the mind depending on circumstance and need. The *elements* of conflict remain categorically the same in every instance, that is, a drive derivative, an unpleasant affect, a defense, a moral/ethical expression, or a demand from the external world, while the *content* of the conflict varies with each individual's makeup, life-experience and current situation. Conflict theorists see in this understanding the manifestation of structure and process in the compromising activity that characterizes all mental life.

III. B. The Unconscious in ‘British’ Object Relations Theory

(Klein, Bion, Winnicott)

Object Relations Theory is a major post-Freudian development spawned in England and in France. The object relations theory develops a concept of the unconscious which is no longer founded on the rather solipsistic Freudian energetic model of the drive and the process of repression but on a relational model of the mind. The various theoretical concepts stemming from the Object Relations School describe the *Unconscious as a system* that develops and is *shaped within a relationship*. Object Relations theory focuses on the *role of the object conceived as the product of the internalisation* of the relational experiences that the individual has had from the early stages of his/her life. From this perspective, there is a *meeting point* between the *intrapsychical and the intersubjective domains*, relational events and unconscious mental functions. The *innate drive endowment* of the baby is thus shaped by interactions with the environment, which in their turn, are coloured and remodelled by unconscious psychical processes. Though he remained relatively unknown during his lifetime, ‘the man who un-split the psychic atom’ (Malberg & Raphael-Leff, 2014), W. R. D. Fairbairn (1952) is widely considered one of the early theoretical innovators in this area.

Better known and more influential for decades has been the work of Melanie Klein who straddles a purely intrapsychic perspective and an intersubjective one. The unconscious for Klein is characterized by the defence mechanisms of the infant who is pushed to get rid of the sadistic and anxiety ridden parts of the self – dominated by the *death drive* – through the *unconscious processes of splitting and projective identification*. To this are added denial and idealisation defences. The concept of the unconscious as a product of primal repression proposed by Freud does not fit into the Kleinian concept of unconscious (Mancia, 2007). In Kleinian theory, the inner life of the individual is founded on *unconscious phantasy* and is governed by the schizo-paranoid and depressive positions (PSP-DP) (Klein, 1935). These are intra-psychical ways of functioning which reflect the way in which the person relates to his/her own internal objects and which deeply influence his/her way of relating to the people in the external world. The original Kleinian concept of *projective identification* has become more and more relationally oriented, thus evolving, in the Bionian theoretical model, into a particular form of communication and an unconscious request for containment and rêverie. In the unconscious mental functioning of alpha function, described by Bion (1962, 1965), one can see how the Unconscious develops within a relational context: the conscious and unconscious mind of the baby is structured through the maternal rêverie function, a crucial element in the organisation of the infant’s unconscious life. Before the emergence of repression, the unconscious is molded through a transformative facilitation by the parent’s mind of sensory and emotional experiences which reach the infant in the domain of primary relations.

All regions and psychoanalytic cultures have been influenced by the central Kleinian concept of ‘*unconscious phantasy*’. The spelling of phantasy with a “ph” instead of an “f” emphasizes that this term refers to a *basic form of psychic structure* with specific ideational content, rather than simply the storyline of an elaborated wish based on drive derivatives or a day dream. The theoretical basis for seeing the mind as organized by and

around these basic building blocks of psychic structure follows from Melanie Klein's assertion that knowledge or at least an *intimation of an object, as either target or source of satisfaction, was an inherent part of the drives*. In contrast to Freudian theory where the drive exists with derivatives in the psyche and the object must be 'found' in order to be placed into the unconscious equation, for Klein, *the object of the drive is there ab initio, in-borne and hard-wired*. Along with the object, there is also an *in-borne sense of the self as subject*, – e.g., *desiring* – no matter how partial, vague or primitive and so the basic unit of 'I wanting something from or doing something to you' (as part or whole object) is assumed *from the very beginnings* of psychic activity.

The Freudian concept of '*contact barrier*' was extended by Bion, who retrieved it from the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (Freud, 1895), and proposed a new way to conceptualize it. In Freudian terms, repression was conceived as a barrier that defended the conscious system from the unconscious one. Bion theorized the reverse: that "repression likewise defended System *Ucs.* from sensory stimuli originating from System *Cs.*" (Grotstein, 2008, p. 201). The contact barrier divides and unites at the same time conscious and unconscious mental phenomena: thanks to its selective permeability, an interchange between *Cs* and *Ucs.* systems is rendered possible. The selective permeability of the contact barrier between conscious and unconscious is created and reinforced by the alpha function through which raw sensory data (beta-elements) are transformed into alpha-elements which can be used for thinking and dreaming. The alpha function includes both primary and secondary processes and functions within both *Cs.* and *Ucs.* systems (Grotstein 2004b, 2007). According to Bion's thinking, in the realm of alpha function both the pleasure and the reality principle are included: they are not conceived as separate principles as Freud theorized (1911b) but seen as conjoined as binary oppositions in both systems and normally functioning cooperatively (Bion, 1962, 1963, 1965).

From the concept of contact barrier stems that of "*binocular vision*": an ability based on a double focussing which fosters the *cooperation between conscious and unconscious mental functions* (Reiner, 2012). Bion refers to it when he writes that "we need a kind of mental binocular vision – one eye blind [to the sensual world], the other eye with good enough sight" (Bion, 1975, p.63). Binocular vision gives depth and resonance to the experience and is seen by Grotstein (1978) as a "dual track" which allows the apprehension of phenomena taking place in the course of an analysis. "Systems *Ucs* and *Cs* can be considered to be like two eyes or two cerebral hemispheres that are receptive to the intersections of the ever-evolving 'O' from their respective vantage points" (Grotstein 2004a, p.103). Such binocular vision allows the analyst to pay attention to and try to understand what he sees from a double reversible perspective: a conscious and unconscious one which in turn fosters a way of looking at things from different points of view (De Bianchedi, 2001).

According to Grotstein (1997), Bion (1970) believes that as analysts we should use both our conscious and unconscious minds in order to be receptive to 'O' as 'the Absolute Truth about the Ultimate Reality'. From this concept derives a theorization of the unconscious as a system which partially coincides with 'O', unknowable and unknown since it remains outside

of reflective awareness. The only way to access it is by resonance in ‘O’ with it. By introducing the concept of ‘O’ and linking it with the-thing-in-itself and ‘infinity’, Bion places the concept of the unconscious in a postmodern age of understanding: it is thus “linked to infinity, chaos and complexity theory, catastrophe theory, and spirituality” (Grotstein 1997, p.84). It must be highlighted that a strong correlation between primary environment and the possibility of encountering ‘O’ exists: it is the quality of the primary objects and interlocutors (and in analysis the quality of the analytical stance of the analyst) which determines the possibility that the baby/patient can bear the encounter with ‘O’ (Gaburri & Ambrosiano, 2003) and with the emotional reality which resides in it.

For Bion, O is the domain of “the psychoanalytic object,” the true north towards which analytic inquiry should be directed, even if it can never be fully ‘known.’ This vision of something that is there but can only be intuited or ‘become,’ because it is not ‘of the senses,’ is epistemologically reminiscent of the thinking of Plato, Kant, and various mystics. To the extent that the elements or ‘occurrences’ of the O of one’s existence can never be fully known or verbalizable, then that *ineffable dimension of being* is by definition ‘unconscious.’ However, the unknowable ‘unconscious’ part of O is not the Freudian dynamic unconscious of the repressed. It is more akin to the *deeper layers of the Freudian id*, something that is emergent, unstructured, not yet formed. If one can speak of ‘elements’ in the domain of O, one might say that they consist of sensorial disturbances or turbulences that are not yet psychic (*‘pre-psychic’ or ‘proto-psychic’*). Bion never designated the contents of O, but did describe *prepsychic, protomental phenomena* he called *Beta elements*, which are unsuited to be thought with or thought about, unless or until they are *transformed* by a kind of psychic ‘dreamwork’. He assigned the name of ‘*alpha function*’ to this latter activity and asserted that alpha function was central to a continuous, 24 hour/day process that created “*waking dream thoughts*” built out of “*alpha elements*.” The latter are assumed to be the building blocks of thought, thinking and psychic organization. Once created, alpha elements are used to establish a contact barrier that is, in turn, essential to the processing (mentalization) of experience, the delimiting of psychic space, the creation of a container for thoughts and the topographical division of the contents of mind into the systems Ucs and Pcs/Cs.

Since *beta elements* are *sensory stimuli before they have acquired any meaning*, they are different from Freud’s concept of “representations.” While the latter can be conscious or unconscious, Beta elements are by definition beyond – or rather *before* – *consciousness*, in that they are not psychic, but ‘*exist*’ or are registered only at a somatic or *neurobiological level* (the sensory organs and the brain as a part of the latter). This formulation relates to Freud’s early model of the hypothetical neuronal pathways of conduction of pleasure and pain, which Freud drew and described in his “Project of a Scientific Psychology” (Freud 1895, pp. 320,324). It is important to note that beta elements are necessarily *unconscious*, because they are *not yet psychic*, but not because they have undergone repression or other defensive alteration necessitated by conflict with the superego or the anxiety produced by their wishful or fearful content and meaning. Once beta elements are *transformed into alpha elements* – i.e., once they have become *psychic* – they can then achieve saturation of meaning, *acquire symbolic status*,

be linked together with other mental elements to form narrative bits and associative chains, etc. It is then that they acquire *status as representations* and can be used to form thoughts and ideas that *can be* brought to consciousness or *repressed into the unconscious* because of the anxiety that they arouse.

Thus, Bion's theory of beta elements and alpha function is a metapsychology of the formation, structuralization and growth of the mind. O contains the seeds of future *psychic evolution and growth that comes about through processes that are initially intersubjective (maternal reverie, container/contained) and dependent upon the presence of a facilitating object*, who lends their own alpha function to that of the patient or infant to form a more effective 'thinking couple'. Once alpha function is achieved, either through the assistance of another mind or the introjection of the maternal alpha function and the 'thinking couple,' then the continuous process of *transforming beta elements into alpha elements* produces the 'contact barrier' and the repressed or *dynamic unconscious of Freud becomes possible*. This is a process that goes on throughout life. Hence, Bion's contention that psychoanalysis is the probe that expands the very domain that it seeks to explore. Alternatively, Bion's recognition that alpha function can be reversed, with alpha elements being cannibalized, evacuated like mental feces to impoverish the mind and the contact barrier replaced by a rigid beta screen, offers a dynamic and dialectical vision of the mind struggling to maintain whatever developmental foothold it has managed to acquire. In the paradoxical statement pronounced by Winnicott (1960) that "there is no such thing as an infant" (ibid, p. 587), one can see to which extent *the subjectivity and the unconscious being of the individual require the existence of another subject* and depend on the primitive relationship with the environment. A widening of the concept of the unconscious, relationally oriented, can be found in Bollas's (1987) '*unthought known*', a point of convergence with neuroscience. This is *made up by the silent traces of the unrepressed unconscious and the sediments of the individual's early interactions*. It represents a *deep relational unconscious form of knowledge* which permeates the 'idiom' and the entire being of the individual.

While Klein's, Bion's and Winnicott's thinking have been strongly influential throughout Europe and Latin America, the reception of especially Klein's theories in North America has been only gradual and somewhat idiosyncratic. For the most part, until the mid 1970s, classical and contemporary Kleinian papers and ideas were not taught in North American Institutes. This particular fact of psychoanalytic life came about in large measure as the consequence of the unresolved tensions that persisted between the followers of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, and the happenstance that all of the major European émigré analysts who escaped from Europe and became prominent in the North America were of the Anna Freud's camp. As a result, until relatively recently, there have been scarcely any Kleinian trained supervisors or training analysts in the U.S. and Canada. (One of the remarkable exceptions is the case of Clifford Scott, a Canadian analyzed by Melanie Klein and trained in the British Psychoanalytic Society, eventually serving as its president before returning to Canada in 1954. Scott left a distinctive mark in London and on three generations of English and French-speaking analysts in Montreal.)

This situation has gradually begun to change in the last four decades, as a number of Latin American trained Kleinians have emigrated to the US and Canada and have begun to assume positions of influence in their local analytic societies.

This state of affairs has proven to be an obstacle to a truly Kleinian development in North America, as well as an opportunity. Lacking a strong culture and tradition of Kleinian thought, North Americans who studied Klein and became ‘Kleinian friendly’ and ‘Kleinian influenced’ have perhaps been freer to adapt and apply Klein and neo-Kleinian ideas than their more orthodox Kleinian trained colleagues in other regions. James Grotstein, an internationally recognized authority on Klein and Bion, who extended their conceptualizations of projective identification in his ‘projective trans-identification’ concept (Grotstein, 2005, 2008); and Thomas Ogden (1980, 1982, 1992a,b), who presented his own creative synthesis of Klein, Fairbairn, Bion and Winnicott while exploring deep fluid structures of (conscious and unconscious) experience and knowledge are most notable examples. It is due to such developments that many North American analysts appear to appreciate the concepts of Projective Identification and/or Containment (see the separate entries PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION and CONTAINMENT), even if at times only as an unconscious interpersonal process of induction.

North American Kleinians have attempted to follow and employ the Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasy as a fundamental complex of animated representations of wished for, feared or imagined *transactions between self and object that constitute, structure and inform one’s internal world*. One could justly call this the “*dramatic point of view*” and see it as an addition to the more classical points of view – *dynamic, topographic, economic, genetic, and structural* – of Freudian metapsychology. Thus seen, unconscious phantasy plays a most important role in the understanding of the patient’s behaviors, feelings and character and transference may be seen as a manifestation or externalization of unconscious phantasy and the royal road to its understanding. For some, however, there is the reservation of Klein’s objection to this idea as potentially blaming the patient for the analyst’s countertransference problem.

The influence of Bion’s thought in North America derives in part from his many years of his latter part of life in California, where a group of American analysts were directly exposed to his teaching. In addition to Grotstein and Ogden, also Harold Boris (1986, 1989), who brought Bion’s thinking to Boston, remained influential sources of Bionian thinking throughout North America. It is believed that Bion decided to come to America in order to free himself from the inevitable pressures that follow from belonging to a group, the Klein group of London, to which he had become a leading contributor. As indicated in his later writings, he felt that membership within a group – and even more so, prominence of the kind that he had attained – inevitably produced pressures that led to conformity and stasis, rather than the continued creation and discovery of new ideas. This tendency and the struggles between the ‘Mystic’ (creative individual) and the ‘Establishment’ (the group) was something that he was aware of, warned about and struggled against all of his life.

The direction of Bion's influence in North America reflects these views in that he was adamant about not wanting to create a 'Bionian' school or even to teach people to analyze as he did. This view is characteristic of the 'late Bion,' with his emphasis on independence of thought and the search for and necessity of creativity and change, even in the face of the 'catastrophic change' that he believed was stirred up by growth.

Ogden's '*the analytic third*' (Ogden, 1994), Bion's '*reverie*' and '*waking dream thought*' (Bion, 1962), as well as Grotstein's (2005, 2008) '*projective transidentification*' can be seen as *expansions of an unconscious* conceived along the lines of the object relations theory and as descriptions of the analyst's mental stance directly derived from such a view of the unconscious. Such expansions are cornerstones of an analytic encounter to be meant as a 'two-way affair' (Bion, 1978). In this regard, Grotstein's (2005, 2008, 2014) '*projective transidentification*', which refers to the *unconscious communicative aspect* of '*mutual induction*', in relation to 'binary' unconscious functioning as the *mutual counterbalancing of symmetrical primary and asymmetrical secondary processes* can be seen as related to Latin American Matte-Blanco's conceptualization of Unconscious Logic (below); whereas Bion's and Ogden's thinking of an expanded unconscious are further engaged and extended by notable Italian field theorists Antonino Ferro and Giuseppe Civitarese. All of these extensions (Grotstein, Bion, Ogden, Ferro, Civitarese) are included in the synthetic Latin American thinking on *Unconscious Communication* (below).

Ferro and Civitarese apply such *expanded conceptualization of the unconscious* also to deepening the separation with classical technique. For Ferro (2004, 2009, 2016), who conceptualizes the session as a *field*, Bion's and Grotstein's emphasis on development of capacity to think through unconscious communication is paramount: "[it] is not a matter of historical facts or the bringing of things from the past into the present; the emphasis is, instead, on the attempt to develop the patient's – or rather, the *field's* – *capacity to think (to dream)*, by way also of ongoing transformation of the patient's communications into a dream" (Ferro and Frangini, 2013, p. 371; the field aspect added in: Ferro and Civitarese, 2016). For his part, Civitarese (2014, 2015; Ferro and Civitarese 2016) has followed Bion's and Ogden's invitation to the analyst to forget the contradictions arising out of rational examination and to be in a state of *hallucinosi*. In this illustration of a "dramatic" point of view referred to above, to be able to see what the patient sees. Ferro and Civitarese, drawing on Ogden (2003, 2005), argue that the analyst must take seriously all impressions, sensations, and ideas, even if they seemingly conflict with aspects of external reality, because they may tell a more accurate a story (Ferro and Civitarese, 2016). In their view, the truth of the unconscious is richer than that which is perceived and communicated consciously. According to these authors, the 'characters' in the 'text of analysis' cast in their roles by the patient or analyst, within and between each of them, are seen to undergo constant *transformation* so as to allow the expression of what progressively becomes thinkable in the here and-now of the session (Civitarese & Ferro, 2013; Ferro & Civitarese, 2016).

III. C. Relational Perspectives and Self Psychology: Two Theoretical Streams Indigenous to North America

III. Ca. Relational Models of Unconscious Process

Relational psychoanalysis began in the 1980s in the United States. Relational theory locates its ancestry, its DNA, in Ferenczi (1949), in Balint (1952) and object relations, and in the field theory derivatives brought by Heinz Racker (1957) to North America as well as the interpersonal school of Harry Stack Sullivan (1953). There are a number of implications from this multiply configured lineage. *Unconscious experience/phenomena emerge in an intersubjective context*, a bipersonal field, and a two-person interaction in which there is expectable *unconscious transmission within the analytic dyad*, within the system in which an individual is embedded. Inalienably and inevitably, this adds dimensions of uncertainty and ambiguity to experience. The origin and site of experiences are often impossible to ascertain. It must remain open within a clinical process to consider and reconsider whose unconscious is operating in any one person's experience. Countertransference in this sense is always ambiguously induced and elicited: personal and dialogic, intrapsychic and intersubjective.

With a strong interest in trauma and its sequelae in conscious and unconscious experience, the relational theory stresses more the presence and power of *vertical splits* than horizontal layering of levels of consciousness. Dissociation comes in varieties of splitting, from radically distinct and uncommunicative to relatively porous. Dissociation has been developed and deepened in the work of Philip Bromberg (1994, 1996) and includes splits in consciousness in the service of disavowing or pushing away toxic or traumatic content, whether emanating from inside or outside the individual. Bromberg also worked out an understanding of the way dissociation intersects with attachment, often outside awareness. The individual (including the quite young child) splits off and 'forgets' experiences that would put an attachment to a potent and needed figure at risk. Mental integration is, in a sense, sacrificed to tenuous ties to another person.

Despite the potency of a *bipersonal unconscious transmission*, unconscious process has a status in the intrapsychic sphere. Here, the influence of object relations on relational theory is felt: the experience of internal worlds, internal objects living, dying, toxic or benign. The degree of awareness, the presence of splitting as a dominant form of mental functioning depends on a variety of factors, individual and external/interpersonal. Thus, a relational analyst might find it useful to think in terms of the presence of unconscious fantasies in the sense of significant relational patterns with particular, often unconscious meaning. One of the struggles and perhaps tensions in relational models of the unconscious is to posit a depth to surface. The intersubjective dimension of experience (dialogue, interaction) includes both conscious and unconscious bi-personal registers of experience. One of the key aspects of relational models of the unconscious is to elaborate unconscious phenomena in both internal and interpersonal experiences. This allows a more dialectical and less polarized account of the interplay between inside/outside; interpersonal and intrapsychic.

While many differing analytic schools might draw on the work of Jean Laplanche in thinking about the development and organization of the unconscious, for some relational theorists Laplanche (1999a ,b, c) offers an interesting two-person account of the emergence and evolution of unconscious experience in the complex encounter of child and adult as a universal situation. The infant feels the effects of desire and longing emanating from the parent as an enigmatic message which invades and intermingles in the child's somatic and affective states of mind/body. On both sides, these experiences may be primarily or solely unconscious. What Laplanche terms enigmatic messages bring the desire of 'the other' into the child, and her intrusive desire interacts with desire emerging from within the child. A repeated process of translation gradually results in the constituting of subjectivity and unconscious desire which will always be both individual and intersubjective. Ruth Stein (2008) among others have been particularly attentive to the impact on unconscious experience of the excessive character of these enigmatic 'seductions.'

Sam Gerson (2004) provides a succinct description of a '*relational unconscious*':

"[T]he unconscious is not only the receptacle of repressed material driven underground to protect one from conflict-induced anxieties; it is also a holding area whose contents await birth at a receptive moment in the contingencies of evolving experience "(p 69). A few pages later, he follows: "The relational unconscious, as a jointly constructed process maintained by each individual in the relation, is not simply a projection of one person's unconscious self and object representations and interactional schemas onto the other, nor is it constituted by a series of such reciprocal projections and introjections between two people. Rather, as used here, the *relational unconscious is the unrecognized bond* that wraps each relationship, infusing the *expression and constriction of each partner's subjectivity and individual unconscious within that particular relation*. In this regard, the relational unconscious is a concept that allows the joining of psychoanalytic thought about intrapsychic and intersubjective phenomena within a theoretical framework that contains each perspective and elaborates their inherent interconnectedness" (p 72).

III. Cb. Unconscious Processing: A Contemporary Self Psychological Perspective

Self psychology, another modern American psychoanalytic theory, accepts the postulation of unconscious mental activity as having been fundamental to psychoanalysis in Freud's formulation of the dynamic unconscious and, more recently, in the recognition of implicit (unconscious or non-conscious) learning and memory. The latter has expanded exponentially the domain of *unconscious processing* (Boston Change Process Study Group, 2008; Clyman, 1991; Fosshage, 2005; 2011a; Grigsby and Hartlaub, 1994; Stern, et. al., 1998; among others). Unconscious and conscious processing – which includes perceiving, categorizing, consolidating memory and learning, regulating shifting priorities in motivation (intentions) and affect, and conflict resolution – is always occurring simultaneously during our waking hours. *Unconscious processing* continues during sleep in the form of REM and non-

REM dreaming (Fosshage, 1997). Both unconscious and conscious processing are always variably *shaped by the relational fields* within which they emerge.

How does one gain access to unconscious processing? Freud developed the free association method and turned to dreams as “the royal road to the unconscious” (1900, p. 608). Ego psychologists have accented the unconscious components of conflict and defenses that emerge latently in conscious articulations. More recently Self psychologists have expanded the listening range so that, in addition to conflict, they listen for explicit and implicit, verbal and non-verbal communications of intentions, meanings and procedural knowledge. Empathic listening is ‘simply’ focused on hearing and understanding these communications from within the patient’s frame of reference. ‘Empathy and judgment’ interpenetrate (Goldberg, 1999); yet the attempt is *to be* in the analysand’s experience and to make inferences and assessments, as far as possible, from within the analysand’s experiential world. Use of the “*other-centered*” listening/experiencing perspective helps to tune into *interaction patterns, typically unconscious* (Fosshage, 2011b).

The use of empathic listening does not minimize the importance of *unconscious processing*. To the contrary, clinical experience indicates that a sense of safety is enhanced through the analyst’s intently listening from an empathic perspective, for it militates against the disruptive influence of an analyst’s imposition of his or her vantage point (though it does not, of course, eliminate this). The subsequent diminished need for protection increases the patient’s reflective space and facilitates the emergence into conscious awareness of unconscious conflicting and non-conflicting intentions, memories, meanings and processing, including unvalidated experience (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992), unformulated experience (D.B. Stern, 1997) and implicit patterns of organization (implicit knowledge). Implicit (relational) knowing consists of interactions with caregivers which is encoded in procedural memory and therefore cannot be verbalized (D.N. Stern et al., 1998). *Unformulated experience* consists of experiences in childhood which are not allowed in consciousness because they are not acknowledged by caregivers (D.B. Stern, 1997). The *pre-reflective unconscious* consists of organizing principles of subjective experiences that originate in the early intersubjective dyad, and *unvalidated unconscious* cannot be articulated at all because of selfobject failure of validation (Stolorow and Atwood 1992). The similarity between the definitions of unformulated experience and the unvalidated unconscious lies primarily in emphasizing the response of caregivers. The *two-person unconscious* is constructed within the dyad itself (Lyons-Ruth, 1998, 1999).

Thus, empathic understanding of the analyst tends to make more permeable and fluid the boundaries between conscious and unconscious, between explicit and implicit, and it increases conscious access to previously unconscious feelings, intentions, thoughts and interpersonal interactions.

III. D. Unconscious in the French Tradition

Post-Freudian France has been the scene of astounding theoretical energy and output. Ripples of this intellectual explosion have had impact on other French-speaking psychoanalytic communities in Europe and North America. English translations of this work have also been influential in some sectors of North America and Great Britain. Keeping themselves partially distant from the object relation perspective while maintaining a view of the unconscious closer to the Freudian one and more inclined to view their work as an elaboration/dialogue with the Freudian oeuvre, French analysts share some general suppositions concerning the concept of the unconscious. Adhering mostly to the Topographic point of view (First Topography), for the French, there is an absolute separation between the preconscious/conscious and the unconscious. Moreover, the unconscious cannot be revealed by observation, but only deduced after the event in an *après coup* deduction.

The ego (*le moi*) is defined as much by its identificatory “alienation” in the desire of the Other as by its capacity for adaptation; it is thus subjective, more a self than the defensive and reality-oriented creature that ego psychology depicts. For French analysts everything that is ego is listened to as emerging from the unconscious. There is an absence of the idea of a conflict free sphere. The *moi* is also composed of unconscious objects and part objects. Where Ego Psychology speaks of the analyst as maintaining a certain constant distance from the patient, French authors, especially Bouvet and somewhat later, Green, McDougall, and Roussillon, early on proposed a flexible approach to patients, paying attention to their reaction to distance. Moreover, and due to the great influence of Jacques Lacan, French analysts have been obliged to reflect on the function of speech and language not only in the analytical situation, but also as the structuring principle of the unconscious.

Jacques Lacan’s (1993) dictum that “the unconscious is fundamentally structured, woven, chained, meshed, by language” (p 119) has been influential for the succeeding generations of analysts whether they have accepted it or opposed the idea. A large group of analysts in the *Paris Psychoanalytic Society*, including among others Pasche, Marty, Lebovici, Diatkine, Fain, Braunschweig, McDougall, Green, and Neyratt, opposed Lacan’s theory and refused to compound drive and language. For Lacan, the unconscious is not something given, waiting to be interpreted; rather, the unconscious is revealed in an act, mostly but not exclusively, in a speech act. Lacan further warned against misunderstanding the unconscious as the seat of the instincts pure and simple. To Lacan, the term unconscious concerns the very idea of how to conceptualize the subject. His whole project is accordingly the study of the unconscious subject. Lacan (2004) recast Freud’s terminology of representations as signifiers, in the Saussurian model of language. Lacan was convincing in his emphasis on the combinatory possibilities of the signifier, which determine the ultimate expression of drives. Something (repression) blocks the expression of signifiers, which circulate in the unconscious. In his version, the unconscious consists of repressed signifiers that in turn control access to drive derivatives. This presents a less biologically reductionist and ultimately more culturally sensitive model of the psyche than one based on supposed erogenous sources of activation.

In the US, at the time of Lacan's famous seminar, the accent was more on fantasies making up the contents of the unconscious. This fostered a different style of clinical listening: listening for indications of a fantasy disguised in the free associations. The French approach taught (in a Freudian way) that the analyst's attention should be on the words themselves and on the unspoken between them. On the other hand, the notion of defenses (other than repression) that are necessary for keeping signifiers in the unconscious and, of course, the analysis of defense, other than the innovative Lacanian development of the notion of "foreclosure", is less prominent in French thinking. Lacan has been criticized for turning psychoanalysis into structural linguistics. However, Lacanian interest is not language *per se*. On the contrary, the interesting thing is the limits, where language fails. The unconscious can, according to Lacan, not be identified. It reveals itself in the traces it leaves especially when it is absent. He has qualified his linguistic approach by arguing that it is only when the unconscious passes into words that we are able to grasp it, and further, that the unconscious works in accordance with the linguistic figures of metonymy and metaphor.

Finally, Lacan insists on the unconscious as discourse, that is, the discourse of the *Other*. The unconscious is the effect of the signifier on the subject. The signifier is what is repressed and what returns in the form of symptoms, jokes, parapraxes and dreams. Lacan's concept of the unconscious took, however, an important step when he reworked the three orders of the *Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real* in "Seminar XX" where he knotted them together in the so called Borromean rings (Lacan, 1999). The assumption of intra-psychic conflict – at least for Lacan – was replaced by the idea of articulation among the three orders. An important consequence was a split in the concept of the unconscious, one part being to a certain degree decipherable or accessible to conventional language, another part termed "*lalangue*", Lacan's term for the kind of language which precedes the language of the Symbolic order. Thus, we have two kinds of knowledge; the knowledge of *le langage* and the knowledge of *lalangue*. The *unconscious-lalangue* is fundamentally situated outside the Symbolic but affects us to a degree that exceeds our enunciated knowledge. Evans defines *lalangue* as "the primary chaotic substrate of polysemy out of which language is constructed" (1996, p 97).

A group of analysts influenced by Lacan has tried to extend the concept of signifier to encompass signifiers beyond language. Based on her work with psychotics, Piera Aulagnier (2001) has pointed to the inadequacies of the concept of the signifier. She has introduced the concept of *pictogram* to refer to a level of unconscious non-verbal "representation" of the infant's bodily encounter with its caretaker (erogenous zones and their part objects) in total ignorance of the duality of which it is composed. Guy Rosolato (1969) has introduced the concept of *demarcation signifiers* with the same aim of pointing to signifiers outside language and Didier Anzieu (1995) has coined the term *formal signifiers* supporting his theory of the skin-ego. Even Jean Laplanche – one of those who had systematically opposed the idea of the unconscious being structured like a language – introduced the terms *enigmatic signifiers* and *designified signifiers*.

Where analysts have adopted Lacan's concept of signifier, they have transgressed its exclusively linguistic meaning and in this way they remained closer to Freud's concept of the

unconscious. Thus, opposing Lacan, Laplanche (1999a) contended that the unconscious is not structured like a language, as there is neither a code nor messages in the unconscious. The unconscious consists of isolated signifiers bereft of any ‘referentiality’. To mark his distance from the Lacanian signifier, Laplanche changed his *enigmatic signifiers* to *enigmatic messages*. Substituting Freud’s idea of repression with that of ‘translation’, Laplanche (1999b, 2011) has paved the way for an *inter-subjective explanation of the constitution of the unconscious*. Because of the activation of her unconscious sexuality in the course of ordinary caretaking of the child, the adult transmits enigmatic messages. The child will translate these messages as well as he or she can. What is *lost in translation* constitutes the unconscious of the child. Because the unconscious of the adult is sexual, an *infantile sexual*, this sexual is what is transmitted to the child as enigma.

Placing himself apart from Laplanche and others who have favored Freud’s first topography, André Green has in his numerous writings pointed to the second topography as being more helpful in the work with non-neurotic patients. As a consequence, his approach to the concept of the unconscious has taken a slightly different course from those French analysts mentioned so far. Also referring back to Freud, Green (2005) argues that the unconscious-as-system is made up of representations and affects which “excludes the sphere of word-presentation” and he takes this to mean, “that the unconscious can only be constituted by a *psyche which eludes the structuring of language*” (emphasis added, 2005, p 99). With Freud’s introduction of an unconscious ego, the status of the unconscious was modified; it was no longer limited to the contents of the repressed but concerned its very structure. This important development in Freud’s theory has opened the door to the modes of thinking, as Green argues, “that are alien to ordinary common sense” and which we find in non-neurotic structures (ibid. p. 205)

In Green’s portrait of the psyche, the *economic factor of the drives* is essential: the unconscious consists of a branching network of drive derivatives (as presentations of things) seeking a pathway toward discharge. Whether these *drive derivatives* are *representations or presentations* and whether they can attain figurability through the mind of the analyst has been a subject of a new Freudian scholarship, theory and debate (Bottella, 2005, 2014; Kahn, 2013, 2014). The dynamic nature of these representations (that represent a primary form of the drive) move them toward action or consciousness. The moving, dynamic aspect of the body-based drives of the unconscious always seeking discharge and determining the actions of the individual has everyday clinical resonance (Green, 2005). Green (1973) was also influential in developing a theory of affect, whereby affect represents a different way of conceiving of the presence of the body in speech.

Lacan (1959-60, p. 132) viewed the pursuing of affect in North American psychoanalysis as leading to “an impasse”, since meaning is rather an effect of the signifier. However, in his later seminars (Lacan, 1999), he began to speak about what was not or could not be represented of the (traumatic) Real, as derived from Freud. So here there is a *conception of the unconscious* by Lacan as the *absence of representation* and what cannot be spoken and which has become a major focus of French study in recent years.

René Kaës (1993) is one author who has helped to conceptualize this duality of the unconscious. He wrote about '*two navels of the unconscious*, one opening or *descending into the body* and the other *connected to the group* and its network of signifiers. Both have input into the formation of the subject, that is, the subject sustaining itself through the actualization of these unconscious reservoirs of accumulated sensations and ideas. Botella and Botella (2005) – based on their work with severely traumatized patients – have followed up Green's work by pointing to the non-representation so characteristic of these patients. Because preverbal traumas are inscribed but not represented in the psyche, they feel a new technique is necessary to incorporate them in psychoanalytic treatment. To address these situations of '*memory without recollection*', the Botellas (2005, 2014) accordingly introduced the '*work of psychic figurability*,' which is then incumbent on the analyst.

Still another important strand of contemporary French scholarship has studied the quality of unconscious 'work' and the quality of relationship between the Unconscious and Conscious systems (e.g. Green, the Botellas, and Reid). At the beginning, Freud (1900) posited an important marker. If, as he claimed, the dream had long been confounded with its manifest content, it was equally crucial to not confuse it with latent content. In fact, the essence of the dream is the *dream-work*. In analogous fashion, one can argue that the essential characteristic of the unconscious is the *work-of-the-unconscious*. Here the emphasis is on the Unconscious as a system, which – over and above specific contents – possesses logic heterogeneous to the Pcs-Cs system (see also UNCONSCIOUS LOGIC below). The unconscious lacks a reality-testing, to the effect that unconscious processes "equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes with their fulfilment " (Freud, 1911c, p 225). The primary process is governed by the hallucinatory; the hallucinatory is the first modality of investment of the Unconscious as system. In contrast, the conscious-preconscious system operates under the aegis of secondary processes and seeks to integrate reality testing. According to Green, Botellas, Reid and others, *the hallucination as a process is thus the first form of unconscious investment-work*. The psychical functioning described in the first (Topographical) Freudian model is actually the product of a long period of dependency on and interaction with the psyches of caretakers, a development which ideally leads to a felicitous articulation between the Ucs and the Pcs/Cs systems. This articulation is characterized by movements of opposition/collaboration, facilitated by a flexible, semi-permeable boundary, which allows repression to have a firm, but not too rigid, footing. Freud detailed this relationship of opposition/collaboration without however elaborating hypotheses about the genesis or construction of this relationship.

It is at this juncture that Winnicott is considered to have taken up the baton, making the discovery of *transitionality* in a revisiting of the genesis of reality testing. Henceforth, this latter is inscribed in the framework of a paradoxical relationship between the psyche and its environment. *Transitional processes induce a new modality of unconscious investment, which joins the hallucinatory mode with signs of reality*. In transitionality, the good-enough object is at the same time, the mother and not the mother. Transitionality simultaneously brings together and separates primary and secondary processes. It is this transitional form of unconscious functioning or 'work' – the combination of hallucinatory mode and reality testing – which

opens the way and explains a flexible gateway of give-and-take between the Ucs and the Pcs-Cs systems. In this context, repression becomes the main defensive operation, preventing and facilitating (in the disguised return of the repressed) the passage back and forth of psychic content. Where the early environment has been inadequate, in place of repression the psyche relies predominantly on ego splitting as defensive operation and the situation becomes one of pure opposition between the Ucs and the Pcs-Cs. This latter type of psychic functioning is found in the non-neurotic registers.

All of this work attests to the intimate bond postulated between the unconscious and drive in contemporary French theorization. An important theme is the close examination of the "construction" of drive from basic physiological reflexes. Drive is regarded as mutable, perpetually in transition, proliferating in all mentation, and created anew in certain intersubjective experiences. The early caretaking environment is assumed to have had a crucial role in the shaping and evolution both of the content and of the processes of unconscious operations in the individual. Thus, even in its most archaic manifestations, the unconscious is never purely unfettered instinctual energy but rather drive intimately marked by, and containing the traces of, the human being's earliest dependency on specific adult others. Thus Aulagnier (2001) wrote "for the perceptions and sensory experiences of the infant as well as its feelings of pleasure and pain to become psychically representable . . . it is essential that [they] be invested libidinally by the maternal psyche" (p xxi). She goes on to point out that her viewpoint is akin to Bion's concept of maternal reverie. Laplanche (1999a,b,c) has introduced the concept of "intromission" in contrast to "implantation" to describe a violent transmission of unconscious sexuality unmitigated by repression and secondary elaboration on the part of the adult. Another similar conceptualization taking into account the quality of parental presence in the construction of the unconscious comes from Christophe Dejours (2001). When the caretaker attacks the thinking process of the child, the capacity for repression is put out of order, Dejours argues, resulting in what he calls an '*amential*' (*thoughtless*) *unconscious*, which lacks the associative and elaborative generativity of the repressed unconscious.

Another twist on the connection between the unconscious and representation comes recently from French Canadian analyst Scarfone (2016a in press, 2016b in press) who has pointed out that the English language has two words: consciousness and awareness. Etymology shows that the "ware" in "awareness" is related to not losing sight of something. But awareness seems to be only a first step towards consciousness, in that one can be aware of something and yet not fully understand what this something is *about*. To be fully conscious requires awareness + the *meaning* of what one is aware of. According to Wittgenstein, *meaning is usage*. Therefore, one can say that to be conscious is to have some usage, in words or in deeds, of what one is aware. Conversely, « unconscious » designates that which dwells inside or outside of awareness but *of which one has no deliberate usage* either in thoughts or in deeds.

Still another object of study among French analysts has been *the temporality* characteristic of the unconscious. Pontalis (2001) has described the unconscious as "this time that does not pass". In a similar vein, Green has also written about the multiple temporalities dwelling within the same subject and in particular about « states in which consciousness (and

not only the unconscious) seems to have no knowledge of time – living in an eternal present, incapable of using their past experience » (2002, p 64). Another contribution in this area comes out of French Canada, where Scarfone (2006, 2014a) has argued that psychoanalysis is not an attention to the past but rather to the "*unpast*" of the individual, an "*actual*" time where what occurs are "*presentations* instead of re-presentations, *acts* (*Agieren*) instead of *thoughts*" (Scarfone, 2006, p 827; original emphasis).

III. E. Latin American Developments and Related Conceptualizations

A strong Kleinian tradition of Latin American psychoanalysis, facilitated by close contacts with the British Kleinian group from the early 1940s, in conjunction with early access to Spanish translations of Freud's oeuvre in the 1920s (López-Ballesteros, 1923), led to such original synthetic conceptualizations of the unconscious, as Unconscious Logic and Unconscious Communication, influence of which has been felt across all three psychoanalytic cultures.

III. Ea. Unconscious Logic

The comprehension of the logic of the unconscious is a fundamental tool to the psychoanalyst at every moment. It belongs to the essence of psychoanalysis. This tool is indeed indispensable to understand any psychotic expression of any patient. The first author to study Unconscious Logic was Freud (1900) in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where he describes what he called "Primary Process", the logic of the unconscious, characterized by: 1) absence of mutual contradiction among the presentations of the various instincts; 2) displacement; 3) condensation; 4) atemporality, and 5) substitution of psychic for external reality. Freud pursued this topic in several other texts: *Two Principles of Mental Functioning* (1911c); *A Case of Paranoia* (1911a); *The Unconscious* (1915c); *The Ego and the Id* (1923a); and *New Introductory Lectures* (1933).

Writing on his view of merits of Freud's fundamental discovery in "The Unconscious as Infinite Sets", Matte-Blanco (1975) noted that it was not the discovery of the unconscious per se, but the discovery of a world ruled by entirely different laws from those governing conscious thinking. In Matte-Blanco's view, Freud's genius was the discovery of these precise laws, which governed this strange "Realm of the Illogical" (Freud 1940a, p. 168). In reviewing Matte-Blanco's work, Henry Rey (1976, p.491) observed: "Matte-Blanco is also extremely concerned and that would seem to be his first preoccupation, with the development that the notion of the unconscious has taken in Freud's writings and amongst psychoanalysts. From being 'the Unconscious', that is to say a living aspect of the personality with activities governed by certain laws, it became demoted to merely the quality of being unconscious".

Combining Freud's conceptions with mathematical propositions, Matte-Blanco developed the concept of Unconscious Logic (bi-logic) which is ruled by two principles: 1) The principle of generalization, which explains that, unlike the logic of the conscious system,

the logic of the unconscious does not consider individuals as units, but as members of ever-larger groups (classes, sets). Displacement occurs according to this principle; 2) The principle of symmetry, which requires the unconscious to always treat the obverse/converse of every relationship in the same way, as if it were always identical to it. Timelessness is a consequence of this second principle. Both principles operate with condensation and the lack of contradiction. He emphasized that this 'Realm of the unconscious' was to Freud the true psychical reality. In this realm, the mind works through a bi-logic, this is, by the simultaneous functioning of the principle of asymmetry in terms of individuals and their differences, which characterizes everyday logic and scientific thinking functions and both consciousness and Freud's secondary process, and the principle of symmetry, governing Freud's primary process. For Matte-Blanco, displacement is at the base of projection, sublimation, transference, the return of the repressed and the division of objects. When an individual displaces, he treats the original primitive object and the object towards which he displaces, as elements of a class with a specific attribute, which might be not apparent to his conscious thinking but is so to his Unconscious. Thus, if someone experiences his boss as a dangerous father, in terms of symbolic logic we may say that his Unconscious treats his boss and father as elements of one and the same class: unconsciously they are identical. Any structure or any system is a set; a class is a set of all the individuals who possess the attributes or qualities defining the class. Whenever a set is infinite in the sense that the counting of its element cannot come to an end, then the part becomes equivalent to the whole: this is what happens in symmetrical logic and in the operation of the Unconscious.

Matte-Blanco's bi-logical structures stratify the entire range of psychic life into layers that are differentiated by the greater or lesser presence of asymmetrical-divisible and symmetrical-indivisible modes of thought processes. This conceptualization includes Freud's later works on an unrepressed unconscious whose 'primitive and irrational characteristics' (1933, p.75) mark the operation of the Id (1923a, 1926) and have the same attributes earlier ascribed to the primary process and the unconscious-as-system.

Drawing on the evolution of Freud's thought on the Unconscious, Matte-Blanco proceeded to reformulate – through the lens of mathematical logic – the laws of the Unconscious and contrast them with the laws of Aristotelian scientific logic embedded in conscious mentation (secondary process). At its extreme, the symmetric logic of the deepest stratum of the structural unrepressed Unconscious constitutes an indivisible symmetric mode of being, characterized by timelessness and spacelessness. In doing so, he elaborated on the problem of psychological space and multidimensionality, in the context of the notion of object and the internal world, past, present and future. Matte-Blanco viewed the psychic facts of timelessness and spacelessness as the expression of Unconscious Logic making the whole equal to any of its parts and vice versa. In the same vein, in his re-analysis of Freud's Case of Paranoia (1911a), he articulated Freud's contrasts between inside and outside and psychic versus physical reality in terms of his concepts of bi-logic and infinitization (Matte-Blanco 1988).

In his Book Review of “The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-Logic”, Henry Rey (1976) gave a clinical example of the usefulness of Matte-Blanco’s ideas for deeper understanding psychotic thought construction, describing Matte-Blanco’s example of a schizophrenic woman. After the blood was drawn from her arm, the woman suffering from delusion, complained, that at times the blood had been taken from her arm and at other times that her arm had been taken away. This was an expression of a well-known schizophrenic way of thinking, the identity/equivalence and complete reciprocity and interchangeability of the part and the whole.

Matte-Blanco’s second book: “Thinking, Feeling and Being” (1988) presents a further evolution of his ideas about the unconscious, its laws, and their application to psychoanalytic work. The *infinity of the unconscious* and the notion of *combinations* in different proportions of *asymmetrical and symmetrical thought* reflecting a stratification of layers between conscious and the deepest unconscious levels opens a new way to understand the psyche. The *deepest unconscious*, which Freud said would be unfathomable, *contains only symmetry*, where everything is equal to everything else. This constitutes the absolute ‘indivisible mode’. Freud’s death instinct can thus be reformulated as the cessation of thought: if everything is equal to everything else, there cannot be thought. Conversely, if in a state of absolute asymmetry, everything is different from everything else, and no connections or associations can be made and objects are closed in a category of oneness, no thought process can take place either. Matte-Blanco’s conclusion was that *psychic processes can only occur when both asymmetrical and symmetrical thought processes are present*. The concepts of conscious and unconscious are reformulated in terms of bi-logic and stratification of the mind. This led Matte-Blanco to extensive exploration of Klein’s concept of projective identification in terms of symmetrical logic. Through this lens, projective identification is viewed as a bi-logically structured manifestation of both symmetrical and asymmetrical thinking.

Matte-Blanco’s ideas of Symmetrization and Infinitization are clinically explicated by Erick Rayner (1981, 1995) who founded the London Bi-Logic Group. Elucidating and further developing Matte-Blanco’s Theory of Emotions and the Theory of Unconscious Logic, he writes further on symmetrization in the realm of feeling, where subject and object tend to become undifferentiated or reversible, and where affects tend to ‘infinitize’. Symmetrization cannot permit any kind of mental development and the obvious consequence is a *infinitization process, a no end repetition*.

An example of infinitization of symmetrization might be a case of erotic impulses infinitizing under the push of intense anxieties: a man who is involved in succession or simultaneously with a ‘set’ of women in a ‘womanizing frenzy’, feverishly substituting previous passionate encounters with the last one ‘of the set’ with new ones. After the ecstasy, when he feels total fusion, he quickly departs to meet the next girl; at this level of symmetrization the women are interchangeable. He himself falls into a sort of infinitized, hypnotic-like trance upon women’s beauty, which is experienced as mutually empowering. Upon further exploration, it becomes apparent that this erotic structure serves as a life-saving outlet for intense claustrophobic anxieties in his business activities and his married life. But,

as soon as ecstatic climax is past, the woman involved is experienced as another claustrophobic object. Clinical inquiry on these infinitizations of symmetrizations highlights the *symmetry of the role of prey and that of the of predator*, which gradually leads to a relinquishment of the centrality of the erotic frenzies, to more tranquil relationships and to more comfortable states of mind. Infinitization is also repetition compulsion, but carries more direct link to the instinctual expression, a no thought realm.

Matte-Blanco's concept of *Unconscious Logic concerns the deepest stratum of the Unconscious, the root of the psyche, the non-repressed structural unconscious, deeply connected with somatic sensations*. In this context, it has been often viewed as related to such conceptualizations as Armando Ferrari's (eclipse of the body) (Lombardi, 2000) and Bion's (1962) transformative processes, as all of them stress the structural difficulty of thinking in the face of the disturbing bio-psychological thrust of the emotions. The pressure the body exerts on mental functioning constitutes the first structural elements of infinitization, as mental trace in contact with the body. The notions of the memory trace and mnemic image in Freud takes us to the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895, p.351) and The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a, b) where we also find the notion of transcription, repetition and "Bahnung", which can be translated as facilitation or pathway. The trace is the first somatic impression.

Lombardi (2008 p. 713) writes: "We wish thereby to emphasize once more how it is that the unconscious and the infinite find their roots in the primitive experience of the body". And "So Matte-Blanco's research is focused on the functioning of the logic that characterizes thought and language, as elements that spur on the analytic exchange, as well as being absolutely central to the treatment of serious cases " (p. 711). Lombardi (p.709) has added the *absence of relations in the structure of thought, the co-existence of thought and non-thought, the presence and absence of time, and the disintegration–confusion of space/time as properties of Unconscious Logic*.

There are technical implications to Matte-Blanco's work, in particular the recognition that at deep levels of mental functioning, a process of reverie (Bion, 1962) and various forms of 'holding' (Winnicott, 1971) may need to precede systematic interpretative approaches. This initial phase may be necessary so that the subject/analysand can experience interpretations, which require tolerance of asymmetry, and therefore a logical (symbolic/metaphoric) leap, as emotionally meaningful and not infinitely dangerous. Florence Guignard (1995) views Matte-Blanco's conceptualization of the Unconscious as a way of bringing "the drive-related, developmental and structural elements of 'the infantile' into the analytic relationship" (p.1083).

In summary, Matte-Blanco's theory of Unconscious Logic (bi-logic, symmetric logic) explores at the microscopic level the deepest unconscious layers. In his theory, two irreconcilable logics determine, to varying degrees, all psychic processes: one is asymmetrical and characteristic of the conscious system, and is based on the principle of non-contradiction, while the other is the symmetrical infinitely generalizing logic of the unconscious. Asymmetrical logic tends to differentiate objects in increasingly individualized sets and characterizes scientific thought. The properties of the unconscious system according to Freud (timelessness, displacement, substitution of external reality by psychic reality, the lack of

contradiction between the two drives and condensation) are viewed as stemming from these two principles that govern the logic of the unconscious.

The relevance of Matte-Blanco's theory of the bi-logic of the Unconscious for contemporary psychoanalysis has been increasingly widely acknowledged (Grotstein, 2000; Guignard, 1995; Keene, 1998; Newirth, 2003). When considered as a form of logic/symbolization/discourse *on its own terms, the 'primitive' unconscious can be appreciated as a sophisticated generator of symbolic codes that utilizes bi-logic to create its message, and which can become a potential resource of growth and recovery.*

III. Eb. Unconscious Communication

The first reference to this topic in psychoanalytic literature was in Freud's (1912b) paper "Recommendation to Physicians Practicing Psycho-analysis" "[The analyst] must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient. He must adjust himself to the patient as a telephone receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone. Just as the receiver converts back into sound waves the electrical oscillations in the telephone line . . . so the doctor's unconscious is able, from the derivatives of the unconscious, which are communicated to him, to reconstruct that unconscious, which has determined the patient's free associations (p 115-116). He returned to this topic in "The Unconscious" (1915c) "It is a very remarkable thing that the Ucs of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the Cs. This deserves closer investigation, especially with a view to finding out whether preconscious activity can be excluded as playing a part in it; ... but descriptively speaking the fact is incontestable" (p 194). After that, Freud no longer took up this theme but Sándor Ferenczi introduced the importance of the analyst's personality to the development of unconscious communication, fundamental to determining the idiosyncratic characteristics of each psychoanalysis process. In his Clinical Diary (1932 pps 31, 45, 107 and 109), this author broached what he called the 'real analyst countertransference', that is, the analyst's emotional participation in the analytic process: "A patient dream, two days earlier predicted an important German revolution, it would be in fact a intuition of my repulsion against suffering" (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 91). Green (2008) considers Ferenczi, from his diaries, the precursor of modern psychoanalysis and Zimerman (2008), in his Contemporary Psychoanalysis Vocabulary, states that Ferenczi considered the analyst's personality an analytical healing instrument. Both Freud and Ferenczi were fascinated by the possibility of telepathy.

There was a silence about these ideas until Theodor Reik published "Listening with the Third Ear" (1948). Reik made a significant step toward understanding unconscious communication when he wrote "The analyst hears not only what is in the words; He hears also what the words do not say. He listens with the 'third ear', hearing not only what the patient speaks but his own inner voices also, what emerges from his own unconscious depths. . . What is spoken is not the most important thing. It appears to us more important to recognize what speech conceals and what silence reveals" (ibid, pp. 125-126). He added: "...the unconscious planes are not grasped directly. The medium is the ego, into which the other person's

unconscious is introjected. In order to understand another, we need not to feel our way into his mind but to feel him unconsciously in the ego" (ibid, p 464) and continued: "What I said was that these unconscious impulses in the one mind induce impulses of the same kind in the other- in this case in the analyst" (ibid, p 468).

However, a great addition to the understanding of unconscious communication occurred in the discovery of the mechanism of projective identification described by Klein in 1946. Initially conceived as a patient's phantasy, the concept was further developed by several authors: Bion, Heimann, Racker and others. In this phantasy, the patient puts something that is not tolerated inside himself into the analyst's mind, thereby temporarily freeing himself from that aspect of his personality. Though the effect is temporary, the patient can then get rid not only of the content but also of an entire part of himself with a resultant impoverishment, an emptying, of his own mind.

In "Attacks on Linking" (1959) Bion developed the concept in its communicative aspect between analyst and patient. An interaction process between the two psyches ensues: an intention of the analysand to produce an effect on the analyst's psyche. In "Learning from Experience" (1962), Bion went a step further by proposing the concept of realistic projective identification in which the analyst really is affected by the projective identification of the patient. About this point, Ogden writes (1980, p. 517): "projective identification is inherently a concept dealing with the interface of the intrapsychic and interpersonal, i.e. the ways that fantasies of one person are communicated to and bring pressure to bear upon another person." It is worth emphasizing that although Klein had worked on projective identification as a phantasy, in her view, instincts were object-seeking from the start. In this way, her theory carried already the germ of Bion's development on the communicative aspect of projective identification. There is an inherent instinctual knowledge of the object and the instinct searches for it. Bion's works on alpha's function, reverie, container-contained and the dream work sketched out unconscious mechanisms in the mother's mind which furthered our knowledge of her role, as well as that of the analyst, in facilitating the development of the baby-patient's ability to think, so that he can learn from the experience. Bion's ideas mapped an interplay between minds.

Alongside these developments, the concept of projective identification has enhanced insight into countertransference, presenting it not only as an unconscious manifestation of the analyst as Freud postulated, but as an essential tool for the understanding of the analytical material. In this direction, Paula Heimann and Heinrich Racker papers are influential milestones (See also the separate entries COUNTERTRANSFERENCE and PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION). For Heimann (1950), since countertransference is the result of the patient's unconscious desire to transfer to the analyst affects that he cannot recognize, nor experience as his own, the analyst can mine his countertransference for insight. For Racker (1953), the main source of the analyst's feelings comes from the patient's mind which transforms the setting into a bi-personal field. Racker develops the concept of concordant identification in which the analyst introjects different objects of the internal world of the patient so he can put himself in the patient's shoes. It is essential for empathic comprehension and will

also allow the psychoanalyst to feel his own emotion. The differentiation between both protagonists is preserved. In contrast, in Racker's concept of complementary identification in which the analyst and the patient do reciprocal projective identifications, the psychoanalyst projects himself into the patient. The consequence is that the process culminates in an enactment. In 1962, Grinberg offered the concept of projective counteridentification to describe the impact of the analysand's projective identification on the subjectivity of the analyst. When this effect is massive, the analyst's reaction would be considered determined by the projective identification of the patient and independent from his own conflicts. Grinberg examined the nature of the internal relationship of the analyst with the internal objects of the patient projected into the former's mind.

These developments in *the study of unconscious communication through transference and countertransference* have led to the conceptualisation of the relationship analyst-patient as a bi-personal field, that is as fundamentally intersubjective. However, this term is used to denote very different understandings. Lawrence Brown in "Intersubjective Processes and the Unconscious" (2011) wrote, "the term intersubjectivity is frequently associated with the American Relational School", which Green (2008) called an epidemic in North America. However, Grotstein (1999) and Brown (2011) state that countertransference has thankfully been transformed into intersubjectivity, and Brown adds "Furthermore, *intersubjectivity is a process of unconscious communication*, receptivity, and meaning making within each member of the dyad to bring idiosyncratic signification to the shared emotional field that interacts with an analogous function in the partner" (Brown, 2011, p 7).

The analytic field concept used here by Brown had its main source in the work of the couple Baranger: "The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field" (1961), republished in Spanish in 1968 and only translated into English in 2008. This fundamental theoretical innovation was thus unknown to most of the psychoanalytic community until recently. The Barangers described their project as follows: "This paper discusses the consequences of the importance that recent papers assign to the countertransference. When the latter acquires a theoretical and technical value equal to that of the transference, the analytic situation is configured as a dynamic bi-personal field, and the phenomena occurring in it need to be formulated in bi-personal terms" (2008, p 795). These authors describe the characteristics of this *unconscious phantasy of the analytic couple* and emphasize the contribution of phenomena of projective and introjective identification in its structure. About the concept of unconscious phantasy, they argued: "more importantly, neither can it be considered to be sum of the two internal situations. It is something *created between the two*, within the unit that they form in the moment of the session, something radically different from what each of them is separately . . . We define phantasy in analysis as the dynamic structure that at every moment *gives meaning to the bi-personal field*" (ibid, p. 806-7).

The idea of the analytic field as bi-personal has deeply influenced Antonino Ferro (1998, 2004, 2009). Referring to Bion, Mom, Pichon-Riviere and to the couple Baranger, Ferro stresses that right from the first contact on the phone and even before it, unconscious communication begins to be organized in the patient, in the analyst's and in the couple's

fantasies. He further describes his listening model without consciousness, which structures the analytic field. Such a deep emotional involvement of the analytic couple, through projective identification, result in the analyst's dreaming about the patient's material in the analytic session. The *shared dream* is revealed to the psychoanalyst from his reverie. In a Bionian concept developed by Ogden, the *reverie expresses the unconscious*. During a shared dream there will be shared reveries; it begins with an unconscious communication, and as it is elaborated by the dyad, it becomes conscious.

On separate continents and independently of the Latin American thinkers, the concept of *analytic third* was developed. Initially formulated by Green in 1975, who described it in 2008 as the "Analytical object is neither internal (the analysand or the analyst) or external (one or the other), but it is between them" (Green 2008, p 231; translation from Portuguese by Avzaradel). Winnicottian inspiration is evident here in Green's *analytic object*, as it is in Thomas Ogden's postulations of an *analytic third*. Winnicott's: "There is no such thing as an infant, meaning...that whenever one finds an infant, one finds maternal care..." (Winnicott 1960, p. 286) will inspire Ogden for whom there is no analytic patient without the analyst. He also uses the Winnicottian notion of *potential space* as the precursor of his view of *intersubjective space*. "[T]he analyst attempts to recognize, understand and verbally symbolize for himself and the analysand the specific nature of the moment-to-moment interplay of the analyst's subjective experience, the subjective experience of the analysand and the intersubjectively generated experience of the analytic pair (the experience of the analytic third)... it is fair to say that contemporary psychoanalytic thinking is approaching a point where one can no longer simply speak of the analyst and the analysand as separate subjects who take one another as objects" (Ogden, 1994, p 3). Taking off from Bion's idea, Ogden suggests a *transformation of dreams theory* using the reverie concept as an important tool. Ogden (2007), referring to Sandler, writes further: "Where there is unconscious dream work, there is also unconscious understanding work" (p 40). There is an echo back to Groststein's, "Where there is an unconscious dreamer who dreams the dream, there is also an unconscious dreamer who understands the dream" (Groststein, 2000, p. 5). From this point on, related developments in psychoanalysis are being advanced by many authors, such as Levine (2013), Groststein (2000,2005), Brown (2011), Cassorla (2013) and Ogden(1994,2005), among others.

An author who has worked deeply with this idea is Civitarese in his book "The Necessary Dream" (2014). He writes: "In this way the paradigm of the dreams takes on even more central role than in classical theory. Understood as *the result of a communication between one unconscious and another*, it is something we listen to as *an intersubjective production*. We read every session as if it were a long shared dream and conceive the whole of analysis as an exchange of reveries" (p. xiii).

The present knowledge about unconscious communication opens up a large territory for further psychoanalytic research across all continents, including the recent interest in conceptualizations of the '*inter-psychic*', defined as "...a functional, pre-subjective level where two persons can exchange internal contents and experiences in a shared way, through the

utilization of ‘normal’ communicative projective identifications” (Bolognini, 2016, p.110).

IV. UNCONSCIOUS AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

IV. A. Unconscious in Neuroscience

"Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the brain as it is with no other organ. (. . .) There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled" (Freud, 1915c, p. 174).

Sixty-five years after Freud’s publication of “The Unconscious”, in which Freud named two pillars of psychoanalysis: the assumption of an unconscious mental life and the existence of two principles of mental functioning, the primary and secondary process, psychoanalyst, psychologist and neuroscientist Howard Shevrin published a synthesis of all subliminal research in which he argued that the unconscious was a necessary assumption of all psychology (Shevrin and Dickman, 1980). First attempts within the experimental cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience were within the narrow confines of perception. In the intervening years there has been an avalanche of research across many areas – perception, memory, emotions, motivation, prejudice, addiction, mood and anxiety disorders, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, autism, neglect – in which (mostly descriptive) unconscious/nonconscious factors have been identified.

It was the ensuing explosion in basic and applied neuroscientific research, especially in North America and in Europe, with the emergence of subspecialties of dynamic neuropsychology (Luria, 1966; 1973; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000), developmental dynamic neuroscience (Balbernie, 2001; Schore, 2003; Siegel, 1999, 2007), affective neuroscience (Panksepp, 1999; Johnson, 2006), and dynamic-cognitive neuroscience (Shevrin, 1994; 1999; Villa, Brakel, Shevrin, Bazan, 2008), which led to the foundation of an interdisciplinary field of Neuropsychanalysis, the objective of which was “to study the dynamic nature of the mind and to identify the neural organization of its unconscious substructure” (Solms & Turnbull, 2011, p. 135). An important voice of support for multi-disciplinary research into dynamic unconscious phenomena came also from the Nobel Prize Laureate for physiology of memory, Eric Kandel (1998, 1999). Kandel and Shevrin concurred that in the neurosciences the ‘dynamic unconscious’ involving conflict over sexual and aggressive impulses was mostly not under study. What had led to considerable conceptual confusion between cognitively oriented neuroscientists and psychoanalysts was that what most neuroscientists called ‘unconscious’ were preconscious processes, only latently and descriptively unconscious in psychoanalytic terminology. There were also other definitional discrepancies, e.g. use of the words ‘drive’, ‘instinct’, ‘conflict’, etc., and methodological

divides, especially in areas of analogues drawing on nonhuman subjects, and inferences drawn from behavioral observations vs. internal representations and unconscious fantasy. At the same time, the neuroscientific advances in early brain development, neuroplasticity and neuro-connectivity seemed to provide potential validation of the psychoanalytic theory of personality and its clinical methodology.

IV. Aa. Dynamic Unconscious in Neuroanalysis: Unconscious Conflict, ‘Repressiveness’, Memory and Early Development

Shevrin et al. (1992, 1996) reported the *first known neuroscientific study of a dynamic unconscious*, in which brain response in the form of event-related potentials provided neurophysiological markers for unconscious conflict in a group of patients suffering from social phobia. Shevrin et al. (2002) correlated the responses to subliminally and supraraliminally presented set of words, with a measure of ‘repressiveness’ and found that that repressive process was inhibiting responses to the words judged by analysts as having an individualized conflictual meaning for specific patients (Shevrin, 2002, p. 136).

A series of follow up investigations from what became known as the Shevrin group of subliminal perception studies (Brakel, L., Kleinsorge, S., Snodgrass, M. & Shevrin, H., 2000) addressed a number of phenomena regarding primary and secondary process mentation, including physiological markers of unconscious conflict, affect, defense, and the attributional vs. relational nature of these two modes of processing. This body of research earned Shevrin the Sigourney Award in 2003. Villa, Shevrin, Snodgrass, Bazan and Brakel (2006) focused on the nature of language processing in the unconscious. The findings highlighted the importance of a connectionist conception of ‘spreading activation’, the neurophysiological equivalent of the Freudian notion of ‘unbound cathexis’ characterizing the primary process. Comparable to the classical psychoanalytic conceptualization of the primary process, the connectionist account, too, found that bound and unbound cathexes were tied closely to the status of motivation and defenses. The more instinctual and ‘drive-like’ a motivation, the more likely it was to mediate ‘spreading activation’ or unbound cathexes. The more defenses failed and the greater the anxiety, the more unbound cathexes prevailed.

Another area of intense interest in both Europe and North America continues to be investigation of memory in the context of early pre-oedipal/preverbal development. Neuroscience has delimited not only the existence of a long term explicit, ‘verbalisable’ memory, but also a subterranean, implicit memory which can neither be consciously recalled nor verbalised. Such a discovery allows us to hypothesize that all infantile experiences of the first two years of life are located in this latter kind of memory, which is managed by the amygdala in its function of the processing of emotions. The hippocampus, in fact, which is indispensable for the explicit memory system, does not reach complete maturation before the infant is two years old. The study of implicit memory, subsequent to its enunciation by Warrington and Weiskrantz (1974), widens the concept of the unconscious and shifts it to a new place: from the realm of the repressed to an arena of biologically determined

“unawareness” (Ginot, 2015), possibly related to Freud’s historical references to other than the repressed unconscious processes (Freud, 1923, 1930, 1940a,b).

From the early stages of intrauterine-prenatal life, sensory experiences take part in the formation of a basic emotional and affective memory, a real cornerstone for the organisation of early representations (Mancia 1980; Le Doux, 1992). Herein might be a mechanism bridging the neurophysiology of memory and the concept of Freudian unconscious. Moreover, with the remarkable widening of the original concept of the unconscious into “nonconscious” domains, other substantial interdisciplinary convergences with cognitive science, neurobiology and neuroscience have also been postulated (Bucci, 2001). The current huge brain research database on unconscious processes and representations has subsequently influenced the way the unconscious is conceived within psychoanalysis itself. Hence, when analysts deal with a kind of knowledge that is out of awareness but not caused by repression, they use more and more the expression borrowed from those disciplines: ‘implicit procedural knowledge’ (Clyman, 1991; Fosshage, 2005).

At the heart of this conceptual territory – which is about relational, implicit or enactive procedures and representations – there is a model of development (as well as a model of therapeutic change) which is consistent with recent findings in attachment research, early parent-infant interaction and affective and cognitive neuroscience (Gabbard & Westen, 2003; D.N. Stern et al., 1998). Along with it, the model of therapeutic change in some quarters might be shifting from reliance on translation of unconscious representations into reflective and symbolized knowledge (or insight), or from procedural coding to symbolic coding (primary process to secondary process, preverbal to verbal forms of thought), to new emphasis on allegedly non-conflicted, non-symbolized, implicit or procedural, knowing (Boston Change Process Study Group, 2007; Lyons-Ruth, 1998, 1999).

This unrepressed unconscious is connected to the biological endowment of the person: it leads from early infantile experiences, which cannot yet be repressed, to the structuring of a nuclear self and the ample ‘subjectal’ domain of the individual. The basic features of the implicit memory system open up connections with the basic assumptions of clinical work hence stressing the central role of the relational experience in psychoanalysis (Barnà, 2007b, 2014) and have greatly transformed the conception of transference/counter-transference workings as far as transformations through dream symbolization, enactments and attunement to the prosody of language are concerned (Mancia, 2006). These findings reaffirm the “constructive” aspects of the analytical relationship (Freud, 1937a): especially the work related to the verbalisation of unconscious phantasies which can be inferred from the empathic listening and attuning of the analyst. This construction can also occur through the negotiation of meanings and the language used to express them (Barnà, 1990, 2007a).

Following Le Doux’ investigation of the implicit interplay of the multiple memory systems under conditions of acute trauma in adults, several longitudinal studies continued to expand knowledge of the neurobiological consequences of early attachment related experiences (Balbernie, 2001; Siegel, 1999; Schore, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010) in children with and without early traumatic histories. Generally, the findings were consistent with Bowlby’s

assertion that secure attachment facilitates and insecure attachment lowers resilience to stress and trauma throughout life. Detrimental early experiences with consequent neurobiological damage to the extended limbic system, which includes the Orbitofrontal cortex, can cause the child to develop a range of cognitive, emotional and behavioral problems, vitiating their adolescent and adult adjustment. The Orbitofrontal cortex is paramount in formulating the fundamental and relational cognitive-affective map. This is also the area where the first attachment related experiences and emotional memories are registered (Siegel, 1999; Balbernie 2001). The key message from neuroscientific studies of brain development is that “human connections shape the neural connections from which the mind emerges” (Siegel 1999, p. 2). During the first three years of life, three basic cortico-limbic circuits for the self-regulation of affect are activated and shaped by interaction with caregivers, thus providing the basis for how future significant emotions will be experienced and handled. In this context, Schore (2003, 2007) also studied the neurobiological correlates of early onset of *dissociation* among infants who were observed to be matching the rhythmic structure of their mother’s dysregulated states of both hyperarousal and dissociative hypoarousal.

In the language of Attachment theory, attachment transactions are imprinted into implicit-procedural memory, mediated by the amygdala (not by the hippocampus, implicated in repression and unconscious symbolization and underdeveloped in the first year of life) thereby forming enduring ‘working models’ of encoded patterns of response and coping strategies of affect regulation to environmental challenge (Schore, 2000, p. 35). When activated, procedural memory generates unconscious anticipation of the future state of mind. According to Siegel, this has particular relevance for early trauma, as “repeated experiences of terror and fear can be engrained within the circuits of the brain as states of mind. With chronic occurrences, these states can become more readily activated (retrieved) in the future (and thus become) characteristic traits of the individual” (Siegel, 1999, p. 33). Synaptogenesis and axon myelination continue in the Orbitofrontal cortex well into the second year of life. After this period of peak neuroplasticity of experience-dependent emotional learning, the “working models” of relationships tend to retain their character. However, the Orbitofrontal cortex tends to retain a remarkable degree of neuroplasticity throughout life and it is possibly through this pathway that in depth psychoanalytical therapy can have a neurobiological impact: “Intensive psychotherapy may be viewed as a long-term rebuilding and restructuring of the memories and emotional responses that have been embedded in the limbic system” (Andreasen, 2001, p. 331).

The ongoing discussion over the dynamic nature of first unrepressed implicit imprints remains an enduring controversy, with implications for clinical work. One perspective (Clyman, 1991; Fonagy, 1999; BCPSG, 2007) sees the earliest imprints as cognitive procedural encoding of ‘self-with-other’, analogous to riding a bicycle. In these strictly procedural terms, the transference reenactment occurs because some feature of the analytic relationship is sufficiently similar to an already laid down relational working model ‘procedure’, so that priming – an automatic unmotivated process – elicits the procedural relationship pattern. Change can be achieved through ‘moments of meeting’, not necessarily interpretable. Whereas in Shevrin’s dynamic paradigm, unconscious intentions and expectations, in addition to context and the demands of the current situation, help determine exactly how and what will be

retrieved. “Retrieval is never simply automatic and unmotivated...” (Shevrin, 2002, p. 137). Shevrin proposes that ‘procedural memories’, while not repressed and not unconsciously symbolized, are still not inherently automatized, but are rather subject to dynamic-conflictual transferential modifications each time they are retrieved. This view is compatible with dynamic concepts of psychic temporality and Freudian notions of *Nachträglichkeit* and screen memories. It is also compatible with the broadly defined contemporary Freudian and Object Relations’ (Bion, Winnicott) approaches to transference enactments, as subsymbolic but ‘symbolizable’ and therefore interpretable (Ellman, 2008; Grotstein, 2014 personal communication). The difference between the two interpretations of the neuroscientific findings seems to be related to the exclusion or inclusion of the dynamic interplay in the inner representational worlds, a hallmark of the psychoanalytic perspective. Giving up our long-held view of the unconscious as a repository for unwanted experience naturally entails a significantly different take on the analyst's role in the consulting room.

Understanding attachment as a behavioral correspondence of internalized object relations under the influence of the early mother-infant relationship (Diamond and Blatt 2007), other contemporary longitudinal studies aimed to capture early representational world. Toth, Cicchetti, Rogosch and Sturge-Apple’s (2009) study of Maternal Depression, Children’s Attachment Security, and Representational Development, found that the early negative representations of parents and of the self are carried forward over the course of development and are likely transmitted intergenerationally. Ellman (2008 citing Freud, 1915c) notes that the earliest representations are encoded as thing-representations without symbolic value. Activities are first associated with denotative as opposed to connotative value (Cassirer, 1953; Langer, 1948). Although non-symbolized, the thing-presentations can act as basic motivators for complex conflicted responses. They were, in this theoretical system, part of the reason for repetitions usually embedded in compromise formations. In a still another perspective, Weinstein (2007) sees the enduring effects of the attachment relationship not in creating templates of self-with-the-other (Fonagy and Target, 2002), but in leaving its mark on the infant’s neurobiological self-regulatory systems for stress and the deployment of attention; the attachment relationship will also shift the set points for the experience of pleasure and unpleasure. “If the attachment relationship is retrieved in memory throughout childhood, forming the raw material upon which the more fantastical constructions of infantile sexuality are based, so too will they be, to some extent, altered by increasing cognitive capacities and shifting zonal excitements. The ...narratives about the self will further impact experiences of pleasure/unpleasure as well as alter the experience of the original attachment figures” (Weinstein, 2008, p. 181).

Such theorization, together with Shevrin’s (2002) psychoanalytic interpretation of neuroscientific studies of Fabiani, Stadler, Wessels (2000) on ‘veridical memories’, which leave ‘sensory signature’, are consistent with the clinical findings that the earliest, pre-symbolic life experiences/happenings can be symbolizable through psychoanalytic (re)constructive work with language prosody, dreams, fantasies, transferential enactments, especially relevant for patients with posttraumatic symptomatology (Mancia, 2006; Papiasvili, 2014; 2015).

IV. Ab. Biological Correlates of Anxiety Disorders, Panic and Phobias; and Borderline Personality Disorder

Studies attempting to integrate the psychoanalytic and neurobiological views of panic disorders and phobias have focused on mapping neuroanatomical pathways involved in the subliminal learning (and unlearning) paradigm, based on classical conditioning, which might be psychoanalytically translated as a ‘transformation of traumatic anxiety into signal anxiety’. Underlying dynamic conflicts around separation, psychic helplessness, aggression, approach/avoidance, fight/flight and their neurobiological correlates (irregularities in functioning of the amygdala and the Orbitofrontal/Prefrontal Cortex) were tracked in real time with the help of neuroimaging technology. Alexander, Feigelson and Gorman (2005) theorized that especially the interaction between amygdala and hippocampus was implicated as “a locus of unconscious fear memories that Freud described....” (p.140). They refer to continuity between Freud’s two models of anxiety as the theoretical superstructure helpful in conceptual understanding of such problems.

A proposed model of the *neurobiological correlates of object relations theory*, using Borderline Personality Disorder as a paradigm, was put forth by Kernberg (2015). Drawing on Wright and Panksepp (2014), Krause (2012) and others, he postulates the integration of the major primary affects into several affective systems. Major primary affects emerge in the first few weeks and months of life. These primary affects include joyfulness, rage, disgust, surprise, fear, sadness and sensual excitement. Affects are grouped into systems of eroticism, play-bonding, fight-flight, attachment, separation-panic, and SEEKING. SEEKING (Wright and Panksepp, 2014) is a basic nonspecific motivation for stimulus gratification, which may attach itself to any of the other affective systems. Because of its lack of specificity, some have held *SEEKING as a contemporary version of Freudian drive* (Johnson, 2008). According to Panksepp and Kernberg, SEEKING provides the basic explanation as to why, under particular conditions, there may be an excessive activation of aggressive or affiliative affective systems. From a psychoanalytic point of view, affects as primary motivating systems raise questions regarding the extent to which *drives are constituted by the integration of corresponding positive (‘libidinal’) and negative (‘aggressive’) affects*, and the extent to which the *affects* are the *expression of these assumed corresponding drives*. Affects initiate the interaction between self and other, and the internalization of these interactions (in the form of affective memory) determines the internalized models of behavior (in attachment terminology), or internalized object relations (in psychoanalytic object relations theory language). Positive and negative affect activating brain structures are separate from each other. The integration of positive and negative affects only occurs at a higher level of limbic structures and involves cortico-limbic interaction. The gradual integration of emotionally opposite conditions leads to an integrated sense of self and the others, effecting the ‘normal ego identity’, and the shift from borderline personality organization towards neurotic personality organization, marked by the shift from primitive defensive operations, centering on splitting, towards advanced defensive operations centering on repression. This advanced level of personality development is reflected in a clear delimitation of a repressed dynamic unconscious, or the ID, constituted by unacceptable

internalized dyadic relationships reflecting intolerable primitive aggression and aspects of infantile sexuality.

IV. Ac. Other areas of neuroanalytic interest: Dynamic implications of Neurological lesions, Dream studies, Symbolization, Drives and Affects

Mark Solms (2000a; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000) has established a paradigm of clinical psychoanalytic observation on a series of patients with right parietal lesions. He has discovered that what was previously termed a ‘cognitive deficit’ in such patients can have important dynamic underpinnings which cause parts of the cognitive processes to become unconscious. By intervening psychoanalytically, it was possible to reverse the dynamic process in question and to recover such cognitions – dynamically excluded from consciousness via primitive defense mechanisms – back to conscious awareness. He found that such dynamically mediated self-deception correlated with right parietal lobe damage was attributable to a complex regressive narcissistic configuration, avoidance of depressive affect and diminished capacity for ‘whole object’ relationships. However, the overall theoretical underpinning and the methodology of this and similar studies has come under the scrutiny of Blass and Carmeli (2007, 2015; Carmeli and Blass 2013), who critiqued the validity of Solms’ claims.

Other specific neurological lesions with resultant regressions and dynamically altered states of consciousness were studied by Wilner and Aubé (2014), Buzsáki (2007) and Uhlhaas et al. (2009).. Further targets of the neuroanalytic study of the dynamic unconscious include dream processes (Solms, 1997; 2000b), specific parameters of primary process symbolization (Shevrin, 1997), and the neurobiology of drives and affects (Wright and Panksepp, 2014; Kernberg, 2015; Johnson, 2008).

The precise contours of the relationship between the neurosciences and psychoanalysis are the subject of spirited debate. The articulation/translation between the two disciplines poses a number of epistemological, ontological, methodological and clinical questions touching on the mind-body, mind-brain problem and interdisciplinary discourse in general. How that articulation might work also speaks to the conception that each analyst has of what is essential to psychoanalytic work. As with any interdisciplinary study, the applicability of neuroscientific investigations has been surrounded by reservations, debates and controversies. Historically, the issue has been debated by Freud (1940a), Winnicott (1949), Alexander (1936, 1964), McDougall (1974, 1993), Green (1999), and more recently by Hinshelwood (2015), Pulver (2003), Blass and Carmeli (2007, 2013, 2015), Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou (2015), Albertini (2015), Scarfone (2014b), and many others, covering a wide range of perspectives. Many analysts find helpful to inform themselves of emerging discoveries pertaining to specific areas of psychoanalytic interest, e.g. documented neurobiological correlates of early traumatic histories and their partial reversibility by psychoanalytic treatment, (Kernberg, 2015; Blum, 2003, 2008, 2010; Mancina, 2006a, b.; Busch, Oquendo, Sullivan and Sandberg, 2010). Canestri’s (2015) proposal to talk about «intersection between disciplines which are diverse in

terms of language, methodology and epistemology» (p 1576) allows all sides to continue to listen to each other.

IV. B. Group Unconscious

IV. Ba. Theoretical Context

Historically, unconscious processes and contents underlying group behaviors, culture and society, have been addressed by Freud throughout the development of psychoanalytic theory in more than 20 writings, most notable of which are *Totem and Taboo* (Freud, 1912-13), depicting a manifestation on a group and social level of the Oedipus Complex; *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (Freud, 1921), with the focus on *group regression* and primitive projective and identificatory processes, i.e. *projection onto the leader* of the group members' (super)ego ideal, freeing them from moral constraints in the expression of their instinctual urges particularly those of aggressive kind, and *mutual identificatory processes* among the members and the leader, *libidinal ties* between them fostering a sense of belonging and heightened sense of strength; and *Civilization and its Discontents* (Freud, 1930), with the group membership unleashing formerly *unconscious aggressive-sadistic-destructive impulses against the 'other' groups*, here in the forefront. Although the formulations or the focus of the Freudian view of the Group Unconscious may have varied depending on the stage of the theory's development, the basic premise remained: the motivating force behind historical-societal developments, failures and successes of civilization has been the antagonism between the demands of instinctual nature and the reactive restrictive formations, instituted by society, leading to progressive renunciations of acting on the instincts (both aggressive and erotic/sexual). According to this view, various more or less successful compromises throughout such reciprocal dynamic interplay of the unconscious and conscious motives, enforced by groups, have been responsible for the highest order sublimatory and beneficial outcomes as well as the malignant destructive outcomes, i.e. slavery, violent genocides, wars, abuses and victimizations, throughout history.

Contributions of W. Bion (1961), Rice (1969), and Anzieu (1981), Kaes (2010, 2014) and Lebovici, Diatkine and Kestenberg (1958) developed further Freud's ideas of the group activated *primal fantasies* and *primitive projective-introjective-identificatory processes* specific to groups, along models of projective identification and/or 'psychic reality' and 'inter-subjective dynamic space'. Bion (1961) postulates that the primitive impulses estranged from their original source through projective identification, contribute to the formation of the '*basic assumption group*', ruled by '*dependency*', '*fight/flight*', and '*pairing*' mechanisms, while the function of the '*working group*' is a productive reality-oriented collaboration. Anzieu (1981) gives an account of the various group fantasies, illusions and imagery of oral threats and dreads of annihilation, such as the '*group as a mouth*', '*breaking apart*', the '*group-machine*', reflective of the earliest structures of the mind and of the psychotic level of the personality as it becomes manifest in the group process. Kaes (2010, 2014) describes the specific 'unconscious psychic

reality model of the group, consisting of *associative interfering processes*, the *shared dreamlike space*, and *unconscious alliances*. In this complex metapsychology inter-subjective system, the triple alliance of fundamentally narcissistic nature is to the Idea, the Ideal and the Idol. It reflects the tyranny of the omnipotent and idealized maternal image and the use of various primitive defense mechanisms of cleavage/splitting, denial and disavowal against the archaic anxieties. Such and other concepts were readily applicable to analytic therapy groups, but also to organizational and institutional groups.

IV. Bb. Group Analytic Therapies

The group analytic therapies have been applying the *Freudian and Bionian notions of unconscious processes and contents* ever since their inception in the post WWII era, especially the orientations modeled after Slavson (1947), where unconscious group dynamic factors are thought of as fostering the resistance against the individual's growth and are interpreted accordingly, and/or Foulkes (1948) where unconscious group dynamic factors and their multi-level communication are utilized to promote the individual's development. The consensus is that *Analytic Group Therapy*, as practiced today, is most suitable for *characterological problems* because in small therapy groups *multiple transferences* of both projection and displacement types onto the therapist as well as onto the group and the group members are *quickly activated, characterological resistances are readily visible* and therefore readily interpretable (Slavson, 1947; Glatzer, 1953; McKenzie, 1992; Kauff, 2011). A group analyst's function is to provide safety from unconscious impulses being acted on, and maintain boundaries and frame, largely via interpretation of unconscious conflicts and strivings when they present resistance to the individual and/or group's progress. From the (unconscious) group dynamic Bionian point of view, this amounts to the group analyst containing, listening for and interpreting the 'basic assumption' group's unconscious regressive tendencies. Overall, group analytic therapies, which evolved from group work with children (Slavson, 1947) and with veterans of WWII (Foulkes, 1948), have grown into an internally coherent field, further developing and applying various extended views of the unconscious, corresponding to most psychoanalytic orientations, including Winnicottian, Mahlerian, relational, self psychology, inter-subjectivist, and field theory models of the unconscious. The core notion of the unconscious continues to be the view of the *group taking on the transferential, as well as developmental emergent function*, and as such, providing a unique dynamic reservoir of the interplay of unconscious processes, which might otherwise not come into full view. A hybrid clinical-organizational modality of psychoanalytically oriented "EXPERIENTIAL PROCESS GROUPS" for professionals, business managers, students or faculty has been employing the concepts of unconscious group dynamics, multiple transference-resistances and unconscious communications to increase functionality of work or study groups and its members across North America businesses, hospitals, non-profit and academic institutions (Papiasvili, 2011).

A specific group modality developed first with children and adolescents, later practiced with all age groups, was a *psychoanalytic psychodrama* of Lebovici and Diatkine (Lebovici, Diatkine and Kestenberg, 1958). Theirs was an individual analytic therapy through

dramatization, in contrast with expressive group psychodrama of Jacob Moreno, developed decades earlier. In its various applications, the individual patient is at the center of the ‘scene’ designed from his/her memories and fantasies; the analyst directs potential auxiliary therapists to participate in the verbal ‘play’/interchange with the patient. This has been shown to have facilitating effect on the emergence of otherwise strongly defended unconscious contents and processes and lead to insight.

IV. Bc. Social Violence and Terrorism

Kernberg’s (2003) *Sanctioned Social Violence* describes a spectrum of regressive, malignant, narcissistic-paranoid mechanisms that provide a common (unconscious) matrix for analysis of those aspects of social psychology that sanction violence. Kernberg extends Freud in that he adds the dimension of the dread of consequences of aggression that mobilizes defenses of a narcissistic and paranoid kind. In this type of process of group regression, normal functions and defensive operations are replaced by the broad gamut of primitive defensive operations typical of *paranoid-schizoid mechanisms*, originally described by Klein. According to Kernberg (2003) and Green (2002b), this uncontrolled powerful *regressive potential toward primitive defensive operations centering on splitting to deal with primitive aggression* may be the most important evidence of the basic motivational system Freud designated as the *death drive*, the counterpart of libido. Rice (1969), Green (1969, 2002b), Glass (2008) and Kernberg (1994, 2003) see such unconscious contents and processes operative within individuals, small and large groups, institutions and society.

IV. Bd. Historical Trauma, Ethnic Unconscious, and Social/International Crisis

Herron (1995) conceptualized the “*Ethnic Unconscious*” as repressed material shared by each generation with the next and with most people of their ethnic group.

Historical trauma binds together the members of a social group, race, religion or nation, and predisposes them to a rapid regression into a paranoid ideology, paranoid mass movement, fanaticism, ostracizing, and violent attacks upon another political, national or racial subgroup. Volkan (1988, 1999) has provided a fundamental understanding of the *interrelationships among historical trauma, identity formation and intergroup conflict*. “Other groups” become objects of early splitting, narcissistic and paranoid regression and defenses against them. The lack of a mourning process was identified as one of the etiological factors (Volkan, 1999). The unconscious potential for primitive aggression available in different degrees in every individual may be activated rapidly in regressive group processes. Throughout history, group activated aggression, in turn, may be amplified by the combination of the collective internalization of historical trauma (Papiasvili and Mayers, 2013), and an acute social crisis that disrupts ordinary social structures. Under such conditions, the paranoid polarity of a dominant ideology can emerge and fall on fertile ground.

IV. Be. Organizational and Social Dynamics; Psychohistory

Applied fields of Organizational and Social Dynamics, and the interdisciplinary field of Psychohistory use the above concepts in their further investigations and elaborations for the understanding of large group functioning, across time and geographies. An example from Social Dynamics is Morris Nitsun's (1996) concept of the "*Antigroup*", a confluence of *unconscious destructive elements that threaten the functioning of the group*, be it a therapy group, organizational or institutional group, or a macro-social group context. The field of Psychohistory in particular, has a long tradition in North America of having applied the psychoanalytic concepts to macro-social events across the ages. The first published articles on psychohistorical themes appeared already in the first issue of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology of 1909. Further extensive work in this field was pioneered by, among others, Robert J. Lifton (1993); The Journal of Psychohistory, founded by Lloyd deMause; and Clio's Psyche, edited by Paul Elovitz. A contemporary example from psychoanalytic Psychohistory is Eva Papiasvili's and Linda Mayers' "Transcendental Configuration" in which the *access to, and transformation of the infantile-irrational-magical provides a needed resource for overcoming traumas* of epic proportions throughout the Middle Ages (2013, 2014, 2016). Nitsun (1996), as well as Papiasvili and Mayers (2013), emphasize both the *limitless destructive and creative potential of the group's irrational and regressive, yet enlivening and regenerating, unconscious contents and processes*.

V. CONCLUSION

In this early 21st century, there are many ways of understanding the unconscious across the three psychoanalytic continents. Within this conceptual plurality, there exist important regional trends.

In Europe, French analysts initiated the trend of "*going back to Freud*", re-reading, de-constructing and setting the classical concepts to work. Within the French tradition, postulating an absolute (irreducible) separation between preconscious/conscious and the unconscious, and linking the unconscious with the *sexual drive* (different from the notion of instinct), is paramount. Within strands of this thinking, it is felt that the unconscious thus cannot be revealed by observation but only deduced in '*après coup*', after the event, psychic movements.

Another trend of European thought on the unconscious is represented by a group of analysts aligned with cognitive science, neurobiology and neuroscience in exploring implicit *procedural knowledge and implicit memory*, where, it is hypothesized, all infantile experiences of the first two years of life are located. At the heart of this conceptual territory, which is about relational, implicit or enactive procedures and representations, there is a model of development

consistent with recent findings in attachment theories, early parent-infant interaction, and affective and cognitive neuroscience.

The third important trend in European conceptualizations of the unconscious is drawn from *object-relation theory* which focuses on the role of the object in the formation of the unconscious, to be conceived as the product of internalization of relational experiences. The innate drive endowment of the infant is presumed to be shaped by interactions with the environment; these interactions are themselves colored and remodeled by unconscious psychical processes. The unconscious in this tradition of thinking is structured through the quality of the mind's transformation of sensory and emotional experiences in primary relations. The innovative notions of an intermediary area between self and other and of the transitional object paved the way for re-thinking the dyad of object relations with extensions into 'third' areas. Theoretical concepts like the analytic third, the waking dream and the unthought known all point to forms of *unconscious knowing* that *exceed the idea of the dyad* while permeating the idiom and the entire being of the individual.

In North America, among the multiple voices conversing on workings of the unconscious ego, on unconscious process and processing, on intrapsychic conflict and compromise, on the role of the object, subject and 'the other' in development and in the psychoanalytic situation, on internalization, representation, symbolization, enactments, horizontal layering and vertical splits, on 'inter-subjectivity', neuropsychanalysis and group unconscious, several following trends can be discerned.

In *focusing on the process*, the study of unconscious processes, processing and structures is set apart from unconscious content, yet the process itself is increasingly viewed as having both fluid and structured dimensions.

There is a recognition of the *role of the object* in the constitution of, and modulation of, unconscious contents and processes. Inherent in this new direction is a less biological view of 'instinct/drive'. At the same time, contemporary dynamic neuroscience and neuroanalysis have given a boost to re-examining Freudian meta-theoretical postulates, as it re-centers the physiology of brain and body again in relation to unconscious processes as well as contents.

The dominant alternative to classical theorizing on the contemporary American psychoanalytic scene has become a group of approaches known under the umbrella term of *relational psychoanalysis* all of which stress in various ways the inherently dyadic, social, interactional, and interpersonal nature of mind. Hence the alternative appellation of '*two-person unconscious*', the unconscious co-created in the inter-subjective field. Traditionally allied with the infant research and neurosciences, the trend seems to be from the exclusion towards the inclusion of the dynamic interplay in the inner representational world.

Outside relational psychoanalysis, contemporary debate is less about the respective contribution of intrapsychic versus relational factors but rather of the *articulation and complex interplay* between the early (and in the analytic situation the present) object's quality of binding-dreaming-symbolizing-facilitating and the subject's unconscious intrapsychic « response » and representation.

Across psychoanalytic orientations, there is a growing emphasis on the 'unrepresented' and 'subsymbolic' unconscious and an attendant reappraisal within the context of the interpretative and non-interpretative participation of the analyst, including countertransference enactments, holding, containing and facilitation. To the degree that the emphasis is on the non-interpretative modes of analyst's functioning, it constitutes a theoretical departure from traditional conflict theory approaches to the unconscious. To the degree that the emphasis is on bringing the unrepresented and subsymbolic into the interpretative discourse, it constitutes the expansion of the intra-psychic realm of variously defined and stratified unconscious processes.

Many schools of thought today stress the advantages of optimally *permeable boundaries* between the different parts of the mind.

In Latin America, the trends towards synthesizing metapsychological and clinical thinking resulted in intensive studies of *Unconscious Logic* and *Unconscious Communication*.

Combining Freud's conceptions of the Primary Process with mathematical propositions, Unconscious Logic is presumed to be ruled by two principles: The principle of generalization, which explains that unlike the logic of the conscious system, the logic of the unconscious does not consider individuals as distinct units, but as members of infinitely large groupings; and the principle of symmetry, which identifies the way in which the unconscious treats identically the obverse/converse of every relationship. It is assumed that *the mind works bi-logically* by the simultaneous functioning of conscious and unconscious Logics.

Historically rooted in Freud's writings on the subject, and incorporating further advances in the conceptualizations of transference, countertransference, projective identification, Latin American analysts introduced the conceptualization of the analytic situation as a dynamic field. Convinced of the profound intersubjectivity of the analytic situation, authors have wrought a transformation of dream theory using the reverie concept. In contemporary expositions of Unconscious Communication, dreaming – postulated as a continuous psychic function – takes on an even more central role than in classical theory. Understood as the result of a communication between one unconscious and another, every session is understood as a long shared dream. Thus, the whole of analysis becomes an exchange of reveries.

Overall, amidst divergences among and within regional trends with conceptual pluralities variously emphasizing multiple dimensions of unconscious processes, contents and structures, including the context of their formation and change, several **converging themes** emerge:

The continuing need for the concept: Most psychoanalysts agree that the concept of the unconscious is an essential tool for apprehending a fundamental reality of the human mind: its traversal by modes of "representation" totally separate from the rules of secondary process cognition. The unconscious is generally construed as the inevitable by-product – both unique and universal – of psychic "incompatibilities" between individual experience and collective life. While the core of the unconscious is presumed to have emerged or have been "deposited"

in childhood, under traumatic conditions the overwhelmed adult mind may at any point in the life cycle generates new regions of unconscious functioning. The unconscious continues to be a cornerstone notion in many schools of thought, admittedly without reification and in differing contexts.

Process: The study of unconscious processes, ‘processing’ and structures is widely considered to be as important theoretically and clinically as traditional analyses of unconscious content. The contemporary trend seems to be to investigate the unconscious processes with their fluid and structured dimensions in their own right as well as deconstructing different layers in unconscious functioning: originally considered relatively ‘illogical’ and ‘non-communicative’, today they are viewed as having their own logic and their own modes of communication. Reliance upon one level of unconscious functioning over others may be seen as an important determinant of an individual’s response to traditional analytic technique.

Prominent Role of the Object, Object-Relations and Various Conceptualized Interaction: Object-relations theories have developed a concept of the unconscious which is founded on relational models of the mind, which assume a prominent role of the object in formation (and change) of the unconscious. Among variously conceptualized models of internalization of relational experiences in a reciprocal interaction with the innate drive/affective endowment of the newborn, there is widespread recognition that alongside the acknowledgement and satisfaction of bodily needs, the mentalizing, symbolizing, and communicative skills of primary caretakers as well as their own unconscious lives are crucial in the constitution of, and modulation of, unconscious content, structure, and process, and of the articulation of all of these with the more rational regions of the mind. While the Relational Intersubjective Self and Attachment theorists' focus on the role of the adult in the constitution of psychic structure has gained widespread recognition, there is an ongoing debate about the movement of some of the proponents’ approaches toward cognitive, subjective and intersubjective "psychological" realities and away from dynamic views of the unconscious as conflict-laden, imbued with infantile sexuality and irreducibly "other". Many contemporary writers of this persuasion envision ‘two-track’ theories of the unconscious, whereby the ‘relational unconscious’ as a concept allows the joining of psychoanalytic thought about dynamic/intrapsychic and intersubjective phenomena.

The participation of the analyst: It has followed from the recognition of the role of the object in unconscious mental life that here-and-now countertransference manifestations are commonly considered another royal road to the intuition and representation of unconscious issues at play in treatment.

Articulation-Interplay: Debate is less about the respective contribution of intrapsychic, external, and relational factors as study is turned to the articulation and complex interplay between the early (and in the analytic situation the present) object’s quality of binding-dreaming-symbolizing-facilitating and the subject’s unconscious intrapsychic « responses » and representations.

The area of Unrepresented, Unsymbolized Unconscious: The vagaries of bodily experience during development and as a result of illness and trauma are considered a crucial impetus to, and limitation of, psychic metabolization and development. Interest in the non-repressed unconscious has been strongly reinforced thanks to the group of analysts who see substantial interdisciplinary convergences with new work on non-conscious processing in neurobiology, developmental and affective neurosciences and neuropsychanalysis. The ongoing discussion over the dynamic nature of first unrepressed implicit imprints remains an enduring controversy. The difference between the dynamic and non-dynamic interpretations of the neuroscientific findings seems to be related to the inclusion or exclusion of the dynamic interplay in the inner representational world, a hallmark of the psychoanalytic perspective. The query, initially raised by Freud himself, about why interpretation triggers insight and change in some patients and not others, and why this qualitatively different response to the classical situation does not necessarily coincide with traditional or even contemporary psychiatric diagnostic distinctions, has continued to stimulate theoretical investigation across regions. From a first formulation in terms of a "deficit" in the early provision of basic needs, interest across regions has branched out into intense study of the different steps in developing the capacity to represent and symbolize, to recover and expand the unconscious symbolic functioning and thus capacity to ferry without undo anxiety the intimate and idiosyncratic luxuriance of unconscious material.

Reversibility-Permeability: Many schools of thought today stress the creative enrichment to human life that two-way permeability between the different parts of the mind permits. Psychic health seems to be associated with the capacity to flexibly access multiple co-existing levels of unconscious psychic organization and processing. A number of models have elaborated parallel insights regarding the requisite psychic fluidity and capacity for regression in the analyst as tools for psychoanalytic work.

Field perspectives: The fundamental inter-subjectivity and inter-dependency of human development have led many analysts to attend to the "dynamic bi-personal" field between analyst and patient, a meeting where new elaborations/extensions and not simple repetitions of the individual unconscious issues for each partner of the dyad can emerge and to which the analyst's presence and mind significantly contribute. This thinking dovetails with the clinical experiences and conviction by many that there is a lifelong potential for more inventive and creative expressions of previously excluded or otherwise un-integrated psychic content.

Narcissistic and identity issues in psychic equilibrium: Many authors have furthered the understanding of the healthy and pathological aspects of narcissism, in psychic development and intra-psychic separation from internal objects, but also as a process of lifelong individuation and struggle to maintain self-cohesion.

Group unconscious: As seen in clinical, institutional as well as macrosocial contexts, both *the destructive and creative potential of the group's irrational and regressive, yet enlivening and regenerating, unconscious contents and process*, is inexhaustible.

Contemporary analysts continue the theoretical extension begun by Freud of unconscious processes, TRAVERSING INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS, as part of their dyadic and triadic internally configured societal interactions and group affiliations. The creative flourish of multiple conceptual overlaps, interacting and standing side-by-side with disparities and contradictions, within and among individual theories and within and across the three regions possibly reflects the maddening and inspiring ambiguities and paradoxes of the essence of the object, the unconscious, itself.

See also:

CONFLICT

CONTAINMENT: CONTAINER-CONTAINED

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORIES

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

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